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Oil and gas resource exploitation has hugely contributed to Nigeria’s revenue. This is 
therefore an important contributor to the Nigerian economy. Nigerian oil and gas business 
has been mainly facilitated by multinational and indigenous oil companies operating in the 
industry. The study regards them as participants in the industry. It is noteworthy that this 
study will refer to company and corporation as one and the same entity.  
 
It has been observed that some oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria have clearly 
violated regulatory standards established in the Nigerian environmental regime. It has 
further been observed that the violations are repeated and persistent in nature. This is 
interesting considering that the Nigerian environmental regime has provided criminal 
sanctions (as a regulatory tool) to prohibit a violation of such standards and stipulates 
penalties that can be imposed for such violations. Moreover, other relevant regulatory 
administrative enforcement mechanisms have been established in relevant legislation to 
enforce the standards. Hence, the regime has established enforcement agencies to carry out 
the enforcement. The persistent violations therefore, show evidence that the Nigerian regime 
has failed to utilise criminal sanctioning and administrative enforcement to prevent or control 
violations of environmental standards, hence has been unable to guarantee the required 
compliance. This study therefore, seeks to identify deficiencies in the regime that have 
limited its utilisation of these regulatory options to ensure compliance with the standards. 
Beyond seeking to identify these deficiencies, this study will explore the UK and USA regimes 
towards identifying aspects of their criminal sanctioning and regulatory enforcement that 
could inspire a correction to the non-performance of the Nigerian regime.  
 









ACJA                     Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
API                       American Petroleum Institute               
APPS                     Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships 
ASME                    American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
BEIS                     Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BP                         British Petroleum  
BSEE                     Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
CAA                       Clean Air Act 
CCA                       Criminal Code Act 
CEHRD                   Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development 
CERCLA                  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability  
 Act 
COPFS                   Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
CWA                      Clean Water Act 
DECC                     Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DEFRA                   Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DPP                       Director of Public Prosecution 
DPR                       Department of Petroleum Resources 
EA                         Environmental Agency 
EAESP                   Environment Agency Enforcement and Sanctions Policy 
EC                        Council of the European Communities  
ECEEA                  European Commission and European Environment Agency 
ECS                      Environmental Crimes Section 
ECTs                     Environmental Courts and Tribunals  
EFCC                     Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
EGASPIN               Environmental Guideline and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in  
                            Nigeria 
EIA                       Environmental Impact Assessment 
iv 
 
EMP                     Environmental Management Plan 
ENRD                   Environment and Natural Resources Division 
EPA                      Environmental Protection Agency 
ESAET                  Environmental Services Association Education Trust  
EU                       European Union 
FEPA                    Federal Environmental Protection Agency 
FHC                     Federal High Court 
FLPMA                 Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
FME                     Federal Ministry of Environment 
FRP                      Facility Response Plan  
GRPA                   Government Performance and Results  
HORA                   Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act 
HSE                      Health and Safety Executive 
ICJ                       International Court of Justice 
ICPC                     Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
IM                        Integrated Management 
IPPC                     Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
MPRSA                  Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuary Act 
NAS                      National Academy of Science  
NAO                                   National Audit Office  
NDES                    Niger Delta Environmental Survey 
NEPA                     National Environmental Policy Act 
NESREA                 National Environmental Standards and Regulation Agency 
NFWF                    National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
NGO                      Non-Governmental Agency  
NNPC                     Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
NOSDRA                National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
NPE                       National Policy on Environment 
NSWLEC                New South Wales Land and Environment Court  
OCS                      Outer Continental Shelf  
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OECD                    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OEP                                   Office for Environmental Protection  
OMPADEC              Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Company 
OMPADEC              Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission 
OPRED                  Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning 
PIB                       Petroleum Industries Bill 
PSNR                    Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
RCRA                    Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
RDS                      Royal Dutch Shell 
Scf                       Standard Cubic Feet 
SCF                      Shell Control Framework 
SEPA                    Scottish Environmental Protection Agency 
SPCC                    Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure 
SPDC                    Shell Petroleum Development Company 
TFEU                     Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
UNDP                    United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP                    United Nations Environment Programme 
UNGA                   United Nation General Assembly 
WCED                  World Commission on Environment and Development 
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Environmental principles have facilitated the development of environmental law and 
contributed to building an appropriate mechanism for ensuring the protection of the 
environment.1 It is for this reason a country such as the UK has instructed its Secretary of 
State to draft a set of environmental principles that will guide environmental law in the UK 
when she exits the European Union.2 Environmental principles are propositions that serve as 
a foundation for environmental protection.3 Hence, environmental principles are the 
framework upon which rules of environmental law are developed.4 This study regards them 
as obligatory because the principles have been provided in international law instruments that 
are binding on member countries who have subscribed to any such international law 
instrument. It has also been manifested in the domestic law of such member countries as 
environmental standards.5 Hence standards stipulated as obligations under the relevant law 
will manifest some or all of the principles.6 
 
                                                             
1 Client Earth, 'What Are Environmental Principles?' (Client Earth 2019) <https://www.clientearth.org/what-are-
environmental-principles-brexit/> accessed 10 April 2019; Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of 
Environmental Law (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2017) p.3. 
2 Section 16 (1) (a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 
Section 16 (2) of the Act stipulates the principles to include: precautionary principle, the preventive principle, the polluter-
pays principle, the principle of sustainable development, the principle of public participation in environmental decision 
making, the principle of public access to environmental information, and the principle of access to justice in relation to 
environmental matters. These principles are discussed in chapter 2.  
3 Lluis Paradell-Trius, 'Principles of International Environmental Law: An Overview' (2000) 9 Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law 97. 
4 ibid. 
5 Ephraim Ikechukwu Elenwo and Justine Ayaegbunem Akankali, 'Environmental Policies and Strategies in Nigeria Oil and 
Gas Industry: Gains, Challenges and Prospects' (2014) 05 Natural Resources 889. 
The environmental standards under the Nigerian regime that have exemplified the international principles of environmental 
law is discussed in section 2.8 of this study. 
6 Hakeem Ijaiya and Onuorah T. Joseph, 'Rethinking Environmental Law Enforcement in Nigeria' (2014) 05 Beijing Law 
Review 306. 
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Environmental standards are obligatory instruments that provide such principles as 
compulsory requirements that should be complied with.7 For example, most environmental 
standards exemplify environmental principles such as the prevention principle, the ideal of 
sustainable development and even the principle of no-harm, among others.8 By being 
obligatory, it entails that the provisions stipulated in environmental standards are binding 
and enforceable. Often, most such standards are in the form of legislative instruments and 
are usually set within a legal or administrative context.9 In line with this, such standards can 
include institutional and legal compliance instruments as regulatory tools to enforce their 
provisions.10 
 
Regulation is regarded as both the provision of the law and the ongoing processes of 
monitoring and enforcing the law.11 One such instrument utilised as a regulatory tool to 
enforce environmental standards are criminal sanctions.12 Another such enforcement tool 
are administrative enforcement instruments.13 Several environmental regimes have 
established administrative enforcement agencies (otherwise referred to in this study as 
enforcement authorities) empowered with the responsibility of utilising different mechanism 
to enforce environmental standards on regulated persons.14 An overview of these regulatory 
instruments will be carried out in section 1.3 of this study. 
 
This study therefore seeks to determine whether these regulatory tools have been properly 
utilised to enforce environmental standards in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The scope 
of the study will be restricted to the utilisation of criminal sanctions as an enforcement tool 
(which the study will regard as criminal sanctioning) and the utilisation of other 
administrative forms of enforcement to regulate compliance in the oil and gas industry. 
                                                             
7 Klaus Pinkau and Ortwin Renn, Environmental Standards: Standards: Scientific Foundations and Rational Procedures of 
Radiological Risk Management (Springer, London 1998) p.11. 
8 Environmental Foundation, New Zealand, 'National Environmental Standards • Environment Guide' 
(Environmentguide.org.nz, 2019) <http://www.environmentguide.org.nz/rma/planning-documents-and-processes/national-
environmental-standards/> accessed 25 October 2019. 
9 Klaus Pinkau and Ortwin Renn (n.7). 
10 Neil Gunningham, 'Enforcing Environmental Regulation' (2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 173. 
11 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (1st edn, Oxford University Press 
2010) p.6. 
12 Anthony Heyes, 'Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance' (2000) 17 Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 108 - 111. 
13 Suresh Bhardwaj, 'Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement for Environmental Obligations', The 12th Annual General 
Assembly of IAMU (2008) p.79. 
14 ibid. 
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Proper regulation in this study will be based on the extent to which compliance with the 
environmental standards has been guaranteed, hence the extent to which there has not been 
violation of such standards. If it is discovered that there is a gross violation of the standards, 
then it will be deemed that the regime has failed to regulate. In this light, the study will 
identify possible deficiencies that have contributed to the failure of the Nigerian regime to 
regulate in this regard, hence reducing environmental performance in the oil and gas sector. 
Upon establishing the deficiencies, this study will seek to explore other model regimes 
(particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) regimes) 
towards adapting aspects of the regimes that can proffer solutions to some (or possibly all) 
the deficiencies identified to have hindered proper regulation in the Nigerian regime. 
 
1.1 Research Aim 
The study seeks to address the issue around securing compliance with environmental 
standards through regulatory enforcement and criminal sanctioning. As mentioned in section 
1.0 above (and subsequently discussed in the study) there have been several alleged 
violations of environmental standards in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The aims of this 
study are therefore: 
a) To identify the deficiencies contributing to the regulatory failure of the Nigerian 
environmental regime in the oil and gas industry; and 
b) To consider the adaptation of aspects of the UK and USA regimes that could be used 
to correct these deficiencies. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
1) To identify environmental standards stipulated in the Nigerian regime to regulate the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry; 
2) To identify the criminal sanctions established in the Nigerian regime for violation of 
environmental standards; 
3) To appraise the role of enforcement agencies in implementing the standards in the 
industry; 
4) To examine factors contributing to both the failure of criminal sanctions and the 
inadequacy of enforcement measures in the industry; 
   4 
 
5) To consider aspects of the UK and USA regimes that could be adapted to proffer 
solutions to the identified deficiencies in the Nigerian regime. 
 
1.3 An Overview of the Literature 
As has been mentioned earlier, environmental principles serve as a structural framework for 
ensuring environmental protection and environmental standards exemplify most such 
environmental principles. Hence, environmental standards seek to promote environmental 
protection.15 Writers have argued that environmental standards embedded in legislation can 
only be complied with if there is efficient regulation to guarantee such compliance.16 
Moreover, most regulated activities pose high risks to the environment.17 Hence, most 
regimes set up enforcement authorities to implement environmental standards in most such 
activities.18 Implementation here refers to all actions/mechanisms required to effect 
compliance with the standards.19 Indeed, most mechanisms usually utilised in enforcement 
have included: investigations to monitor compliance and detect violations,20 formal legal 
actions such as: criminal prosecutions for alleged violations,21 civil suits,22 or other 
administrative options.23 It has been argued that the enforcement powers of such authorities 
are limited to the stipulations of the relevant statutes that establish them.24 Hence, while 
the authorities are required to fulfil the enforcement duties that come with such powers, 
they cannot pursue matters that fall outside the scope of their powers.25 If for instance, a 
statute has not established criminal prosecution as one of the powers of an enforcement 
agency, it will be ultra vires for the agency to utilise criminal prosecution as one of its 
enforcement mechanisms. It therefore implies that every enforcement mechanism that will 
be utilised in a regime will be stipulated in the existing statutes regulating the regime. 
                                                             
15 Neil Gunningham (n.10) p.170. 
16 Raymond W Mushal, 'Reflections upon American Environmental Enforcement Experience as it may relate to Post-Hampton 
Developments in England and Wales' (2007) 19 Journal of Environmental Law 201. 
17 Julia Black, 'Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices and Lessons Being Learned' in Nikolai Malyshev and Gregory M 
Bounds Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk (OECD Paris 2010) p.187. 
18 Daniel Riesel, Environmental Enforcement (11th edn, Law Journal Press 2012) p.28. 
19 Ibrahim Shihata, 'Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements - Practical 
Suggestions in The Light of the World Bank's Experience' (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 37. 
20 ibid. 
21 Daniel Riesel (n.18) p.28. 
22 Mary Clifford, Environmental Crime: Enforcement, Policy, and Social Responsibility (Aspen, Gaithersburg 1998) p.19. 
23 Alon Tal, Yaara Ahalon and Hadar Yahas-Peled, 'The Relative Advantages of Criminal Versus Administrative 
Environmental Enforcement Actions In Israel' (2010) 4 Journal of Environmental Monitoring 
<https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2010/em/b919960h#!divAbstract> accessed 5 November 2019. 
24 Justia, 'Enforcement Actions Overview' (Justia.com, 2019)<https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/enforcement-
actions/> accessed 5 November 2019. 
25 ibid. 
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However, authorities can also create enforcement instruments to facilitate the regulatory 
process.26 
 
One such enforcement tool of regulation is criminal sanctions. Scholars have argued that 
criminal law should be used for serious violations or non-compliance with environmental 
standards.27 Criminal sanctions have been asserted to be severe in nature, purposed to 
punish offenders, deter offenders, and compensate victims of the harm.28 Such sanctions 
are often imposed on significant offences that threaten public safety and range from 
punishments such as criminal fines and prison sentences.29 This study is of the view that 
these characteristics distinguish criminal sanctions from civil and administrative sanctions. 
Generally, criminal sanctions will condemn crime, uphold deference to the law, deter an 
occurrence of the criminal act, incapacitate the offender from being a menace to the society 
(often through incarceration), protect societal interest, rehabilitate and reintegrate the 
offender into society; and remediate the affected subject.30 In particular, an effective 
criminal sanction should uphold deference to the law by compelling persons to abide by the 
stipulations of the law. This will be mainly achieved by deterring future persons likely to 
become offenders from becoming offenders, incapacitating offenders to rehabilitate them 
into becoming non-offenders. In an environmental purview, criminal sanctions will be utilised 
by a regime to compel compliance with statutory standards by prohibiting violations. These 
criminal violations are generally viewed as environmental crimes.  
 
There are several definitions of environmental crime. Each definition is particular to what 
has been provided as an environmental standard under the relevant law. For this reason, an 
acceptable definition to this study is given by the European Commission stating that: 
environmental crime is an action or inaction that contravenes environmental regulation 
resulting to significant harm and environmental risk.31 For example, Section 3 of the Nigerian 
                                                             
26 ibid. 
27 The Law Commission, 'Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts': Consultation Paper No 195 (The Law Commission, UK 
2010) pp.2-3. 
28 Jacob Öberg, 'The Definition of Criminal Sanctions in the EU' (2014) 3 European Criminal Law Review 273. 
29 Michael G Faure and Katrina Svatikova, 'Criminal or Administrative Law to Protect the Environment? Evidence from 
Western Europe' (2012) 24 Journal of Environmental Law 253. 
30 Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 'Criminal Sanctions Discussion Document' (Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform 2010) p.7. 
31 European Commission, 'Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Offences' (European Commission - European Commission, 
2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/energy-climate-change-environment/implementation-eu-countries/criminal-sanctions-
environmental-offences_en> accessed 23 October 2019. 
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Oil in Navigable Waters Act prohibits the discharge of crude oil, mud or fluid into Nigerian 
navigable waters. The criminal action prohibited in Section 3 is the discharge of crude oil 
into Nigerian navigable waters, which is therefore non-compliance with the standard not to 
pollute the navigable waters. From the Section, it is also evident that criminal sanctions 
prohibit environmental crime, thus upholding statutory standards. This is because while 
Section 3 above prohibits and sanctions the discharge of crude into navigable waters, it 
upholds the statutory standard of protecting navigable waters in Nigeria from oil pollution 
stipulated in Section 1 of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act.32 
 
Pollution is a notorious form of environmental violation in the oil and gas industry.33 
Examples of pollution for which strong criminal sanctions have been developed in the USA 
are the Exxon Valdez oil spill34 or the Deep Water Horizon spill.35 Similarly, writers have 
pointed out that existing statutory provisions in the USA regime prohibit pollution in the oil 
and gas industry.36 It has been argued that over the years, the USA regime has built a 
regulatory system with robust criminal sanctioning mechanisms in response to pollution in 
its oil and gas industry.37 In light of this, there is a need to determine how existing criminal 
sanctioning and enforcement have dealt with similar violations in the Nigerian regime. 
Indeed, this study is not concerned with the issue of whether environmental regimes (such 
as Nigeria) should rely less on utilising criminal law for sanctioning. This is because this study 
seeks an improvement of a criminal regime already existing within the regulatory sphere of 
the Nigerian environmental regime. To make the above determination, this study will first 
identify activities involved in oil and gas operations and forms of pollution that have been 
associated with the different stages of such operations. This will enable knowledge of the 
system for which a better developed regulatory regime will be recommended.  
                                                             
32 One environmental standard in the Nigerian regime is the requirement to prevent the pollution of navigable waters in 
Nigeria with crude oil, mud or fluid stipulated in Section 1 of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968. In this standard, it is 
evident that an environmental principle clearly exemplified in this standard is the prevention principle. 
33 United Nations Environment Programme, 'Environmental Management in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production: An 
Overview of Issues and Management Approaches' (Words and Publication 1997) p.11. 
34 This spill occurred on March 24, 1989, in the Gulf of Alaska, after the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef. Delayed 
efforts to contain the spill dispersed nearly 11,000,000 gallons (41,640 kilolitres) of crude oil across the sound. The spill 
eventually polluted 1,300 miles (2,092 kilometres) of shoreline and adjacent waters. 
35 This spill (also referred to as the BP oil spill or the Macondo blowout) occurred on April 20, 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico on 
discharging an estimated 4.9 million barrels (210 million US gal; 780,000 m3). It is regarded as the largest marine oil spill. 
36 Francis T Cullen and others, 'Attribution, Salience, and Attitudes Toward Criminal Sanctioning' (1985) 12 Criminal Justice 
and Behaviour Journal 385. 
37 Engobo Emeseh, 'Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Enforcing Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage: A 
Study of the Oil Industry in Nigeria' (PhD, University of Dundee 2005) p.200. 
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1.3.1 General Overview of Oil and Gas Operations 
This study will focus on conventional oil and gas resources that includes crude oil - and 
natural gas and its condensates. The difference between conventional and unconventional 
natural oil and gas is in the types of rock within which the oil and gas are found, and the 
method by which they are extracted.38 Generally, conventional oil and gas are found in 
relatively permeable materials in which the oil or gas can flow relatively freely towards a 
production well.39  In contrast, unconventional oil and gas are trapped within rocks such as 
shale or coal, making it more difficult to extract.40 The main reasons for concentrating on 
conventional oil and gas resources is that Nigeria has significant conventional oil and gas 
reserves.41 The country possesses the world’s sixth largest reserve of crude oil estimated at 
36.2 billion barrels.42 Nigeria also has a proven natural gas reserve of nearly 5 trillion cubic 
metres.43 The oil and gas reserves are mainly found and located along the Niger Delta, Gulf 
of Guinea, and Bight of Bonny.44 Unconventional resources such as oil shale reserve in 
Nigeria remains untapped because of the large deposit of the conventional oil wells (crude 
oil).45 Another reason for this concentration on conventional resources is that most 
unconventional oil and gas resources in the USA occur on non-federal lands, hence are 
principally regulated by individual states.46 In effect, unconventional resources fall outside 
the scope of regulation in this research which concentrates on regulation at a national 
(federal) level. 
 
Despite the differences identified between conventional and unconventional oil and gas 
resources, testing, investigating underground formations, and drilling processes are integral 
to all forms of oil and gas development.47  Hence, the process of extracting conventional and 
                                                             
38 Natural Resources Wales, 'Natural Resources Wales / Extracting Onshore Oil and Gas' (Naturalresources.wales, 2020) 
<https://naturalresources.wales/guidance-and-advice/environmental-topics/energy/extracting-onshore-oil-and-gas/?lang=en > 
accessed 31 March 2020. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 Sunday Olayinka Oyedepo, 'Energy and Sustainable Development in Nigeria: The Way Forward' (2012) 2 Energy, 
Sustainability and Society 3; Christian Osueke and Chinedu Ezeugwu, 'Study of Nigeria Energy Resources and Its 
Consumption' (2011) 2 International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research 6. 
42 Sunday Olayinka Oyedepo (n.41). 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 Edith Nnanna, 'Oil Shale Mineral Deposits in Nigeria with Their Locations and Uses' (Finelib.com, 2020) 
<https://www.finelib.com/about/nigeria-natural-resources/important-information-on-oil-shale-endowed-states-in-nigeria/158 > 
accessed 31 March 2020. 
46 Stone Pigman Walther and James Cogan, 'Oil & Gas Regulation 2020 | Laws and Regulations | USA | ICLG' (International 
Comparative Legal Guides International Business Reports, 2020) <https://iclg.com/practice-areas/oil-and-gas-laws-and-
regulations/usa > accessed 30 March 2020. 
47 Natural Resources Wales (n.38). 
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unconventional resources are same. Generally, operations carried out in the extraction of 
conventional oil resources are divided into three stages: the upstream, midstream and 
downstream stages of operation.48 The upstream stage mainly involves exploration, 
development, production and site abandonment. The exploratory stage first involves the 
search for rock formations with oil or natural gas deposits.49 The exploration is carried out 
to estimate whether there are commercially viable reserves of oil and gas deposits in areas 
of the earth.50 Techniques utilised to carry the exploration include: deep and shallow 
geophysical (seismic) surveys, shallow drilling and coring, aero-magnetic/gravity surveys 
and exploration and appraisal drilling.51 Often, broad areas of earth are estimated to have 
prospective potentially high reserves of oil and gas.52 Subsequently, appraisal wells are 
drilled to determine whether there are commercial quantities of oil and gas and the economic 
feasibility of developing such reserves.53 
 
Afterwards, the oil and gas resources are produced from the validated reservoirs.54 
Subsequently, production commences after the development wells have been linked to the 
surface production unit and transportation facilities.55 During production, the hydrocarbons 
are extracted and separated from the mixture of liquid hydrocarbons, gas, water, and 
solids.56 Oil is often processed at a refinery while natural gas may be processed at a natural 
gas plant to remove impurities.57 At the end of a production life-cycle (typically 20–40 years), 
operators are expected to plug and abandon the wells.58 The obsolete installation is thereby 
removed or towed away to a new location for reuse depending on the case, a process 
otherwise known as decommissioning.59 The requirements for decommissioning are often in 
line with the domestic regulations guiding the process in the jurisdiction or other 
                                                             
48 USA’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 'EPA Office of Compliance Sector Notebook Project Profile of the Oil and 
Gas Extraction Industry' (Environmental Protection Agency 1999) p.15. 
49 ibid. p.16. 
50 Department of Trade and Industry, 'An Overview of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Activities' 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2001) 4. 
51 ibid. p.5. 
52 ibid. 
53 Square Space, 'Overview of The Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Process' (Environmental Management in Oil and 
Gas Exploration and Production, 2019) 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52d71403e4b06286127a1d48/t/53237da4e4b02c883fb2303c/1394834852799/AttAover
view.pdf> accessed 11 October 2019. 
54 USA’s EPA (n.48) p.28. 
55 Square Space (n.53). 
56 Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Project, 'The Development Process' (2019) Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Project 
<http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/development.php> accessed 11 October 2019. 
57 ibid. 
58 USA’s EPA (n.48) p.33. 
59 Department of Trade and Industry (n.50) p.24. 
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international laws in force at the specified time of decommissioning.60 There is also an 
expectation that during the process, the sites will be rehabilitated and restored to their pre-
licence condition.61 In effect, activities that occur at this stage include: well plugging, 
removal of installations and equipment as well as site restoration.  
 
The midstream stage on the other hand, mainly involves the transportation of crude or 
refined petroleum products, through pipelines, oil tankers, barges, trucks or rail from the 
well to the processing facilities, and then to its final destination (the refineries).62 The 
midstream sector also includes the storage of petroleum products and other wholesale 
marketing efforts.63 The main component of the downstream stage however is the refining 
of crude oil and processing of natural gas.64 It also encompasses efforts to market and 
distribute crude oil and natural gas related products.65 
 
1.3.1.1 Pollution as an Environmental Violation in the Oil and Gas Industry 
To understand the reasons for establishing environmental standards, one must first 
understand the extent and significance of environmental damage caused in a bid to seek 
socio-economic independence and dominance.66 Excerpts from the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED) stated that: “The world manufactures seven times 
more goods today than it did as recently as 1950. Given population growth rates, a five- to 
ten-fold increase in manufacturing output will be needed just to raise developing-world 
consumption of manufactured goods to industrialized world levels by the time population 
growth rates level off next century.”67 Indeed, most industrialised activities (and indeed most 
other human activities) harm the components of the environment (air, water, and land) and 
public health.68 For the purpose of protecting the environment, there is a necessity to 
regulate the environmental aspects of such industrial activities.69 In the background section, 
                                                             
60 ibid. 
61 Claudine Sigam and Leonardo Garcia, 'Extractive Industries: Optimizing Value Retention in Host Communities' (United 





66 Bhaskar Nath, Environmental Regulations and Standard Setting (E-Book, Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) 
2009) p.1. 
67 World Commission on Environment and Development, 'Our Common Future' (1987) Oxford University Press p.15. 
68 Bhaskar Nath (n.66) p.2. 
69 Claudine Sigam and Leornado Garcia (n.61) p.14. 
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this study has noted that states like Nigeria have prescribed standards (manifesting 
principles of environmental law) in their environmental regime. The study also noted possible 
violation of such standards in the oil and gas industry. It has also been noted that pollution 
is a significant form of violation in the industry.  
 
Scholars have associated oil and gas pollution with the extent of the oil and gas activity, the 
location and surrounding areas of the extraction process, and the technology used during 
the process.70 In effect, the larger the oilfield, the greater the impacts; and complex 
technology used during drilling can also increase the possibility of significant impact.71 This 
study will utilise the aid of Figure 1.0 below to illustrate pollution violation during oil and gas 
extraction. These pollutions contradict some principles of international environmental law.  
 
Figure 1.0: Potential Pollution That Occur During Upstream Oil and Gas Operations 




Fugitive natural gas, other 
volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), polyaromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs), carbon 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
hydrogen sulphide. 
Drilling muds, organic acid, 
alkalis, diesel oil, crankcase 
oils, acidic stimulation fluid 
(hydrochloric and hydrofluoric 
acids). 
Drill cuttings (some oil-coated), 
drilling mud solid, weighting 
agents, dispersants, corrosion 
inhibitors, surfactants, 
flocculating agents, concrete, 
casing, paraffin. 
Production Fugitive natural gas, Other 
VOCs, PAHs, carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide, hydrogen 
sulphide, fugitive BTEX 
(benzene, toluene, 
ethylbenzene, and Xylene) 
from natural gas conditioning. 
Produced water possibly 
containing heavy metals, 
radionuclides, dissolved 
solids, oxygen-demanding 
organic compounds, and high 
level of salts. Also may 
contain additives including 
biocides, lubricants, corrosion 
inhibitors, waste water 
containing glycol, amines, 
salts and untreatable 
emulsions. 
Produced sand, elemental 
sulphur, spent catalysts, separator 
lodge, tank bottoms, used filters, 
sanitary wastes. 
                                                             
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
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Maintenance  Volatile cleaning agents, 
paints, other VOCs, 
hydrochloric acid gas. 
Completion fluid, waste water 
containing well-cleaning 
solvent (detergent and 
degreasers), paints, stimulation 
agent. 
Pipe scale, waste paint, paraffin, 
cement, sand. 
Abandoned 
Wells, Spills and 
Blowout 
Fugitive natural gas and other 
VOCs, PAHs, particulate 
matter sulphur compounds, 
carbon dioxide, carbon 
monoxide. 
Escaping oil and brine. Contaminated soils, sorbents. 
 
Source: USA’s EPA, 'EPA Office of Compliance Sector Notebook Project Profile of the Oil and Gas Extraction Industry' 
(USA Environmental Protection Agency 1999) p.45. 
 
Based on Figure 1.0 above, it is discovered that significant oil and gas pollution occurs during 
the upstream stage of operations. In relation to this study, it translates that criminal 
sanctioning and regulatory enforcement should be properly utilised to ensure compliance 
with relevant standards promoting environmental protection. Other forms of violation in the 
upstream stage of the Nigerian oil and gas industry will be examined in chapter 3 of this 
study. The next section will therefore give an overview of the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
and the Niger Delta in which a significant portion of upstream operations have occurred. 
 
1.3.2 The Nigerian Oil and Gas Regime: A Review of Upstream Operations 
There have been extensive oil and gas operations in the Nigerian upstream onshore72 areas.73 
Most of the extraction activities have occurred in the onshore areas of the Niger Delta.74 
Moreover, writers have described a significant portion of the Nigerian oil and gas pollution 
to have also occurred in these areas.75 According to Azaiki, the exploration of crude oil in the 
Nigerian onshore areas commenced in 1908 when German surveyors for the Nigerian 
                                                             
72 Oil can sometimes be found below the surface of earth and at other times, below the sea bed. The process of extracting oil 
from under the sea bed (usually through floating or fixed platforms on the bed of the ocean) is called offshore drilling whereas 
onshore drilling is the practice of extracting oil from under the surface of earth away from the ocean. 
73 United Nations Environment Programme, 'Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland' (n.33) p.9. 
74 Sunday Olayinka Oyedepo (n.41). 
75 Aniefiok E Ite and Others, 'Petroleum Exploration and Production: Past and Present Environmental Issues in the Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta' (2013) 1 American Journal of Environmental Protection 80. 
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Bitumen Corporation started exploring the onshore areas of Araromi (a fishing coastal 
community in the western fringe of Ondo State in Western Nigeria).76 This effort was cut 
short by the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the exploration for petroleum resources 
only commenced again in 1938 when Shell D’Arcy (a consortium of British Petroleum and 
Royal Dutch Shell)77 was granted a sole concessionary right over the entire nation.78 The 
second effort was also cut short by the outbreak of World War II in 1939.79 As a result, oil 
exploration only resumed in 1946 (a year after the war ended) with Shell D’Arcy drilling a 
number of oil wells in the Araromi area in 1951.80 Exploration activities moved to the Niger 
Delta in 1956 when Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) discovered crude oil in 
the onshore area of Oloibiri in Bayelsa state (of the Niger Delta region).81 By late 1956, 
another discovery of commercial value was made at Afam, in Rivers State (of the Niger 
Delta)82 and by 1958, full commercial development of crude oil had already begun in the 
onshore areas of the region.83 This discovery in commercial quantities was the giant Bomu 
oil field of Port Harcourt-Rivers State, which has estimated total recovery (EUR) of 0.311 
billion of barrels (BB) of oil and an estimated total  of 0.608 billion of barrels of oil equivalent 
(BBOE) including gas.84 It is believed that the country was already producing over 5,100 
barrels of crude oil per day by 1958 from its onshore platform;85 an understandable contrast 
to the over 2 million barrels of crude being produced per day presently.86 
 
The oil and gas sector has since played a pivotal role in shaping Nigeria’s socio-economic 
and political development since the 1956 discovery.87 Since then, the oil and gas industry 
has been a significant portion of the Nigerian economy.88 Indeed, other writers have 
                                                             
76 Steve S Azaiki, Inequities in Nigerian Politics (6th edn, Treasure Books 2003) p.240. 
77 This company later became Shell-BP operating in Nigeria and later Shell Petroleum Development Company 
78 Joseph Egbegbulem and others, 'Oil Exploration and Poverty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Critical Analysis' 
(2013) 4 International Journal of Business and Social Science 280.  
79 ibid. 
80 Aniefiok E Ite and Others (n.75). 
81 Lawrence Atsegbua, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria: Theory and Practice (2nd edn, New Era Publications 2004) p.42. 
82 Ayo M Ajomo, ‘Law and Changing Policy in Nigeria's Oil Industry’ in J.A. Omotola ed. Law and Development (Lagos: 
University of Lagos Press 1987) 84. 
83 Joseph Egbegbulem and others (n.78). 
84 Marius S Vassiliou, The A to Z of the Petroleum Industry (116th edn, Scarecrow Press 2009) p.300. 
85 Scott R Pearson, Petroleum in the Nigerian Economy (California: Stanford University Press 1970) p.44. 
86 USA Energy Information Administration, 'Nigeria Crude Oil Production: 2.01M Bbl/Day for Dec 2018' (Energy 
Information Administration 2018) <https://ycharts.com/indicators/nigeria_crude_oil_production> accessed 2 April 2019. 
87 ibid. 
88 Anthony E Akinlo, 'How Important Is Oil in Nigeria’s Economic Growth?' (2012) 5(4) Journal of Sustainable Development 
165; Gazi M Alam and others, 'Impact of Gas Industry on Sustainable Economy in Nigeria: Further Estimations through 
Eview' (2012) 12(21) Journal of Applied Sciences 2244-2251. 
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argued that it is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy89 as it generates approximately 80% 
of the country’s revenue.90 As of 2000, 98% of the country’s export earnings were derived 
from oil and gas exports.91 Indeed, recent data has shown that oil and gas resources account 
for an estimated 90% of total exports and 80% of foreign exchange revenue.92 
 
Upon Nigeria’s independence in 1960, Shell–BP began to relinquish its acreage and convert 
its exploration licences to become prospecting licences to enable it to also produce crude.93 
However, as it became clear that the oil and gas sector was fast becoming a prime 
contributor to the Nigerian economy, the country made moves towards asserting its 
dominance in the oil and gas sector in a number of ways.94 These moves were reasonable 
considering that in Nigeria, the permanent sovereignty and ownership over its mineral 
resources are vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria pursuant to Section 44 (3) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). This sovereignty of the 
Nigerian state over its resources is in line with the provisions of the United Nations General 
Assembly (Resolution 626) and the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) which stipulates that it is “the inalienable rights of all states to dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources in accordance with their national interests and based on respect 
for their economic independence.”95 
 
First, the country discarded the sole concession policy it operated and extended exploration 
rights to other multinational oil companies (MOCs) so as to facilitate increased development 
of petroleum resources.96 For example, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria 
obtained exploration rights for oil and gas resources in Nigeria in 1961, Gulf Oil Company 
(now Chevron) also in 1961, Société Africaine des Pétroles (SAFRAP) (which later became 
Elf Nigeria Limited in 1974) in 1962, Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (now AGIP) in 1962, 
                                                             
89 Matthew N. Uwakonye, Gbolahan Solomon Osho and Hyacinth Anucha, 'The Impact of Oil and Gas Production on the 
Nigerian Economy: A Rural Sector Econometric Model' (2006) 5(2) International Business & Economics Research Journal 
(IBER) 62. 
90 Ayuba, A Kadafa, 'Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria' (2012) 12(3) 
Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Environment & Earth Sciences15. 
91 ibid. p.15. 
92 Moses C Ekperiware, 'Effect of Oil and Agriculture on Economic Growth in Nigeria' (2015) 3(2) Journal of Global 
Economics, Management and Business Research 75-76. 
93 Marius S Vassiliou (n.84). 
94 Armin Rosencrantz, Paul Kibel and Kathleen D. Yurchak, 'The Principles, Structure, And Implementation of International 
Environmental Law' (Ucar.edu, 1999) <https://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3html.html#chapter1> accessed 
3 December 2018. 
95 United Nations General Assembly - ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, 14 December 1962. GA Res. 1803 
(XVII). 
96 Marius S Vassiliou (n.84). 
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and ENI in 1964. Shell–BP commenced exploration and production operations through one 
of its Nigerian subsidiaries, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in 1979.97 
 
Furthermore, under the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Act 1977, the 
Federal government established and utilised the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) to undertake commercial activities in the oil and gas industry.98 Pursuant to Section 
10 of the NNPC Act, the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources regulates the operations of 
the NNPC and its partners through the Petroleum Inspectorate (the Department of the 
Petroleum Resources [DPR]). It is however interesting that Section 10 (1) of the NNPC Act 
also makes the DPR an integral component of the NNPC. This implies that the law makes the 
NNPC a regulator of its own operations, hence creating a conflict of interest in the regulation 
of the Nigerian oil and gas sector. It also reveals to what extent the oil and gas activities of 
the NNPC and its partners are being regulated. 
 
1.3.2.1 Shell Petroleum Development Company as Main Example in Nigeria 
To evaluate possible oil and gas pollution in Nigeria, this study will repeatedly cite Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) as a main example of a Nigerian operator. SPDC 
is used as the main example because the company is the operator of a Joint Venture 
Agreement involving the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which holds 55%, 
Shell 30%, Total Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (TEPNG) 10% and Nigerian Agip 
Oil Company limited (NAOC) 5%.99 Indeed, SPDC has been the pioneer operator for oil and 
gas operations in Nigeria.100 In line with the joint venture formula for production in Nigeria, 
the SPDC is believed to control an oil mining lease area of over 31,000 square kilometres.101 
In this lease, the corporation controls more than 6,000 kilometres of pipeline; runs more 
than 87 flow stations; owns 8 gas plants; and produces from more than 1,000 producing 
wells.102 It has been asserted that there are an estimated 159 operational oil fields in 
                                                             
97 ibid. 
98 This is pursuant to Section 5 of the NNPC Act. 
99 Shell Nigeria, 'SPDC - Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria' (Shell Nigeria 2017) 
<http://www.shell.com.ng/about-us/what-we-do/spdc.html> accessed 10 December 2018. 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid.  
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Nigeria.103 With the above arrangement, Shell accounts for more than 80 of the 159 fields.104 
It has been alleged that as of 1997, Nigeria’s joint venture operated by Shell accounted for 
a production of over 899,000 barrels per day (bpd).105 Similarly, it has been alleged that as 
of 2018, Shell accounted for 819 million barrels of oil cumulatively produced in Nigeria.106 
Shell in Nigeria plays pioneering roles in onshore, shallow and deep-water exploration 
and production.107 In light of this, the study believes that the environmental implications of 
SPDC’s operations would give a perfect insight into the role of oil and gas operators in the 
industry.  
 
This study will hereafter, review a Nigeria jurisdiction in which significant oil and gas 
operations have been carried out and which possibly may have suffered some significant 
environmental impacts as a result of the operations. The study asserts that the Niger Delta 
region is most suited for this purpose. The next section will therefore, give an insight into 
the Niger Delta and the significance of the region in the development of the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry.  
 
1.3.2.2 The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria  
Nigeria is a major oil producing country108 producing 1.9 million barrels of oil per day.109 In 
line with this, there has been extensive exploration and production of oil and gas resources 
in the country.110 The Niger Delta region accounts for approximately 62.1% of Nigerian oil 
production.111 The region is located at the apex of the Gulf of Guinea on the west coast of 
                                                             
103 Thomas Catan and Dino Mahtani, 'Shell’s Problems in Nigeria Mount Up' [2006] Financial Times 
<https://www.ft.com/content/8ff2c40a-c59e-11da-b675-0000779e2340> accessed 10 December 2018. 
104 ibid. 
105 Resolution Law Firm, 'Joint Ventures in the Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry' (2019) Resolution Law Firm 
<https://resolutionlawng.com/joint-venture-in-the-nigeria-oil-and-gas-industry/> accessed 16 October 2019. 
106 Shell Nigeria, 'Economic Development in Nigeria (Sustainability Report) ' (Shell Nigeria 2018) 
<https://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2018/special-reports/economic-development-in-nigeria.html> accessed 10 
January 2020. 
107 Shell Nigeria, 'Our Business in Nigeria (Sustainability Report) ' (Shell Nigeria 2020) <https://www.shell.com.ng/> accessed 
10 January 2020. 
108 Matthew N. Uwakonye, Gbolahan Solomon Osho and Hyacinth Anucha (n.89) p.61. 
109 Eurasia, 'Nigeria Energy Profile: Largest Oil Producer in Africa and World’s Fourth-Largest Exporter of LNG – Analysis' 
[2019] Eurasia Review and Analysis <https://www.eurasiareview.com/08052016-nigeria-energy-profile-largest-oil-producer-
in-africa-and-worlds-fourth-largest-exporter-of-lng-analysis/> accessed 26 September 2019. 
110 Joseph Effiong, 'Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: The Paradox of the Black Gold' (2010) 18 Environment and Social 
Justice: An International Perspective 329-330. 
111 International Business Publications, Nigeria Oil and Gas Exploration Laws and Regulation Handbook (Intl. Business 
Publications USA 2008) p.63. 
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Africa.112 It is made up of 9 oil–producing states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, Ondo, Imo and Rivers) which comprises over 800 oil–producing communities.113 
The region is also home to 37 million inhabitants and occupies a land space of approximately 
75,000 km2 (thus constituting 7.5% of Nigeria's land mass).114 Indeed, 37 million people 
are a significant portion of the estimated 150 million inhabitants of Nigeria.115 The first 
commercial quantity of crude in the Niger Delta region was discovered in the Bomu 
community in 1957.116 Subsequently, exploration and production activities expanded to 
several other areas of the region.117 
 
It has been argued that oil and gas activities have thrived in the region because of the 
topography and natural aesthetics.118 A significant number of the Nigerian onshore oil fields 
are situated across the region.119 Indeed, Khan asserted that 78 of the 159 oilfields operative 
in Nigeria are located in the Niger Delta.120 It implies that a significant portion of the Nigerian 
oil and gas extraction operations are carried out in the Niger Delta region. It is also believed 
that over 80% of Nigeria’s revenue is generated from the sale of crude oil derived from the 
Niger Delta region.121 It is therefore, not surprising that the Niger Delta has been extensively 
studied as a result of the presence of vast deposits of petroleum resources in its basin.122 
This is because the Niger Delta is alleged to be one of the world’s largest prolific hydrocarbon 
provinces globally.123 According to Curtis, “A large portion of the world’s oil and gas reserves 
are in tertiary terrigenous fill on passive continental margins and the most significant 
                                                             
112 Harry Doust, 'Petroleum Geology of the Niger Delta' (1990) 50 Geological Society, London, Special Publications 365. 
113 Leo Osuji and Chukwunedum Onojake, 'Trace Heavy Metals Associated with Crude Oil: A Case Study of Ebocha-8 Oil-
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Niger-Delta Region as Oil Producing States of Nigeria' [2010] Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development 
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hydrocarbon deposits of this type could be found in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, Canadian 
Beaufort-Mackenzie Delta and Nigeria’s Niger Delta.”124 
 
It would be expected that there should be a balance in the utilisation of petroleum resources 
and the management of the existing rich ecosystem of the region. This is because the Niger 
Delta arguably has the largest mangrove forests in Africa and the third largest in the world.125 
The region is also endowed with petroleum resources and a healthy ecosystem that supports 
the growth of aquatic plant and animal life.126 Indeed, environmental scholars have asserted 
that as a result of its complex ecosystem, the mangrove forests and swamps also easily 
support the growth of important terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna.127 In this light, the 
ecological zones in the Niger Delta region can be broadly classified as tropical rainforest in 
the northern part of the Delta and mangrove forest on the warm coastlines of Nigeria.128 It 
is therefore expected that activities such as the exploitation of oil and gas resources from 
such environment will consider the conservation of such an ecosystem. This conservation is 
best guaranteed under environmental principles established within the purview of 
environmental law to ensure environmental protection.  
 
1.3.2.3 Pollution as a Violation of Environmental Standard in the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry 
It has been argued that although Nigeria has a seemingly vast environmental regulatory 
system, the country has failed to protect its environment (especially in its Niger Delta).129 
Generally, pollution sources in Nigeria include, but are not limited to, the reckless dumping 
of household waste and other decomposing domestic waste, waste generated from mineral 
mining activities, and industrial waste from manufacturing corporations.130  In the same vein, 
Sangodoyin asserted that the littering of major roads and streets is a common cause of 
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domestic waste in Nigeria.131 Other writers have asserted that domestic polluters often dump 
kitchen waste into major gutters or waterways causing flooding on the roads.132 Even more, 
other writers believe that the indiscriminate felling of trees and sporadic burning of bushes 
and farmland often lead to soil erosion.133 The list is legion and covers a wide spectrum 
(ranging from such domestic pollution to oil spills). Indeed, Uchendu believes that these 
sources of pollution cause environmental degradation and even in some cases harm to public 
health.134 
  
Odularu has however, argued that although these sources of pollution all deserve regulatory 
attention, they do not match the extent of pollution that occurs during the upstream phase 
of oil and gas production in Nigeria.135 It has further been argued that most such pollution 
violates existing environmental standards regarding the prevention of pollution of the air, 
water or land of any part of Nigeria.136 In other words, the Nigerian pollution is a significant 
form of violation of environmental standards. Aworawo has further argued that most such 
pollution has occurred in the onshore areas because most E&P activities in Nigeria (especially 
the Niger Delta) have occurred in the onshore areas of the Niger Delta.137 A writer has argued 
that the oil and gas pollution has negatively impacted the environment and public health of 
the Niger Delta inhabitants.138 Moreover, considering the significant population of the region 
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in ratio to the estimated population of Nigeria, it is inevitable that impact of environmental 
pollution invariably affect a huge portion of the Nigerian population.139 Some such pollution 
and their impacts includes: 
i) Oil Spill Pollution in Nigeria 
 
Writers believe that there has been repeated oil spill pollution in the Niger Delta region.140One 
of the numerous examples of such pollution occurred in the populated Biile community of 
the Niger Delta.141 This was caused by the SPDC’s Forcados Terminal storage tank failure in 
1979, which discharged approximately 580,000 barrels of crude oil into the Biile navigable 
river.142 As a result of this pollution, inhabitants of the region suffered negative health 
challenges.143 Writers have observed that several communities in the Niger Delta region have 
suffered repeated oil spills (mostly from dis-used pipelines that are yet to be 
decommissioned and well blow-outs from over 100 wells scattered around the area).144 For 
instance, Amnesty International records that between 2008 and 2009, over 650,000 barrels 
of oil were emitted into Bodo land and creeks after a disused oil pipeline that was buried in 
the community ruptured.145 
  
It is also reported that between 1976 and 2001, the SPDC discharged 3,726,000 tons of 
hydrocarbons, 11,695,000 tons of carbon dioxide, and 53,000,500 tons of methane in the 
region.146 Recent reports also show evidence of 210 onshore oil spills in 2008 and 190 in 
2009.147 SPDC argued that sabotage of oil pipelines by inhabitants of the region accounted 
for some of its recorded spills.148 Indeed, records show that within 1976 to 1991 alone, there 
were an estimated 2,976 oil pipeline spills (2.1 million barrels of oil) that occurred from 
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SPDC’s pipelines in Ogoni.149 Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
estimates that between 1976 and 2001 alone, there were an estimated 6,800 well blowouts, 
discharging over 3,000,000 barrels of oil into the Niger Delta region.150 Cumulatively, it has 
been argued that between 9 and 13 million barrels of crude oil polluted the Niger Delta 
between 1958 and 2009.151 Consequential harm that has arisen from the pollution include, 
but is not limited to the destruction of the aesthetic environment, destruction of aquatic life, 
destruction of land by oil residue, and even harm to public health and the lives of 
inhabitants.152 Amnesty International has argued that most of the oil and gas pollution has 
been a result of the deliberate, sometimes reckless, and at other times, negligent acts of oil 
companies operating in the region.153 Furthermore, it has been adduced that the oil and gas 
companies that perpetrated the pollution acts have failed to clean-up the affected sites.154 
 
Amnesty International observed that most of the rivers and ponds that run through the Niger 
Delta region have been contaminated with the discharge of crude oil substances as well as 
oil waste.155 Crude oil discharged during repeated spills has caused both short and long term 
harm to aquatic life generally (especially the Niger Delta).156 Fish farming is one of the chief 
occupations of the Niger Delta inhabitants; hence it is economically important to the 
region.157 To this extent, one can assume that the impact of oil pollution on the aquatic life 
of Niger Delta has negatively affected the economy of the region. Also, it is on record that 
the people of the Niger Delta rely on agriculture.158 Most inhabitants of the Niger Delta rely 
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on subsistence crops that grow on their land. Despite this, oil pipelines (constructed to 
transport crude oil from the gathering stations to the refineries) have been allowed to run 
across Ogoni farmland (on the top soil) while other oil and gas infrastructure, such as 
wellheads and flow stations are often situated close to residential areas.159 Based on the 
above fact, it would be easy for a single spill incident to destroy the viable nutrients of crops. 
Ordinioha and Brisibe discovered that oil spills in the Niger Delta region had reduced plant 
nutrients by an estimated 36% and the protein component of cassava by an estimated 40%, 
hence resulting in increased child malnutrition in the region.160 More generally, oil spill waste 
has made a significant soil portion in most Niger Delta communities toxic to plant growth 
and also dangerous to animals that feed on the materials that grow on such soil.161 
  
Recently, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) found that the Ogoni River 
(from which most of the Niger Delta inhabitants derive drinking water) had been 
contaminated with a carcinogen at an estimate of almost 900 times above World Health 
Organisation (WHO) standards.162 To this effect, the contamination of the rivers by oil spill 
toxins could affect the health of inhabitants that fetch drinking water from it. Other writers 
have argued that emissions from the combustion of associated gases during well blow-outs 
often cause a discharge of toxic substances such as benzene and nitrogen oxide.163 It has 
been argued that the toxic gases increase the risk of air-borne diseases such as asthma, 
leukaemia and pneumonia.164 
 
Writers have alleged some of the factors that have contributed to some of the pollution in 
the Nigerian upstream sector to include: the use (by oil and gas corporations) of outdated 
technology that is not environmentally friendly165 and the use (by oil and gas corporations) 
of faulty and outdated facilities that cause spill and well-blowouts.166 Some such allegations 
are described below. 
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Asset Integrity Work concerns improving the quality of the pipelines, well-heads, flow lines, 
flow stations and terminals during exploration and production of oil resources.167 However, 
it was reported that in 2007, the (then) Managing Director of SPDC, Omiyi, in commenting 
on the of the company’s assets, stated: “we do have a substantial backlog of asset integrity 
work to reduce spills and flaring.”168 Similarly, in 2004, while being questioned by Christian 
Aid (an NGO), a Shell Vice-President acknowledged that the existing documents showing a 
total picture of the lifespan and condition of SPDC's pipelines were inadequate to reflect the 
actual information.169 Hence it is possible that the company could have been using a pipeline 
for 100 years without changing it, since the document that should have reflected such details 
could not be relied on.  Furthermore, in 2007, Ljosne, Shell’s former Regional Director 
(Communications Africa), in replying to an email sent by Professor Steiner, asserted that: 
“the Asset Integrity Reviews are internal Shell operating documents designed to provide 
information on the state of our assets and improvements that are necessary - and are 
regarded as strictly confidential and business sensitive.” In view of this, Professor Steiner 
concluded in a report that SPDC still operated well below internationally recognized standards 
to prevent and control pipeline oil spills by not utilising the globally recognised best available 
technology and practices.170 
 
Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES) recently concluded that, “many operators have 
hidden under the cloak of sabotage to avoid remediation in cases of environmental spills, 
accidents and discharges.”171 This implies that most such companies have avoided cleaning 
up their oil and gas pollution discharge under the pretence that such pollutions were caused 
by the pipeline sabotage activities of other third parties. Similarly, Amnesty International 
attributed a major cause of the spills to corroded pipes rather than sabotage.172 They have 
alleged that the defence is only employed by the corporation to evade the strict liability of 
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their pollution crimes.173 Indeed, the National Council on the Environment (NCE) once 
asserted that “most cases of oil spills across the country are results of old and faulty pipelines 
that were laid more than three decades ago. They have become obsolete resulting most of 
the time in rupture and equipment failure. Some of these pipelines are on the surface making 
them easy targets for vandalisation.”174 The above assertion was reasserted by Adekola and 
others who stated that the Niger Delta oil pollution has been mainly caused by the use of 
faulty and obsolete equipment by operators.175 
 
In line with the argument of the NCE, reports have shown that although the specific age of 
some of the existing pipelines in the Niger Delta region are not known, several such oil 
pipelines were installed and commenced operations in 1965.176 Indeed, it is on record that 
by the year 2000, 73% of the existing pipelines in Rivers State and Bayelsa State were older 
than 20 years and 41% of the entire pipelines in the Niger Delta region at the time, were 
older than 30 years.177 
 
Despite this level of pollution, there are repeated allegations that oil and gas companies 
believed to have caused the pollution (such as Shell Producing Development Company) have 
failed to clean-up the oil spill pollution.178 It has been argued that the affected sites have 
been left in its deplorable state for decades with more oil spill pollution happening on such 
sites with recent extraction activities.179 It is believed that although companies have failed 
to adequately remediate the affected sites, enforcement agencies have issued certificates 
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identifying such sites as fully remediated.180 This study will make a comprehensive analysis 
of the violation of environmental standards during the upstream stage in chapter 3.  
 
ii) Gas Flaring Pollution in Nigeria 
 
Having considered the incidence of oil spill in the Niger Delta, and the impact it has had on 
the environment and the public health of its inhabitants, this study will consider gas flaring 
and its effect on the Niger Delta environment. Indeed, the extraction of natural gas in Nigeria 
is incidental to the exploitation of crude oil.181  In effect, gas flaring in Nigeria started about 
the same time oil was first discovered in the country.182 Moreover, no deliberate effort has 
been made to explore for commercial gas quantities in Nigeria, except mostly those found 
with petroleum (associated gas).183 These associated gases are called gas flares.184 Gas 
flaring therefore involves the burning of crude oil’s associated gas.185 The associated gas is 
burnt instead of re-injecting it to be refined as usable gas.186 The gas is burnt to enable the 
disposal of gas and the extraction of crude oil.187 Friends of the Earth have alleged that a 
major reason for the continued flaring of gas was because burning off the gas, while 
extracting the much desired oil is cheaper than re-injecting it and refining it.188 
 
It is notable that in the course of oil production associated gas is routinely flared.189  
However, Nigerian gas flaring is grossly significant considering the volume of gas flared 
annually. It is estimated that about 2 billion standard cubic feet of gas is currently flared in 
Nigeria.190 This makes Nigeria accountable for over 75 per cent of gas flared in Africa.191 
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Emoyan further alleged that Nigeria is one of the foremost flarers of gas globally192 
accounting for 25 percent of global gas flaring.193 Agbola and Olurin reported the existence 
of 123 gas flaring sites in the Niger Delta194 from which an estimated 70 million cubic metres 
of the natural gas extracted in the oil wells are flared per day.195 As of 2004, the World Bank 
declared that Nigeria flared 75 percent of the gas it produced.196 
 
Before the 1960 Nigerian independence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies reply to the 
reason for its continued gas flaring operations in Nigeria was: “until there is a worthwhile 
market and until there are facilities (e.g. pipelines and storage tanks) to use the gas, it is 
normal practise to burn off their  by-products from the oil wells.”197 In fairness to her, Gordon 
pointed out that in the early twentieth century, environmental consciousness was also low 
in the USA.198 It is believed that World War II, increased population, urbanisation and 
reliance on personal vehicles for transportation increased air pollution in the mid-1900s.199 
This is not surprising, considering that environmental consciousness at the time was low. 
For instance, it has been asserted that until 1955, the regulatory regime of air pollution in 
the USA was dominated by municipal, county and state legislation.200 Municipal, county, and 
state legislation dealing with air pollution has however continued beyond 1955.201 The first 
real attempt at enacting federal legislation dealing with air pollution was accomplished in the 
enactment of the Air Pollution Control Act 1955.202 
 
Similarly, it is believed that  environmental consciousness became significant in the 1960s.203  
This consciousness was represented in the institutional response to environmental problems 
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represented in developments in environmental science, public awareness and the emergence 
of the environmental lobby.204 There was also an ongoing process of ‘greening’ of political 
parties, defined by Robinson as “the translation of ideas, attitudes, motivations, symbols 
and ways of thinking from the constituent cells of the environmental movement to the 
mainstream political parties in terms of rhetoric, policy and ideology.”205 An example of this 
political attitude to environmental issues was represented in the ‘Leaders Speech’ made by 
Prime Minister Wilson during the 1969 Labour Party Conference in Brighton whereby he 
stated: “There is a two-fold task: to remove the scars of 19th century capitalism - the derelict 
mills, the spoil heaps, the back-to-back houses that still disfigure so large a part of our land. 
At the same time, we have to make sure that the second industrial revolution through which 
we are now passing does not bequeath a similar legacy to future generations. We must deal 
with the problems of pollution - of the air, of the sea, of our rivers and beaches. We must 
also deal with the uniquely 20th century problems of noise and congestion which will 
increasingly disturb, unless checked, our urban life.”206 Moreover, as stated earlier, the NPE 
was only formulated in 1989. It could therefore, be implied that environmental consciousness 
was relatively low at the time the Secretary of State made the above statement in Nigeria. 
 
Several years later, it is evident that gas flaring has continued in Nigeria despite the market 
availability for gas resource globally,207 and the availability of pipelines and storage tanks in 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry.208 This creates a doubt as to whether there was any 
intention to actually end gas flaring. It also gives insight into the passiveness of the Nigerian 
government in decisively dealing with this pollution source. The reason for describing it as a 
strong source of pollution is argued below. 
 
Friends of the Earth argued that gas flaring in Nigeria has caused the emission of the two 
greenhouse gases (methane and carbon dioxide) which have contributed to over 80% of 
global warming.209 They have also suggested that gas flaring in the Niger Delta generates 
significant heat, in this way causing thermal pollution in the region.210 In line with this, it is 
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believed that an estimated 45.8 billion Kilowatts (kws) of heat is discharged daily into the 
atmosphere.211 Similarly, it has been alleged that the heat temperature from the Isoko site 
alone is as high as 400 degrees centigrade from an approximate distance of 43.8 metres.212 
It is believed that the harsh heat emitted from these sites has killed vegetation and destroyed 
the mangrove swamps in the region. Moreover, the toxic gases emitted at the sites have 
exposed the inhabitants of the affected areas to serious health risks such as asthma, 
bronchitis, etc.213 Furthermore, the high concentration of acid rain in the Niger Delta region 
had negatively impacted the viability of crops that grow in the region.214 
 
Nwaomah argued that the toxic gas emitted into the atmosphere from leaking corroded 
pipelines has caused a significant source of air pollution in the Niger Delta.215 In addition, 
another writer has recently argued that atmospheric emissions from gas flare sites are the 
most significant form of air pollution in the Niger Delta (and indeed, Nigeria).216 This is 
because in the Niger Delta, the flaring process is usually located very close to communities 
and their farmlands, hence invariably has direct negative environmental implications on the 
region.217 Upon conducting an investigation into the effects of gas flaring, Bankoff, Frerks 
and Hilhorst concluded that gas flaring in the Niger Delta had caused significant 
environmental and health risks.218 In 2006, the United Nations summarised its view of the 
environmental risk associated with gas flaring in the Niger Delta, in a Human Development 
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Report whereby they stated: “there is a strong feeling in the region that the degree and rate 
of degradation are pushing the delta towards ecological disaster.”219 
 
A comprehensive study of the Nigerian pollution (including noise pollution arising from gas 
flaring activities) will be discussed in section 3.1 of this study. However, based on the 
incidences of pollution mentioned in the literature review above (and other forms of 
environmental violations during upstream operations that will be described in this study), 
the challenge has been to what extent Nigeria has utilised its criminal sanctions and 
enforcement to regulate the environmental aspects of upstream operations. This is what this 
study will discover. If, however, it is discovered that Nigeria has not effectively utilised 
criminal sanctions and regulatory enforcement to regulate, this study will explore the 
possible deficiencies contributing to the defective regulation and consider aspects of the USA 
and UK regimes that can proffer solutions to some of the identified deficiencies.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Methodology is a significant component of any research.220 This is because the methodology 
section provides the structure and underpinnings of the research.221 It has been argued that 
the relevance of arguments made in a research can only be justified in its methodology 
section.222 In line with this, writers have asserted that the core methodologies of undertaking 
research in an academic paradigm are quantitative, qualitative or mixed method.223 Creswell 
believes that qualitative research is based on the interpretation persons ascribe to a social 
or human problem.224 He defines qualitative research as “a type of educational research in 
which the researcher relies on the view of participants, asks broad, general questions, 
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collects data consisting largely of words (or texts) from participants, describes and analyses 
these words for themes, and conducts the inquiry in a subjective, biased manner.”225 
 
Bryam argued that in quantitative research, a solution is gained from the collection and 
analysis of data, whereas qualitative research involves an in-depth analysis of theories.226 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech have argued that while researchers in the quantitative school believe 
“in a single reality that can be measured reliably and validly using scientific principles,” 
qualitative researchers believe “in multiple constructed realities that generate different 
meanings for different individuals, and whose interpretations depend on the researcher’s 
lens.”227 Hence, Creswell & Clark argue that the role of a quantitative researcher is to 
maintain a passive stance to his preconceived views on the research subject, while 
conducting the research objectively from the background.228 
 
On the other hand, they believe that in qualitative research, the values of the researcher 
would largely influence the research.229 It is believed that a qualitative researcher would 
determine his opinion on a research topic subject to how his experiences and background 
shape his interpretation of the research subject.230  This position therefore implies that while 
quantitative research concerns itself with deductive reasoning,231 qualitative methodology 
concerns itself with inductive reasoning.232 This has influenced the reason why several legal 
researchers infer qualitative research as primarily exploratory research.233 Indeed, it has 
been asserted that qualitative research enables the researcher to show a clearer picture of 
the research subject better than the previous picture on the subject.234 A writer has argued 
that most law researchers adopt the qualitative approach because it enables the researcher 
to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations behind the 
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subject.235 It provides insights into the problem or helps to develop ideas or hypotheses for 
potential quantitative research.236 This has also encouraged the increased use of qualitative 
research in studies.237 
 
Either way, the research methodology chosen often largely depends on the research aim, 
objectives and questions.238 To this, Onwuegbuzie and Leech have argued that both forms 
of research make use of research questions addressed through some form of observation.239 
Sechrest and Sidani noted that the observation in both research methods would always make 
the researcher query the reason for their observation.240 Moreover, in the interpretation of 
data, both use some measure of analysis to verify and interpret data.241 To this extent, one 
can infer that there are some similarities in both forms of research.  
 
Based on this, writers argue that quantitative research seeks to test the validity of theories 
by deductively searching for evidence to prove or disprove the theory.242 On the other hand, 
qualitative research assembles data on the research subject from which it identifies themes 
that enable it develop the research theory inductively.243 In the same vein, the quantitative 
researcher utilises the review of past literature to justify the research and identify the reason 
for conducting the research.244 Hence, one can identify the research questions (which 
determine the research hypothesis) from the literature review.245 To this effect, it has been 
asserted that the literature review of quantitative research is always more elaborate and 
precise than qualitative research.246 On the other hand, the literature review in a qualitative 
research provides corroboration with the overall aim of the research study and points to the 
questions in the research.247 
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To this effect, this study will adopt qualitative research methodology as its research 
approach. It is noteworthy that the researcher is a Nigerian lawyer who has some previous 
knowledge of the Nigerian environment. Indeed, most of the inquiries that the researcher 
will make will be based on this knowledge. While this researcher will conduct this study from 
the viewpoint of his knowledge of this Nigerian environment, he will not input the sentiments 
arising from his knowledge of this into the study so as not to create some form of bias in the 
interpretation that will be made at the conclusion of the analysis. This research will make 
these inquiries through its research questions and determine an answer from the analysis of 
the literature that will be reviewed in the study. Moreover, this literature will serve as 
corroboration of the researcher’s observations identified from his analysis. The researcher 
believes that an in-depth analysis of the Nigerian environmental criminal regime would 
expose the possible deficiencies associated with the regime. Also, an analysis of the UK and 
USA regimes would enable the researcher to develop ideas by way of solutions which could 
be proffered to the Nigerian regime to solve some of its deficiencies. Specific methods of 
data collection and analysis constitute a major component of the methodology of every 
research.248 Furthermore, outlining the research justification as well as the research 
structure249 enables a reader to understand the viewpoint of the research and its relationship 
with other related scholarly works on the subject.250  This research will subsequently discuss 
the process it will adopt in gathering and analysing its data for the study. 
 
1.4.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
This legal research is a pertinent and systematic search for knowledge and information in 
the environmental and criminal law fields. The research process for this study will be 
undertaken through inquiry, close scrutiny and discovery, hence the need for adequate and 
suitable data. Data is the information, facts, observation, measurements or materials that 
are collected by a researcher for the purpose of generating results for his research.251 It has 
been asserted that quantitative research makes use of interviews, questionnaires, attitude 
scales or observational tools to gather its data.252 It is also believed that the most common 
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of these strategies is the use of the questionnaire which involves the utilisation of close-
ended questions.253 Indeed, some quantitative researchers even post questionnaires through 
the mail to maintain some measure of anonymity.254 Other quantitative researchers conduct 
face-to-face interviews or over the telephone.255 
 
Data analysis in quantitative research studies has been viewed as cumbersome as a result 
of the complex language and large statistics used during analysis.256 It has been asserted 
that while conducting quantitative research, the researcher must clearly determine the 
statistical tests used the reason for their use and the result achieved from their use.257 
Moreover, a writer has shared the view that quantitative research does very little to identify 
the level of significance of research subjects.258 Hence, quantitative researchers show their 
research findings and analysis of data under their research questions towards establishing 
whether the results achieved have actually answered the research questions.259 Russell also 
argues that a researcher who makes use of tables and graphs to accentuate his research 
must ensure that they are accurate and clearly shown to enhance the presentation of 
results.260 Moreover, at least fifty percent of the persons who were sampled for the research 
must actually participate, or else the result determined on fewer responses could be viewed 
as biased.261 
 
On the other hand, qualitative research often utilises textual data for its analysis. The pre-
existing texts can be in the form of reports, policy documents, legislation, and text books.262 
Qualitative data is also situated in a researcher’s transcribed interview or focus group data.263 
Hence, qualitative and quantitative research might share the use of similar sources of data. 
The difference however is in the expression of the data.264 While quantitative analysis would 
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predominantly utilise numerical statistics in expressing its data, qualitative research would 
make use of words.265 The analysis of data would usually involve the extraction of themes, 
patterns, groups and case samples.266 
 
For most of the study, this research data gathered was documentary, hence desk based. 
This researcher generated the data for this study from textbooks, law journals, statutory 
documents, legislative materials, law reports, law monologues, and online public documents 
of environmental agencies and departments in Nigeria. This researcher will also determine 
the result of his study from extraction of the commonalities and differences between the 
Nigerian environmental regime and other jurisdictions. To achieve this, this study will 
explicitly categorise the laws and case laws relating to each regime and analyse them 
individually. The study would then pair the themes generated from the analysis to determine 
aspects of the more developed regime(s) that had been determined to be adaptable and the 
present solution to the deficient regime (identified).  
 
1.4.2 Legal Research Method 
A writer has defined research to be the continuous investigation into a subject towards 
securing a result.267 Such a result will involve either a new finding or special knowledge about 
an existing fact.268 In this vein, legal research is a systematic investigation and analysis of 
legal theories, doctrines, cases and rules.269 Legal research therefore, seeks to determine 
the nature and purpose of legal rules regarding a social problem towards determining 
possible amendments that can be utilised to resolve the problem or recommend a new law 
on the subject entirely.270 In this context, legal research will study how existing legal rules 
have tackled social problems. Hence, through the spectrum of the problem, the research 
would determine the extent to which the legal rule has been effective. Based on this, it will 
determine whether the rule needs to be amended or even changed entirely. 
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In essence, legal research reviews legislation, legal principles and precedents established by 
courts towards determining their scope of application.271 Furthermore, legal research enables 
the verification of old facts of law, the discovery of new facts, the development of legal 
theories, and the interpretation of legal ideas.272 The strength of a law researcher is his 
ability to investigate, analyse, criticise, theorise and synthesise law discussions.273 This 
ability would enable the researcher to formulate a hypothesis that gives meaning to an 
existing legal rule.274 Relying on this premise, legal scholarship therefore concerns itself with 
the manipulation and examination of such theoretical concepts.275 
 
To this effect, the different forms of research methods in a law research are the doctrinal 
research method, the non-doctrinal research method and comparative study. Indeed, some 
research might choose to adopt one of these methods or adopt the combination of more 
than one method.276 This section will however, limit its scope of discussions of the doctrinal 
research and comparative study since they are the two tools of legal research utilised for 
this study.  
 
1.4.2.1 Doctrinal Research 
The doctrinal research method involves research into a legal phenomenon or the legal 
principles guiding rules, cases or statutes.277 A writer has asserted that it relates to the 
analysis of case laws, the development and arrangement of legal doctrines and the study of 
legal institutions.278 In essence, it enables the critical analysis of legal propositions and legal 
concepts.279 Writers have also asserted that this normative research methodology develops 
legal doctrines for legal publications and journals.280 To this effect, doctrinal research would 
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usually seek to determine what the law is regarding a particular legal subject.281 It would 
also seek to determine the solution to a legal issue.282 Hence, the research would simply 
inquire into a legal issue and review how laws relating to the issue have provided a form of 
solution to the legal issue.283 The tools of doctrinal research include: statutory material, 
committee reports, legal precedents, judgements and case reports, law text books and 
journals, law periodicals, commentaries and parliamentary debates.284 This might have 
contributed to the reason why it is also referred to as law research or armchair research or 
even library based research.285 
 
Indeed, since the 19th century, the doctrinal research method has dominated legal 
research.286 It is otherwise referred to as black letter analysis and is arguably the traditional 
legal methodology.287 It concerns itself with the internal consistency of the law.288 Doctrinal 
research would inquire about the position of the law in a jurisdiction.289 Indeed, doctrinal 
research would critically analyse all relevant statutes and case laws regarding a statement 
of law apposite to the subject of research.290 Considering that traditionally, legal research 
methods are taught at the beginning phase of legal training, law scholars will easily utilise 
the available techniques from the foundation legal research methods to initiate their 
graduate research.291 To this effect, it has been argued that it is still a core research base 
for research in most law schools.292 This is because it is considered to be established 
research, which if utilised by a law researcher, would make the research study more 
manageable and contribute to his expected results being more predictable.293 
 
This study will apply doctrinal research methodology towards determining possible 
deficiencies identified in the Nigerian regime. In attempting this, the study will review to 
what extent the existing environmental criminal regime in Nigeria (enacting environmental 
                                                             
281 Vijay Gawas (n.277). 
282 Salim Ibrahim (n.280). 
283 ibid. 
284 Vijay Gawas (n.277) p.130. 
285 Salim Ibrahim (n.280).  
286 ibid.  
287 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy (n.221) p.30. 
288 Andrew Knight and Lex Ruddock (n.275) p.29. 
289 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n.273) p.4-5 
290 Vijay Gawas (n.277) p.129. 
291 ibid.  
292 ibid.  
293 ibid. 
   36 
 
criminal sanctions) has been sanctioning criminal actions. For this purpose, just as is 
common in doctrinal research mentioned above, this study will be desk based. The reasons 
why this study will be library based (and no empirical study will be conducted) include:  
1) There is considerable doubt that operators in the Nigerian oil and gas sector will be 
transparent enough to provide information regarding their pollution acts or that 
enforcement bodies will be open to discuss whether they have performed their duties 
to standard or not. 
2) There is a considerable availability of resources to the researcher, in the form of data 
that can be accessed in legal texts, statutes, law journals and instruments of 
environmental law. Relying on the discussion of doctrinal research above, it would 
then imply that these legal resources relied on are primary data used for this research.  
3) Conducting an empirical research to gather primary data on the effects of pollution in 
the Niger Delta will raise ethical concerns about the security of the researcher 
considering the concerns identified in the literature review section of this study 
regarding security challenges caused by pollution in the region. 
4) There is an opportunity for future research on the scientific aspects of this subject 
beyond the scope of this study. 
 
1.4.3 General View of Comparative Study and Legal Transplant 
This study is of the view that the utilisation of comparative study will best fit the purpose of 
deriving solutions for any possible deficiencies identified to have limited the ability of the 
regime to regulate effectively. To justify this view, this section will first seek to find out what 
comparative legal study is all about. Watson defined comparative law study as “an academic 
discipline in its own right” regarding “a study of the relationship, above all, the historical 
relationship, between legal systems or between rules of more than one system”294 
 
Similarly, Rainer asserted that comparative law is a sub-discipline of jurisprudence which 
engages in the study of different phenomena in the different legal systems of the world and 
comparatively examines and analyses them.295 A comparative study in law would indicate 
the consideration of the similarities and differences of the different legal systems of the 
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world.296 Recommendations from the comparative study of a developed country can in turn, 
impact the policy decisions of other nations.297 
 
Comparative study therefore, analyses the similarities and differences of different legal 
systems, and explains the rationale for such similarities and differences.298 Zweigert and 
Kötz stated that functionality is the fundamental methodological principle of all comparative 
law study.299 Moreover, all the other rules that determine the choice and extent of the 
undertaking of the laws to be compared are generated from this principle.300 The scholars 
premise the importance of comparative analysis because most legal systems of different 
societies face fundamentally the same problems.301 A comparative study helps in 
standardizing specific areas of law, or in determining defective aspects of a law.302 This 
necessitates the need for legal transplants from one regime to another. Firstly, in conducting 
a legal transplant, the jurisdiction borrowing the law or legal system of another must be 
confident that its legal system is capable of accommodating the borrowed laws or systems 
of the lending jurisdiction.303 
 
1.4.3.1 General Views on Legal Transplant 
Pierre Legrand defined legal transplant as involving the transfer of law(s) from one 
jurisdiction to another.304 It would therefore naturally entail that legal transplant would 
require the comparative study of two jurisdictions to be able to carry out such a transfer of 
law. To determine whether this natural position has been entirely shared by major scholars 
on the subject, this study will mainly review the opinions of Watson and Kahn-Freund on this 
subject.305 To adapt aspects of the UK and USA model regimes, this study must first 
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determine why we must conduct a legal transplant and explore the possibility of 
transplanting the legal doctrines of an alien regime to another. This is after the study has 
determined the existence of any possible deficiency limiting the existing Nigerian regime. 
This is in line with the questions raised by Kahn-Freund during a lecture at the London School 
of Economics in June 26, 1973, where he asked: “what are the uses and misuses of foreign 
models in the process of law making? What conditions must be fulfilled in order to make 
desirable or even make it possible for those who prepare new legislations to avail themselves 
of rules or institutions developed in foreign countries?”306 
 
Similarly, Watson argued that the laws of all societies were simply borrowed from one 
another.307 Hence for Watson, legal transplant involved the movement of rules from one 
society to another.308 According to him, transplants are beneficial to countries with defective 
legal regimes because they contribute to their legal development by strengthening the areas 
of deficiency in the regime.309 He further asserted that it was not really necessary for the 
borrowing state to be concerned about the legal and political structure of the donor state, 
although such knowledge would make the transplant process more efficient.310 According to 
him, the, “[s]uccessful legal borrowing could be made from a very different legal system, 
even from one at a much higher level of development and of a different political complexion. 
What, in my opinion, the law reformer should be after in looking at foreign systems was an 
idea which could be transformed into part of the law of his country. For this a systematic 
knowledge of the law or political structure of the donor system was not necessary, though a 
law reformer with such knowledge would be more efficient. Successful borrowing could be 
achieved even when nothing was known of the political, social or economic context of the 
foreign law.”311 As implied from Watson’s argument, although it would be more efficient for 
a country that is borrowing a legal system to know the socio-political and economic 
environment in which the foreign rules were enacted, such knowledge is not absolutely 
necessary. It is apparent that Watson’s argument sought to dissociate the direct link between 
law and society. It could also be implied that he placed priority on the deficiency existing in 
the borrowing country’s system being corrected rather than the externalities that were 
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involved during the transplant (such as the question as to whether there was sufficient 
knowledge of the foreign rules).  
 
He further stated that “The Reception [of Roman law] shows that legal rules may be 
successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic, geographical and political 
circumstances of the recipient are very different from those of the donor system. Indeed, 
the recipient system does not require any real knowledge of the social, economic, 
geographical and political context of the origin and growth of the original rule. [W]here a 
rule of Roman law was inimical to the political, social or economic circumstances of a later 
state, its chances of being borrowed by that later state would be greatly diminished. But this 
reduced possibility of being borrowed existed . . . usually only when the rule was inimical 
and not also when the Roman context of the rule was simply different from the circumstances 
prevailing in the later state. ... One might deduce the proposition: However historically 
conditioned their origins might be, rules of private law in their continuing lifetime have no 
inherent close relationship with a particular people, time or place.”312 By this assertion, he 
implied that while he believed that the borrowing of an entirely different legal system will 
still be beneficial to a borrowing country, such benefits will be diminished where the borrowed 
rules are detrimental in nature.313 By such, the borrowed rules might also be detrimental to 
the legal system of the borrowing country.314 
 
On the other hand, Kahn-Freund faulted the view of Watson regarding the ease of carrying 
out a legal transplant.315 He argued that it would be totally difficult to transplant the legal 
rules of one country to another without a comprehensive knowledge of the socio-political 
and economic climate in which the rules were made.316 He summarised this argument in his 
statement that: “we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are 
transplantable….Any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin 
continues to entail the risk of rejection. The consciousness of this risk will not, I hope deter 
legislators in this or any other country from using the comparative method. All I have wanted 
to suggest is that its use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its 
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social, and above all, its political context. The use of comparative law for practical purposes 
becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores this context of 
law.”317 Kahn-Freund rather suggested that a country seeking to borrow legal rules must 
reflect on the environment within which the rules were enacted and how it had been applied 
in the foreign legal system. Therefore, unlike Watson, Kahn-Freund sought to unite law and 
society in a way that one cannot do without the other, and from this generate a basis for a 
legal transplant to take place.  
 
It is evident that Watson and Kahn-Freund agreed on the benefits of legal transplant for the 
development of a defective regime. It is also evident that both scholars sought to propose 
the best way to approach the process of legal transplant. Watson’s argument placed huge 
consideration on the benefit of the transplant, regardless of the extent of difference in the 
legal systems of the transferring jurisdictions. On the other hand, Kahn-Freund’s argument 
is predicated on the ground that while legal transplant is essential to legal development in a 
country, it would be inconceivable to expect that the transplantation of an entire system or 
rule would be easily applicable in the borrowing country.318 This is because it is believed that 
legal rules could become difficult to apply as they pass from one culture to another.319 Hence 
there has to be a reasonable relationship between the comparator jurisdictions that will show 
that an adaptation of the regime would fit into the other. Kahn-Freund also argued that it is 
best to adapt specific aspects of the lending regime that can correct the specific deficiencies 
identified in the borrowing regime.320 
 
This study agrees with the view of Watson to the extent that if the regime of a borrowing 
country has significantly deficient rules, it would only be expected that the deficient system 
is corrected by adopting the legal systems of a regime better developed in those aspects. 
This is however, on the basis that the borrowing regime can be convinced that the system 
being borrowed is worth borrowing. Hence, the study does not agree that a legal transplant 
should be carried out without a consideration of the adaptability of the aspect being 
transplanted to the borrowing country. To this effect, this study also agrees with the view of 
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Kahn-Freund that it is necessary for a country seeking to borrow legal rules from the regime 
of another country to consider the applicability of the rules in its regime. Hence, there should 
be some similarity between the comparator regimes propelling such comparison ab-initio. 
Moreover, only specific aspects that present solutions to the deficiencies in the defective 
regime should be adapted. This is in line with the suggestion of Cohn that the best way to 
conduct a successful legal transplant is by adapting aspects of the legal regime that would 
provide solutions for the identified deficiencies in the defective regime.321 To this effect, the 
legal system/rules to be adapted must be harmonised to fit into the system already in place 
in the borrowing country.   
 
1.4.3.2 The Utilisation of Comparative Study and Legal Transplant in this Study 
For the purposes of deriving solutions to the possible deficiencies of the Nigerian 
environmental criminal regime, the study will utilise the tool of comparative legal research 
whereby it will identify possible aspects of the UK and USA regimes that present solutions to 
the specific defects identified in the Nigerian regime. This is because both Watson and Kahn-
Freund agreed with the fact that comparative study is an essential tool to correcting the 
deficiencies of a defective regime (a major objective this study seeks to accomplish). 
However, as has been argued by Kahn-Freund, the study cannot just compare the UK and 
USA model regimes with Nigeria without first establishing some form of relationship 
propelling such comparison.  
 
As will be seen, this study is mainly concerned with oil and gas pollution. For this reason, 
the study has utilised three comparator regimes which are all oil and gas producing nations 
and have established applicable environmental criminal regimes to regulate oil and gas 
operations in their jurisdictions (regardless of whether the regimes have been effective or 
not).322 This study has already established Nigeria to be endowed with oil and gas resources. 
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Similarly, the USA and UK are notable for their upstream oil and gas operations.323 It is also 
believed that both jurisdictions underwent significant reforms as a result of significant 
environmental disasters that occurred in their countries.324 Based on this, it is suggested 
that the UK and USA regimes have developed environmental criminal regimes (at least better 
developed when compared to Nigeria). It is for this reason the researcher has chosen them 
as model jurisdictions for the legal transplant. However, one could argue that there could be 
other developed regimes, hence why compare with and transplant from the UK and USA 
regimes?  
 
Indeed, the UK, USA and Nigeria are common law jurisdictions, and for this reason have 
similar styles of legal system. This creates some form of historical background to the legal 
systems of the comparator jurisdictions. This research is of the view that the similarity in 
the UK and USA legal systems to the Nigerian system would enable a reasonably smooth 
comparison. Moreover, just as in Nigeria relevant regulation in the form of criminal sanctions 
and regulatory enforcement mechanisms have been established to regulate the 
environmental aspects of the oil and gas industry. It has been asserted that the UK has 
utilised adequate environmental criminal sanctions and regulatory enforcement mechanisms 
to regulate environmental commitment in its oil and gas industry.325 It is therefore, the view 
of this study that adapting aspects of such developed sanctions and enforcement 
mechanisms in the UK regime (in the context of the Nigerian identified deficiencies) will 
inspire a correction of some of the deficiencies identified in the Nigerian regime. As has been 
mentioned above, for a legal transplant to be carried out, the researcher must first 
adequately explore the aspects of the developed jurisdiction to ensure that it is able to fit 
into the borrowing jurisdiction. Moreover, this study agrees with Kahn-Freund that it will be 
inconceivable to transplant the entire enforcement system or statutory sanctions into the 
Nigerian regime. For this reason, the study has only chosen to adapt specific aspects of the 
UK regime that inspires solutions to some of the deficiencies in the Nigerian regime.  
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Furthermore, this study will seek to utilise an adaptation of aspects of the USA regime in 
correcting some of the deficiencies identified in the Nigerian regime. Unlike Nigeria, that has 
specifically mandated a duty on the government to protect the Nigerian environment,326 the 
USA Constitution has not incorporated this provision.327 This might be because the drafters 
of the USA Constitution in 1787 did not foresee the severe effect that the unprecedented 
expansion of population, technology and economic power would have on the environment.328 
However, in a bid to develop even further in this regard, there has been an increasing 
demand for environmental obligations to be included in the USA Constitution.329 In choosing 
the USA as a comparator regime to Nigeria, the study observes that just like Nigeria, 
environmental legislation and policy frameworks in the USA are formulated at federal, state 
and local levels. Hence, just like Nigeria, the USA has federal environmental legislations 
prohibiting different hues of environmental crime in its oil and gas industry and stipulating 
penalties relevant to each offence.330 This study concentrates on the USA federal 
environmental laws because unlike the state and local laws, the federal laws apply to all 
inhabitants and companies in the USA. This position was argued in the case of Butz v 
Economou,331 whereby it was held that all US individuals were subject to federal law. 
Furthermore, scholars believe that the USA environmental regime has effectively utilized 
criminal enforcement against environmental harm in its oil and gas industry.332 In addition, 
since after independence, Nigeria has adapted features similar to the USA system such as 
the utilization of a republican constitution.333 Nigeria is also a federal state with its federal 
environmental structure tailored to the one applicable in the USA.334 Hence, it is appropriate 
to compare the USA’s model of enforcement of environmental standards with the Nigerian 
model.  
                                                             
326 This is stipulated in Section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution (as amended) 1999. 
327 Lynton K Caldwell, 'The Case For An Amendment To The Constitution Of The United States For Protection Of The 
Environment Affirming Responsibilities Rather Than Declaring Rights May Be The Most Promising Route To The Objective' 
[1991] Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 
<https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context=delpf> accessed 16 July 2019. 
328 ibid. 
329 Lynton K Caldwell, 'A Constitutional Law for the Environment: 20 Years with NEPA Indicates the Need' (1989) 31 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 6. 
330 Victoria Kajo, 'An Evaluation of the Need for and Functioning of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States 
and Nigeria' [2008] 14 Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers 
<https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1042&context=lps_clacp>accessed 
12 August 2019. 
331 Butz v Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). 
332 Michael Hertz, 'Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement' (2019) 7 Fordham Environmental Law Review 679-
681. 
333 Engobo Emeseh (n.37) p.200. 
334 ibid. 
   44 
 
1.5 Justification for the Study 
In justifying this research, this study will first establish the scope of the oil and gas industry 
which it will concentrate on. It has been asserted in section 1.3.1 that this study will 
concentrate on the extraction of conventional energy resources. Hence the discussion in this 
study will focus on operations that occur during the upstream stage. The study also observed 
in section 1.3.2 that most of the Nigerian extraction activities occur in the onshore areas of 
the Niger Delta. Similarly, issues arising from the Nigerian upstream oil and gas operations 
(particularly in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria) have mainly occurred during such onshore 
operations. It will also be observed in chapter 3 that distinct environmental statutory 
provisions in the Nigerian regime relate to the onshore oil and gas industry. In the same 
light, distinct environmental regulators (enforcement agencies) regulate the environmental 
aspects of onshore operations in the industry (as will be seen in this study). Similarly, the 
UK onshore industry is regulated as will also be discussed in chapter 5. Scholars have 
mentioned different environmental agencies that carry out enforcement in the onshore oil 
and gas industry for the extraction of conventional resources to include: the Environment 
Agency (EA) in England, Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland and 
Natural Resources Wales (NRW) in Wales, and also the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).335 
Similarly, as will be seen in chapter 5 of this study, the USA onshore industry is regulated 
which is exemplified in the roles of the EPA and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).  
 
However, both the UK and USA regimes are largely offshore.336 Environmental regulatory 
structures for the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) are 3 tiered (international, regional and 
national).337 It is also noteworthy that significant oil pollution that has been recorded in the 
UK has occurred on its coastal areas (as will be recorded in chapter 5 of this study). 
Moreover, the environmental criminal provisions in some UK environmental statutes such as 
the Environmental Protection Act 1990 relate to both onshore and offshore operations. Also, 
the requirement of well integrity in other predominantly offshore instruments such as the 
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations 1996 (DCR) 
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apply to all wells drilled with a view to the extraction of petroleum regardless of whether 
they are onshore or offshore.338 
 
Similarly, the USA upstream conventional oil and gas regime is predominantly offshore.339 
Pursuant to Section 3(3) of the USA’s Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953, “the outer 
Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the Federal Government for the 
public, which should be made available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to 
environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of 
competition and other national needs.” It has been asserted that offshore oil and gas in the 
Gulf of Mexico is a major source of oil and natural gas in the USA.340 According to the Energy 
Information Administration, “Gulf of Mexico federal offshore oil production accounts for 17% 
of total USA crude oil production and federal offshore natural gas production in the Gulf 
accounts for 5% of total U.S. dry production.”341 Furthermore, it will be observed that most 
environmental regulation utilised in the USA in the form of statutory instruments and 
enforcement agencies mostly cover offshore operations.  
 
Hence, this research will also occasionally refer to environmental aspects relating to the 
offshore industry. In effect, the study will mainly concentrate on environmental aspects of 
the onshore industry but also use environmental aspects of the offshore industry to build its 
literature on regulation. 
 
Having established the scope of the oil and gas industry in which this study will focus on, it 
is necessary to justify the reason for carrying out this research. It has been earlier observed 
that the oil and gas sector constitutes a significant portion of the Nigerian economy. The 
activities of the sector have a disproportionate impact on politics in Nigeria, hence carry 
greater weight. In the literature review section, this study has identified the argument by 
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writers that environmental violations such as pollution have been inherent during the 
upstream stages of oil and gas activities, particularly in the onshore areas. This creates a 
necessity for the utilisation of effective regulatory measures in compelling compliance with 
environmental standards in the industry. Writers have argued in favour of the utilisation of 
criminal sanctions and administrative enforcement to achieve this.342 It is believed that 
strong sanctioning and enforcement will ensure a robust regulatory structure for 
environmental management in the industry.343 
 
This study is essential to determine the regulatory performance of criminal sanctions and 
administrative enforcement in compelling compliance with environmental standards in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. This determination is important considering the repeated 
allegations of violations in the industry, particularly in the form of pollution. While the study 
has given an example of violation in the form of pollution in the literature review section, 
the study will further discuss in chapter 3, other possible forms of violation that have 
occurred during the Nigerian upstream oil and gas operations. This research will utilise an 
identification of the violation to establish the defectiveness of the Nigerian environmental 
regulatory system. The study will further seek to identify deficiencies that have contributed 
to the defective regulatory system identified. Upon identifying the deficiencies, the study will 
explore possible aspects of other model regimes (the UK and the USA) that proffer solutions 
to the deficiencies. The adaptation of aspects of these model regimes will aid in correcting 
some of the deficiencies contributing the poor performance of the Nigerian environmental 
regulatory regime.  
 
1.5.1 Contribution of Thesis to Body of Knowledge/Research Impact 
In section 1.0 of this study, regulation was identified to be a tool of enforcing environmental 
standards. The study further identified two distinct forms of regulation in the Nigerian 
environmental regime as being criminal enforcement through sanctioning and administrative 
enforcement. While these regulatory tools are inherent in Nigerian environmental law, 
environmental standards have been continually breached in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
This study therefore seeks to prove that this continued breach translates to an inherent 
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defect in the form and/or utilisation of these significant regulatory tools in the Nigerian 
regime (particularly with relation to the environmental aspects of the Nigerian upstream oil 
and gas industry). 
 
Scholars such as Emeseh have undertaken research that identified defects in criminal 
enforcement as a regulatory tool in the Nigerian environmental regime.344 However, unlike 
this study, such previous research has been more general rather than comprehensively 
dealing with such defects in the scope of upstream oil and gas operations. Moreover, such 
previous research has failed to explicitly identify deficiencies that have contributed to such 
defects. On the other hand, this study seeks to identify both the defects of the regulatory 
tools and the deficiencies that have contributed to the defectiveness. In particular, Emeseh’s 
research was carried out in 2005. This study argues that this is a long time ago and several 
developments relating to the regulatory tools could have occurred in the Nigerian regime 
since that period. An example of such new occurrence were the enactments of the National 
Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment) Act 2006 and the National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007 
which were not in place at the time of her research.  
 
In addition, this study is necessary to point out some defects that have persisted since 
previous observations in previous researchers. For example, while Emeseh’s study pointed 
out that the Nigerian government was attempting to prosecute oil and gas criminal polluters 
at the time,345 this study might discover the possibility that no such prosecution has occurred 
to date. This study therefore serves as a litmus test on the progress of the Nigerian 
environmental regulatory regime in line with previous observations and recommendations 
for its improvement. 
 
1.6 Limitation of the Study 
This study is limited by its significant reliance on the well documented ‘big picture’ of 
environmental violations in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and the possible inability of 
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agencies to perform properly. This limitation is a result of the reluctance of the relevant 
enforcement agencies to provide information regarding the extent and progress on their 
enforcement and the extent of compliance by the companies. As a result, the study relies on 
this existing well documented evidence on the subjects. This limitation is partly caused by 
the volatility of the Niger Delta environment discussed further in the study and the seeming 
unwillingness of both the oil and gas companies operating in the region and enforcement 
agencies in the Nigerian environmental regime to make accessible, information regarding 
enforcement and compliance with environmental standards in the industry. 
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Chapter Two 
Environmental Standards, Criminal Sanctions and Administrative 
Enforcement in the Nigerian Regime 
2.0 General Overview of Environmental Principles  
This chapter will first provide a general overview of environmental principles that 
are central to environmental law in environmental regimes.1 In effect, 
environmental principles are the framework for environmental protection in the 
regimes. Subsequently, it will examine environmental law provisions in Nigeria 
that stipulate environmental standards reflecting environmental principles such as 
the prevention principle and the public participation and environmental awareness 
principle. Hence, this chapter will be divided into two parts- (a) a general overview 
of environmental principles; (b) an identification of environmental standards in 
the Nigerian regime that reflect some of the principles and establish criminal 
sanctions that prohibit violations of the standard. The general overview is 
necessary as it gives insight into principles that can be explored by future research 
towards formulating new environmental law provisions to regulate the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry. Hence, it is notable that some of the principles that will be 
discussed in the first part of this chapter may not be presently reflected in the 
Nigerian regime.  Furthermore, the analysis of some principles in this chapter will 
relate to offshore examples which is understandable considering that the UK and 
USA oil and gas regimes have been established to be predominantly offshore.  
 
2.1 No-Harm Principle 
As has been earlier mentioned, this study will also extend its focus to 
environmental regulation in offshore operations. Article 2 of the 1982 United 
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulated the sovereignty of 
a coastal state to extend beyond its land territory, internal waters archipelagic 
waters, territorial sea, and air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed 
and subsoil.2 This provision affirmed the 1952 United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolution regarding the free right of states to own and exploit their 
natural resources.3 However, Article 2(3) of the UNCLOS limited the sovereignty 
of states to be subject to the provisions of the convention and other rules of 
international environmental law. In effect, Article 2(3) obligates that the 
operations undertaken by a host state in exploiting its natural resources must be 
done in a manner that would not breach the sovereign environment of other 
states.   
 
This is supported by Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration which stipulates that: “states 
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.”4 In effect, this principle is premised on the grounds that every state 
has the right to exploit the resources within its territories. However, such 
exploitation must not cause environmental damage to other states or the 
international community.  
 
The responsibility that emanates from this principle however, precedes the Rio 
Declaration. Prior to this, there was an obligation on all states to protect the rights 
of other states situated in the Trail Smelter case,5 whereby it was stated that: 
“under principles of international law . . . no state has the right to use or permit 
the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or 
                                                             
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982. 
3 United Nations General Assembly – ‘Right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources’, 21 December, 1952. 
GA Res. 626 (VII). 
4 This Declaration was produced at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
at Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992 AGENDA 21 (also known as the Earth Summit) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]. 
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1972). 
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to…properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”6 
 
This principle was later set out in Article 194 (2) of the UNCLOS which stipulated 
that: “States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to…. 
their environment.” Similarly, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration7 provided 
that while states had the sovereign rights over their resources in line with their 
environmental policies, they owed an obligation to avoid causing environmental 
harm in the process of utilising such resources.  
 
Based on these instruments, one can assume that regardless of any rights to 
utilise and maximise oil and gas resources, oil and gas participants including the 
host states are required to have recourse to this obligation. This study argues that 
this obligation imposes a standard on states in which a project with significant 
environmental risk is being carried out, to draw out an environmental legislative 
framework regulating such a project and also enforce such a framework on the 
participants of such project. Such a framework must be worded in such a way that 
obligates the participants to prevent pollution at all costs. In that case, such a 
state would be operating a regime that clearly regulates the operators against 
polluting at all. This regime would clearly establish that there is no room for 
pollution in the first place, something that will be referred to as the preventive 
principle of environmental law. This study will therefore examine how this 
prevention can be applied as an environmental principle. 
 
2.2 Preventive Principle 
The preventive principle (also referred to as the prevention principle) is very 
similar to the no-harm principle.8 However, the preventive principle went beyond 
requiring just an avoidance of environmental damage to mandate the reduction 
                                                             
6 United States v Canada 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941). 
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and control of activities that might actually cause the environmental damage.9 
Hence this principle seeks to prevent pollution, and in the event of an occurrence 
of pollution, control and reduce it. This is in line with Principle 7 of the Stockholm 
Declaration which provides that “States shall take all possible steps to prevent 
pollution….by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to 
harm living resources and marine life.”  
 
This study believes that the requirement to take steps (as mentioned in Principle 
7 above) would entail some measure of diligence in the form of action to be 
undertaken by the host state and operator.10  For the operator it would include 
undertaking tangible commitments towards the prevention, reduction or control 
of pollution or all of them. This requirement for diligence in preventing 
environmental damage was underscored in the Pulp Mills Case11 whereby the ICJ 
noted that “the principle of prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins in the 
due diligence that is required of a state in its territory.”12 
 
Similarly, Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities mandates states to exercise all proper measures at 
preventing pollution and minimising its risk.13 This duty is emphasized in 
Regulation(s) 2-3 of the Offshore Installations (Emergency Pollution Control) 
Regulations 2002 which empowers the UK government to intervene in an accident 
involving offshore facilities to prevent and reduce the likelihood of pollution. 
Incidental to this right, Regulation 2 empowers the Secretary of State to direct 
the operator (or the operator’s agent)14 of an offshore installation to take or refrain 
from taking any action, in line with the objective of preventing pollution.15 In view 
of this, the Secretary of State can direct the operator to relocate the installation 
(or parts of the installation), not cause the discharge of any oil16 or substance, 
                                                             
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14 (‘Pulp Mills’), 
para. 101. 
12 ibid. 
13 Art. 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001 
stipulates that “the State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary 
harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.” 
14 Regulation 3(2) of the Offshore Installations (Emergency Pollution Control) Regulations 2002. 
15 ibid. Regulation 3(3). 
16 Pursuant to Regulation 2 of the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control) 
Regulations 2005, oil is defined as: “any liquid hydrocarbon or substitute liquid hydrocarbon, including 
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and take remedial measures when pollution has occurred.17 If the Secretary of 
State is dissatisfied with the adequacy of the direction, he may take “any action 
of any kind whatsoever”18 such as taking over control of the relevant facility,19 or 
destroying the facility (or its parts).20 
 
Another major component of preventing pollution in the oil and gas industry is the 
decommissioning of oil and gas facilities after the production life cycle. In any 
oilfield operation, some assets are routinely decommissioned when they are no 
longer useful to production.21  Decommissioning involves decoupling of oil rig 
installations or oil wells.22  An oil well can be decommissioned when it has reached 
its economic limit.23 The process of decommissioning often involves the removal 
of the tubing of the well and sections of the wellbore filled with concrete.24 The 
environmental consideration for proper decommissioning is that idle structures 
used previously for development could be damaged, then cause environmental 
pollution.25 There are two types of decommissioning, namely onshore and offshore 
decommissioning.26 Onshore decommissioning involves the operator plugging well 
bores with cement to prevent ground water contamination; dismantling of storage 
tanks, wellheads, waste handling pits, processing equipment and pump jacks and 
securing any exhausted or non-producing wells.27 
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25 Ayoade M Adedayo, 'Environmental Risk and Decommissioning of Offshore Oil Platforms in Nigeria' (2011) 
1 NIALS Journal of Environmental Law 2. 
26 ibid. 
27 James Pittard, 'Field Abandonment Costs Vary Widely World-Wide' (1997) 95 Oil and Gas Journal 84. 
On the other hand, offshore decommissioning involves four distinct stages: a comprehensive planning process to 
determine the options; termination of oil and gas production, and safe plugging of the wells; dismantling of all 
or part of the installation; and disposal or recycling of the dismantled parts. Unlike fixed platforms, a 
demobilised Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) structure only requires the decommissioning 
of subsea equipment and pipelines; and the plugging and abandonment of wells. 
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It is asserted that most states provide domestic regulations guiding 
decommissioning in their onshore operations.28 On the other hand, the system in 
the offshore industry is regulated by international treaties and rules.29 The 
standard of decommissioning for offshore installations is specified in Article 60 of 
the UNCLOS which provided that: “…any installations or structures which are 
abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into 
account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard 
by the competent international organization. Such removal shall also have due 
regard to fishing, the protection of the marine environment and the rights and 
duties of other States.” This provision imposes an even higher standard on the 
operator by requiring a consideration of environmental issues during the 
operation. Hence, the expectation goes beyond just removing disused structures, 
to removing it in a manner that does not cause pollution to the environment.  
 
Similar to this, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) Decision 98/3 prohibited the “dumping 
and the leaving wholly or partly in place, of disused offshore installations within 
the maritime area.”30 In the Decision, the competent authority of relevant  
contracting parties can only permit the leaving of a disused installation or parts of 
it when such an installation falls under the categories described in Annex 1,31 is 
subject to assessment (as stipulated in Annex 2) and consultation (as provided 
for in Annex 3) and with implementation reporting (in Annex 4).  As a way of 
implementing the Decision, OSPAR has maintained a revised inventory of all oil 
and gas offshore installations in the OSPAR maritime area.32 The inventory 
specifies the name and identification number, location, operator, water depth…..of 
the installation.33 
 
                                                             
28 Marc Hammerson, Oil and Gas Decommissioning: Law, Policy and Comparative Practice (1st edn, Globe 
Business Publishing Ltd 2013) p.284. 
29 ibid. 
30 The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention) was open for signature at the Ministerial Meeting of the Oslo and Paris Commissions in Paris on 22 
September 1992. The Convention entered into force on 25 March 1998 and replaced the Oslo and Paris 
Conventions.  
31 The categories specified under Annex A includes: a. steel installations weighing more than ten thousand 
tonnes in air; b. gravity based concrete installations; c. floating concrete installations; d. any concrete anchor-
base which results, or is likely to result, in interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
32 Marc Hammerson (n.28) p.54 
33 ibid. 
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In 1989, former Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO), 
(currently IMO) published its Guidelines and Standards regarding the removal of 
installations in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the continental shelf, 
while requiring coastal states to subjectively consider whether or not each of the 
installations is permitted to remain on the seabed.34 Two of the other factors 
expected to be considered by coastal states in accordance with the Guidelines are 
the extent of degradation a failure to decommission could cause; and the potential 
harmful effect such failure could have on the marine environment.35 To this effect, 
the Standards gave the directive that “all abandoned or disused installations or 
structures……should be entirely removed.”36 
 
Two other prominent words that feature in the preventive principle (as can be 
seen from the definition of preventive principle above) are ‘reduction’ and ‘control.’ 
This means that while this principle requires due actions to guarantee that 
pollution does not occur, it includes the duty to remedy and limit the effect of the 
pollution after it has occurred. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration provides 
the responsibility to “improve the environment for present and future 
generations.” Similarly, Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration makes this clear 
by stating that: “The discharge of toxic substances or other substances and the 
release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of 
the environment to render them harmless, must be halted.” Improvement is 
generally defined as value added or an amelioration and repair of an existing 
state.37 This entails a measure of correcting an existing deplorable state. Applying 
this understanding of improvement to Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration, it 
could be interpreted that the provision also stipulates the requirement for diligence 
to correct an already polluted environment.  
 
This study is of the view that the required diligence (as established in the Pulp 
Mills Case) and the expected ‘measures’ (as established in the ILC Draft Articles) 
on the part of a host state would best be exercised through clear actions of 
regulations to control and minimise pollution within its territory. With respect to 
                                                             
34 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry and Governments (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) p.339. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. p.340. 
37 Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary (2nd edn, Black Law) 
<https://thelawdictionary.org/improvement/>accessed 8 March 2019. 
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oil and gas operations, it implies that the diligence would elicit some form of 
environmental vigilance by the state over the actions of operators that develop oil 
and gas resources within its territory. The best way to exercise this vigilance would 
therefore be to regulate the activities of oil and gas operators within its territory 
such that they show tangible actions towards preventing pollution and when they 
have caused pollution, they clean it up and remediate the environment.  
 
This was expressed in the Pulp Mills Case whereby it was emphasized that states 
must adopt rules and measures to regulate public and private operators and be 
vigilant in their administrative enforcement over private and public operators 
within their territory.38 An exercise of the apparatus of vigilance could include 
utilising the command and control approach to compel the oil and gas operator to 
comply with the obligation to prevent pollution. The command and control 
approach of regulation has often utilised the polluter pays principle of 
environmental law to achieve this purpose. This study will therefore discuss the 
polluter pays principle as an apparatus through which the state will regulate the 
environmental aspects operations within its territory. 
 
2.3 Polluter-Pays Principle 
Pollution is defined as the degradation of the quality of the environment with 
hazardous substances by a person.39 The OECD also, views pollution as “‘…the 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
environment resulting in deleterious effects.”40 In this vein, the European 
Commission defines a polluter as “‘someone who directly or indirectly damages 
the environment...”41 Bleeker argued that the increase in economic activities, 
together with population growth precipitated the unprecedented damage to the 
environment and public health.42 
 
                                                             
38 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (n.11) para.97.  
39 Jude Eeanokwasa, 'An Appraisal of the Conformity of the 2007 Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act to the 
Polluter Pays Principle1' (2017) 8 Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 
66. 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid.  
42 Arne Bleeker, 'Does the Polluter Pay? The Polluter-Pays Principle in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Justice' (2009) 18 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 289. 
   57 
 
The polluter-pays principle therefore indicates that environmental cost for 
pollution be borne by a polluter.43 Indeed, the implications and interpretation of 
the principle has been open to discussion.44 However, Gaines noted that the 
increasing demand to protect the global environment has facilitated the issue of 
who bears the pollution costs that could arise.45 To this effect, the polluter-pays 
principle seeks to ensure that the polluter bears the costs of pollution.46 Similarly, 
Steven argued that in response to the increased environmental concerns facing 
countries (especially concerning corporate pollution), governments such as the 
USA and UK had implemented regulations or taxes to compel polluters to bear the 
cost of preventing and remedying their pollution.47 Hence, the polluter-pays 
principle could be assumed to incorporate the cost of preventing pollution at the 
decision making level of an organisation.48  According to Bleeker, the common 
issues that must be determined in applying the polluter-pays principle are: who 
should bear the cost of pollution; the scale/extent of pollution/potential pollution 
to determine the pollution cost; and the cost of pollution.49 
 
The polluter-pays principle became significant in Europe in 1972 when the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommended it 
to become the principle guiding the economic standards for every environmental 
policy.50 In line with the recommendation, there is a requirement that the cost of 
pollution has to be included while considering the costs of goods and services.51 
Furthermore, Paragraph 4.0 of the Recommendation of the Council concerning the 
Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution required operators 
of hazardous installation to bear the cost of prevention and control of their 
accidental pollution, subject to the domestic law of the jurisdictions of their 
                                                             
43 Philip Sands and others (n.8) p.230. 
44 ibid. 
45 Sanford Gaines, 'The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos' (1991) 26 
Texas International Law Journal 463. 
46 Philip Sands and others (n.8) p.228. 
47 Candice Stevens, 'Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and Environment Context' (1994) 27 
Cornell International Law Journal 577. 
48 Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi and Shruti Rajagopalan, 'The Rise and Fall of the Polluter-Pays Principle in 
Developing Countries' (2012) 32 International Review of Law and Economics 135-144. 
49 Arne Bleeker (n.42).  
50 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Council Recommendation concerning 
the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution C (72)128 (1972), 14 ILM 236 (1975). 
51 ibid. Annex, para. A.4. 
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operations.52 Similarly, the Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) has applied 
the polluter-pays principle to the illegal discharge of hazardous waste and waste 
oil.53 
 
The above declaration set out the stance of action that European member states 
are required to adopt for the environment.54 The declaration sets out the polluter-
pays principle as significant in developing the European environmental policy.55 
Subsequent to this, the principle has been permanently adopted in environmental 
legislation.56 For instance, it became a constitutional principle by virtue of the 
enactment of Article 130 (r) of the Single European Act 1987.57 Affirming the 
principle as a general principle of environmental law, the European Council 
adopted at union level, the Recommendation which states that: “natural or legal 
persons governed by public or private law who are responsible for pollution must 
pay the costs of such measures as are necessary to eliminate that pollution or to 
reduce it so as to comply with the standards or equivalent measures laid down by 
the authorities.”58 
 
The Council also recommended that its member states incorporate this ideology 
of the polluter-pays principle into their national legislation.59  The campaign for 
the incorporation of this principle into the national laws of states was further 
emphasized in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration which states that: “national 
authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that 
the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the 
public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.” It has 
been reported that several states have incorporated this principle into their 
national legislation.60 
                                                             
52 OECD Council Recommendation concerning the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental 
Pollution, C (89)88/Final, para. 4 (1989). 
53 Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (Waste Framework Directive). 
54 Jude Eeanokwasa (n.39).  
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
57 Single European Act 1987.  
58 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Cost Allocation and Action by Public Authorities on 
Environmental Matters, 75/436/EURATOM, ECSC, EEC (1975), Annex, para. 2; OJ L169 (1987). 
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In effect, the principle can be viewed as a sanction mechanism used to mitigate 
pollution.61 For this reason, it would be expected that the cost is determined 
proportionately to the extent of the pollution risk.62 By such, the principle would 
be serving as a form of deterrence to polluters. This is because in considering the 
high cost that can be appropriated to significant pollution, the polluter will make 
efforts at reducing and controlling the acts that can result in significant pollution. 
Indeed, in the oil and gas industry, the internalisation of pollution cost at the 
decision making/planning stage of operations will entail the operator spending 
more in maintaining good oilfield practice and investing more in the Best Available 
Technique (BAT) of oil and gas development instead of paying high pollution costs 
such as the cost of remediation.  
 
Anderson argued that the polluter-pays principle has become significant in the 
environmental policy of the USA.63 According to him, the Oil Pollution Act 1990 
which governs pollution discharge from vessels in the USA requires that polluters 
bear the liability of their pollution by bearing the cost of clean-up and damage.64 
Munir summarises what he believes a polluter should pay in his argument that a 
polluter ought to pay whatever the government regulation determines as 
necessary to improve the quality of a polluted environment.65 
 
The polluter-pays principle has been adopted in environmental treaties such as: 
Article 10(d) of the ASEAN Convention;66 Article 2(1) of the 1991 Alpine 
Convention;67 Article 3(4) of the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention;68 Article 2(2) (b) of 
                                                             
61 Eric Larson, 'Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the United States, the European Community, and 
Japan Have Grown Synonymous with the Polluter Pays Principle' (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 541. 
62 Irina Glazyrina, Vasiliy Glazyrin and Sergey Vinnichenko, 'The Polluter Pays Principle and Potential 
Conflicts in Society' (2006) 59 Ecological Economics 324. 
63 Charles Anderson, 'Marine Pollution and the Polluter Pays Principe: Should the Polluter Also Pay Punitive 
Damages' (2012) 43 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 43. 
64 ibid. 
65 Muhammad Munir, 'History and Evolution of the Polluter Pays Principle: How an Economic Idea Became a 
Legal Principle?' [2014] Institute of Legal Studies, Islamabad 
<http://file:///C:/Users/Sister%20Hope/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/Te
mpState/Downloads/SSRN-id2322485%20(1).pdf> accessed 8 March 2019. 
66 ASEAN Agreement on Conservation on Nature and Natural Resources on July 9, 1985 
<http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/asean.natural.resources.1985.html> accessed 10 December 2018. 
67 Convention on the Protection of the Alps (Alpine Convention) on November 7, 1991. 
68 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area signed in 1992 and entered 
into force on 17 January 2000. (Helsinki Convention). 
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the OSPAR Convention; and Article 2(5) (b) of the 1992 UNECE Transboundary 
Waters Convention which stipulates that the parties shall utilise the polluter-pays 
principle in determine which “costs of pollution prevention, control and reduction 
measures shall be borne by the polluter.”69 It is therefore apparent that the 
principle has gained global recognition.  
 
In the Nigerian environmental regime, several environmental provisions have 
provided for this principle. For example, Article 3.3 (IV) of the National Policy on 
Environment 1988 stipulates the polluter-pays principle as a guiding principle for 
the Nigerian environmental regime. Similarly, Section 12 (1) of the Harmful 
Wastes (special Criminal Provisions) Act, 1988 provides that the polluter who 
discharges or contributes to the discharge of harmful waste in Nigerian waters or 
on land shall be liable for the damage arising from such pollution. Similarly, 
Section 8.1 of the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2002 stipulates that: “a spiller shall be liable for 
the damage from a spill for which he is responsible.” 
 
Ezeanokwasa argues that the principle is not aimed at eliminating the chances of 
pollution occurring because that would be impossible. It rather seeks to ensure 
that pollution is kept at its barest minimum and does not escalate to a point where 
it adversely affects the environment.70 Indeed, the application of this 
environmental principle and earnest commitment to its application by an operator 
will entail that such an operator takes necessary precautions against the adverse 
effects of pollution. This precaution in itself comes as a principle of environmental 
law and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Precautionary Principle 
The term ‘precautionary principle” is an English translation of the German words 
‘Vors orgeprinzip.’71 Although the principle originated from German environmental 
                                                             
69 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes on 17th March 
1992. 
70 Jude Eeanokwasa (n.39) p.48. 
71 David Kriebel and others, 'The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science' (World Health Organisation 
2004) p.146. 
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policy, it has become a central factor in international environmental treaties 
regarding North Sea pollution, ozone-depleting chemicals, fisheries, climate 
change, and sustainable development over the past twenty years.72 To this effect, 
the principle is one of the governing principles of environmental laws in the 
European Union.73 It has been asserted that: “when an activity raises threats of 
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be 
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically.”74 In emphasising that the precautionary principle is based on the 
possibility of environmental harm occurring (which in this context becomes a risk), 
this study will utilise the definition of risk provided by Litmanen whereby he 
asserted that “ the problem with risk is that it is an abstract concept that refers to 
the future. It is not entirely here at the present moment; instead, it depends on a 
multiplicity of choices, which are made at the present moment. It is never entirely 
concrete and it always leaves room for different interpretations and debate. Parties 
involved in these debates, such as scientists, experts, journalists, lay people, 
power companies, or social movements avail themselves to different resources in 
an attempt to establish their views over the views of others, but looking from 
sociological perspective they all take part in social construction of risk, which is an 
ongoing process full of inconsistencies and contradictions.”75 
 
The precautionary principle has been defined in many different ways, and from 
different contexts.76 However, for the legal purposes of this study, the 
precautionary principle will be defined as environmental protection based on 
precaution, even where there is no clear evidence of harm or risk from an 
activity.77 Hence this principle suggests that actions be taken to protect the 
environment from possible pollution that could arise from carrying out an 
operation even when there is no absolute scientific evidence to prove the pollution 
                                                             
72 Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel A Tickner, Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle (1st Edn, Island Press 1999) p.300. 
73 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012/C 326/01. 
<http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/oj>accessed 8 March 2019. 
74 Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel A Tickner (n.72). 
75 Tapio Litmanen, 'The Struggle Over Risk. The Spatial, Temporal and Cultural Dimensions of Protest Against 
Nuclear Technology' (PhD, University of Jyväskylä 2001) p.45. 
76 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 'The Precautionary Principle' 
World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (UNESCO 2005) 
<https://en.unesco.org/themes/ethics-science-and-technology/comest> accessed 6 March 2020. 
77 Kimmo Jalava and others, 'The Precautionary Principle and Management of Uncertainties in EIAs – Analysis 
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risk of the operation.78 This is in line with Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration which 
states that: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental damage.”  
 
On the above grounds, four actions that exemplify the precautionary principle 
include: taking preventive action when faced by uncertainty; imposing the burden 
of proof on the proponents of any project; exploring other alternatives that could 
lead to the avoidance of harmful actions; and increasing public participation in 
decision making.79 To this effect, one of the key objectives of the principle is to 
remove the potential for excuse by an operator to carry out operations that could 
cause pollution simply due to the unavailability of scientific evidence to prove that 
the operation could cause the pollution. This requirement was also put forward in 
the preamble to the 1984 Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference 
on the Protection of the North Sea whereby it was stated that: “states must not 
wait for proof of harmful effects before taking action.” The precautionary principle 
can be significant in the environmental regulation of the oil and gas industry. This 
is because a failure to protect the environment on the excuse of lack of proof of 
potential pollution could result in significant/extensive environmental pollution 
which might then become too difficult for the operator to control or remedy.80 
 
Beyond this argument, the principle also seeks to ensure that host states and 
operators protect the environment when there is evidence of pollution risk in an 
operation. This view was reflected in Article 4(4) of the Convention for The 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention) which 
stated that: “the Contracting Parties may, furthermore, jointly or individually as 
appropriate, implement programmes or measures to forestall, reduce or eliminate 
pollution of the maritime area from land-based sources by a substance not then 
listed in Annex A to the present convention, if scientific evidence has established 
that a serious hazard may be created in the maritime area by that substance and 
if urgent action is necessary.”81  
                                                             
78 Philip Sands and others (n.8) p.219. 
79 David Kriebel and others (n.71). 
80 ibid. 
81 Convention for The Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources on June 4, 1974 (as amended 
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For oil and gas operations, this principle raises an expectation on the part of the 
host state to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the intending 
oil and gas development plans of the operator even before operation commences. 
EIA simply involves gathering information on the environmental impacts of a 
project/development before deciding whether or not to progress on such a 
project.82 The process utilises the best available sources of objective information 
through a systematic and holistic process that permits regulatory authorities and 
the general public to properly understand the impact of the proposed project.83 
The information gathered and presented in an EIA aids in the pollution risk 
evaluation of projects and by such, reduces the uncertainty surrounding the 
project.84 In effect, the EIA as an environmental policy tool reflects the 
precautionary principle because it seeks to identify and reduce the uncertainties 
and negative impacts associated with projects with uncertain effects on the 
environment.85 
 
Based on this principle, this study will expect that the EIA requirement is not only 
embedded within existing environmental laws regulating an oil and gas regime, 
but also the licence agreements entered into by the operator and the host state. 
Furthermore, based on the assertion of Article 4(4) above, an application of this 
principle will mean the host state and operator cancelling the undertaking of an 
intended oil and gas project/operation that has the possibility of harming the 
environment. It could also mean both parties engaging in practical measures that 
would reduce or minimise the potential environmental risk of the said oil and gas 
project.  
 
Indeed, the precautionary principle has even been linked to the principle of 
sustainable development. This link was made at the 1990 Bergen conference on 
Sustainable Development which stated that: “in order to achieve sustainable 
                                                             
82 Friends of the Earth, 'Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): A Campaigner's Guide' (Friends of the Earth 
2015) p.2. 
83 ibid. 
84 Ronlyn Duncan, 'Problematic Practice in Integrated Impact Assessment: The Role of Consultants and 
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development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. 
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of 
environmental degradation. When there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.”86 This provision 
creates the impression that a major aim of the principle is to achieve sustainable 
development. Relying on the expectation of environmental protection the principle 
hinges on, it could therefore be assumed that the sustainable development aim 
will also encompass protection of the environment. For this reason, this study will 
give an overview of the principle of sustainable development in the next section. 
 
2.5 Sustainable Development Principle 
This term ‘sustainable development’ has been mentioned in several environmental 
literatures.87 In line with this, it has been asserted that the principle has been 
recognised globally in environmental treaties and instruments.88 Rosencrantz and 
others have viewed sustainable development as an important paradigm for most 
discussions on environmental law and policy.89 In this study, sustainability is all 
about development, healthy and steady development. Among other definitions, 
sustainability as development was particularly set out in the publication of the 
Brundtland Report in 1987 whereby the concept was defined as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”90 
 
Two ideals embedded within this definition include: the ideal that the resources 
available to satisfy man’s needs are scarce, hence requiring a balance in its 
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2008) p.256; Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as A Principle of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2009) p.428; Alan E Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development 
(Oxford University Press 1999) p.408. 
88 Jo Burgess and Edward Barbier, 'Sustainable Development' [2001] International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
& Behavioural Sciences 15329. 
89 Armin Rosencrantz, Paul Kibel and Kathleen D. Yurchak, 'The Principles, Structure, And Implementation of 
International Environmental Law' (Ucar.edu, 1999) 
<https://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3html.html#chapter1> accessed 3 December 2018. 
90 World Commission on Environment and Development, 'Our Common Future' (1987) Oxford University Press 
p.43. 
   65 
 
utilisation so as not to extinguish the existing resource; and the ideal that 
industrialisation used to utilise the resources might affect the environment in a 
way that makes it uninhabitable for the future generations.91 This was reiterated 
in Principle 3 of Rio Declaration which stipulated that: “The right to development 
must be pursued so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs 
of current and future generations.” This principle therefore asserted the utilisation 
of resources in a reasonable manner and the consideration of environmental issues 
while utilising the resources. It means that all oil and gas projects must take into 
account the environmental aspects of its operations. This is regardless of the other 
spheres of development such a project will improve. An operator is expected under 
this principle, to consider the consequence of oil and gas operations on the 
environment such that it does not become uninhabitable for persons living around 
the development sites. 
 
The consideration of environmental issues will include the integration of the 
economic and other development plans of an operation.92 Hence, this principle 
also asserts the inclusion of environmental consideration at the decision making 
level of any project. The above assertions were reflected in the preamble to the 
1968 African Nature Convention which requires the utilisation of natural resources 
to “aim at satisfying the needs of man according to the carrying capacity of the 
environment.”93 Similarly, it was restated in Article 33 of the 1989 Lomé 
Convention which stated that: “...the protection and the enhancement of the 
environment and natural resources, the halting of the deterioration of land and 
forests, the restoration of ecological balances, the preservation of natural 
resources and their rational exploitation are basic objectives that the [states 
parties] concerned shall strive to achieve with community support with a view to 
bringing an immediate improvement in the living conditions of their populations 
and to safeguarding those of future generations.”94 
 
Indeed, sustainable development has also been found in several other guiding 
principles. For example, the principle of intergenerational equity acknowledges the 
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long duration of sustainability to meet the demands of future generations.95 
Furthermore, the polluter-pays principle stipulates that “governments should 
require polluting entities to bear the costs of their pollution rather than impose 
those costs on others or on the environment.”96 Hence, it is expected that violators 
found responsible for pollution bear the costs of preventing and controlling it 
rather than allowing its effect to negatively impact others. To this effect, a critical 
objective that the Brundtland Report identified as essential for the development 
of any state has been the consideration of environmental issues and economics in 
decision-making.97 This placed environmental protection at the very heart of any 
plan for resource exploitation. It therefore means that a state must consider the 
environmental effects of its resource maximisation operations and assess the 
potential risks of such effects while planning for such an operation. The issue 
therefore becomes ensuring that an integration of environmental concerns does 
not adversely affect other developmental indices (such as profit maximisation) of 
the host state and operators both in the present and future generation. 
 
The National Policy on Environment (NPE) is one of the fundamental frameworks 
providing the sustainable development principle under the Nigerian environmental 
regime.98 Paragraph 8 of the NPE described the legal framework as: “….an 
instrument that recognises the need to achieve a balance between environment, 
development and socio-economic considerations.”99 In the same vein, Paragraph 
4.1.4 of the NPE stipulates that: “the sustainable development of the oil and gas 
sector is, therefore, of utmost importance, especially since virtually all of the 
activities in both the upstream and downstream sectors are not only pollution-
prone, but readily provoke social discord.” In effect, the environmental regime 
sets out the sustainable development principles guiding the oil and gas sector in 
the NPE.  
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2.6 Access to Environmental Information, Public Participation and 
Access to Environmental Justice Principle 
The principle of access to environmental information, public participation, and 
access to environmental justice is relatively new in international environmental 
law.100 This principle is found in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).101 
 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights empowers all persons with 
a right to freely express their opinions, convey and receive information.102 Article 
3 (9) of the Aarhus Convention requires that the public should: “have access to 
information, have the possibility to participate in decision-making and have access 
to justice in environmental matters without discrimination as to citizenship, 
nationality or domicile and, in the case of a legal person, without discrimination 
as to where it has its registered seat or an effective centre of its activities.” These 
combined principles were also provided under Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
which stipulated: “Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of 
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, appropriate 
access to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making process. 
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” 
It therefore entails that this provision stipulates three salient principles being: 
1) Access to environmental information; 
2) Public Participation in environmental decision making; and  
3) Access to environmental justice. 
 
                                                             
100 Shawkat Alam and Others, Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (1st edn, Routledge 
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2.6.1 Access to Environmental information 
From the provision of Article 3(9) of the Aarhus Convention, this study observes 
a requirement on host states and other public authorities (such as enforcement 
agencies) to make available environmental information to all citizens. Indeed, it 
is believed that facilitating easy access to information regarding the state of the 
environment and activities that can cause pollution enhances public confidence in 
environmental regulation.103 In line with this pillar principle, Principle 2 of the 
Stockholm Declaration requires “the free flow of up-to-date scientific information 
and transfer of experience.” Similarly, Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration stipulates 
the “exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge”; Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration stipulates the “individual access to environmental information.”  
 
In line with this pillar principle, Article 205 and 206 of the UNCLOS stipulates that: 
“when  states have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under 
their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and 
harmful changes to the…environment, they shall as far as practicable, assess the 
potential effects of such activities….and shall communicate reports of the result of 
such assessments at appropriate intervals to the competent international 
organisations, which should make them available.” Similarly, Article 9(2) of the 
OSPAR Convention requires regulatory/enforcement authorities to provide the 
public with available information regarding activities that can potentially affect the 
environment. The Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers 
(PRTRs) reflects this principle by requiring its parties to establish coherent, 
nationwide PRTRs as a way of promoting public access to information.104A PRTR is 
a publicly accessible database or inventory of chemicals or pollutants released to 
air, water and soil and transferred off-site for treatment.105 It gathers information 
                                                             
103 Michael Baram, 'Risk Communication Law and Implementation Issues in The US and EC' (1988) 6 Boston 
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on the extent of pollutants discharged, where, how much and by whom.106 PRTRs 
typically require facility owners or operators who release pollutants to quantify 
their releases and to report them to government regularly.107 Although the PRTRs 
seem to have regulatory effect only on pollution information as against the actual 
pollution, it was envisaged that it will enhance the accountability of companies 
since most companies will not want to be seen as significant polluters.108 
 
This study appreciates the ability of the Environmental Information Regulations 
(EIRs) 2004109 to successfully transpose this principle into UK national 
legislation.110 Parts 2 and 3 of the EIRs provide not just a requirement for public 
authorities to disseminate environmental information but also specify various 
means through which such disseminations can occur including electronic means. 
The statutory attention paid to access to environmental information in UK law is 
further evidenced by the provision stipulated in Regulation 5(6) of the Regulations 
that no other existing law will prevent the disclosure of information required under 
the Regulations. Similarly, Section 1 of the UK’s Freedom of Information Act 2000 
gives a general right of access to information held by public authorities. 
Furthermore, Section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act requires public 
authorities to write back to the person requesting such information as to whether 
they have the information of the description being requested.  
 
It has however been reported that although the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO) has generated guidance to the public regarding its environmental 
information rights in line with the Aarhus Convention,111 the task of informing the 
public about such rights should be left to Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs).112 On the other hand, some EU state governments have been actively 
involved in the dissemination of environmental information through environmental 
                                                             
106 OECD, 'Introduction to Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs) - OECD' (Oecd.org, 2020) 
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information centres known as ‘Aarhus Centres’ which offer their citizens adequate 
information in line with the Aarhus Convention.113 
 
As part of implementing this principle, some governments in Eastern Europe, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA), and the South-Eastern Europe (SEE) regions 
have established Aarhus Centres towards providing a platform for public 
awareness and dialogue on environmental issues between NGOs, the public and 
state officials and promoting environmental education.114 One such Aarhus Centre 
is the Yerevan Centre in Armenia, which has become a model to the region.115 This 
is because many of the Centre’s activities (including information exchange) have 
extended beyond Armenia to other states.116 This inter-state exchange of 
information and public awareness was previously expressed in Article 9(2) of the 
OSPAR Convention which requires enforcement authorities to provide the public 
with available information regarding activities that can potentially affect the 
environment. 
 
Based on the provisions above, it can be summarised that major techniques to 
facilitate environmental information include: 
1) Impact Assessments; 
2) Exchange of information between states; and 
3) Dissemination of environmental information to the public. 
 
2.6.2 Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making 
Regarding public participation, there have been measurable global and regional 
legal instruments that have also reflected the principle.117 For instance, Article 4 
(i) (ii) of the UNFCC obliges parties to “encourage the widest participation in this 
                                                             
113 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Aarhus Centres | OSCE Aarhus' 
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process, including that of non-governmental organisations.”118 Furthermore, 
Article 6 of the UNFCC obligates states to enable public access to environmental 
matters and also give the inhabitants an opportunity to participate in 
environmental decision making.119 Enunciating the necessity for public 
participation in the environmental impact process, Article 2 (6) of the Espoo 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
provides that the State will: “provide … an opportunity to the public in the areas 
likely to be affected to participate in relevant environmental impact assessment 
procedures regarding proposed activities and shall ensure that the opportunity 
provided to the public of the affected Party is equivalent to that provided to the 
public of the Party of origin.”120 
 
It is therefore evident, that the principle does not only require public authorities 
to be more transparent and accountable in their decision making process,121 but 
also requires that the authority will include the general public in the decision 
making process.122 The public authorities are expected to do this by first making 
environmental information available, educating the public on the relevance and 
implications of such environmental issues, and then encouraging the public to 
actively participate in the environmental decision making process.123 
 
The importance of this principle is further accentuated in Article 5 (6) of the Aarhus 
convention whereby operators engaging in operations with the potential of huge 
environmental risk are required to disseminate information regarding measures to 
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protect the environment for the public. Article 6(6) of the Aarhus Convention also 
requires the public authority to give any concerned member of the public free, 
easy access to environmental information (as soon as it becomes available). A 
significant instance of this dissemination of information is reflected in the 
increased adoption of Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs), requiring 
governments to release gathered data on environmental pollutants to the 
public.124 Stephan argued that the PRTRs enable the effective gathering data on 
pollution and dissemination to the public.125 Moreover DeVito observed an increase 
in the number of countries disclosing PRTRs.126 
 
The public participation principle has become a household concept in 
environmental law over the past two decades.127 The provision of ‘public 
participation’ in the above provisions suggests the significance of this principle as 
it cuts across the bridge between international law and environmental law. 
Interestingly, it has been asserted that there are various legal instruments (in the 
form of treaties),128 that have given firm basis to this principle in other aspects of 
international law.129 For example, the public participation principle was used to 
interpret the legal provision of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights130 in the case of Tatar v Romania131 as well as Taskın and others v Turkey.132 
This understanding would normally have suggested an inference to some 
customary grounds for the principle. However, the ICJ in Argentina v Uruguay,133 
rejected such a view on the grounds that “…no legal obligation to consult the 
affected populations arose….’ from European Convention on Human Rights;134 a 
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statement which still fails to expressly affirm or deny the customary strength of 
the public participation principle. 
 
Indeed, in international law, public participation has been recognized as being 
essential to sustainable development.135 In this vein, the principle has been 
embedded into several other international and regional legal instruments such as: 
Article(s) 16 and 23 of the 1982 World Charter for Nature,136 Article(s) 2(6) and 
4(2) of the 1991 Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context,137 Principle 10 
of the Rio Declaration, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity138 and the 
Aarhus Convention (discussed above). Agenda 21, adopted at the Earth Summit 
in Rio in 1992 which declares: “One of the fundamental prerequisites for the 
achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-
making. Furthermore, in the more specific context of environment and 
development, the need for new forms of participation has emerged. This includes 
the need of individuals, groups, and organizations to participate in environmental 
impact assessment procedures and to know about and participate in decisions, 
particularly those that potentially affect the communities in which they live and 
work.”139 
 
Despite its international recognition, it has been asserted that although some 
states like the USA have shown high compliance with the public participation 
principle by institutionalising it in their law and policy,140 other states have delayed 
implementing it.141 It is believed that this delay is a result of the unwillingness of 
some states to recognise the principle in their national laws hence limiting the 
applicability of the principle within such jurisdiction.142 Writers have argued that 
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there should be a binding requirement on public authorities to understand and 
enforce the right to public participation.143 On this ground, states have been 
encouraged to incorporate the principle especially in their environmental impact 
assessments for developmental projects.144 This would encourage social 
acceptance of projects and particularly, the legitimacy of oil and gas developments 
by inhabitants of host states. This view emphasises the position previously 
expressed by the World Bank that “public participation in EIA facilitates project 
design, environmental soundness and social acceptability”.145 
 
2.6.3 Access to Environmental Justice 
Regarding easy access to environmental justice, Article 3 (2) of the Aarhus 
Convention provides that States should “endeavour to ensure that authorities 
assist and provide…….access to justice in environmental matters.”146 
Environmental justice entails that everyone ought to have access to seek redress 
for environmental harm done to them.147 By ‘everyone’, this study means 
‘anybody’ that has suffered environmental harm from an action. It also implies 
that environmental justice is expected to utilise proper sanctioning mechanisms 
(whether civil, criminal or administrative) to address environmental harm 
committed by companies.148 It is believed that generally, environmental justice 
has influenced government policies and regulations and has enabled communities 
to protect their environment from corporate polluters.149 According to Dobson, “no 
theory of justice can henceforth be regarded as complete if it does not take into 
account the possibility of extending the community of justice beyond the realm of 
                                                             
143 John Glasson, Riki Therivel & Andrew Chadwick, Introduction to environmental impact assessment (3rd edn, 
Routledge 2005) p.138. 
144 Aloni Clinton and others, 'The Importance of Stakeholders Involvement in Environmental Impact 
Assessment' (2015) 5(5) Academic Publishing 148. 
145 Mutemba S, 'Public Participation in Environment Assessment in Bank–Supported Projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa', Proceedings of the Durban World Bank Workshop (June 25, 1995) p.42. 
146 ibid.  
147 Ronald D Sandler and Phaedra C Pezzullo, Environmental Justice and Environmentalism (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press 2007) p.29. 
148 Matthew Hall, 'Criminal redress in cases of environmental victimisation: A Defence.' (2016) 49(2) Revue 
Criminologie 141. 
149 Ronald D Sandler and Phaedra C Pezzullo (n.147). 
   75 
 
present generation human beings.”150 His assertion emphasises the importance of 
this pillar principle to present and future generations. 
 
2.7 General Overview of Environmental Regulation of the Nigerian 
Oil and Gas Industry 
This study has discussed principles of environmental law that are used to ensure 
environmental protection. This section will therefore seek to discover the extent 
to which the Nigerian environmental regime has provided for environmental 
principles as obligations of its environmental law. On this basis, the study will 
utilise one of two indices to determine the extent to which such international 
environmental law provisions have been applied to the Nigerian regime. The 
indices are: 
1) Has Nigeria incorporated the international treaties into its national law; or 
2) Has Nigerian environmental law stipulated provisions reflecting the tenets 
of the environmental principles synonymous with the principles of 
international environmental law discussed above? 
 
In the case of index 1, it would have been expected that Nigerian would have 
implemented Treaties and Conventions that it has ratified. However, Section 12 
of the Nigerian Constitution stipulates that: “No treaty between the Federation 
and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such 
treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.” In effect, any such 
international instrument providing for the environmental principle has to be 
adopted as Nigerian law before it can have binding effect. Upon enactment, such 
a treaty will have the same force as a Nigerian statute. The status of 
undomesticated treaties in the Nigerian legal system was controversial until it was 
seemingly settled in the case of Abacha v Fawehinmi,151 whereby the Supreme 
Court held that undomesticated treaties have no force of law whatsoever in 
Nigeria. However, Section 6(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010 seems to have reopened the controversy. The 
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provision states that “the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and 
power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining the application of any 
international convention with or pertaining to the application of any international 
convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified.”  
 
In effect, the status of ratified but undomesticated treaties in Nigeria is currently 
controversial. Until this controversy is settled, the ratification of international 
treaties providing for environmental principles would not be deemed as making 
such treaty principles binding in Nigeria. This becomes significant considering that 
although Nigeria has signed and ratified various international instruments 
providing for environmental principles,152 the only domesticated instruments have 
been the International Convention for the prevention of pollution of the Sea by Oil 
1954 implemented in the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968; and the African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981 implemented in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983. 
In any case, this portends a bleak environment for instruments like the Aarhus 
Convention instrument. This is because although Nigeria is yet to ratify the Aarhus 
Convention,153 such ratification will be useless unless the instrument is either 
domesticated or the current controversy on ratified but undomesticated 
instruments is resolved.  
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This study will not delve into the challenges that can be associated with ratified 
but undomesticated environmental treaty provisions in Nigeria. This is to avoid a 
detour outside the scope of discussion in the study. In effect, this study will not 
rely on the domestication of the provisions of the international treaties discussed 
above but will discuss environmental standards that exemplify the principles 
discussed above. As will be seen below, the Nigerian environmental legislation 
bearing the standards are all framed in similar form. They specify the standards 
together with criminal and administrative provisions enforcing the standards. The 
study will examine the legislation in a chronological order of the year in which 
each of the legislative instruments were formulated. Furthermore, to properly 
examine the effect and significance of the monetary sanctions utilised in the 
instruments, this study will convert the Naira currency indicated on all the 
instruments to its British Pound Sterling equivalent(denoted as £ hereafter).154 
 
2.7.1 Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations 1963 
For the purposes of discussion in chapter 3, this study will point out the stipulation 
of Regulation 7 of this secondary legislation which states that: “Where no specific 
provision is made by these Regulations in respect thereof, all  drilling, production, 
and other operations necessary for the production and subsequent  handling of 
crude oil and natural gas shall conform with good oilfield practice which for  the 
purpose of these Regulations shall be considered to be adequately covered by the 
appropriate current Institute of Petroleum Safety Codes, the American Petroleum 
Institute  Codes or the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Codes.”  
 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) and American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME) formulated the integrity management (IM) standards for high 
consequence areas (HCAs).155 The criteria for HCAs are in line with the USA 
regulations on Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas.156 In 
addition, the API developed the ISO 29001 in 2003 as a certification standard for 
EMS by stakeholders operating in the USA oil and gas industry represents a 
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significant opportunity for standardisation and improvement.157 Similarly, the 
Alaska legislature formulated the Best Available Technology (BAT) requirement 
towards oil pollution prevention and response.158 Together, these industry 
standards form the global standards for pipeline management referred to as ‘good 
oil field practice’ for operators.159 The IM is required to protect all HCAs (including 
highly populated areas, navigable waterways, and environments that are 
adversely affected by oil spills).160 By virtue of these standards, oil and gas 
corporations are required to assess their pipelines (located in all HCAs) towards 
ensuring the integrity of the pipelines.161 It is therefore, apparent that Regulation 
7 of the Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations exemplifies best practice of the 
Precautionary Principle as reflected in Article 4(4) of the 1974 Paris Convention 
requiring implementation of programmes to forestall, prevent or reduce 
environmental harm.  
 
2.7.2 Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 
Pursuant to the section 1 of the Act, the discharge of crude oil into prohibited sea 
areas is proscribed.162 Furthermore, Section 3 of the Act prohibits the discharge 
of oil or oily mixtures into Nigerian waters.163 As stipulated in the preamble section 
of the statute, the Act was enacted to implement the terms of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 and to prohibit 
discharge into Nigerian navigable waters. Hence, this standard exemplifies the 
prevention principle by reflecting the provision of Article III of the Convention 
prohibiting the discharge of oil or oily mixtures into navigable waters. As has been 
stated earlier, the preventive principle requires practical action towards controlling 
or reducing pollution.  
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This requirement is evidenced in Regulation 25 of the Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations 1969 which stipulates that licensees in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry should: “adopt all practicable precautions, including the provision  
of up-to-date equipment approved by the Director of Petroleum Resources, to 
prevent the  pollution of inland waters, rivers, watercourses, the territorial waters 
of Nigeria or the  high seas by oil, mud or other fluids or substances which might 
contaminate the water,  banks or shoreline or which might cause harm or 
destruction to fresh water or marine life..” This provision manifests the preventive 
principle by requiring licensees to utilise precautionary measures (such as the 
provision of up-to-date equipment approved by the Director of Petroleum 
Resources) towards preventing environmental harm. In line with this, Regulation 
37(a) and (d) of the Regulations stipulates that an operator must keep all the 
facilities used in the petroleum development operation in good condition, conduct 
the development operation in accordance with relevant regulations acceptable to 
the DPR and take all practicable steps to prevent discharge of avoidable waste and 
petroleum discharge.  
 
Section 3 of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act finds an operator guilty of an offence 
of discharging crude oil into Nigerian navigable water in contravention of the 
standard above. In line with this, Section 6 thereby stipulates a penalty not 
exceeding N2,000 (£4.20) for such discharge and an amount not exceeding N400 
(£0.84) for failure to report the discharge. Similarly, Sections 1 (3), 2(3), 5(1) & 
(3), 7(1) & (2) of the Act empowers the Minister of Transport to make regulations 
that operators must provide details of pollution discharge from their vessels. 
Section 7 (5) (a) thereby prohibits failure to comply with such ministerial 
regulations and provides that a person who fails to comply with the regulations 
made by the Minister will be criminally liable to a fine of up to N1,000 (£2.10).  
 
2.7.3 Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975 
Section 1 of the Act prohibits the intentional illegal sabotage of oil facilities in a 
manner that disrupts the flow of production and distribution and causes harm to 
the natural environment and public health of Nigerians. By seeking to prevent 
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pollution caused by sabotage, this statute manifests the prevention principle. On 
this ground, Section 2 of the Act stipulates the death penalty or an imprisonment 
term of 21 years as punishment for an offender who is in breach of the standard. 
 
2.7.4 Associated Gas Re–Injection Act 1979 
This Act mandates all oil and gas companies in Nigeria to submit preliminary 
programmes for gas re-injection and detailed plans that outline the steps that will 
be involved in the implementation of gas re-injection by October 1, 1980 and 
cease the flaring of gas by January 1, 1984.164 In effect, this Act stipulates the 
standard of preventing pollution through the phasing out of gas flaring. This re-
affirmed the pre-existing obligation under Regulation 43 of the Petroleum (Drilling 
and Production) Regulations 1969 requiring the operator to submit a feasibility 
plan for the re-injection and utilisation of natural gas, whether associated with oil 
or not, “not later than five years after the commencement of production from the 
relevant area.” These constitute the standards regarding gas flaring required to 
be complied with on the part of operators. Section 3 of the Associated Gas Re–
Injection Act prohibited the continued flaring of gas in Nigeria beyond 1984. 
Section 4 further stipulated an administrative penalty of loss of licence and 
production entitlements for an offender that fails to end flaring within the 
stipulated time.165 It is however, observed that there was no formal criminal 
sanction established under the Act to prohibit the offence. Subsequently the 
Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Decree 1984 was promulgated because 
of the inability of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act to end gas flaring. Section 
7 of the Decree thereafter introduced a penalty of 2 kobo (less than £0.00002) 
per 1000 standard cubic feet (SCF) of gas flared in any site. This provision was 
introduced to curtail the extent of gas flared. 
 
As has been established in the literature review section, gas flaring is a significant 
form of pollution. Hence in seeking a prohibition of gas flaring, this standard seeks 
to prevent pollution thus exemplifying the prevention principle discussed above. 
                                                             
164 This is stipulated under Section 2 of the Act. 
165 An offender in this regard is a person who is in breach of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act. 
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2.7.5 Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions Etc.) Act 1988 
Section 1 of this Act prohibits anyone from depositing, dumping, storing and 
transporting solid, semi-solid or liquid harmful waste on Nigerian land and 
territorial waters. In line with this, Regulation 13 of the Petroleum Regulations 
1967 stipulates that: “no petroleum shall be discharged or allowed to escape into 
the waters of the port.” To achieve this, Regulation 40 of the Petroleum (Drilling 
and Production) Regulations 1967 provides the precautionary measure for 
ensuring such prevention of pollution by stipulating that operators: “shall use 
approved methods and practices acceptable to the Director of Petroleum 
Resources for confining the petroleum obtained from the relevant  area in tanks, 
gasholders, pipes, pipelines or other receptacles constructed for that purpose; 
and, except as a temporary measure (for which the prior consent of the Director 
of  Petroleum Resources has been obtained).” An interpretation of Section 1 of the 
Harmful Wastes Act clearly shows that the statute manifests the prevention 
principle. Indeed, just as the prevention principle dwells on the prevention or 
reduction of actions that can result to environmental degradation, so does Section 
1 through its prohibition of the deposition or discharge of harmful waste. Section 
1(2) (d) finds any person guilty of the offence strictly liable. In line with this, 
Section 6 imposes the penalty of life imprisonment on such an offender.  
 
2.7.6 The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act (FEPA) 1988 
(now repealed) 
The FEPA Act established the enforcement agency– FEPA. The law empowered the 
agency to protect the environment, ensure the conservation of Nigeria’s natural 
resources and ensure the achievement of sustainable development in line with the 
NPE.166 The law also provided a mechanism through which the agency would 
actualise the set objectives by requiring the agency to ensure that all corporations 
align with the national environmental policy for air quality,167 water quality,168 
ozone protection,169 and noise control.170 The law required the agency to set 
                                                             
166 This is provided for in Section 5 of the Act. 
167 This is provided for in Section 18 of the Act. 
168 This is provided for in Section 16 of the Act. 
169 This is provided for in Section 19 of the Act. 
170 This is provided for in Section 20 of the Act. 
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standards ensuring that corporations apply the best practicable technology that 
would prevent pollution, and prosecute a corporation that is in breach of such 
standards.171  In other words, this Act provided the preventive principle of 
environmental law. It also entails that this Act spelt out the standard of BAT 
regarding oil and gas operations (discussed above). Moreover, the Act required 
the agency to ensure the protection of the Nigerian environment through 
regulation and enforcement.172 This Act also clearly manifested a requirement for 
the agency to ensure sustainable conservation of resources (which is part of 
sustainable development as described above) 
 
Section 23 of the repealed FEPA Act specified that the President must enact 
regulations that outline methods of cleaning-up pollution, the national contingency 
plan for regulating pollution, and even penalties for criminal pollution. Similarly, 
Section 24 of the FEPA Act  required the Petroleum Minister and the Department 
of Petroleum Resource (DPR) to ensure the clean-up of all oil and gas waste 
discharge in Nigeria (a role now performed by the DPR and National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency). 
 
Furthermore, Section 22 of the Act required FEPA to ensure that a 
person/corporation who has caused a discharge; bore the cost of the clean-up for 
the discharge,173 rehabilitated the damaged environment,174 and compensated the 
victim.175 Section 21 (1) of the Act strictly prohibited the illegal discharge of 
hazardous waste.176 The Act stipulated a criminal fine of N100,000 (£210.52) or 
an imprisonment term of 10 years for individual offenders177 and a penalty of up 
to N500,000 (£1043.7) for corporate offenders. For a corporate offence, the Act 
also stipulated an additional fine of up to N1000 (£2.10) for each day the offence 
continues.178 Indeed, the Act provided regulation for virtually all components of 
criminal pollution relating to the oil and gas industry. This is not surprising 
considering that the Act was the foremost environmental legislation in Nigeria at 
                                                             
171 ibid. 
172 This is provided for in Section 26 and 27 of the Act. 
173 This is provided for in Section 22 of the Act. 
174 This is provided for in Section 37 of the Act. 
175 This is provided for in Section 22 and 37 of the Act. 
176 This is provided for in Section 21 (1) of the Act. 
177 This is provided for in Section 21 (2) of the Act. 
178 This is provided for in Section 21 (3) of the Act. 
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the time. The Act has been replaced by the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007. Unlike the FEPA Act, 
the NESREA Act does not cover the oil and gas sector. It is however notable that 
as at the existence of the FEPA Act, oil and gas pollution existed at a significant 
rate in Nigeria. In effect, the FEPA Act failed to serve the purpose of prohibiting 
pollution as it stipulated. Possible deficiencies that caused this inability will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
2.7.7 Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA) Act 1992 
The EIA Act was enacted to address environmental concerns associated with 
industrial operations in Nigeria.179 Section 1 of the Act stipulates that the EIA 
process is established to ensure that environmental issues are considered before 
any operation of possible significant effect to the environment is undertaken. 
Section 2 of the Act require companies to conduct an EIA on  any public or private 
project that is likely to significantly affect the environment to determine possible 
environmental risks such project poses.180 In effect, this Act stipulates the EIA 
standard as a protective measure against pollution. This study therefore regards 
this Act as exemplifying the precautionary principle. 
 
The assessment is to determine the potential environmental effects of such activity 
towards ascertaining whether such operations can be permitted by the Federal 
Ministry of Environment (FME) or not.181 Section 5 of the Act stipulates that the 
level of priority given to the examination of assessments will be in the order of 
environmental significance for each development. Section 6 of the Act stipulates 
that the FME will examine the information provided as part of the EIA process and 
the eventual report submitted by the company in conclusion of the assessment 
towards determining whether the project can continue. Pursuant to Section 21 of 
the Act, based on an assessment of the prior information and that provided in the 
assessment report submitted by the company, the FME can permit or disallow the 
development of the project if it is discovered to have significant adverse effect on 
                                                             
179 This is provided for in Section 2 (1) of the Act. 
180 These operations are listed out in Sections 2 (2), 12 and 13 of the Act. 
181 This is provided for in Section 2 (1) of the Act. 
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the environment or refuse to issue permits to a company that has not submitted 
the EIA report. This permission will be in the form of an impact assessment 
certificate (IAC) issued to the company pursuant to Section 41 of the Act. 
 
In line with producing an impact assessment report, Section 3 (1) of the Act also 
requires that the operators prepare an environmental management plan (EMP) to 
describe how they address any potential negative environmental impacts arising 
from their operations. In other words, the EMP is a relevant precaution required 
under the Act. The EMP would enable the regulator to assess the effectiveness of 
pollution mitigation measures designed by the operator.182 This entails that beside 
the prevention principle through the EMP, this Act mandates compliance with the 
precautionary principle through EIA.  
 
Section 7 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act reflects the public 
participation principle by stipulating that: “before the Agency gives a decision on 
an activity to which an environmental assessment has been produced, the Agency 
shall give opportunity to government agencies, members of the public, experts in 
any relevant discipline and interested groups to make comment on the 
environmental impact assessment of the activity.” In effect, the public ought to 
be made well aware of the environmental impact of operations before such 
operations are carried out. In particular, this will provoke the requirement that 
the Niger Delta indigenes be made aware of the oil and gas projects of oil 
companies in their region before such projects are carried out. Furthermore, 
Section 24 stipulates the provision for an access to environmental information by 
requiring the FME to publish the outcome of their investigation of the projects 
(codified in a mandatory study report) to the general public showing the date of 
the study of report, the place(s) where the report can be obtained and the deadline 
and address for filing comments and recommendations concerning the report.  
 
This Act also provides for the pillar of environmental principle requiring access to 
public information. Section 7 of the Act sets out the provision of public 
participation by stipulating that: “before the Agency gives a decision on an activity 
                                                             
182 Madu Akintunde and Akin Olajide, 'Environmental Impact Assessment of Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) Awka Mega Station' (2011) 2 American Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research 
<http://www.scihub.org/AJSIR/PDF/2011/4/AJSIR-2-4-511-520.pdf> accessed 10 December 2018. 
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to which an environmental assessment has been produced, the Agency shall give 
opportunity to government agencies, members of the public, experts in any 
relevant discipline and interested groups to make comment on the environmental 
impact assessment of the activity.” 
 
Pursuant to Section 60 of the Act, anyone found guilty of breaching the 
environmental standard of undertaking and making a report on EIA before 
commencing operations is strictly liable. This offence is punishable by a fine not 
exceeding N100,000 (£210.52) or imprisonment for a period of five years. 
Similarly, a corporation that is found guilty is strictly liable to a fine of not more 
than N1,000,000 (£2105.21). 
 
2.7.8 The Nigerian Constitution 1999 (as amended)  
Section 44 (3) of the Constitution vests the sovereignty and ownership of mineral 
resources in Nigeria on the Nigerian state, Section 20 of the Constitution mandates 
the state (through its government) to “protect and improve the environment and 
safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria.” This provision 
implies that the provision inputs a requirement for adequate regulation on the 
government. In effect, the provision holds the government accountable (through 
its established state agencies) for the enforcement of environmental standards in 
the regime. Hence, even when such agencies are under-performing, the provision 
requires the government to make extra efforts to find a long-lasting solution to 
the under-performance. In the recommendation section, this study will explore 
measures through which this can be carried out. 
 
2.7.9 Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2002 
The EGASPIN sets out environmental standards and requirements that must be 
met by operators during the project approval, operations, and closure or 
decommissioning phases.183 Since its enactment, the EGASPIN has remained an 
                                                             
183 Damilola S Olawuyi and Zibima Tubodenyefa, 'Review of the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for 
the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN)' [2018] OGEES Institute, Afe Babalola University 
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important document in the Nigerian oil and gas sector.184 The EGASPIN will be 
discussed in the light of the two salient standards it stipulates- decommissioning 
and clean-up. The decommissioning requirement of this principle in relation to the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry is included in Part VIII-B (Decommissioning of Oil & 
Gas Facilities) Section 1.1 of the EGASPIN which stipulates that: “All abandoned 
installations…. shall be removed entirely……The process of removal shall avoid 
significant adverse effects upon navigation or the marine environment.” 
 
Furthermore, Part VIII-A (Decommissioning of Oil & Gas Facilities) of the EGASPIN 
stipulates the processes through which an operator will successfully decommission 
in the Nigerian oil and gas regime. The significant aspect of the decommission 
process as stipulated in Part VIII-A (Decommissioning of Oil & Gas Facilities) 
Section 2.0 is for the operator to “appropriately decontaminate, dismantle and 
remove structures from oil and gas installations and facilities after such 
installations/facilities have been abandoned and decommissioned.” Part VIII-A 
(Decommissioning of Oil & Gas Facilities) Section 2.1 specifies that this process 
must commence one year after abandonment and be completed within 6 months 
of its commencement. Part VIII-A (Decommissioning of Oil & Gas Facilities) 
Section 1.1.1 requires the operator to carry out an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) on the proposed decommission plan before commencement.  
Furthermore, the operator is required to   submit a report on the environmental 
evaluation which will be  attached to the decommissioning plan report. 
 
Pursuant to Section 1.1.1, the decommissioning must be carried out in a manner 
that avoids significant negative impact on navigation or the marine environment. 
Part VIII-B (Decommissioning of Oil & Gas Facilities), Sections 2.1.1 and 2.4 of 
the EGASPIN also require the operator to obtain an appropriate permit from the 
Director of Petroleum Resources for well abandonment and on strategies that will 
be utilised for the decommissioning programme. This corresponds with the 
provision of Regulation 36(1) of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations which stipulates that: “No borehole or existing well shall be re-drilled, 
plugged or abandoned, and no cemented casing or other permanent form of casing 
                                                             
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/2019/review_of_the_environmental_guidelines_and_st
andards_for_the_petroleum_industry_in_nigeria.pdf> accessed 16 January 2020. 
184 ibid. 
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shall be withdrawn from any borehole or existing well which it is proposed to 
abandon, without the written permission of the Director of Petroleum Resources.” 
Similarly, Regulation 2of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 
stipulates that: “Every borehole or existing well which the licensee or lessee 
intends to abandon  shall, unless the Director of Petroleum Resources otherwise 
permits in writing, be securely plugged by the licensee or lessee so as to prevent 
ingress and egress of water into  and from any portion or portions of the strata 
bored through and shall be dealt with in  strict accordance with an abandonment 
programme approved or agreed to by the Director  of Petroleum Resources.” The 
above analysis entails that the Nigerian environmental regime through the 
EGASPIN stipulates decommissioning (which has been earlier described to be a 
significant action in the prevention principle) as an important requirement in the 
oil and gas industry.  
 
While the EGASPIN as a rule has provided no explicit criminal sanction for the 
failure to decommission properly, PART IX (Schedule of Implementation, Permits 
Enforcement Powers and Sanctions) Section 4.5 stipulates that “any person or 
body corporate who contravenes any provisions of the environmental guidelines 
and standards, commits an offence and shall on conviction, where no specific 
penalty is prescribed therefore, be liable to a fine, imprisonment and/or revocation 
of licence/permit by the Minister. (a) where the offence is committed by a body 
corporate or by a member of a partnership, firm or business, every director and/or 
relevant management staff, shall be liable.”  
 
Furthermore, the EGASPIN provides for the removal of pollution or contaminants 
from environmental components such as soil, groundwater, sediment, or surface 
water. This is otherwise referred to as remediating environmental pollution. 
Pursuant to PART III (Production Operations) Section 7.1.1, all oil spill must be 
reported to the Director of Petroleum Resources, in accordance with the Oil 
Spillage/Notification. Section 7.1.1.1 stipulates that subsequent to this, a Joint 
Spillage Investigation (JSI) team, comprising the Licensee/Operator/Spiller, 
Community, and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) shall within 24 
hours of the notification, be constituted to investigate the spill.  
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Furthermore, Part VIII-B (Contingency Planning for the Prevention, Control and 
Combating of Oil and Hazardous Substances Spills) Section 2.6 stipulates that: 
“clean-up shall commence within 24 hours of the occurrence of the spill.” The 
responsibility to carry out the clean-up and remediation of affected sites is 
imposed on the company on whose facility the spill occurs pursuant to PART III 
(Production Operations) Section 2.6.3. Hence, the defaulting company must 
commence clean-up immediately after investigation of the clean-up has been 
conducted. In line with this, Part VIII-B (Contingency Planning for the Prevention, 
Control and Combating of Oil and Hazardous Substances Spills) Section 2.11.1 
stipulates that: “it shall be the responsibility of a spiller to restore to as much as 
possible the original state of any impacted environment.”  
 
Similarly, concerning all waters, Section 2.6 stipulates that upon clean-up, “there 
shall be no visible oil sheen after the first 30 days;” and for swamps, “there shall 
not be any sign of oil stain within the first 60 days.” Pursuant to Section 5.1.2.1 
of the EGASPIN, clean-up and a remediation certification was originally to be 
issued by the DPR to the company upon certification that the remediation has 
been adequately completed. This power was later to be handed to the National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) as will be seen below. However, 
Section 5.1.2.2 of EGASPIN stipulates that: “appropriate approval shall be granted 
by the Director, Petroleum Resources for any remediation/rehabilitation method 
used to clean-up/restore impacted site(s).” 
 
In penalising avoidable oil spill pollution committed in Nigeria, PART IX (Schedule 
of Implementation, Permits Enforcement Powers and Sanctions) Section 4.6.2 
stipulates that such avoidable oil spills shall: “(a) attract a royalty not less than 
N500,000, to be deducted at source and additional fine of N100,000 (£210.52) for 
every day the offence subsists; (b) The spiller (operator or owner of vessel) shall 
pay adequate compensation to those affected and; (c) The spiller shall 
restore/remediate the polluted environment to an acceptable level as shall be 
directed by the DPR.” 
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2.7.10 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment) 
Act 2006 
Section 1(1) of this Act established the NOSDRA. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Act, 
the agency is required to ensure the co-ordination and implementation of the 
National Oil Spill Contingency Plan towards the reduction and remediation of oil 
spill pollution in Nigeria. The objectives that must be achieved under this plan 
include (but are not limited to):185 (a) ensuring a safe, prompt, effective and 
suitable response to significant oil pollution; (b) identifying high-risk and priority 
areas for protection and clean up; (c) establishing an appropriate means of 
monitoring, assisting, and directing the response of oil and gas companies towards 
protecting a polluted environment by ensuring the clean-up of the affected site to 
the best practical extent;(d) co-operating with the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and other national, regional and international organisations in 
the promotion of the exchange of scientific results and research relating to oil 
pollution preparedness and response “including technologies, techniques for 
surveillance, containment, recovery, disposal and clean up to the best practical 
extent.” This study views a summary of the purpose of the above plan and the 
duties of NOSDRA as the reduction of pollution which exemplifies the prevention 
principle.   
 
Section 6 (1) (a) of the Act mandates the agency to investigate oil spills and their 
remediation process and ensure that oil spill defaulters comply with all existing 
environmental legislation regarding oil spill, its detection and clean-up. Similarly, 
Section 6 (1) (b) mandates NOSDRA to receive reports on oil spillages, co-ordinate 
and direct the clean-up and remediation process. Similarly, Section 17 of the Oil 
Spill Recovery, Clean-up, Remediation and Damage Assessment Regulations 2011 
requires NOSDRA to issue certification for the completion of such remediation 
upon properly monitoring and evaluating the completion of the process. This 
replaced the pre-existing provision requiring such certificates to be issued by the 
DPR under the EGASPIN 2002. Comparing this provision to Section 5.1.2.2 of the 
EGASPIN above, it implies that there is a joint approach by the DPR and the 
NOSDRA in the coordination of the clean-up process. While the DPR is required to 
approve the process and technique utilised, the NOSDRA is required to coordinate 
                                                             
185 This is set out in Section 5(a) – (n) of the Act. 
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and supervise the actual implementation of the process. It could therefore be 
assumed that this Act, similar to the EGASPIN empowers NOSDRA to carry out 
duties relating to the prevention and control of oil spill in Nigeria. 
 
Section 6(2) finds a person who fails to report an oil spill to the agency in writing 
not later than 24 hours after the occurrence of the oil spill strictly liable for an 
offence and imposes a penalty of not more than N500,000 ((£1043.7) for each 
day the offence subsists. Similarly, Section 6(3) stipulates an additional penalty 
of not more than N1,000,000 (£2105.21) for an offender who fails to clean up the 
impacted site, to all practical extent.  
 
2.7.11 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (Establishment) Act 2007 
Section 1(1) of this law established the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) and empowered it with the 
responsibility of conserving the ecosystem and ensuring sustainable development 
of Nigeria’s natural resources as well as sharing environmental information 
relating to the enforcement of environmental standards and policies with other 
stakeholders in and out of Nigeria. Section 2 of the Act goes further to obligate 
NESREA to coordinate and liaise with other relevant stakeholders within and 
outside Nigeria regarding enforcement of environmental standards, guidelines, 
regulations and laws thus manifesting the requirement for exchange of 
information between states in line with the principle of co-operation and the spirit 
of good neighbourliness discussed above.  Section 8m of this Act further requires 
enforcement agencies to develop and utilise research experiments, surveys and 
studies in enforcement towards preventing, reducing and eliminating pollution. 
This manifests the requirement for precaution and prevention in line with the 
prevention and precautionary principles discussed above. Section 29 requires 
collaboration between NESREA and other enforcement agencies towards ensuring 
environmental protection.  
 
Section 20 of the Act also empowered NESREA to formulate regulations setting 
specifications and standards to enhance air quality and reduce atmospheric 
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emissions. However, Section 7 (g) (h) (j) (k) (l), and 8 (g) (k) (m) of the NESREA 
Act precludes oil and gas regulation from its scope of enforcement. It therefore 
entails that the duty of NESREA as specified in Section 20, to set regulatory 
standards does not relate to the oil and gas industry. On the other hand, Section 
7(c) of the Act requires NESREA to enforce provisions of international 
environmental treaties and agreements regarding environmental protection 
(including oil and gas related instruments). Technically, if applied, this will entail 
environmental regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas industry under this Act. 
However, considering the earlier mentioned controversy of ratified but 
undomesticated treaties in Nigeria, this study will discuss the confusion arising 
from the seeming contradictions between Section 7(c) of the NESREA Act and 
Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution, in chapter 4.  
 
Pursuant to Section 20(3) of the Act, an offender who violates the regulations 
made by NESREA in line with Section 20 of the NESREA Act is guilty of an offence 
and strictly liable to a fine not exceeding N200,000 (£408) or to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment and an 
additional fine not more than N20,000 (£40.8) for every day the offence subsists. 
Section 20 (4) of the Act stipulates that if the offence is committed by a 
corporation, it will on conviction be strictly liable to a fine not exceeding N2, 
000,000 (£4083) and an additional fine of not more than N50,000 (£104.3) for 
every day the offence continues.   
 
Similarly, under the Act, an individual who has committed a water pollution crime, 
is criminally liable to a fine not exceeding N50,000 (£104.3) and an additional fine 
not exceeding N5,000 (£10.40) for each day the pollution continues or an 
imprisonment term not exceeding one year.186 Similarly, under the Act, a 
corporation that is criminally responsible for water pollution crime is liable to a 
penalty not exceeding N500,000 (£1043.7) and an additional fine of N10,000 
(£21.05) every day the pollution continues.187 Even more, except where permitted 
under any law in force, the Act forbids the discharge of hazardous substances into 
the air or territorial lands.188 An individual found guilty of violating this provision 
                                                             
186 This is provided for in Section 23 (3) of the Act. 
187 This is provided for in Section 23 (4) of the Act. 
188 This is provided for in Section 27 (1) of the Act. 
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is criminally liable for an offence punishable on conviction by a fine not exceeding 
N1,000,000 (£2105.21) or to an imprisonment term not exceeding five years.189 
For a corporation, the Act stipulates a criminal fine not exceeding N1,000,000 
(£2105.21) and an additional fine of N50,000 (£104.3) for every day the offence 
continues.190 
 
The NESREA (Establishment) Act prohibits noise pollution and imposes a criminal 
fine of up to N50,000 (£104.3) or an imprisonment term not exceeding one year, 
an additional fine of  N5,000 (£10.43)  for every day the offence continues.191 
Similarly, the NESREA (Establishment) Act imposes a fine not exceeding N500,000 
(£1043.7) as penalty for a corporation that commits a noise pollution crime, and 
an additional N10,000 (£21.05) for any day the pollution crime continues.192 
 
2.7.12 Minerals and Mining Act 2007 
Section 118 (a) of the Minerals and Mining Act regulates all aspects of the 
exploration and exploitation of solid minerals in Nigeria and by such mandates all 
licensees to reduce, manage and mitigate any environmental impact resulting 
from their exploitation activities. Furthermore, Section 118 (b) of the Act 
mandates the licensee to rehabilitate, reclaim land that has been disturbed as a 
result of the exploitation activities. Sections 120 and 121 of the Act require that 
the rehabilitation of affected sites will be conducted in line with the Environmental 
Protection and Rehabilitation Programme (EPRP). Section 121 further stipulates 
that this will be coordinated and enforced by the Mines Environmental Compliance 
Department. Section 4(a) (b) and (h) requires the Petroleum Minister to ensure 
that the oil and gas resources are exploited in a sustainable manner, by drawing 
out as part of the licensing programme, a coherent sustainable development 
policy. It is therefore evident that the statute exemplifies the Sustainable 
Development Principle by requiring rehabilitation actions towards making the 
damaged environment fit for future use.  
 
                                                             
189 This is provided for in Section 27 (2) of the Act. 
190 This is provided for in Section 27 (3) of the Act. 
191 This is provided for in Section 22 (3) of the Act. 
192 This is provided for in Section 22 (4) of the Act. 
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2.7.13 National Environmental (Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit 
sharing) Regulations 2009 
Regulations 1 and 2 prohibit the carrying out of operations that adversely impact 
the ecosystem, resulting in the extinction of any species or leading to the 
unsustainable use of natural resources without an environmental impact 
statement. In line with this, Regulation 23 provides that an offender who is in 
breach of the Regulations will be liable to a fine ranging from N1,000,000 
(£2105.60) to N10,000,000 (£21,050.60) or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding one year or both fine and imprisonment and an additional fine of 
N1,000,000 (£2105.60) for every day the offence subsists. Similarly, Regulation 
23 stipulates that where the offence is committed by a corporation, it will on 
conviction be liable to a fine not less than N10,000,000 (£21,050.60) and not 
exceeding N100,000,000 (£210,500.60) and an additional fine of N1,000,000 
(£2105.60) for every day the offence continues. 
 
2.7.14 National Governmental (Noise standards and Control) 
Regulations 2009 
This regulation has been included since the study will subsequently establish noise 
pollution as a physical effect of the oil and gas industry in chapter 3.193 Regulation 
1 of the National Governmental (Noise standards and Control) Regulations seeks 
to guarantee a healthy environment for all Nigerians, maintain the calmness of 
their surroundings including their psychological wellbeing by setting a maximum 
limit of noise levels which a corporate facility as well as any individual must not 
exceed. Regulation 12(1) empowers the NESREA to enforce the standard for noise 
levels and sanction a noise pollution offender who causes noise pollution above 
the maximum standards. In line with the Regulations, an individual offender is 
liable to a fine not exceeding N5,000 (£10.43) for every day the offence continues 
and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding N50,000 (£104.3) or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both. A corporate offender will 
on conviction, be liable to a fine of not more than N500,000 (£1043.7) and an 
additional fine of N10,000 (£21.05) for every day the offence continues. 
 
                                                             
193 This is mentioned in section 3.1 of chapter 3. 
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2.7.15 National Environmental (Wetland, River Banks and Lake Shores 
Protection) Regulations 2009 
Regulation 3 provides for the conservation and sustainable utilisation of resources 
from the wetlands in Nigeria. This exemplifies the Principle of Sustainable 
Development described above. Pursuant to Regulation 2, it is the duty of all 
individuals and corporations to: guarantee that the wetlands are protected as 
habitats for species of flora, minimize and control pollution. Regulation 31 
criminalises anyone who neglects to comply with this environmental obligation on 
precaution regarding the protection of the wetlands. Furthermore, Regulation 38 
prescribes that on conviction, an offender will be liable to an imprisonment term 
of not less than three months or a fine not exceeding N500,000 (£1043.7) or both. 
 
2.7.16 Freedom of Information Act 2011 
Similar to the UK, the Nigerian Freedom of Information Act 2011 sets out the 
general right to access to information held by public authorities. Section 1(1) of 
the Act stipulates that: “notwithstanding anything contained in any other Act, law 
or regulation, the right of any person to access or request information…...which is 
in the custody or possession of any public official, agency or institution howsoever 
described, is established.” This is in consonance with the provision of Section 24 
of the Nigerian Environmental Impact Assessment Act mentioned above. Both 
instruments exemplify best practice as reflected in Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration, Article 4.1. It is therefore expected that environmental enforcement 
agencies in Nigeria publish reports on their enforcement to the general Nigerian 
public. It is also expected that upon requesting environmental information, the 
relevant public authority make it available. This statutory provision in the Freedom 
of Information Act manifests the principle of access to environmental information 
described above. This implies that the provision exemplifies best practice reflected 
in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and Article 3(9) of the Aarhus Convention. 
 
From the overview above, this study observed that the different standards set out 
under Nigerian environmental law exemplify some of the principles of 
environmental law set out earlier in this chapter such as the precautionary 
principle, the preventive principle and the public participation principle. Since the 
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study has argued that the environmental principles are the framework for 
environmental protection, then it also implies that the environmental standards 
exemplified in the Nigerian regime are the framework for environmental 
protection. This relevance creates a justification for an examination of regulatory 
enforcement measures enforcing the standards in the form of criminal sanctions 
and administrative enforcement. Based on the sanctioning and enforcement 
techniques employed by the regime, it is expected that at a minimum, even if 
rather unwillingly, the industry would have complied with the standards so as not 
to be found liable of an environmental offence. The question will therefore be 
whether the industry has complied with the standards. This study will make this 
determination in chapter 3 by seeking to identify alleged incidents of violations in 
the industry.  
 
2.8 Criminal Liability of an Environmental Criminal Violator in 
Nigerian Law 
This study has earlier discussed the statutory provisions of sanctions under the 
Nigerian environmental criminal law. The study however, argues that the liability 
of a Nigerian environmental criminal violator can only be established after it is 
proven that the environmental violation is indeed criminal in line with the statutory 
provisions discussed above. This chapter will therefore examine the criminal 
liability of Nigerian environmental violators. This discussion will be divided into 
two parts. The first part will be a general overview of criminal liability (the 
elements that must be present to establish the liability of an offender). The second 
part will examine the criminal liability of environmental offenders in line with 
Nigerian environmental criminal law. 
 
2.8.1 General Overview on Elements of Crime 
A significant issue in traditional criminal law has been the determination of the 
liability of an accused person. Every crime has its element. Hence, the guilt of an 
accused person can only be established after a prosecutor has proven each and 
every essential element for that crime. A general overview of the elements of 
crime in criminal law will be explained below. 
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A) Actus Reus 
 
In order for an actus reus to be committed there has to have been an act. 
Several common law jurisdictions define ‘act’ differently but generally, an act is a 
“bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary.”194 The USA Supreme 
Court held that a Californian law making it illegal to be a drug addict was 
unconstitutional because the mere status of being a drug addict was not 
an act, hence not criminal.195 Commentator Dennis Baker asserts:196 “Although 
lawyers find the expression actus reus convenient, it is misleading in one respect. 
It means not just the criminal act but all the external elements of an offence. 
Ordinarily, there is a criminal act, which is what makes the term actus reus 
generally acceptable. But there are crimes without an act, and therefore without 
an actus reus in the obvious meaning of that term. The expression “conduct” is 
more satisfactory, because wider; it covers not only an act but an omission, and 
(by a stretch) a bodily position. The conduct must sometimes take place in legally 
relevant circumstances. The relevant circumstances might include consent in the 
case of rape. The act of human sexual intercourse becomes a wrongful act if it is 
committed in circumstances where one party does not consent and/or one or more 
parties concerned are below the age of consent. Other crimes require the act to 
produce a legally forbidden consequence. Such crimes are called result crimes. ... 
All that can truly be said, without exception, is that a crime requires some external 
state of affairs that can be categorized as criminal. What goes on inside a person's 
head is never enough in itself to constitute a crime, even though it might be proven 
by a confession that is fully believed to be genuine.” 
 
From the above assertion, one can infer that a criminal conduct is (by way of 
action) the commission of a criminal act. In other words, an act can involve 
commission. However, it can also involve omission. Omission involves a failure to 
engage in a required action resulting to harm.197 As with commission acts, 
omission acts can be viewed using the but for approach.198 Hence, ‘but for not 
having acted, the injury would not have occurred.199 The Model Penal Code 
                                                             
194 Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes Ch. 900, Section 1.13[2] [American jurisprudence]. 
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however, specifically outlines specifications for criminal omissions including:200 the 
omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offence; or a duty to 
perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. 
 
B) Intention (Mens Rea)  
 
A famous Latin legal maxim puts the principle of intention succinctly by stating 
that: ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’ – ‘the act does not make one guilty 
unless there is a guilty mind.’201 Mens rea is the state of mind indicating the 
culpability of an offender, and must be statutorily required as an element of the 
crime.202 It therefore implies that under crimes requiring mens rea, an offender 
must have some intention or knowledge to commit the crime.203 In effect, it is one 
of the essential ingredients of criminal liability.204 According to Clause 6 of the 
Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill (Vol.1, No.177) 1989, to establish the liability 
of an offender, one must prove the element of the offence consisting of a criminal 
state of mind with which the offender has acted.  
 
Intention means that the state of mind of the offender would have been such that 
he actually intended to commit the offence. It is generally agreed that one intends 
to commit an offence where he acts with the purposes of committing the 
offence.205 To this effect, it is sufficient that committing the crime was his object 
of purpose, that he wanted to commit the crime and that he acted in a manner as 
to commit the crime.206 This is regardless whether the said action was a 
spontaneous act.207 Indeed, the ordinary interpretation of intention restricts the 
intention element to be only direct (hence, it is the purpose of the committer to 
cause the harm and he acted in order to cause the harm through his actions).208 
In this case, such an offender intended the consequential harm that occurred as 
a result of the criminal act. However, the courts have recently extended the limits 
                                                             
200 Model Penal Code (n.194) Sec 2.01[3]. 
201 William A. Stadler and Michael L. Benson, 'Revisiting the Guilty Mind' (2012) 37 Criminal Justice Review 
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of its interpretation on intention to include an indirect approach whereby the harm 
is a natural consequence of the voluntary act of the offender, and the offender 
foresaw the possibility of such harm as highly probable or most certain to occur, 
even if achieving the harm was not his direct intention.209 In the UK case of R v 
Woollin,210 the trial judge directed the jury that oblique intention exists if there is 
“an appreciation of a substantial risk of injury,” which resulted in the jury deciding 
that exposing somebody to a risk of harm was sufficient to amount to intention. 
It has been asserted that intention is generally viewed in terms of foresight of 
particular consequences and a desire to act or fail to act so that those 
consequences occur.211 Similarly, it has been held that for intention to exist, the 
offender has made a “decision to bring about a prohibited consequence.”212 
 
According to Clifford, “an environmental crime is an act committed with the intent 
to harm or with a potential to cause harm to ecological and/or biological systems 
and for the purpose of securing business or personal advantage.”213 This view has 
been reiterated by other writers who asserted that environmental crime is a 
deliberate destruction of the environment for political and financial gain.214 In 
these definitions the terms ‘deliberate’ and ‘intentional’ featured. It therefore 
implies that environmental offenders in this class possess the criminal mind to 
pollute and commit environmental harm even before carrying out the actual 
pollution. To this effect, it is the direct purpose of the environmental offenders to 
cause ‘environmental harm’ or ‘destruction to the environment’ by virtue of their 
actions. 
 
In February 2006, Richard Cheney, ex-Vice-President of the United States, shot 
and seriously wounded a hunting companion, yet no assault charges were filed.215 
This scenario suggests that criminal punishment is not imposed on every person 
                                                             
209 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2010) pp.215-218; 228-229; Anthony Duff, 
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214 Sally M Edwards, Terry D Edwards and Charles B Fields, Environmental Crime and Criminality (E-Book, 
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who harms others.216 This raises the question: Why? One reason is that for most 
offences, something other than just a harmful act is required before such an act 
is considered criminal.217 Hence, one can only be convicted of a crime after it has 
been proven that he acted with a wrongful state of mind and in the absence of 
any justification or excuse for his conduct.218 In particular, it would then entail 
that where the offender fully intended to commit the crime, he would have greater 
blame/fault for the offence.  
 
C) Criminal Negligence 
 
Criminal negligence involves the offender departing from the standards expected 
of a reasonable person by committing the crime. In negligence, the offender has 
a lower form of mens rea to commit the crime by virtue of being aware of the 
expected standards and yet committing the act. In this case, the offender will still 
be guilty for the offence. 
 
D) Criminal Recklessness 
 
This liability for criminal recklessness arises where the offender is expected to 
foresee the risk of the offence but still performed the act resulting to the offence. 
In effect, the accused has a deliberate lack of concern regarding the risk of harm 
resulting from his actions. This suggests that a known risk has been ignored thus 
is indicative of subjective recklessness. The leading case on subjective 
recklessness is R v Cunningham.219 In the case, the court applied a subjective test 
based upon whether the defendant had ‘foreseen that the particular kind of harm 
might be done, and yet has gone on to take the risk of it’.220 The court held that 
the defendant could only be liable if he realised that there was a risk arising from 
his action.221 Based on the position in Cunningham, it can be deduced that 
subjective recklessness is only established if the accused is aware of a risk of a 
particular type of harm arising from his actions.  
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In other areas of criminal law, the courts have taken a wholly different approach 
to recklessness. The House of Lords formulated an objective test of recklessness 
that was not based on whether the defendant recognised a particular risk but on 
whether a reasonable person would have recognised a risk of harm.222 If the risk 
of harm was obvious to the reasonable person, the defendant will be found to have 
been reckless even if he did not realise that there was a risk of harmful 
consequences occurring as a result of his conduct.  
 
On the other hand, the House of Lords in Reid held that the accused can be 
indifferent to a risk without being aware that it exists.223 It has been asserted that 
an accused who deliberately ignores the risks that were obvious to other people 
is equally blameworthy of taking a risk that had been recognised.224 In supporting 
this view, writers have asserted that when an accused goes about his business 
without considering the possible consequences of the action, this form of 
recklessness can occur.225 This notion of objective recklessness as a deliberate 
blindness to obvious risks could legitimately be described as wanton indifference 
to the consequences of one’s actions.  
 
E) Strict Liability  
 
In this category, the guilt of an offender is established simply by virtue of the 
offensive action committed and the prohibition of the criminal act under law rather 
than the establishment of mens rea or recklessness.226 All that needs be proven 
is that there is a law creating the offence and that the offence has been committed.  
In 1798 Lord Kenyon CJ in an oft cited dictum in Fowler v Padget227 delivered what 
might have become a canonical text of English law, stating that: “It is a principle 
of natural justice, and of our law, that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The 
intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime...”228 This statement 
reflected a fundamental principle of criminal law being that blame, and 
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punishment, was not to be employed against a blameless defendant. However, 
the strict liability doctrine has been proven to be an exception to this principle as 
it requires only the commission of the prohibited conduct for an offence to arise.229 
For strict liability offences, the mental state of the accused is irrelevant in 
determining the guilt of the offender.230 Hence, the prosecution need only prove 
that the accused did a wrongful act that has been prohibited under law.231 This 
position was emphasized in Brend v Wood,232 whereby Lord Goddard, CJ stated: 
“It is of utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a 
court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute either clearly or by 
necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the 
court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he 
has a guilty mind.”233 
 
General principles of strict liability can be gathered from examining a few cases of 
strict liability in the UK and USA. In the UK case of Alphacell Ltd v Woodward,234 
a factory owner was appealing the factory’s conviction of discharging polluted 
matter into a river contrary to the provision stipulated under the Rivers 
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. Indeed, it was established in the case, that the 
appellant was not aware of the pollution, nor was it alleged that it was negligent. 
In upholding the conviction, Lord Salmon held that “If this appeal succeeded and 
it were held to be the law that no conviction be obtained under the 1951 Act unless 
the prosecution could discharge the often-impossible onus of proving that the 
pollution was caused intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would 
go unpunished and undeterred to the relief of many riparian factory owners. As a 
result, many rivers which are now filthy would become filthier still and many rivers 
which are now clean would lose their cleanliness. The legislature no doubt 
recognised that as a matter of public policy this would be most unfortunate. Hence, 
Section 2(1)(a) which encourages riparian factory owners not only to take 
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reasonable steps to prevent pollution but to do everything possible to ensure that 
they do not cause it.”235 
 
In the case, it is obvious that despite the defence of lack of knowledge of the 
pollution crime, as well as the inability of the prosecution to prove that the 
appellant acted wilfully or negligently, the court still upheld the appellant’s 
conviction on the grounds that it was an issue that affected public policy. To this 
effect, it was not the mental state of the appellant that was used to adjudge his 
guilt, but rather the prohibition of the criminal action by the relevant law. Hence, 
it could be adduced that strict liability crimes are regulatory crimes, requiring only 
a proscription of the criminal act by law.236 
 
Similarly, in the USA case of People v Lardie,237 it was held that for strict liability 
offences, all that needs to be proven is that the offender did the wrongful act 
regardless of intent. The Supreme Court held that “for a strict-liability crime, the 
people need only prove that the act was performed regardless of what the actor 
knew or did not know. On this basis, the distinction between a strict-liability crime 
and a general-intent crime is that, for a general-intent crime, the people must 
prove that the defendant purposefully or voluntarily performed the wrongful act, 
whereas, for a strict-liability crime, the people merely need to prove that the 
defendant performed the wrongful act, irrespective of whether he intended to 
perform it.”238 Hence, this form of liability is in contrast with the general intent 
liability whereby it must be proven that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally 
committed the wrongful act.239 This view was reiterated by Roe who asserted that 
criminal liability in a strict liability offence is determined by the commission of the 
offence and the regulatory sanction proscribing the offence.240 
 
In the early 19th century, city congestion and industrial development brought with 
it environmental and public health challenges.241 As a response to this, the US 
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championed the creation of ‘public welfare offences’ as a form of regulatory 
offence.242 A creation of this category of regulatory offence was to “heighten the 
duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities 
that affect public health, safety or welfare.”243 Public welfare offences do not 
require the prosecution to prove any criminal intent or mens rea on the part of 
the accused.244 These offences are punishable regardless of the state of mind of 
the accused at the time of committing the crime.245 All that would matter is that 
there be an existing statute prohibiting such criminal acts and that the criminal 
act is dangerous enough to adversely affect public interest.246 
 
Environmental offences are regarded as public welfare offences.247 This 
categorisation is not surprising considering that environmental offences pose 
potential harm to the natural environment. Moreover, it has been established that 
the harm to the natural environment often impacts the inhabitants of such an 
environment (as had been seen in the Nigeria scenario). Hence, treating it as a 
strict liability crime would make a significant contribution to dealing with the harm 
and risks it could potentially cause the public and the natural environment. In that 
light, environmental offences do not need mens rea to sustain the liability of the 
offender. All that needs to be proven is that the offender actually did commit the 
environmental offence and that there is a regulatory sanction proscribing the 
environmental offence. This corresponds with the opinion that “[o]ne…. does not 
have to be bad to do bad when it comes to environmental crime. The ‘black heart’ 
requirement commonly associated with other criminal activity is not necessary to 
sustain a conviction.”248 In any case, a criminal polluter cannot plead that he was 
ignorant of the relevant law sanctioning the pollution crime as ignorance of the 
law is no excuse under the law.249 
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Woods and Macrory have criticized the: “wholesale’ use of strict liability in 
environmental criminal law … This can lead to indignation on the part of businesses 
which are found ‘guilty’ of offences without having a real sense of moral fault, or 
an inclination to treat such offences akin to a business overhead because guilt is 
applied automatically.”250 It is also notable that in jurisdictions like the UK, judges 
have been permitted to apply the purposive approach to the interpretation of 
seeming strict liability provisions. Previously the courts were not allowed to refer 
to Hansard251 in interpreting legislation.252 In this case, Lord Kilbrandon held that: 
“It has always been a well-established and salutary rule that Hansard can never 
be referred to by counsel in court and therefore can never be relied on by the 
court in construing a statute or for any other purpose.”253  
 
Furthermore, Lord Scarman asserted that two reasons for which the courts should 
not regard parliamentary comments in the interpretation of statutes include: (i) 
the unreliability and vagueness of such materials as guide to statutory 
enactments;254 and (ii) the presence of the rule maintained by Parliament which 
precludes counsel from referring to Hansard in court arguments, hence also 
precluding judges from utilising such parliamentary proceedings for the judicial 
use of interpreting statutes.255 In line with this, Viscount Dilhorne further stated: 
“While, of course, anyone can look at Hansard, I venture to think that it would be 
improper for a judge to do so before arriving at his decision and before this case 
I have never known that done. It cannot be right that a judicial decision should be 
affected by matter which a judge has seen but to which counsel could not refer 
and on which counsel had no opportunity to comment.”256 However, the courts 
departed from this position and took a purposive approach to interpretation by 
ruling that Hansard may be referred to in legislative interpretation.257 
 
Regarding the purposive approach, Lord Griffiths held that: “The days have passed 
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when the courts adopted a literal approach. The courts use a purposive approach, 
which seeks to give effect to the purpose of legislation and are prepared to look 
at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the 
legislation was enacted.”258 Similarly, Lord Browne Wilkinson on reference to 
Hansard adduced:259 “My Lords, I have come to the conclusion that, as a matter 
of law, there are sound reasons for making a limited modification to the existing 
rule (subject to strict safeguards) unless there are constitutional or practical 
reasons which outweigh them. In my judgment, subject to the questions of the 
privileges of the House of Commons, reference to Parliamentary material should 
be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or 
obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases 
references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such 
material clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying 
behind the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in 
Parliament as at present, I cannot foresee that any statement other than the 
statement of the Minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet these 
criteria.”  
 
It therefore entails that under common law, in the utilisation of strict liability 
provisions, credence could be given to the parliamentary intentions behind the 
enactment of the strict liability provisions. This reduces the ambiguity in the strict 
liability provision. It therefore entails that such provisions could be examined in 
the light of other surrounding legislative documents relating to the provision. This 
view is however, contradicted in Nigerian law. Section 3(3) of the Nigerian 
Interpretation Act 1964 stipulates that “Words in an enactment descriptive of 
another enactment shall not be used as an aid to the construction and 
interpretation of the other enactment and are intended for convenience of 
reference only.” In effect, such parliamentary materials that are extraneous to an 
enactment sought to be interpreted cannot be utilised to give purpose to the 
enactment.  
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However, other writers have argued that the application of strict liability will make 
companies and their officers take more care in their actions understanding that 
their liability will simply be established by virtue of proof of their committing the 
criminal offence.260 Hence the understanding that a strict liability regime will make 
their conviction easier could make companies more environmentally accountable 
for their actions. 
 
2.8.2 Criminal Liability of the Nigerian Polluter 
Based on the wordings of the criminal liability of environmental offenders under 
the Nigerian environmental criminal legislation discussed in section 2.7, it can be 
observed that the Nigerian environmental criminal regime predominantly imposes 
strict liability for the environmental offences they prohibit. Indeed, it is also 
observed that is only the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) 
Act that requires a proof of intention to be established under its offence.261 Hence 
the elements of environmental crime stipulated under relevant laws relating to the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry are intention and strict liability. Hence, while the 
elements of criminal liability discussed above are all important paradigms to the 
development of criminal law, this study will subsequently limit its concentration to 
the criminal liability of a Nigerian environmental violator in line with existing 
environmental criminal provisions in the Nigerian regime discussed above. The 
elements of criminal liability for environmental violation in Nigeria include: 
 
i) Intention  
 
Subject to Section 24 of the Nigerian Criminal Code Act (CCA),262 some wrongful 
acts can only be deemed offences after a wrongful party has intentionally 
committed an offence. In line with this, some relevant statutory instruments under 
Nigerian environmental criminal law have provided the requirement of intent in 
criminal offences. According to Okonkwo and Naish, the provision of a Nigerian 
criminal statute requiring a determination of intention must be worded in a way 
that the requirement of intention would be clearly shown under the criminal 
                                                             
260 Cyrus CY Chu and Yingyi Qian, 'Vicarious Liability under a Negligence Rule' (1995) 15 International 
Review of Law and Economics 305. 
261 This is set out by the use of the term ‘intentionally’ as mentioned above. 
262 Criminal Code Act Chapters 77 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
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provision.263 For example, most of the criminal provisions in the CCA requiring 
intent would phrase their provisions for the commission of offence as ‘knowingly’; 
‘intentionally’ or ‘with the intent to’ committing the offence. For example, Section 
244(2) of the CCA stipulates that anyone who “knowingly sells the whole or part 
of the carcass of any animal which has died of any disease, or which was diseased 
when slaughtered” is guilty of an offence. Similarly, Section 332 of the CCA 
stipulates that: “any person who, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable, any 
person, or to do some grievous harm to any person, or to resist or prevent the 
lawful arrest or detention of any person” is guilty of an offence. 
 
This study discovered that the only known environmental criminal provision in the 
Nigerian regime that stipulates the requirement of intent to determine liability in 
pollution crimes is the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 
which provides that for the sabotage act of a third party polluter to be considered 
criminal, it has to be a wilful action of the third party.264 This is relevant considering 
the allegation that has been made by operators like the SPDC that most pollution 
at their facilities is caused by the sabotage and vandalism of oil pipelines by other 
third parties from the Niger Delta region.265 
ii) Strict Liability under the Nigerian Environmental Criminal 
Regime 
Akpotaire observed that several environmental offences existing within the 
Nigerian regime are treated purely as strict liability offences.266 For example, 
Section 245 of the CCA stipulates that: “any person who corrupts or fouls the 
water of any spring, stream, well, tank, reservoir, or place, so as to render it less 
fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and 
                                                             
263 Cyprian O Okonkwo and Michael E Naish, Okonkwo and Naish on Criminal Law in Nigeria (2nd edn, Sweet 
and Maxwell 1980) p.67. 
264 This is stipulated in Section 1 of the Act. 
265 Peter C Nwilo and Olusegun Badejo, 'Oil Spill Problems and Management in the Niger Delta' (2005) 15 
International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 567-570; Royal Dutch Shell, 'Shell Sustainability Report 2016' 
(Royal Dutch Shell 2016) <http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2016/managing-operations/our-
activities-in-nigeria/spill-prevention-and-response.html>accessed 7 March 2019. 
266 Vincent Akpotaire, 'Strict Liability and The Nigerian Criminal Codes: A Review' (Nigerianlawguru.com) 
<http://nigerianlawguru.com/articles/criminal%20law%20and%20procedure/STRICT%20LIABILITY%20AN
D%20THE%20NIGERIAN%20CRIMINAL%20CODES,%20A%20REVIEW.pdf> accessed 12 March 2019. 
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is liable to imprisonment for six months.”267 This provision (just like most other 
criminal provisions in Nigerian environmental law) is a strict liability offence 
requiring no other element of crime to constitute an offence. This is backed up by 
the evidence shown in section 2.7 above whereby most of the environmental 
criminal provisions regulating the oil and gas are strict liability in nature. As can 
be observed in most such provisions, the phrases used in the prohibition of the 
offences and imposing of sanctions do not denote intention or negligence or even 
recklessness as would be other instruments that have provided for either of these 
other elements. They simply criminalise the offence by virtue of the offence being 
committed and impose sanctions. In the UK, a popular phrasing that can be found 
in several strict liability environmental provisions is ‘caused the’. An example is 
Section 3 of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 which provides that an 
offender who ‘causes’ oil pollution by the discharge of oil from a pipeline or during 
exploration is guilty of a crime and is liable to a fine of up to £50,000. 
 
Indeed, there would be no need for this study if having determined statutory 
provision on the criminal liability of a Nigerian violator of environmental standards, 
there is no actual record of violation identified.  In line with this, this study will 
seek to identify instances of alleged violations that have occurred in the upstream 
sector of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. As has been earlier mentioned in 
chapter 1, significant attention will be given to such violations as it relates to 
developments in the onshore areas of Nigeria.  This evidence will establish a 
justification for the determination of deficiencies that might have contributed to 
such violations.
                                                             
267 Ikenga KE Oraegbunam and Julian NK Chukwukelu, 'Section 24 of the Criminal Code and its Effect on 
Criminal Liability in Nigeria' (2015) 3(1) Journal of Law and Criminal Justice 130.  
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Chapter Three 
Alleged Violations of Environmental Standards in the Nigerian Oil 
and Gas Industry 
3.0 Synopsis 
In section 2.7 above, this study has identified environmental standards 
established under the Nigerian environmental regime to regulate the oil and gas 
industry. The study also identified complementary criminal provisions established 
under the relevant statutes to criminalise violation of the standards as 
environmental offences and provide penalties for offenders. The study also 
observed enforcement agencies that have been established in the regime to 
implement the standards on the regulated oil and gas companies. The issue 
therefore remains whether the standards have been complied with in the oil and 
gas industry. If there is actually a violation, there is a question as to whether the 
violation is significant, extensive or not. A determination of this will help determine 
whether the prohibition of the criminal violations by the sanctions has reduced 
such violations and whether the enforcement agencies have actually carried out 
their enforcement roles, or not. This study will mainly utilise information from 
Amnesty International reports as data for this chapter. Recently, NGO Monitor was 
quoted as asserting that “Amnesty International is perhaps the most prestigious 
international non-governmental organization (NGO) dedicated to furthering 
human rights. Amnesty’s campaigns and publications are quoted by political 
leaders, journalists, diplomats, and academics.”1  
 
3.1 Oil Spills and Gaseous Emissions 
This study has discussed an overview of some such pollution in the oil and gas 
industry as an instance of the violation. This section will further discuss this 
violation and the challenges it has portended to the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. 
                                                             
1 NGO Monitor, 'Amnesty International' (NGO Monitor 2015) <https://www.ngo-
monitor.org/books/amnesty_internationalcorruption_and_anti_israel_bias/> accessed 17 January 2020. 
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Based on a study carried out by Gbadebo and others, it was discovered that a 
significant quantity of exploratory waste (in the form of drilling muds and cuttings) 
was generated from the Igbokoda onshore oil wells operated by the SPDC.2 The 
waste contained levels of total hydrocarbon (TPH), aliphatic hydrocarbon (AH), 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) that were higher than the standard set by 
the DPR for those wells.3  According to them, although the drilling muds were 
primarily disposed of in reserve pits, most of the waste got into adjacent soil and 
water bodies during precipitation and run-off.4 It was even reported that on some 
occasions, the oil waste were deposited directly on lands meant for farming5 and 
such waste were often difficult to clean up.6  This is only one such example of the 
waste pollution that has been discharged by the oil industry in the Niger Delta 
region.7 To this effect, the EGASPIN has summarised most of the oil and gas 
wastes that occur during the E&P stages of Nigeria’s oil and gas operations to 
include: spent drilling fluid/wastes, well treatment wastes, drill cuttings, 
oil/product/chemical spillage and leaks, oil/hydrocarbon product 
sludge/debris/scales, organic sludge/residue (sanitary wastes), spent oil/catalyst, 
produced sand/formation water, garbage and gaseous emission.”8 
 
There have also been incidents of significant oil spills and well blowouts in the 
onshore areas of the region. For instance, Bodo West suffered two major oil spills 
from SPDC’s pipelines between 2008 and 2009.9 The volume of oil waste 
discharged during both oil spills has been estimated to almost equal the Exxon 
Valdez spill in Alaska in 1989.10 Although some of these pollution incidents have 
been mentioned in section 1.0 of the introductory chapter, some other incidents 
                                                             
2 Gbadejo M Adeleke and others, 'Environmental Impacts of Drilling Mud and Cutting Wastes from the 
Igbokoda Onshore Oil Wells, South-western Nigeria' (2010) 3 Indian Journal of Science and Technology 504. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
5 Neal E. Thurber, 'Waste Minimization for Land-Based Drilling Operations' (1992) 44 Journal of Petroleum 
Technology 542-547. 
6 Gbadejo M Adeleke and others (n.2). 
7 Ibama Brown and Eyenghe Tari, 'An Evaluation of the Effects of Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Activities on the Social Environment in Ogoni Land, Nigeria' (2015) 4 International Journal of Scientific 
Technology Research p.276. 
8 Part II-C (Exploration and Development Operations: Sources and Characteristics of Wastes) Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) Section 2.1.1. 
9 Amnesty International, ‘The True ‘Tragedy’ Delays and Failures in Tackling Oil Spills in the Niger Delta' 
(Amnesty International 2009) <https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/afr440182011en.pdf> accessed 10 December 
2018. 
10 ibid  
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of oil pollution that have occurred in the Niger Delta include: the then Royal Dutch 
Shell's Forcados Terminal storage tank failure in 1979 which caused a discharge 
of approximately 580,000 barrels of crude oil into Niger Delta lakes,11 the 1980 
Texaco Funiwa oil well blow-out of 1980 which caused a discharge of 421,000 
barrels of crude oil into the Funiwa lake in the Niger Delta region,12 the 1980 
Oyakama pipeline spill which caused a discharge of 30, 000 barrels of crude oil on 
over 32 hectares of land in Oyakama in the Niger Delta,13 the SPDC operated 
Abudu pipeline spill which caused a discharge of 5240 barrels of oil waste into the 
Abudu lands of the Niger Delta,14  the 1986 SPDC operated Funiwa oil well blowout 
which caused a discharge of 200, 000 barrels of crude oil into over 350 hectares 
of mangrove in Funiwa, Niger Delta,15 the SPDC operated Agoda Brass Oil Pipeline 
oil breakout in 1994 which caused an unascertained discharge of crude oil into 
over 10sq km of farmlands as well as polluted ponds and lakes around the Agoda 
area of the Niger Delta,16 the 1998 Mobil Idoho spill which caused a discharge of 
401, 000 barrels of crude oil offshore,17 the 2003 SPDC Kwale oil well explosion, 
suspected to be  as a result of poorly maintained facilities, which caused an 
unascertained discharge on several farmlands around the Kwale area,18 the SPDC 
Kalabilema oil spill explosion in 2003 which caused an unascertained discharge of 
crude oil and inferno in the Kalabilema area as well as causing the death of five 
persons.19 
 
The oil waste and crude oil discharged in the industry are clear violations of the 
environmental standards not to pollute embedded within legislation like the Oil in 
Navigable Waters Act and the Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions etc.) Act 
described in chapter 2. Writers have argued that Nigerian oil pollution has 
negatively affected the Nigerian environment at a considerable rate and has also 
caused significant health harm to the inhabitants of the areas affected by the 
                                                             
11 Godwin Eshagberi, 'The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Environment' (2012) 23 The Nigerian Academic 
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pollution.20 For example, it is believed that in the affected areas of the Niger Delta, 
there has been poor plant growth21 and reduced chances of plant survival.22 This 
deficiency was caused by the fact that either the oil spills produced microbial 
organisms that competed with the plants for soil nutrients or suffocated them as 
a result of the exclusion of oxygen by the oil deposit.23 Upon conducting a study 
in a contaminated area, Esurusuoso, Nwoboshi and Ogunwale discovered that 
crops like yam and cassava took 6-8 months to grow as against the usual 2-4 
months.24 Osuji, Erondu, and Oguli also discovered that the seeds of mangrove 
plants were suffocated as a result of the deprivation of oxygen by the oil deposits 
in the soil.25 Eshagberi observed that a significant portion of the Niger Delta oil 
spill incidents have also affected fresh water habitats (including the mangroves, 
swamps, river, stream and lakes) in the region.26 
 
Activities such as the dredging of canals for oil wells have contributed to this 
degradation of the fresh water environment.27 Moreover, the fresh water habitat 
mainly serves as a source of drinking water for the Niger Delta inhabitants and 
also as a habitat for aquatic life.28 The pollution of the body of water has not only 
denied the inhabitants their drinking water, but also denied the aquatic life their 
natural habitat.29 Ejituwu argued that before the pollution incidents made it 
impossible, inhabitants used to easily gather crabs, oysters, cockles and 
periwinkles from the roots of the mangrove.30 Omoweh also observed that cat fish, 
manatee, electric fish, hippopotami and sharks were fast becoming extinct in the 
                                                             
20 Gbadebo O Odularu, 'Crude Oil and the Nigerian Economic Performance' [2008] Oil and Gas Business 
<http://www.ogbus.ru/eng/authors/odularo/odularo_1.pdf> accessed 28 December 2018. 
21 Essien J Udo and Adeboyejo A Fayemi, 'The Effect of Oil Pollution of Soil on Germination, Growth and 
Nutrient Uptake of Corn1' (1975) 4 Journal of Environment Quality 537-540. 
22 Akuro Adoki and Token Orugbani, 'Influence of Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant Effluents On Growth of Selected 
Farm Crops in Soils Polluted with Crude Gasoline Hydrocarbons' (2019) 2 African Journal of Agricultural 
Research 569-573. 
23ibid. 
24 Godwin Eshagberi (n.11).  
25 Leo C. Osuji, Ebere S. Erondu and Regina E. Ogali, 'Upstream Petroleum Degradation of Mangroves and 
Intertidal Shores: The Niger Delta Experience' (2010) 7 Chemistry & Biodiversity 116-128. 
26 Godwin Eshagberi (n.11).  
27 Elijah Ohimain, Tunde Imoobe and Dorcas Bawo, 'Changes in Water Physico-Chemical Properties Following 
the Dredging of an Oil Well Access Canal in the Niger Delta' (2019) 4 World Journal of Agricultural Science 
757. 
28 Donald Mackay and others, 'Development and Calibration of an Oil Spill Behaviour Model' (US Coast Guard 
Research and Development Centre 1982) <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a133693.pdf> accessed 8 
March 2019. 
29 ibid.  
30 Nkparom Ejitiwu, 'Andoni Women in Time Perspective', in NkparomEjitiwu and A. Gabriel, Women in 
Nigerian History: The Rivers and Bayelsa States Experience (Onyoma Research Publications 2003) p.56. 
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Niger Delta.31 It has even been asserted that the decimation of marine life has 
recently extended to edible frogs, iguana and crayfish.32 This is interesting, 
considering that the Niger Delta inhabitants (especially in the Ogoni area) are 
predominantly farmers and fishers.33 Jemimah and Ike argued that the inhabitants 
of the region not only feed on the crops and the marine organisms, but also sell 
them for a livelihood.34 Hence, the pollution has not only denied the inhabitants 
their drinking water source, but also their food and revenue.  
 
A major part of the discussion on gas flaring in this study has been done in the 
literature review section of this study.35 It is therefore valid to regard gas flaring 
in Nigeria as a major upstream pollution in the Niger Delta.36 According to an Oil 
Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) report, Nigeria produced an estimated  
total of 22.8 billion barrels of crude oil between 1958 and 2003 (and in this 
production ratio, an average of 22.8 trillion cubic feet was flared).37 The continued 
gas flaring is in violation of the standard to cease flaring stipulated under the 
Associated Gas Re–Injection Act discussed in chapter 2 above. Indeed, there have 
been reports that gas facilities (such as the SPDC’s Bille and Bormu sites) are 
located very close to residential areas.38 The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) observed that most facilities in the Niger Delta are situated in 
the residential areas with many families living close to such facilities.39 UNEP have 
suggested the lack of clarity as to whether the residences were set up before or 
after the installations were established.40 There have therefore been reports that 
                                                             
31 Daniel Omoweh, 'Shell and Land Crisis in Rural: A Case Study of the Isoko Oil Areas' (1998) 17 
Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies 26. 
32 ibid.  
33 Michael Ikehi and Julie Zimoghen, 'Impacts of Climate Change on Fishing and Fish Farming in the Niger 
Delta Region of Nigeria' (2017) 3(1) Direct Research Journal of Agricultural and Food Science 2. 
34 Ekanem Jemimah and Nwachukwu Ike, 'Sustainable Agricultural Production in Degraded Oil Producing and 
Conflict Prone Communities of Niger Delta, Nigeria' (2015) 8 Journal of Agriculture and Sustainability 15. 
35 The literature review section can be found in chapter 1. 
36 Oyelara-Oyeyinka Banji and Antonia T Okoosi, 'Conflict and Environmental Change: Response of Indigenous 
Peoples to Oil Exploration in the Nigeria's Delta Basin' Conference on Environment and Development in Africa 
(1995) pp.14-16. 
37 Nelson Takon, 'Environmental Damage Arising from Oil Operations in Niger Delta of Nigeria: How Not to 
Continually Live with Their Specific Impact on Population and Ecology' (2014) 3(9) International Journal of 
Development and Sustainability 1881. 
38 Jerome Nriagu and others, 'Health Risks Associated with Oil Pollution in the Niger Delta, Nigeria' (2016) 13 
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 346; Emmanuel A Ajao and Sam Anurigwo, 
'Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the Niger Delta, Nigeria' (2002) 31 AMBIO: A Journal of the Human 
Environment 442. 
39 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 'Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland' (United Nations 
Environmental Programme 2011) p.96. 
40 ibid. 
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gas flaring operations cause high ambient noise pollution which has often caused 
harsh psychological and physiological effects on victims living in such areas of the 
Niger Delta.41 This is in clear violation of the standard to maintain a calm 
environment stipulated in the National Governmental (Noise standards and 
Control) Regulations. 
 
A writer expressed the view that the loud noise from oil and gas activities in the 
region (such as gas flaring) is slowly making residents of such areas deaf.42 In any 
case, even relatively low levels of noise affect human health adversely.43 This is 
because such low noise could cause hypertension and hinder cognitive 
development in children.44 This necessitates wondering what greater effects 
excessive noise would have on human health considering that it has been alleged 
to cause permanent loss of memory or psychiatric disorder.45 Medical 
jurisprudence has found loud noise pollution to be a slow and subtle killer.46 It is 
therefore, implied that noise pollution (regardless of whether it is loud or low) 
could cause environmental harm.  
 
3.2 Failure of Operators to Properly Decommission Disused 
Facilities 
As has been discussed above, decommissioning is an important aspect of the 
prevention principle towards preventing potential pollution that could arise from 
disused facilities. The processes involved in decommissioning have also been 
discussed. At present, the Nigerian offshore oil and gas industry has not reached 
the maturity seen in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, hence, its fields are 
still in their productive phase.47 Therefore, no decommissioning of offshore 
                                                             
41 Layi Egunjobi, 'Urban Environmental Noise Pollution in Nigeria' (1986) 10(3) Habitat International 238. 
42 Soni-Ehi Asuelimen, 'The Challenge of Noise to Public Health' The Guardian Newspaper (1984) p.9. 
43 Vincent Kieran, 'Noise Pollution Robs Kids of Language Skills' [1997] New 
Scientist<https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg15420810-300-noise-pollution-robs-kids-of-language-
skills/> accessed 10 December 2018. 
44 Narendra Singh and S C Davar, 'Noise Pollution- Sources, Effects and Control' (2004) 16(3) Journal of 
Human Ecology 182. 
45 Michael Bond, 'Plagued by Noise' [1996] New Scientist<https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg15220562-
200-plagued-by-noise/> accessed 10 December 2018. 
46 Narendra Singh and S C Davar (n.44).  
47Ayoade M Adedayo, 'Environmental Risk and Decommissioning of Offshore Oil Platforms in Nigeria' (2011) 
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structures has taken place.48 It is however reported that some oil and gas 
operators in Nigeria have failed to decommission onshore facilities in the Niger 
Delta region.49 This is in clear violation of Part VIII-A (Decommissioning of Oil & 
Gas Facilities) of the EGASPIN discussed above. For example, it has been reported 
that when Shell left the Ogoni area of the Niger Delta (where most of their facilities 
are located), many such facilities were not properly decommissioned and made 
safe.50 This is despite the fact that it has been more than 18 years since Shell 
ceased operations in Ogoni.51 SPDC has internal guidelines on ‘Well and Field 
Assets Abandonment Standards and Strategy.’52 However, the process of 
decommissioning has been rather complex in the Ogoni area.53 This is because 
the SPDC left most of the oilfields in the area in an abrupt and unplanned manner, 
as a result of the security challenges in the region.54 As a result, subsequent 
decisions were taken to abandon other facilities.55 This was in clear violation of 
Part VIII-A (Decommissioning of Oil & Gas Facilities) Section 2.1.1 and 2.4 of the 
EGASPIN and Regulation 36(1) of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations discussed above. 
 
Upon investigation, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
discovered that while the SPDC database shows a number of such assets as 
‘abandoned’ or ‘decommissioned’, the way in which such facilities were left in a 
hurry contravened decommissioning standards in the EGASPIN.56 This is because 
UNEP observed oilfield assets which had evidently been abandoned in a scattered 
manner.57 Such assets vary from oil pipelines left open and lying in trenches 
(possibly abandoned midway through pipe laying operations), to oil facilities left 
                                                             
48 ibid. 
49 Stakeholder Democracy Network, 'White Paper on Sustainable Closure and Decommissioning of Oil and Gas 
Assets in Nigeria' (Stakeholder Democracy Network 2015) <https://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Sustainable-Closure-and-Decommissioning-of-Oil-and-Gas-Assets-in-Nigeria.pdf> 
accessed 31 August 2019. 
50 Amnesty International, 'Memorandum: Amnesty International’s Concerns Regarding Shell’s Response to The 
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56 The standard has been previously discussed in section 2.8.9 of this study. 
57 United Nations Environment Programme (n.39) pp.99-100. 
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standing but without subsequent maintenance.58 This action contravenes the 
provision of Regulations 35 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 
(mentioned above) which requires an oil company to obtain a prior permit for 
abandonment of wells. Even more, such action violates the standard stipulated in 
Section 1 of the Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions, etc.) Act prohibiting 
the dumping of solid, semi-solid or liquid harmful waste in the Nigerian Exclusive 
Economic Zone. While oil and gas structures have not been specifically mentioned, 
‘harmful waste’ has been described as toxic substances such as the radioactive 
substances found in deactivated installations.59 
 
The UNEP further noted that the improperly abandoned assets constitute 
environmental and safety risks.60 One important reason to decommission is that 
no matter how used up an oil and gas field might seem, there will always be 
residual hydrocarbons left under-surface.61 Unless made safe underground, such 
residual substance might emit to the surface and pollute the surrounding land (soil 
sediments) and water bodies.62 Concerning this, the UNEP have observed the lack 
of any indication that the several container like metallic objects lying around the 
area are full or empty, or what they contain(ed).63 Moreover, their other argument 
has been that corrosion of such metallic objects results in ground contamination.64 
Moreover, the uncontrolled abandonment of the facilities have left them vulnerable 
to accidental or deliberate tampering.65 This contravenes the requirement that 
Shell exercises adequate due diligence towards preventing any third-party 
interference with their facilities considering the associated environmental risk.66 
Attempts by criminal vandals to recover parts of such metals for sale as scrap 
could result in further environmental and health risks.67 
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62 ibid. 
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Shell has excused their inability to properly decommission because of lack of 
access to the areas of the Niger Delta where they have installations.68 This excuse 
has been refuted by Amnesty International who insisted that while access may 
have been sometimes denied in Ogoniland, Shell has had access to the area.69 
Moreover, 18 years (with the possibility that it has lasted more) has been more 
than enough time to make safe the area.70 Amnesty International’s research has 
shown that such claims to lack of access are incredible and do not stand up to 
interrogation.71 
 
This study noted that the EGASPIN mandates that sanctions be imposed on 
offenders. It has also been observed that the EGASPIN empowers the Minister of 
State under the Nigerian government to revoke the licence of operators that fail 
to decommission. This study therefore wonders why no sanction has been found 
to be imposed for the violations nor any licence of defaulting operators revoked 
considering that operators such as Shell found to have defaulted is still very active 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.72 This study believes that this has enhanced 
the crass manner in which this violation has occurred. In chapter 4, the study shall 
identify deficiencies that might have contributed to the inability of the Nigerian 
government to revoke the licences of some companies such as Shell, found to be 
guilty of this violation.  
 
3.3 Failure to Conduct EIA and Submit Report 
As can be seen in chapter 2, the Nigerian EIA Act has stipulated standards 
requiring companies to conduct and submit reports on impact assessments for 
their proposed developments to determine the potential environmental risk. The 
Act also required the FME to deny violating companies an Impact Assessment 
Certificate (IAC) permitting their operations. In contravention of this, some 
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companies have clearly violated this standard. There have been circumstances 
whereby fake EIA reports have been submitted and the FME failed to investigate 
further or detect the fake report.73 Moreover, it has been reported that there have 
been times when the FME permitted the commencement of projects, even when 
EIA has not been conducted or a report submitted.74 In 1993, the Oil Mineral 
Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) produced a report 
confirming the degradation of the Niger Delta environment.75 A major instance 
cited in the report was the destruction of aquatic life in the Gbaran community of 
Bayelsa state, as a result of blocked natural drainage.76 The blocked drainage was 
caused by an unregulated construction of oil field roads by Wilbros Eng. Ltd (a 
company contracted by SPDC to construct oil field roads in the Gbaran community) 
without first conducting and submitting an EIA on the environmental implications 
of the construction.77 This study argues that this is clear violation of the standard 
requiring that EIA reports be submitted for all such projects by the company.  
 
Even when impact assessments have been carried out, such processes have not 
complied with the detailed procedure laid down in the Section 7 of the EIA Act 
regarding consultation.78 An instance of such an occurrence involved a notorious 
dispute between the FME and some coastal towns along the Imo River.79 The 
Nigerian government awarded a contract for dredging the river to facilitate 
vehicular access to the aluminium smelting factory at Ikot Abasi.80 However, most 
communities along the river (which the construction will pass through) protested 
against the project on the grounds that they were not consulted in the approval 
of the EIA report and that the contents of the report showed certain processes in 
                                                             
73 Aloni Clinton and others, 'The Importance of Stakeholders Involvement in Environmental Impact Assessment' 
(2015) 5(5) Academic Publishing 148. 
74 Frank Ikpefan, 'Fed Govt to Sanction Companies with Fake EIA Certificate' The Nation (2015) 
<http://thenationonlineng.net/fed-govt-to-sanction-companies-with-fake-eia-certificate/> accessed 15 December 
2018. 
75 Terry Andrews Odisu, 'The Nigerian State, Oil Multinationals and the Environment: A Case Study of Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)' (2015) 7 Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research 
<https://www.grin.com/document/334514> accessed 10 December 2018. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid.  
78 Onyenekenwa Cyprian Eneh, 'Managing Nigeria’s Environment: The Unresolved Issues' (2011) 4 Journal of 
Environmental Science and Technology 259. 
79 Ifeanyi, Anago, 'Environmental Impact Assessment as a Tool for Sustainable Development: The Nigerian 
Experience ‘Proceedings of the FIG XXII International Congress, Washington, D.C. USA (April 19-26, 2002) 
p.13. 
80 ibid. 
   119 
 
the course of the project that would cause environmental harm to their 
communities.81 Interestingly, even before the protest, the report had already been 
certified by the FME and the project commenced.82This study argues that this is 
not surprising considering that the EIA Act fails to establish any sanction for an 
authorisation based on an improperly conducted EIA. This study believes that such 
a lacuna is an easy escape route for this violation to continue unless corrected. 
 
Indeed, this study is of the view that the existing criminal sanctions have obviously 
failed to prevent these violations of full compliance with EIA requirements in line 
with the EIA Act. The study will discover reasons that might have facilitated the 
inadequacies of the sanctions in chapter 4.  
 
3.4 Failure of Oil Companies to Give Accurate Report on Oil Spills 
Every year, there are hundreds of oil spills in the Niger Delta, caused by obsolete 
and faulty pipelines or criminal activity such as oil facilities sabotage.83 These spills 
degrade the Niger Delta environment, contaminate the drinking water and expose 
the inhabitants to serious health risks.84 However, it has been asserted that 
operators such as the SPDC have repeatedly failed to report such oil spills resulting 
in an inaccurate record of the number of oil spills from most such facilities in 
Nigeria.85 This is in direct contravention of PART III (Production Operations) 
Section 7.1.1 of the EGASPIN and Section 6 (1) (b) of the NOSDRA described in 
chapter 2 above. This study will utilise Figure 2.0 below to better explain this 
failure. 
 
Figure 1.0:  The Number of Oil Spills by Onshore Operators as Recorded by NOSDRA 
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2007 180 171 320 3 354/503 
2008 235 95 210 3 333/448 
2009 258 118 190 2 378/450 
2010 323 188 170 1 512/494 
2011 400 207 207 1 608 
2012 474 207 192 7 688/673 
2013 to end 
September 
471 138 138 -  
Overall 2341 1124 1427 17  
 
Source: Amnesty International, 'Bad Information on Oil Spill Investigations in the Niger Delta' (Amnesty 
International 2013) p.10. 
 
According to Amnesty International, the statistics gathered in Figure 2.0 were 
generated from the NOSDRA, Shell’s database and Agip’s database after repeated 
refused requests.86 From the Figure, one can clearly observe a discrepancy in the 
reports concerning the number of onshore oil spills that have occurred in the Niger 
Delta. While NOSDRA has fewer oil spills recorded for Shell in 2007 (171) and 
2009 (118), Shell has more spills reported on their database as 320 in 2007 and 
190 in 2009. Moreover, from the records, it is also evident that NOSDRA has a 
lower total record of oil spills than the oil companies put together. For instance, 
while NOSDRA has a total record of 378 oil spills in 2009 recorded for Agip, Shell 
and Total, the companies have a total record of 450. Interestingly, Amnesty 
International claims that it shared the NOSDRA records with Agip who maintained 
that the records were grossly inaccurate as they have significantly fewer 
operations and a lower production ratio in the Niger Delta than Shell.87 
 
Moreover, on a similar note, it has been recorded separately, that even Royal 
Dutch Shell has given different details of the number of oil spills from Shell’s 
facilities in the Niger Delta as against its subsidiary, the SPDC.88 For example, 
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while the Royal Dutch Shell Sustainability reports recorded 182 spills in 2011 and 
173 spills in 2012, the SPDC recorded 207 spills in 2011 and 192 spills in 2012.89 
This shows that for companies like Shell, the inaccuracy even starts from within 
the company. There have been attempts to estimate the number of spills and the 
volume of oil spilt in the onshore and offshore areas of Nigeria since the inception 
of oil and gas operations.90 For example, the company’s report of a spill in the 
Bodo community of the Niger Delta in 2008 claimed that only 1,640 barrels of oil 
were spilled.91 However, based on an independent assessment published by US 
firm Accufacts Inc., Amnesty International calculated the total volume to exceed 
100,000 barrels.92 This is not surprising considering that upon obtaining an 
independent assessment in April 2012, they discovered that the reported volume 
was only counted from 5th October 2008, which was 72 days after the spill had 
already begun.93 This contradicted the information NOSDRA and the DPR already 
had that the spill commenced on the 28th of August.94 While believed to be grossly 
less than the actual figure,95 it is approximated there have been over 10,000 spills 
in Nigeria since the late 1950’s.96 Furthermore, upon available data, some 
independent oil and gas environmental experts estimated 9 to 13 million barrels 
of crude oil to have been spilt in the onshore and offshore areas of Nigeria between 
1958 and 2009.97 It is therefore evident that the oil spill data reporting in the 
Niger Delta is inaccurate, unreliable and needing detailed investigation.  
 
Most such oil and gas operators have reported their pollution to be as a result of 
the sabotage and bunkering activities of third parties.98 This is the illegal tapping 
of the infrastructure on oil and gas facilities so as to procure oil illegally.99 For 
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example, it is noteworthy that some abandoned SPDC oil wells are located in the 
Ogoni creeks.100 Such wells still contain oil and are self-flowing, hence once such 
third parties illegally operate the well valves, crude oil (along with gas and water) 
can be produced.101 On one of its visits, the UNEP assessment team claimed to 
observe some third parties tapping into the defunct wells and transferring oil from 
such wells.102 Furthermore, the SPDC and NNPC still have crude oil pipelines 
transporting oil through the lands in the Ogoni area.103 There have been reports 
of such pipelines being tapped illegally often resulting in oil spills.104 These 
observations signify that there are existing incidents of oil facilities sabotage 
occurring in the Niger Delta. Such oil pipeline sabotage causes significant oil spill 
pollution of the surrounding areas in which the pipelines are located.105 Such 
sabotage is in direct contravention of the provision stipulated in Section 1 of the 
Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act as highlighted in 
chapter 2.  
 
Furthermore, it has been reported that on some occasions, when such third parties 
have bunkered the oil and gas facilities,106 they illegally refine the hydrocarbon 
using very crude means which usually result in infernos and the emission of toxic 
gases causing harm to both the environment and public health.107 However, this 
study argues that blame for such sabotage goes back to the companies, as the 
third-party actions are a result of their inability to exercise due diligence in 
protecting their facilities from illegal sabotage acts. For example, this study argues 
that if most of the disused facilities were decommissioned properly in line with the 
regulatory standard, there would not even be a reason for most such sabotage 
acts to have occurred.  
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This study further argues that if most such facilities are not laid on the topsoil of 
farmlands in the Ogoni areas, it might be difficult for such third parties to illegally 
access the pipelines as easily as they do currently in the region. This is in line with 
the record of pollution in the region discussed in this study. This is also a 
confirmation of an existing observation made by Professor Richard Steiner in 
relation to oil pollution in the USA and Nigeria.108 He considered the Niger Delta a 
High Consequence Area (HCA) for oil spills due to the susceptibility to facilities 
sabotage by third parties.109 By virtue of being an HCA, the Niger Delta should 
require additional risk reduction measures from oil companies in line with US 
Integrity Management standards codified in the API and considered international 
good oil field practice.110  
 
Moreover, as has been observed in this study, the standard has been embedded 
within Regulation 7 of the Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations, hence required of 
operators statutorily.111 By domesticating the API guideline in the  Mineral Oil 
(Safety) Regulations, there is a requirement for operators like the SPDC to adopt 
sabotage prevention measures such as: securing sabotage resistant pipe 
specifications, thicker walled pipe, higher grade steel, adopting pipe-bundle 
technology, laying pipelines in areas distant from HCAs, burying pipelines deeply 
underground, casing the pipelines solidly with cement concrete, rigorous and 
frequent inspections, and decommissioning disused facilities properly.112 
 
The issue remains how this violation has continued despite its prohibition under 
the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act and the sanctions stipulated in the Act to 
penalise it. This study believes that its alleged persistence is evidence of the 
inability of the existing sanctions in the Act to compel companies in the industry 
to report their pollution. This necessitates the question as to deficiencies in the 
sanctions that might have contributed to the inadequacy of the sanction in 
achieving this purpose. This will be discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore, although 
Amnesty argued the failure of oil and gas companies to present accurate records 
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of their oil spills, this study argues that even if the companies do not report the 
spills, the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act has clearly stipulated a requirement for 
NOSDRA to investigate the oil spills. In effect, NOSDRA is accountable for its 
failure to investigate the spills in line with statutory provision. This study therefore 
wonders how violators of the standard to report oil spills can be sanctioned if the 
enforcement agencies themselves are not even aware of the number of spills that 
have occurred.  
 
3.5 Failure to Clean-Up Affected Sites and Remediate Oil Spills 
Pursuant to Part VIII-B (Contingency Planning for the Prevention, Control and 
Combating of Oil and Hazardous Substances Spills) Section 2.6.3 of the EGASPIN, 
oil spill clean-up and remediation is the responsibility of the oil company on whose 
facility an oil spill occurred. Amnesty International however, pointed out that some 
oil and gas companies such as Shell have a limited concept as to what clean-up 
and remediation should be.113 It has been reported that on Shell’s website, the 
statement on clean-up and remediation reads as follows: “After the JIV, SPDC’s 
spill response team makes the necessary repairs and recovers as much of the 
spilled oil as possible. This is called the clean-up.”114 Amnesty International argued 
that this definition is a limited interpretation of what is involved in the process to 
mere containment and recovery.115 Amnesty International cited a better definition 
that has been stated by Total as: “the removal of the free-phased oil in the 
impacted environment, removal of the contaminated soil /vegetation, carrying out 
soil and water analyses to check the level of [hydrocarbon] contamination, and 
based on the analyses results launch remediation / treatment of the residual oil in 
the impacted area, to achieve the target level of [hydrocarbon] content as 
specified in the DPR’s EGASPIN 2002 (revised) and the NOSDRA guidelines.”116 
 
Similarly, Agip stated: “Methods of clean up include manual cleaning, use of 
mechanical equipment, low pressure wash, use of sorbents, vacuum skimming as 
well as deployment of containment booms, when needed, as safe guard measure 
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during the clean-up job. After clean-up, a Post Clean-up Inspection (PCI) is carried 
out…”117 
 
The argument therefore, is that if a company like SPDC has a limited view as to 
what remediation is, it will be difficult for it to effectively remediate. This study 
argues that the extent to which a company will carry out remediation will be 
subject to its understanding of what remediation entails. Hence, a vague 
understanding of the obligations required under it will translate to a poor approach 
to its implementation.  
 
Despite the significant oil spills, it has been alleged that companies operating in 
the onshore areas of the Nigerian Delta like the SPDC are yet to clean-up most of 
the affected sites in the Niger Delta.118  This is in contravention of the requirements 
of Part VIII-B (Contingency Planning for the Prevention, Control and Combating of 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Spills) Section 2.6 the EGASPIN requiring clean-up 
and remediation to commence within 24 hours of the spill and to be concluded 
within 60 days of the commencement. In 2015, following litigation in a UK court, 
Shell was instructed to clean-up and remediate its oil pollution in the Bodo 
community (that had suffered two huge oil spills caused by the corporation 
between 2008 and 2009).119 However, it has been observed that Shell failed to 
comply with the clean-up and remediation instruction.120 Another example is the 
allegation by Amnesty International that despite claims by the SPDC to have 
cleaned up pollution in  six areas of the region (the Bomu Manifold, Kegbara Dere, 
Barabeedom, Kegbara Dere, Okuluebu–Ogale, and Boobanabe–Kegbara Dere) 
and clean-up and remediation certificates having been issued, there were still 
significant remains of oil spill pollution at the certificated sites.121 
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Amnesty International reported that 45 years after the spill of the Bomu Well 11 
at Boobanabe, experts discovered waterlogged areas with oily sheen and black 
soil encrusted with oil. This is despite Shell’s claim to have remediated the site 
completely in 1975 and 2012.122 Oil soaked soil was also discovered on the 
perimeter of the Bomu Manifold at Kegbara Dere (arising from the 2009 spill on 
the site) which Shell claimed to have completely remediated in 2012.123 
Furthermore, experts discovered visible crude oil contamination in the 
Barabeedom swamp even after NOSDRA had certified it to be clean.124 Experts 
also discovered patches of oil blackened soil at various spots in the Okuluebu, 
Ogale, despite the site certified by NOSDRA to have been remediated in 2012.125 
 
Indeed, a contractor who had been previously been employed by the SPDC told 
Amnesty International that the SPDC only took a half-hearted and superficial 
approach to clean-up.  He asserted that the efforts were “just a cover up. If you 
just dig down a few meters you find oil. We just excavated, then shifted the soil 
away, then covered it all up again.”126 This report was a sequel to a previous joint 
report made by the Friends of Earth Europe, Amnesty International, Environmental 
Rights Action, Platform and the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and 
Development (CEHRD) in 2014 showing a gross lack of action on the part of Shell 
and the Nigerian government to clean up the Niger Delta environment that has 
been contaminated with oil spill127 despite recommendations made by the United 
Nations in 2011 for a speedy clean-up of the affected sites in the region.128 
 
This study has identified the DPR and the NOSDRA to be jointly responsible for 
clean-up investigation, direction and certifications by virtue of the EGASPIN and 
the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act. As earlier observed, oil spill clean-up and 
remediation is the responsibility of the oil company on whose facility an oil spill 
occurred. Unlike the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act which requires NOSDRA to be 
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part of the process, it has been observed that often, when any such company 
assess the site as completely remediated (implying that the oil content in the soil 
and water has dropped at least below the regulatory intervention level for 
remediation),129 it reports back to NOSDRA.130 If NOSDRA is satisfied that the 
company has adequately restored the land to as much as can be similar to the 
original state, it issues a certificate declaring the clean-up and remediation efforts 
as completed.131 
 
It is therefore interesting that sites that have been marked as completed will be 
discovered to still be polluted. Only recently, a member of the National Coalition 
on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta (NACGOND)-an ‘independent 
verification’ team set up by the Nigerian government to examine the extent of 
remediation in the affected zone informed Amnesty International that it had found 
that most such sites were still contaminated, despite Shell’s clear assurances to 
have remediated them. According to the team, 8 of the 12 sites the team tested 
still contained hydrocarbons above the Nigerian government’s regulatory level.132 
This failure collaborates the previous observation made by UNEP that: “Ten out of 
the 15 investigated sites which SPDC records show as having completed 
remediation, still have pollution exceeding the SPDC (and government) 
remediation closure values. At eight of these sites the contamination had migrated 
to groundwater.”133 
 
This study wonders how NOSDRA certifies sites that have not been adequately 
remediated as completed and how it issues certificates of completion of 
remediation without investigating the remediated areas to ascertain the veracity 
of the claims of remediation. The certification by NOSDRA of sites discovered to 
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still be polluted entails that the agency failed to properly investigate and ensure 
the proper clean-up and remediation of such sites before certifying them. This is 
a clear breach of the obligation to investigate cleaned-up sites codified in PART III 
(Production Operations) Section 7.1.1 of the EGASPIN and Regulation 17 of the 
Oil Spill Recovery, Clean-up, Remediation and Damage Assessment Regulations 
2011.  
 
In January 2013 an International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Panel 
that was requested by Shell to review environmental issues in the Niger Delta 
discovered, once again, that regulators had signed off on a site as cleaned up that 
was still polluted.134 The panel stated: “in a recently concluded remediation site in 
Soku, the [Chemicals of Special Concern] levels were far higher than standards of 
EGASPIN (2002), even though all the authorities had signed off on the certificate 
for a clean bill of health for that site.”135 In conclusion, the panel stated that: 
“Based on the observations by the Panel, the current remediation practices in oil 
impacted areas in the Niger Delta are not satisfactory. Oil spill responses and 
remediation are not implemented fast enough and the methods and regulatory 
standards for biodiversity and habitat rehabilitation have not been adequately 
established. Some of the issues that are not properly addressed in the current 
context need a different approach consistent with best practice in the industry.”136 
The study views this as a contravention of the requirement of Section 6 of the 
NOSDRA (Establishment) Act which mandates the agency to investigate and 
certify that remediation has been properly carried out.  
 
Moreover, this study also wonders how most such remediation operations were 
carried out improperly since the EGASPIN clearly mandates the DPR to approve 
the method of remediation. It begs the question as to whether in such 
circumstances, the DPR (through its director), approved a method of remediation 
that is substandard or even faulty; or whether the companies have failed to utilise 
the approved method of remediation. In any case, if the company fails to utilise 
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the approved method, it should have been the duty of NOSDRA to investigate the 
process and by such means detect such violation. It therefore entails that the 
NOSDRA under such circumstances, had either not directed and supervised the 
process at all or had not done so properly. Furthermore, with regard to the 
reckless manner in which the companies have abandoned their assets in the Niger 
Delta, this study wonders whether the DPR through its director are actually 
carrying out their role of issuing permits for the abandonment process and 
formulating regulation on the process to be utilised in abandonment. If they are, 
and the company is simply violating the regulation, why is there no public record 
showing that the DPR has utilised some administrative penalties stipulated in the 
EGAPSIN such as the revocation of the licence of such an operator? 
 
Based on the above facts, this study concludes that there have clearly been 
incidents of violations of the environmental standards described. Since it has 
previously been asserted in the study that the regulatory enforcement tools of 
criminal and administrative sanctions are supposed to be utilised to enforce 
compliance with the standards, these violations contribute to a failure to properly 
utilise the tools for this desired purpose. It is therefore necessary to identify 
possible deficiencies causing the failure. This is because, if the deficiencies are 
corrected, then the resulting failure will also have been corrected. 
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Chapter Four 
Identification of the Deficiencies Contributing to the Regulatory 
Failure  
4.0 Synopsis 
This study has observed environmental standards embedded in Nigerian 
environmental legislation to regulate its oil and gas industry. The study further 
observed a utilisation of criminal sanctions by the Nigerian environmental regime 
to prohibit a violation of such standards. Judging from the evidence of 
environmental violations identified in chapter 3 of this study, it is obvious that the 
Nigerian criminal sanctions have failed to prevent a continued violation of the 
standards by oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria and their officers. This 
chapter will therefore, seek to identify deficiencies that have contributed to the 
failure. Furthermore, the study observed the failure of enforcement agencies to 
properly carry out administrative enforcement duties required of them under their 
enabling statutes. Field and Field have argued that generally there is a natural 
tendency for people to expect laws to simply rectify environmental problems 
without the creation of an appropriate mechanism of enforcing such laws.1In line 
with this assertion, this study argues that it is possible for an environmental 
regime to have abundant robust environmental laws and policies, and yet be 
unable to achieve its environmental protection purpose if the mechanism required 
to implement them is lacking. In effect, it is necessary that every environmental 
regime establishes an effective means of implementing/enforcing its legislative 
provisions, or else they will be ineffective. For this, enforcement agencies are 
required to implement the standards in the Nigerian environmental legislation; 
else the standards will merely be empty words with no real application. 
 
This study will therefore seek to identify deficiencies that have impeded criminal 
and administrative enforcement in the Nigerian environmental regulatory regime 
for its upstream oil and gas industry. In order to accomplish this, the study will 
                                                             
1 Barry C Field and Martha K Field, Environmental Economics: An Introduction (5th edn, Mc-Graw Hill 2009) 
p.48; Zephnaiah Edo, 'The Challenges of Effective Environmental Enforcement and Compliance in the Niger 
Delta Region of Nigeria' (2012) 14 Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 265. 
   131 
 
break the chapter into two parts. The first part will discuss deficiencies that have 
impeded criminal enforcement in the regulatory regime while the second part will 
discuss deficiencies impeding administrative enforcement in the regime. 
 
4.1 Deficiencies Contributing to the Inadequate Utilisation of 
Criminal Enforcement 
This study has observed repeated violations of environmental standards in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. The violations reflect badly on the existing Nigerian 
environmental criminal regime. The study has identified criminal sanctions 
embedded in several Nigerian environmental legislative instruments that prohibit 
such violations. This study therefore argues that the seeming weakness of the 
criminal sanctions to effectively prohibit the violations as it is supposed to, 
portrays the regime as having a deficient criminal structure for enforcing its 
standards. This study will therefore identify deficiencies that have contributed to 
the deficient criminal enforcement mechanism in the Nigerian environmental 
regime (particularly relating to its onshore upstream oil and gas sector). The 
identification of these deficiencies is essential towards strengthening the 
environmental criminal structure of the Nigerian environmental regime. 
 
4.1.1 Weak Environmental Criminal Sanctions that Fail to Adequately 
Punish and Deter Environmental Violation 
In properly determining what a weak sanction is, this study will qualify the 
strength of a sanction in the punishment and deterrence it provides. According to 
Garland, punishment is the “legal process whereby violators of criminal law are 
condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specified legal categories and 
procedures.”2 This assertion tallies with the argument made by Flew that 
punishment in the form of sanctions for criminal offences should:3 be against an 
offender, be unpleasant to the offender, be meted out for a criminal offence, and 
be established by a relevant authority. In line with this view, Benn and Peters 
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stressed that the unpleasantness of the punishment imposed by criminal sanctions 
is an essential element of punishment.4 This view is also set out by Hudson who 
argued that criminal punishment should be deserved by an offender hence be 
meted out to displease such an offender.5 This theory is referred to as the 
retributive theory of punishment.6 This retributivist school argues that there is a 
moral link between punishment and guilt.7 They argue that retribution operates 
on a societal model that acts ‘rightly’ through a legal system of rules aimed at 
condemning ‘wrong’ criminal acts.8 In effect, theorists of this idea emphasize the 
past by regarding punishment as a deserved consequence of criminal actions.9 
Theorists of the idea also seem to be un-interested in making any social change 
but only concentrate on the blameworthiness of criminal acts. 
 
Over time, this retributive approach to punishment has shifted to enable criminal 
punishment to incorporate other purposes of utilising criminal sanctions to punish 
an offender.10 Such other purposes of punishment have been established to 
include: deterrence (propounded in the utilitarian theory), just desserts, 
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and more recently, restorative justice.11 However, 
for this section, this study will concentrate on the purpose of deterrence and to 
what extent the Nigerian environmental criminal regime has prevented the future 
commission of environmental offences through deterrence. The reason for this 
concentration is that: 
1) This study recognises Bentham’s argument that punishment is only justified if 
it prevents a greater harm than the harm such punishment inflicts on the 
offender.12 Bentham’s exact words were that “pain and pleasure are the great 
springs of human action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the 
                                                             
4 Stanley I Benn and Richard S Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State (1st edn, Allen and Unwin 
1959) p.100; Philip Bean, Punishment: A Philosophical and Criminological Inquiry (1st edn, Oxford, England: 
Martin Robertson 1981) p.6. 
5 Barbara Hudson, Understanding Justice: An Introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and Controversies in Modern 
Penal Theory. (1st edn, Open University Press 1996) p.3. 
6 Hugo A Bedau, 'Retribution and the Theory of Punishment' (2019) 75 Journal of Philosophy 601. 
7 Philip Bean (n.4) pp14-15. 
8 ibid. p.17. 
9 David J Crossley, 'Bradley's Utilitarian Theory of Punishment' (1976) 86 Ethics: International Journal of 
Social, Political and Legal Philosophy 200. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 Jeremy Bentham and James T McHugh, The Rationale of Punishment (Prometheus Books 2009) p.220. 
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consequence of an act he is acted on in such manner as tends with a certain force 
to withdraw him as it were from the commission of that act. If the apparent 
magnitude be greater than the magnitude of the pleasure expected he will be 
absolutely prevented from performing it.”13 This argument implied that 
punishment would only contribute further to human suffering without achieving 
any real purpose if it fails to deter an offender from committing a crime. This view 
was further emphasised by Becarria who argued that “the aim of punishment can 
only be to prevent the criminal committing new crimes against his countrymen 
and to keep others from doing likewise.”14 
 
2) This study has already established the prevention of pollution to be a 
fundamental component of complying with the environmental principles provided 
under the regime, and in effect, achieving environmental protection. Moreover, a 
significant way of preventing pollution is by deterring polluters from polluting. A 
major approach to effecting deterrence to pollution in the Nigerian environmental 
regime has been the utilisation of criminal sanctions to prohibit such pollution. It 
is therefore necessary (considering the persisting pollution in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry despite the presence of the criminal sanctions) that this study 
determines a possible weakness in the sanctions to prohibit and prevent the 
criminal pollution. 
 
The theory that views the purpose of criminal punishment to be the prevention of 
future crime (deterrence) is referred to as the Utilitarian theory.15 People are said 
to have been deterred from an action when they refuse to carry out such action 
as a result of their aversion to the possible consequences of carrying out the 
action.16 To this effect, this school of thought views punishment as a means to the 
end of preventing crime rather than the actual end in itself. Rather than focus on 
the punishment that ought to be meted out to offenders, it focuses on the ability 
to utilize punishment to achieving the overall end of preventing crime. Hence, the 
                                                             
13 ibid. 
14 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (3rd edn, Seven Treasures Publications 2009) p.10. 
15 Fredrick Rosen, 'Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent: The Origins of a False Doctrine' (1997) 9 
Utilitas 23. 
16 ibid. 
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essence of punishing criminal polluters under this theory would be towards 
preventing criminal pollution in the long-run. Deterrence has also been argued to 
either be individual or general.17 
 
Generally deterrence (which applies to both individual and corporate offenders), 
seeks to reduce or prevent an offence by attaching specified punishment 
provisions to offences towards deterring potential offenders from offending.18 
Often, such provision will be in the form of legislation imposing criminal sanctions 
for specific offences with the view that such criminal sanctions will deter offenders 
from committing the crime.19 Indeed, as has been established in the methodology 
section of this study, most of the issued identified in this study relate to the 
pollution crime of corporate bodies. In other words, the deterrence that will be 
discussed in this section will mostly relate to corporate offenders with little 
emphasis on individual offenders. 
 
It is trite that in certain legislative contexts, the word person has been construed 
as referring only to individuals.20 However, as a general rule of law (and as it 
applies to the UK and Nigeria as comparator jurisdictions in this study), there is a 
presumption that reference in any Act of Parliament to a ‘person’ will include both 
natural persons and juristic persons (in the form of natural individuals and bodies-
corporate and incorporate [such as companies, associations and partnerships]).21 
                                                             
17 ibid.  
18 Kelly D Tomlinson, 'An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?' (2016) 80 Federal 
Probation 33-35. 
19 ibid. 
20 Anand Ballabh Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes (1st edn, Universal Law Pub Co 2008) p.80. 
21 This can be found in Schedule 1 of the UK’s Interpretation Act 1978 whereby it stated that “person includes a 
body of persons corporate or unincorporated”. Similarly, it has been provided for under Section 18(1) of the 
Nigerian Interpretations Act 1990 whereby it stated that: “person includes anybody of persons corporate or 
unincorporated.” Furthermore, as can be seen in most of the Nigerian law examples used in this study, offences 
and punishments for individual offenders are distinguished from those for corporate offenders thereby not only 
explicitly recognising both as legal persons both also demarcating what punishment should be imposed for their 
liability in the criminal act. Also, Section 31 of the NESREA Act 2007 recognises the violation of the NESREA 
provision by a corporate offender as well as by an individual offender and outlines the different punishment 
accruable to the separate categories of offenders. This can also be found in Section 34 of the Nigerian Company 
and Allied Matters Act 2004. Furthermore, Nigerian statutory provisions such as Section 7 of the Harmful 
Waste (Special Criminal Provisions etc.) Act explicitly stipulate corporate bodies as liable persons under the 
Acts. In the Nigerian case of Government of Midwestern State v Mid Motors Nig. Co. Ltd (1977) 10 S. C. 4, it 
was held that a company is a legal person which can be liable for an offence and can sue and be sued. However, 
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In the UK, this is unless there is a contrary indication (express or implied) in the 
Act itself22 or any accompanying subordinate legislation as to the inclusion of this 
category into the scope covered in the legal term ‘persons’.23 By virtue of their 
juristic personality, companies can be liable for criminal acts, subject to certain 
limitations such as assault, manslaughter, murder and rape.24 This necessitates 
the adoption of the definition given by Kramer which states that corporate crimes 
are illegal acts, omissions or commissions by corporate organisations themselves 
as, social or legal entities or by officials or employees of the corporations acting 
in accordance with the operative goals or standard.25 It is an argument in this 
study that deterrence by means of punishment will reduce or prevent the 
occurrence of such corporate crimes. Similarly, in line with the assertion above, 
deterrence regardless of whether it is individual or general will have the same 
effect on crimes committed by individual persons. It is therefore noteworthy that 
as discussed in this chapter, individual and general deterrence applies to both 
individual and corporate offenders. 
 
Individual deterrence is directed at the person (individual or corporate) being 
punished and aims at preventing the offender from repeating the offensive 
behaviour.26 In effect, punishment under this category seeks to give an individual 
offender an idea of the consequence of his criminal action if it happens again. For 
an individual criminal polluter, this form of deterrence gives such polluter an idea 
of punishment that accrues from polluting towards preventing the polluter from 
polluting again.  
 
On the other hand, general deterrence seeks to dissuade others from following 
the offender’s example.27 This form of deterrence is less concerned with the future 
                                                             
in Njemanze v Shell B.P. Port–Harcourt (1966) 1 All NLR 8, it was held that the action must be in the name by 
which the Company is registered.  
22 This is pursuant to Section 5 of the UK Interpretation Act. 
23 This is pursuant to Section 11 of the UK’’s Interpretation Act.  
24
  Samson Erhaze and Daud Momodu, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: Call for a New Legal Regime in Nigeria' 
(2015) 3 Journal of Law and Criminal Justice pp.64, 65. 
25 Ronald C Kramer 'Corporate Criminality: The Development of an Idea' 
in Ellen Hochstedler (ed.), Corporations as Criminals (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1984) pp.13, 37. 
26 Kelly D Tomlinson (n.18). 
27 Tran [2012] VSCA 110; DPP v Russell [2014] VSCA 308; Boulton v The Queen; Clements v The Queen; 
Fitzgerald v The Queen [2014] VSCA 342 at [123]. 
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behaviour of the offender himself. The interest in general behaviour rather than a 
single individual is on the grounds that most individuals are rational, and should 
calculate the risk of being similarly caught, prosecuted, and sentenced for the 
commission of a crime.  
 
Deterrence theory has proven difficult to validate, however, largely due to many 
intervening factors which makes it difficult to prove unequivocally that a certain 
punishment has prevented someone from committing a given crime.28 
Nevertheless, writers insist that penal laws and criminal sentences for offences 
usually have a strong deterrent effect on criminal behaviour of not just an 
individual offender, but also the general public.29 For example, it has been argued 
that in the UK, laws designed to prevent driving under the influence of alcohol 
(e.g., by setting a maximum legal level of blood alcohol content) can have a 
temporary deterrent effect on a previous offender, and indeed, the wide 
population, especially when coupled with mandatory penalties and a high 
probability of conviction.30 
 
Andenaes however, argues that it is necessary to distinguish classes of offences 
and their punishment as offences vary with the motivation of offenders.31 Hence 
any reasonable discussion on deterrence should consider the specific norms and 
circumstances of each class of the offence.32 This will entail legal drafters 
formulating legislation sanctioning offences which will consider these factors. On 
this ground, some offences might bear higher punishment than other offences. 
Nevertheless, upon researching into the economic and sociological models of 
general deterrence, Tullock concluded that increasing the frequency or severity of 
punishment for an offence definitely reduces the possibility of the offence being 
committed.33 In line with this, scholars have argued that at the barest minimum, 
                                                             
28 Chin L Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment (1st edn, Clarendon Press 1989) p.9; Nigel Walker, Why Punish? 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford 1991) p.16. 
29 Johannes Andenaes, 'Does Punishment Deter Crime?'in Gertrude Ezorsky, Philosophical Perspectives on 




33 Gordon Tullock, 'Does Punishment Deter Crime?' (1974) 36 Public Interest Journal 109. 
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an optimum penalty should be imposed for offences.34 Optimum penalty entails 
that the penalty for an offence should equate to the total social cost of the crime. 
The above assertion implies that to effectively achieve general deterrence, the 
penalty/punishment meted out for the offence should at the minimum be equal to 
the extent of harm caused by the offence and severe enough to deny the polluter 
the benefits accruing from the criminal profit, such as some measure of the 
polluter’s profits. In examining the severity of the existing sanctions, it is 
noteworthy to be reminded of the observation in chapter 3 that most of the 
existing oil and gas companies in Nigeria are subsidiaries of multinational parent 
firms. It is therefore not surprising that the companies will be wealthy by virtue 
of their global profits. However, this study notes that even in Nigeria, they make 
huge profits from their share of the exploitation of oil and gas resources. For 
example, in 2018, the SPDC posted a report showing revenue of approximately 
£34 million.35 It would therefore be unrealistic to attempt to deter the company 
with weak fines. Hence, in the analysis below of some of the existing sanctions, 
this study will seek to determine whether the sanctions are too weak to not just 
punish the criminal polluting companies, but also to deter a general commission 
of the pollution crimes.  
 
The weakness of most sanctions under the regime is laughable considering the 
extensive violation that has occurred in the oil and gas industry. Indeed, the 
significant manner in which most of the violations described above has occurred 
shows persistence on the part of the offenders. For instance, the failure of 
defaulting companies that cause oil spill to remediate the environment properly 
has lingered giving the significant time gap in carrying out the remediation 
processes in affected sites as observed in chapter 3. This study therefore wonders 
how such poor sanctions can deter a persistent violator. The obvious reasoning 
for the persistence is that there is a motivation for the criminal violation. This 
study argues that for the motivation to look unattractive, sanctions must be tough 
enough to take away the attraction. Having examined the existing sanctions in the 
                                                             
34 Jonathan M Karpoff and John R Lott, 'The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud' 
(1993) 36 the Journal of Law and Economics 757; Gary S. Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach' (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169. 
35 Shell Petroleum Development Company, 'Annual Report: Providing Energy for a Changing World' (Royal 
Dutch Shell, 2018) <http://file:///H:/shell_annual_report_2018.pdf> accessed 18 March 2019. 
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Nigerian regime, this study argues that some of the sanctions are simply unable 
to create this deterrence. For example, Section 6 of the Oil in Navigable Waters 
Act only stipulates a penalty of N2000 (£4.20) for an offender who discharges oil 
waste into Nigerian navigable waters. This is interesting considering the extensive 
discharge of oil waste into the navigable waters of the Niger Delta. The penalty is 
grossly insignificant when compared to the consequential harm that has been 
suffered by the Niger Delta inhabitants as a result. Similarly, in only introducing a 
penalty of 2 kobo (less than £0.00002) per 1000 standard cubic feet (SCF) of gas 
flared at any place, the Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Decree 1984 
has failed to provide a sufficient penalty that will present general deterrence to 
the offence. For this reason, gas flaring has apparently continued beyond 1984 
despite the requirement to phase it out.  
 
Furthermore, in stipulating a weak penalty of N100,000 (£205.30) for an individual 
offender and not more than N1,000,000 (£2052.30) for a corporate offender who 
is found guilty of failing to submit an EIA on a proposed project, the EIA Act 
presents a very weak deterrence to the criminal act. Indeed, considering the 
volatility of oil and gas operations to the Nigerian environment, and the extensive 
pollution caused by such oil and gas projects, it is obvious that this sanction 
provided by the legislation is grossly inadequate to deter a company or individual 
that might choose not to submit their EIA despite the project they seek to engage 
in being risky to the environment.  
 
Similarly, even if the NESREA Act were to cover the oil and gas pollution sphere, 
the criminal penalty for the offence of noise pollution in the Act is also too weak 
to effect any deterrence. Pursuant to the Act, an individual offender guilty of the 
offence of causing noise pollution is criminally liable to a fine not exceeding 
N200,000 (£408) or to imprisonment of up to one year or to both penalties.36 If 
however, this offence has been committed by a corporate organisation, the Act 
finds the corporate organisation criminally liable to an amount not exceeding 
N1,000,000 (£2050.60).37 In the same vein, it can be observed from chapter 3 
that the National Governmental (Noise standards and Control) Regulations 2009 
                                                             
36 This is provided for in Section 26 (3) of the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (Establishment) Act. 
37 This is provided for in Section 26 (4) of the Act. 
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prohibit noise pollution above maximum statutory standards. In particular, the 
Regulations stipulate the penalty of a fine of not more than N500,000 (£1025.7) 
for companies that are guilty of the crime and an additional fine of N10,000 
(£20.50) for every day the offence continues. The study also argues that the 
penalty neither provides sufficient punishment for the extent of crime committed 
nor sufficient deterrence for a wealthy corporation (such as the SPDC) if found 
guilty of the crime. This is despite the earlier observed allegations that some 
companies site their facilities close to residential areas. 
 
Indeed, it is not all legislation in the regime that has provided for such weak 
sanctions. There are other legislations that have rather provided for extremely 
severe sanctions (as will be discussed in the next section of this chapter) such as 
Section 6 of the Harmful Wastes Act which stipulates the penalty of life 
imprisonment for an offender who discharges harmful waste into the Nigerian 
environment or Section 2 of the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti 
Sabotage) Act 1975 stipulates the death penalty or 21 years’ imprisonment for 
the sabotage act of third parties causing pollution and harm to public health. 
Hence, this study will not refer to the utilization of weak sanctions by the regime 
as pervasive. This study is however of the view that while a few environmental 
criminal provisions have provided these severe sanctions, there is rather a high 
rate of the utilization of weak sanctions by the regime as is obvious from the 
sanctions mentioned in section 2.8 of this study. This study believes that 
considering this, such violations of environmental standards might still occur 
regardless of the presence of such criminal sanctions prohibiting the violations. 
This study concludes this section of this chapter by repeating the assertion of 
Nancy Firestone, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the United States 
Department of Justice: “You want to make criminal offences serious, or criminality 
becomes meaningless.”38 This agrees with the argument of Tullock (observed 
above) that the penalty should be made severe to achieve better deterrence.  
                                                             
38 William Wilson, Making Environmental Laws Work: An Anglo-American Comparison (3rd edn, Hart 
Publishing Oxford 1999) pp.107, 110. 
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4.1.2 Other Criminal Sanctions that are not proportional to Crime 
Committed and that Fail to Rehabilitate Offenders 
This study has observed the provision for long incarceration in the form of long 
prison terms (life imprisonment) in the Harmful Waste (Special Provisions) Act to 
punish the offence of the discharge of hazardous waste.39 This observation is 
notable considering that this statute is significant for the prohibition of harmful 
waste discharge in Nigeria. With regard to exactly which offenders will probably 
be affected by this statutory provision, it will obviously affect individual offenders 
and bodies corporate in line with Section 18 (1) of the Nigerian Interpretations Act 
identified above. However, since a company cannot be sent to prison,40 it will 
involve piercing the veil of corporate liability to identify and impose criminal 
liability on responsible corporate officers in the company. The doctrine of 
corporate personality is a term used to describe the separation of a corporation 
from its owners. As a separate entity, a corporation is set up to ‘shield’ its owners 
from personal liability for the debts or negligence of the business. This is on the 
basis that corporations are separate entities from their shareholders, and under 
normal circumstances, the individual shareholders and officers cannot be brought 
into a lawsuit involving the corporation.41 The piercing of the corporate veil on the 
other hand, describes the action of a court to hold the ‘responsible corporate 
                                                             
39 Sections 2 and 15 of the Harmful Wastes Act prohibit the discharge of hazardous waste. 
40 The above reasoning was asserted in the celebrated case of Lennards Carrying Co. v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd. 
[1915] A.C 705 at 713-714 where Viscount Haldane L.C held: “a corporation is an abstraction; it has no mind 
of its own any more than it has a body of its own...” 
41 This principle was enunciated in the celebrated case of Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, 
whereby the learned Lord MacNaghten in the Court of Appeal held that: “when the memorandum is duly signed 
and registered, though there be only seven shares taken, the subscribers are a body corporate “capable 
forthwith‟, of exercising all the functions of incorporated company”. Those are strong words; there is no period 
of minority on its birth, no interval of incapacity. I cannot understand how a body corporate such as this made 
capable by statute can lose individuality by issuing the bulk of its capital to one person, whether he be a 
subscriber to the memorandum or not. The Company is at law a different person altogether from the 
subscriber… Nor are the members (subscribers) liable…” On the premise of the ratio given above by the 
Learned Lord Justice, the doctrine of corporate personality has been settled to confer the toga of personae juris 
on a company. By such, a company can create personae juris capable of enjoying legal rights to own property, 
has a perpetual succession and its liabilities limited.  
In the USA case of Milan Kosanovich v Worcester Street Associates, LLC and Another Mass. App. Div. 93 
(2014), “the trial court pierced [the company's] corporate veil and found [the defendant] personally liable..." 
for the damages. The sole reason for this piercing of the corporate veil was because "corporate records did not 
exist or were not properly kept by the defendant.” Similarly, in the Nigerian case of Akinwunmi Alade v Alic 
Nigeria Ltd [2010] 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 111, Galadima J.S.C stated that “the consequences of recognizing the 
separate personality of a company is to draw a veil of incorporation over the Company. One is therefore 
generally not entitled to go behind or lift this veil. However, since a statute will not be allowed to be used as an 
excuse to justify illegality or fraud it is a quest to avoid the normal consequences of the statute which may result 
in grave injustice that the Court as occasion demands have to look behind or pierce the corporate veil.” 
   141 
 
officers’ of a corporation personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the 
corporation. To rely on the dictum of Devlin J, in the UK case of Bank Handel v 
Slatford,42 it was opined that: “… the legislature can forge a sledge hammer 
capable of cracking open the corporate shell…” In Re H,43 the court was of the 
view that the corporate veil can be set aside on the grounds that the company has 
been used to carry on an unlawful activity or in order to avoid the impact of an 
order of court. Usually in such cases, if the veil is lifted, the principle of limited 
liability is not affected. In this context, ‘responsible corporate officers’ are officers 
who are either the owners of company or in charge of the functioning of the 
company (such as the company directors)44 or other officers directly involved in 
the harmful waste discharge act. In this case, such officers will be found liable for 
the company’s discharge offence and therefore punishable by a long prison term 
as stipulated in the Harmful Waste (Special Provisions) Act. It is noteworthy that 
the application of corporate officer liability in the UK and USA will be explored in 
sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.2 of this study respectively, with a view to understanding 
its applications in the comparative model jurisdictions (the UK and the USA).  
 
This study argues that such long prison terms imposed as punishment might not 
serve the purpose of rehabilitating such corporate officers. Morris argued that 
offenders are incapacitated for long periods of time to protect the public from 
suffering from the offensive act in future.45 In the Utilitarian theory, incapacitation 
is regarded as a suitable punishment that removes the offender from committing 
further offence in the society.46 Arguing in favour of this, Hudson argued that an 
offender should be treated severely for his offence.47 However, it has been argued 
                                                             
42 [1953] 1 Q.B 248 at 278. 
43 [1996] 2 ALL E.R. 291 CA. 
44 This dimension was enunciated in Denning L.J in Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v Graham and Sons (1934) 1 
K.B 57 whereby it was held that: “a company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and 
nerve center, which controls what it does. It also has hands, which holds the tools and act in accordance with 
direction from the center. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing 
more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and 
managers who represent the directing mind and will.” This view was similarly set out in Lennards Carrying Co. 
v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd. whereby it was held that any corporation’s “active and directive will must consequently 
be sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent but who is really the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of personality of the corporation.” 
45 Herbert Morris, 'A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment ' in Antony Duff and David Garland, A Reader on 
Punishment (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press 1994) p.238.  
46 Chin Liew Ten (n.28) p.8 
47 Barbara Hudson (n.5) p.29. 
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that the essence of criminal sanctions is not only to punish or deter offenders, but 
also to reform the offender.48 According to Bean, crime is the symptom of a social 
disease, while rehabilitation is the treatment of the disease.49 He argued that 
rehabilitation does not only treat the offender for his social vices but also creates 
new thinking in an otherwise rigid penal system.50 In recent times, theorists of 
rehabilitation argue that punishment must seek to prevent crime and at same time 
maintain the right of the offender.51 In line with this, Rotman argued that while 
an offender might deserve imprisonment as punishment for his offence, he also 
has a right to “return to society with a better chance of being a useful citizen and 
staying out of prison.”52 In line with this, Section 2(4) of the Nigerian Prison Act 
1972 stipulates that the Nigerian prison system must seek to: identify the reason 
for such anti-social behaviour of the offender; and rehabilitate and reform the 
offender towards becoming a responsible and useful member of society.  
 
In light of the above, Levitt has argued that the utilisation of long prison terms 
might result in the offenders getting used to a prison environment rather than 
being remorseful and correcting their ways as a result of the long duration of such 
imprisonment terms.53 He argued that often an incarcerated offender adapts to 
prison conditions, and suffers less than in the beginning as he would become 
comfortable with the prison environment, made friends there and become used to 
the segregation.54 It has also been argued that by sharing criminal experience 
with other convicted persons in the prison, the offender might become smarter in 
committing crime and grow even more hardened and strong-willed in his 
criminality than he initially was before the imprisonment.55 By that, a convicted 
criminal violator (who is fairly naïve in the ways of violating standards and getting 
away with it), who has been sentenced to a long prison term of 10-20 years might 
simply learn better ways to mask his pollution crime so that he would not be 
                                                             
48 ibid. pp.7-8 
49 Philip Bean (n.4) p.54. 
50 ibid. p.64. 
51 Hugo A Bedau (n.6). 
52 Edgardo Rotman, 'Beyond Punishment' in Antony Duff and David Garland, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press 1994) p.286. 
53 Steven D Levitt, 'Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six 
that Do Not' (2004) 18 Journal of Economic Perspectives 163-165. 
54 ibid.p.70. 
55 Civil Liberty Organisation, 'Annual Report on Human Rights in Nigeria' (Civil Liberty Organisation 1993) 
pp.1-6. 
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caught subsequently. Hence, the corrective measure sought after in the 
imprisonment of the offender would not be achieved. To this effect, this study 
argues that while imprisonment terms have remained a strategic mechanism for 
retribution and deterrence to a criminal polluter, very long prison terms will fail to 
achieve this very important purpose of rehabilitation required to correct the 
ideology of violation inherent in the offender. In penalising a criminal violator of 
environmental standards, this study argues that the focus must not be limited to 
punishing the offender so as to deter future commission of the offence, or even 
removing the environmental offender from society to keep society safe, but also 
to correct the offender so that the offender voluntarily ceases to violate 
environmental standards. In effect, in the long run, the punishment must be such 
that someday there would not be need to compel the offender, rather the offender 
will wilfully comply. 
 
Furthermore, this study observed the death penalty stipulated in Section 2 of the 
Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act for the illegal sabotage 
of oil facilities in a manner that disrupts the flow of production and distribution, as 
well as causing harm to the natural environment and public health of Nigerians.56 
A writer has argued that one of the fundamental goals of criminal law is equitable 
sentencing.57 In effect, it has been argued that sentencing laws should be 
reformed to ensure that sentences are appropriate to the particular offence 
committed.58 A major advantage of equitable and appropriate sentencing refers 
back to the earlier argument made in this study that it will restore legitimacy to 
the criminal justice system in Nigeria. The Nigerian public will have confidence in 
the approach of the courts to imposing punishments for environmental criminal 
acts. In line with the analogy, this study argues that stipulating the death penalty 
as possible punishment for environmental violation is simply not appropriate. The 
sanction is not commensurate with the violation. Applying such punishment during 
                                                             
56 Section 1 of the Petroleum Production and Distribution Anti Sabotage Act 1975 prohibits the illegal sabotage 
of oil facilities in a manner that disrupts the flow of production and distribution, as well as causing harm to the 
natural environment and public health of Nigerians. 
57 Yair Listokin, 'Crime and (With a Lag) Punishment: Equitable Sentencing and the Implications of' (2007) 552 
Yale Faculty Scholarship Series 116. 
58 Open Agenda, 'Check Out @Oppagenda Report with Policies on Transforming Criminal Justice #Transforms' 
(Transforming the System, 2019) <https://transformingthesystem.org/criminal-justice-policy-
solutions/encouraging-equitable-sentencing/> accessed 7 August 2019. 
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court sentencing can further create dissatisfaction in the criminal justice system 
among the Nigerian public. It must be noted that the death penalty has been 
viewed as a cruel punishment generally for any crime.59 Countries are increasingly 
abolishing it for all crimes.60 Countries have abolished the death penalty even for 
more significant crimes such as murder.61 In line with the assertion of United 
Nations Human Rights, the death penalty should have no place in the 21st 
century.62 
 
This study argues that if the penalty under the Act is applied, it will fail to achieve 
the purpose of rehabilitation discussed earlier. This study argues that the aim of 
sanction must not be only to punish offences, but also to correct the offender. 
Such correction will be non-existent if the person is simply killed for committing 
an environmental violation regardless of the extent of violation. It is a different 
issue if the penalty is for a more grievous offence like murder63 arising from the 
criminal action of the offender. An example is the conviction of a third-party 
polluter for wilfully causing an explosion on an oil and gas facility with the intent 
to cause the death of another person.64 In this case, it becomes a murder case 
rather than a criminal matter of environmental violation. Another example is 
where the spill arising from the sabotage act causes the death of another, though 
not with the intent to spill. It becomes a manslaughter case.65 However, if the 
subject is simply about causing an oil spill as a result of the sabotage act, then 
the death penalty is certainly a disproportionate penalty for the offence. Hence, 
although capital punishment and long terms of imprisonment may deter and 
apparently incapacitate an offender, it may delay or even limit the rehabilitation 
                                                             
59 Amnesty International, 'Death Penalty' (Amnesty International, 2019) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-
do/death-penalty/> accessed 7 August 2019. 
60 For instance, in 2004, the 13th Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights prohibiting the 
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1965. 
62 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Death Penalty' (United Nations Human 
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63 Pursuant to Section 319 of the Criminal Code Act “…any person who commits the offence of murder shall he 
sentenced to death.” 
64 Intention has been discussed in section 2.9.1 of this study. 
65 Pursuant to Section 325 of the Criminal Code Act “Any person who commits the offence of manslaughter is 
liable to imprisonment for life.” 
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of offenders as rehabilitation can only occur after the incarcerated offender has 
been re-integrated into society. 
 
4.1.3 Failure to Apply Criminal Sanctioning through Proper Prosecution 
This study found no public record of any criminal prosecution for the criminal 
violations of environmental standards analysed in chapter 3. This observation 
supports an earlier observation previously made that most offenders guilty of 
environmental offences in Nigeria are yet to be prosecuted.66 For example, 
considering the assertions of SPDC that some of the oil spill from their facility had 
been caused by the sabotage and bunkering acts of third parties, this study 
wonders why there is yet no record of investigation into and prosecution against 
the third parties accused of carrying out the sabotage acts causing the oil spills or 
even why the SPDC that has failed to carry out all possible precautions to prevent 
such sabotage and bunkering acts. The study even wonders why no single culprit 
of the act has been identified to date. This raises the issue as to how the existing 
criminal sanctions in the environmental criminal regime can even be applied to 
offenders if there is no proper arraignment of such offenders. This study argues 
that the inability of criminal sanctions for environmental offences to be applied on 
offenders through the prosecution of offenders impedes the functionality of such 
sanctions. Hence, it causes a dormancy of the sanctions in achieving their purpose 
of enactment. It reduces the sanctions to mere words on paper with no possibility 
of effecting compliance.  
 
The importance of prosecuting criminal offences cannot be overstated. Shoemaker 
argued that prosecution is a mechanism utilised in a criminal law regime to ensure 
the settlement of criminal disputes and protect society against social harm.67 
Hence, prosecution upholds deference to societal laws. In this light, it has been 
argued that: “the obligation to participate in prosecutions went deep into the ranks 
of propertied societies, assuring not only the involvement of a fair number of 
persons but also their interest in upholding deference to the law.”68 Similarly, it 
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has been asserted that criminal law utilises prosecution to promote the specific 
interests of society.69 
 
Oil and gas matters fall under the exclusive list in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
(as amended), hence they are strictly Federal matters.70 Likewise, environmental 
offences in the oil and gas industry are Federal criminal matters, hence are 
regulated by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 rather than 
the procedural law of states. This is because the ACJA is the procedural law that 
guides the Federal criminal law system.71 
 
To this effect, environmental offences related to oil and gas are different from 
other general environmental offences as they are federal criminal matters that can 
only be tried in the Federal High Court.72 This position was justified in Okoni v 
Nigerian Agip Oil Co. (Nigeria) Ltd73where the court re-established the position 
that all matters relating to oil and gas pollution were to be held at the Federal 
High Court. The court affirmed the ruling of Justice Acholonu in the case of C.G.G 
(Nig) Ltd v Asaagbara74 that “any unsavoury result is actionable in consequence 
of the activities of the companies engaged in operation and relating to prospection 
in oil, mines, minerals, gas exploration and related geophysical works or activities 
comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In this regard 
pollution caused by oil spillage comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court. This is because it is the pipelines that carry the oil. When the 
pipelines burst and spill all over the place, such an accident arises from the natural 
usage of the pipelines connected, with and pertaining to mineral oil prospecting 
and pipelines carriage.”  
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Furthermore, Section 104 (b) of the ACJA stipulates that all criminal matters to be 
prosecuted at the Federal High Court must be instituted by the Attorney-General 
and (any other person appointed by the Attorney-General) in the Federal High 
Court.75 Specifically, Section 106 of the ACJA explicitly hands over the power to 
prosecute criminal matters to: (a) the Attorney-General of the Federation or 
anyone in his department; (b) a legal practitioner working for the Attorney-
General under the Ministry of Justice; (c) a legal practitioner authorised by the 
Attorney-General; (d) a legal practitioner authorised under the ACJA or any Act of 
the National Assembly, subject to the Attorney-General.  
 
The above statutory provisions clearly provide an institutional framework for the 
prosecution of environmental matters relating to oil and gas operations. It is 
therefore interesting that despite such explicit provisions, there seems to be no 
record of such prosecution against environmental offenders in the industry. This 
study argues that this limits the capacity of the regime to actually apply criminal 
sanctioning towards enforcing environmental standards. This inadequacy is made 
significant by the inability of enforcement agencies to impose such criminal 
sanctions. One might have wondered whether there were circumstances in which 
the enforcement agencies could impose criminal sanctions in light of the fact that 
virtually all fines in the environmental statutes are criminal fines. Moreover, there 
could be times when the process of prosecution could be cumbersome. For this, 
Nigerian case law as discussed below, has made it clear that there is no such 
provision in the Nigerian criminal regime.  
 
In NOSDRA v ExxonMobil,76 it was determined that enforcement agencies lacked 
both the powers to impose criminal sanctions and to prosecute environmental 
offences unless decided by a competent judicial arm.77 The dispute in this case 
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arose because of oil spillage that occurred at ExxonMobil's facility.78 During the 
trial, ExxonMobil alleged that the spill was accidental and that they immediately 
shut down the affected tanks as soon as they were aware of its occurrence.79 The 
company also alleged that it activated its Emergency Response Procedure (ERP) 
and carried out a clean-up, remediation and assessment of the impacted site in 
accordance with the stipulated standards of the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act.80 
The company further alleged that NOSDRA rated the ERP as satisfactory and 
certified the clean-up and remediation exercise.81 
 
NOSDRA on the other hand, argued that the company failed to comply with the 
standards established in Sections 6(2) and (3) of the NOSDRA Act requiring the 
company to report an oil spill within 24 hours of its occurrence and sanctioning an 
inability of the company to clean up and remediate impacted sites.82 Hence the 
agency imposed the sum of N10,000,000 (ten million Naira) as a penalty on the 
company for the violation.83 On these grounds, the company queried whether the 
Nigerian judiciary has the exclusive powers to impose fines and penalties, and 
wondered if NOSDRA, as a non-judicial entity, could impose such a fine. 
 
In its judgment, the Court decided that the imposition of a criminal penalty by 
NOSDRA was ultra vires (outside the scope) of its powers stipulated in the 
NOSDRA (Establishment) Act.84 In its decision, the court ruled that:85 
1. "….. the imposition of penalties by the Appellant was ultra vires its powers, 
especially where no platform was established to observe the principles of 
natural justice. 
2. Penalties or fines are imposed as punishment for an offence or violation of 
the law. The power as well as competence to come to that finding belong 
to the courts, and the Appellant is not clothed with the power to properly 
exercise that function in view of the law creating the Appellant (NOSDRA). 
There is, therefore, a lacuna in that law establishing the Appellant. 
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3. The said law also prevents NOSDRA from even prosecuting environmental 
offenders as it must be reported to the Attorney-General or members of his 
office.” 
 
Relying on this precedent, it is apparent that prosecution for environmental 
criminal violations in the oil and gas industry is solely left to the Attorney-
General and designates in his office. The question therefore remains why such 
prosecutions have not been adequately carried out. The study suggests a 
number of reasons for this below.  
 
4.1.3.1 Corruption Limiting Detection of Environmental Crime 
A major challenge that has impeded the quick prosecution of oil and gas pollution 
offenders is the inability to actually identify the culprits of the offences as a result 
of corruption. Indeed, the SPDC has alleged that the perpetrators of intentional 
oil sabotage acts that contribute to Nigerian pollution crime are often inhabitants 
of the Niger Delta communities.86 Moreover, the group that has been mainly 
carrying out the identification of the sabotage criminals in Nigeria is the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) which is an arm of the Nigerian police force.87In line with Section 4 of 
the Police Act 1967, it is the duty of the JTF to detect such inhabitants perpetrating 
the sabotage acts. It has however been asserted that often the JTF have failed in 
their duty to discover the perpetrators of oil pipeline sabotage.88 This study argues 
that corruption in the force has also contributed to this inability to detect crime. 
Firstly, corruption is prohibited by Section 19 (a) (11) of the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Act 2000 which states that: “any public officer who uses his office or 
position to gratify or confer any corrupt or unfair advantage upon himself or any 
relation or associate of the public officer or any other public officer shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for five years 
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without option of fine.” However, despite this provision, the corruption of the 
public officers (such as members of the police force) is an open secret. There have 
been repeated allegations of corruption at different times among Nigeria’s public 
officers.89 
 
In 2005, Tafa Balogun, the then inspector general of police was sentenced to six 
months imprisonment for corrupt enrichment, stealing and embezzlement of 
public funds totalling a sum of 103 million dollars.90 Furthermore, in 2008, the 
National coordinator of the Police Equipment Fund (PEF) Kenny Martins and his 
deputy Ibrahim Dumuje were charged with the misappropriation of N50 billion 
donations to enhance police performance by diverting the funds to their personal 
use.91 
 
Furthermore, it has been reported that law enforcement agents in Nigeria 
sometimes extort offenders rather than sanction them.92 This deficiency was also 
emphasized in the criminal case of Temple Nwankwoala (DSP) v Federal Republic 
of Nigeria93whereby the accused (a Deputy Superintendent of the Nigerian Police) 
was convicted of extorting large sums of money from a person against whom 
criminal complaints had been made and were being investigated. In any case, the 
Worldwide Governance Indicator regarding control of corruption ranging from 0 
(lowest control of corruption) to 100 (highest control of corruption) shows that 
Nigeria scored just 11 on control of corruption in 2012.94 There was very little 
variation since the first assessment in 1996 when the country scored 
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approximately 9.95 This puts the country lower than the sub-Saharan African 
average of 30 in the management of corruption.96 This study argues that there 
cannot be prosecution if the alleged perpetrators have not been identified ab-
initio. This is because without the identification of such persons, there would no 
one to prosecute. 
 
4.1.3.2 Lack of Will of the Attorney General (or His Designate) to Prosecute 
Despite the statutory capacity of the Attorney-General or his designates to 
prosecute, it has been alleged that sometimes, they fail to actually perform this 
role of prosecution. A writer has alleged that there have been circumstances in 
which the Attorney-General refused to prosecute environmental offences in the oil 
and gas industry simply because he was too busy with other matters.97 In this 
way, inhabitants of the areas can be denied redress for the harm they have 
suffered or there may be a delay in getting justice for environmental wrong done 
in the country. This necessitated the question as to whether it is right that a person 
who had genuinely suffered from pollution “be prevented from commencing an 
action to enforce his legitimate rights to a clean and hazard-free environment, if 
the Attorney-General is unconcerned with his plight?”98  This leads to the next 
point, whether private litigation is permitted under any circumstance in Nigerian 
criminal law especially considering that there might be circumstances where the 
designated parties might fail to carry out the role. A determination of the position 
of Nigerian environmental criminal law on the prosecution by other private parties 
(not listed in Section 106 of the ACJA) is necessary considering that there is no 
statutory provision in Nigerian law that specifies that a decision not to prosecute 
can be challenged by other third parties. 
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4.1.3.3 Inadequacy of the Federal High Court in trying Environmental Offences 
and Lack of a Specialised Environmental Court 
In line with the ACJA, environmental offences relating to the oil and gas industry 
can only be tried at the Federal High Court (FHC). However, it is notable that 
several matters are also tried in the Federal High Court (including matters of other 
concerns that do not relate to the oil and gas industry).99 It is notable that the 
FHC adjudicates on various other matters besides environmental ones. This study 
therefore argues that the FHC could be overwhelmed by a large number of other 
cases which could cause lengthy delays in environmental adjudication and a denial 
of environmental justice. After all, it has been asserted that “delay of justice is a 
denial of justice.”100 A delay to render justice for an environmental offence 
committed could invariably limit the possibility of eventually accessing justice on 
the environmental issue. This reduces the applicability of the access to justice 
pillar of the Aarhus principle described in chapter 2 of this study. 
 
Writers have argued that even if environmental criminal matters were to be 
prosecuted, there is a substantial possibility that the court and judges of the FHC 
might lack the relevant experience required to deal with environmental crimes, 
especially relating to the exploitation of oil and gas resources.101 They are of the 
view that the consequences of pollution that form the basis of the accused person’s 
culpability are often technical in nature, hence requiring adjudicators with expert 
knowledge of the field and a jury and judge who are experienced in the field.102 In 
any case, it has been observed that the technical expertise required for 
prosecuting environmental criminal matters in the oil and gas industry is often 
lacking.103 Noting this insufficiency, it has been observed that most developing 
countries: “require the service of the qualified and experienced investigators, 
professional and especially well trained prosecutors in criminal cases on 
environment, and expert in various fields is of major importance, as well as a 
qualified laboratory, supported by sufficient funds, especially in handling water 
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and air pollution caused by industry…..”104 It has also been observed that most 
developing countries such as Nigeria lack necessary environmental laboratories 
which can serve and provide the data needed to construct an indictment accurately 
and prove the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.”105 Similar to this 
assertion, the Attorney-General of the Nigerian Federation and members of his 
department might not necessarily possess the appropriate environmental 
expertise required to adjudicate environmental offences given that they are 
trained lawyers not environmentalists. Moreover, even the judges of the courts 
that make the final decisions (since Nigeria does not operate a jury system) might 
not possess the required environmental knowledge and expertise to deliver right 
judgements on environmental criminal matters. 
 
Moreover, the Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth have argued 
that while there might have been efforts to speak against the failure to prosecute 
environmental criminals in Nigeria, they acknowledge the current lax judicial 
system in the country.106 They observed that the Nigerian judiciary is not totally 
independent and decisions at court are often influenced by the executive arm of 
government.107 This goes against the assertion of Lord Bingham that “the principle 
of independence calls for decision-makers to be independent of local government, 
vested interests of any kind, public and parliamentary opinion, the media, political 
parties and pressure groups, and their own colleagues, particularly those senior 
to them. In short, they must be independent of anybody and anything which might 
lead them to decide issues coming before them on anything other than the legal 
and factual merits of the case as, in the exercise of their own judgment, they 
consider them to be.”108 
 
The inherent deficiency in the FHC being the only court for trying environmental 
offences related to the oil and gas industry and the possible lack of specialisation 
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in the courts necessitates the establishment of an environmental court that could 
not only effectively deal with environmental offences but grant access to 
environmental justice for all Nigerians. The reason for the establishment of an 
environmental court in Nigeria and factors that have to also be considered while 
setting it up will be discussed in the recommendation section of this study. 
 
4.1.3.4 Absence of Public Interest Prosecution in the Nigerian Regime 
Other public persons (besides those listed in Section 106 of the ACJA) lack the 
capacity to prosecute environmental offences committed in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry.109 This is as a result of the lack of locus standi to establish such 
actions. As has been statutorily established, criminal procedures for environmental 
offences in the oil and gas industry can only be rightly instituted by the Attorney-
General of the Federation or his designates specified in Section 106 of the ACJA. 
In essence, private persons, NGOs or any such person that has not been statutorily 
delegated under Section 106 lacks the locus standi to prosecute criminal offences 
(and in particular, environmental criminal offences relating to oil and gas 
resources) at the Federal High Court.  
 
Indeed, the procedural law in a few Nigerian states empowers private persons to 
institute criminal complaints against offenders (an example is Section 143 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code Law of Kwara State 1977 which permits private persons 
to institute criminal complaints against offenders when they have suffered harm 
from the crime committed). This position was reflected in Tolulope Onyide v Taiye 
Ayotunde Onyide.110 In the case, the Court of Appeal held that “…in fact even the 
roadside petition writer or any person for that matter can prepare and sign a 
criminal complaint for a complainant under Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code Law of Kwara State.”111 
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The inability of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) to prosecute under 
Nigerian criminal law (generally) has also been established under a relevant case 
law provision.112  The court argued that unless such powers are delegated to such 
an NGO, which under Nigerian law is impossible, such an NGO lacks the capacity 
to prosecute. In Adesanya v President (supra),113 the court argued that while 
NGOs might have the capacity in other jurisdictions, they lacked the locus standi 
under Nigerian law.114 The trial judge held that “the position of the law may have 
changed to cloak ‘pressure groups, NGOs and public spirited taxpayers’ with locus 
standi to maintain an action for public interest, as argued by the Appellant, but 
that is in other countries, not Nigeria. The truth of the matter is that there is a 
remarkable divergence in the jurisprudence of locus standi in jurisdictions like 
England; India; Australia, etc., and the Nigerian approach to same.”115 
 
This exclusion has clearly been extended under case law to environmental 
enforcement agencies in the regime whereby the Supreme Court ruled that 
enforcement agencies such as NOSDRA lacked the requisite locus standi to 
prosecute environmental criminal matters in the oil and gas industry as such 
matters can only be prosecuted by an Attorney-General of the Federation.116 To 
this effect, criminal prosecution of pollution offences relating to the oil and gas 
industry is the responsibility of the Attorney-General of the Federation or his 
designates, regardless of whether they are incompetent in performing such roles 
and there is no flexibility for performance by other private persons that might be 
willing to prosecute. Moreover, writers have argued that the duties of the 
environmental agencies to regulate should also be interpreted as a measure of the 
right to prosecute offenders.117 However, an inherent limitation to such a 
supposition in the Nigerian environmental regime is that the establishment Act 
that set up such agencies and listed their scope of duties clearly excluded the 
possibility of the agencies to prosecute. For example, while Sections 5-7 of the 
NOSDRA Act fails to specifically stipulate a permission for NOSDRA to prosecute 
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oil and gas firms that fail to remediate and rehabilitate the environment, Section 
6 (m) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 
explicitly empowers the commission to prosecute financial offences, in addition to 
other duties of enforcement stipulated in the Act.  
 
Hence, on a general note, Nigerian environmental criminal law fails to provide for 
public litigation of environmental offences. In line with this argument, it has been 
observed that the existing legislative framework in the Nigerian environmental 
regime prevents affected communities from easily accessing environmental justice 
for environmental crimes committed against them.118 Although Section 3 of the 
(yet to be passed) Private Prosecutions Bill 2009 gives a private person or NGO 
the right to prosecute, except when any given law has particularly stipulated that 
the Attorney-General prosecutes the criminal offence, such locus standi is yet to 
be extended to private persons under the existing regime generally.   
 
This study argues that the limitation to public interest litigation under the Nigerian 
environmental criminal regime (which has been a major contributor to the absence 
of prosecutions in the regime) could be viewed as having limited the application 
of the pillar principle of access to environmental justice in the Nigerian regime. 
This is based on the argument made in chapter 2 that the principle facilitates easy 
access for private persons affected by environmental harm to seek redress. This 
is not surprising considering that Nigeria has neither signed nor ratified the Aarhus 
Convention nor has it domesticated it (as mentioned in chapter 2). The ratification 
of this Convention and domestication as Nigerian law would facilitate the ability of 
the regime to be open to flexible approaches to enhancing environmental justice 
such as the utilisation of private interest litigation if the Attorney-General fails to 
prosecute. This study does not seek a replacement of the role of the Attorney-
General of the Federation to prosecute environmental offences with public interest 
litigation. Rather the study argues against the inability of the regime to extend 
the right to prosecute to other public interest persons that can also be capable of 
                                                             
118 Onoriode Emoyan (n.97).  
   157 
 
prosecuting if permitted, especially considering the perceived inability of the 
Attorney-General to prosecute on some occasion. 
 
4.1.3.5 Heavy Standard of Proof Required for the Prosecution to Prove their 
Case against Environmental Offenders 
Another factor that has contributed to the gap in the prosecution of criminal 
pollution in the Nigerian oil and gas industry is the great statutory expectation of 
the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person under Nigerian criminal 
law.  Section 138 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 requires that the burden of proof 
in criminal trials must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 
Hence generally in Nigerian criminal law, the burden of proof can only fall on the 
accused after the prosecutor has established evidence that helps in proving the 
crime for which the accused is charged.119 The interpretation of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ was established in the criminal case of Osetola & Anor v The 
State120 to imply a strict burden placed on the prosecution to establish its case 
against the defendant by proving ‘every’ element of the offence. However, in some 
circumstances, an excessively strict burden comes with its demerits. 
 
For instance, the defendant can simply deny the existence of a criminal element 
or simply sit back and wait for the prosecution to fail to meet its burden of proof; 
a legal strategy referred to as either a denial or failure of proof defence.121 At other 
times, the defendant can assert an affirmative defence that is not connected to 
the prosecution’s burden of proof before or during the trial by raising a new issue 
that must be proven to a certain evidentiary standard.122 Either way, the heavy 
requirement of standard of proof in the prosecution of a legal person who has been 
accused of committing an environmental offence will always create tedious work 
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for the prosecution even when the prosecution might have a good case against 
the accused person. 
 
Indeed, it has been asserted that the need to prove strict liability offences beyond 
reasonable doubt has impeded the ability of enforcement agencies to prosecute 
environmental offences.123 This is because significant attention (which sometimes 
might be undue) has to be given to investigation, as each element of the criminal 
offences being investigated has to be capable of strict proof.124 In line with this, 
investigators must establish procedures for conducting any necessary searches, 
for securing physical evidence, for gathering and storing documentary and other 
evidence, for holding interviews under caution, for taking the statement of 
witnesses, for examining their evidence and ‘plugging gaps’, and for ensuring that 
these procedures are carried out on time before the evidence goes stale.125This 
study believes that the above reasons have contributed to the inadequate 
prosecution of environmental offences committed in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry.  
 
4.1.3.6 Lack of Sentencing Guidelines in the Nigerian Criminal Law System 
The process of enacting legislation in Nigeria is similar to the USA, involving a joint 
effort of the legislative arms. Furthermore, most such legislation prohibiting 
particular violations contain within themselves the prescribed punishment for such 
violations.126 However, no existing sentencing guideline has been observed in the 
Nigerian regime that could provide guidance to the sentencing of environmental 
offenders by the courts even if the regime decided to commence adequate 
prosecution of its environmental offences in the oil and gas industry.127 The closest 
to a Federal Sentencing Guideline in Nigeria are the statutorily prescribed penalties 
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discussed above.128 Proponents in favour of this absence have argued that in 
Nigeria, sentencing is a little less complex than other jurisdictions that might have 
utilised Sentencing Guidelines, such as the USA.129 This is mainly as a result of 
the form of federalism practised in Nigeria involving no jury in its judicial 
system.130 Hence, they believe there is really no necessity for a sentencing 
guideline.131  
 
This study will however argue this as a deficiency in line with the purposes of a 
sentencing guideline in any criminal regime. First, Justice Brewer has argued that 
by categorizing offenders through the use of ‘offence’ and ‘offender,’ sentencing 
guidelines have reduced disparity in sentencing in the USA.132 Accordingly, the 
USA guideline has narrowed the sentencing range to make sure that offenders 
with similar crime elements and similar criminal histories receive similar 
punishments upon conviction.133 It has also been asserted that sentencing 
guidelines have facilitated accurate sentencing in the USA.134 Indeed, it has been 
argued that prior to the introduction of sentencing guidelines in the USA, parole 
officers had enormous powers to determine the length of time offenders served in 
prison.135 This was because despite the prison terms imposed by trial courts, the 
parole officers could recommend the offenders being let out after a while on 
account of ‘good behaviour.’136 This made it difficult to know for certain how much 
actual time an offender was going to serve.137 
 
Hence, one such recommendation under the existing USA definitive sentencing 
guideline is to make sentencing more definite by abolishing parole with minor 
exceptions, and making the time imposed under the sentencing the actual time 
served.138 Most sentencing guidelines also make sentences proportional to the 
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offence committed and the financial capacity of the offender.139 Indeed, the 
uniformity, accuracy and proportionality of sentencing that has been associated 
with sentencing guidelines creates some form of consistency which makes the 
court and criminal justice system legitimate to the general public.140 For instance, 
in 2007, Smith discovered that consistency in sentencing was a determinant factor 
in the confidence of the British people in the judicial system.141 Furthermore, a 
national survey in Britain showed most respondents asserting that the most 
significant issues contributing to the deterrence of crime were the sentencing of 
criminal acts and the consistency of such sentencing.142 Hence, not only are 
sentences pivotal in gaining public confidence in the criminal judicial system, but 
the consistency that has been associated with sentencing guidelines is equally 
essential. 
 
The weak sanctioning in the Nigerian regime is worsened by the absence of a 
Federal Sentencing Guideline in the Nigerian regime. This study has discussed the 
arguments made in favour of the use of Sentencing Guidelines. In line with the 
arguments, the study has viewed such Guidelines as necessary to the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice system based on the proportionality of allocating sentences 
commensurate to offences. Indeed, while the Nigerian regime has provided for 
scalable fines, the fines are currently too weak to deter offenders even if they 
were applied by a sentencing guideline. It is however of note that the Guidelines 
do not go outside the scope of established statutory sanctions to sentence. Hence 
there must be the first step of toughening up the Nigerian environmental criminal 
sanctions as analysed above. Subsequent to this, the study argues that the 
scalable nature of the environmental criminal sanctions in the Nigerian regime 
without a sentencing guideline could be detractive. The reason being that since 
the statutes have only provided a limit which the sanctions cannot exceed with no 
provision as to the minimum sanction, judges can impose sentences that are very 
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minimal when compared to the offence committed (yet still within the scope of 
scalable sanctions provided under the statute). For example, while it has been 
argued that the imposition of fines up to N2000 (£4.20) as sanction for the 
pollution of navigable waters in Nigeria waters143 is weak, a judge can further 
decide to sentence the offender to an even lower a fine to half the statutory fine 
and still be within the statutory scope stipulated in the Act.  
 
Moreover, while the study has acknowledged the apparent lack of prosecution for 
environmental offences related to the Nigerian oil and gas industry, this study 
argues that a lack of such guideline could make future sentences heterogeneous 
in nature. Considering the apparent defectiveness of the Nigerian environmental 
criminal regime, it would only be expected that the criminal justice system might 
not be as legitimate as required to collectively ensure the enforcement of 
environmental standards in Nigeria. A comparative analysis of the applicability of 
sentencing guidelines in the UK and USA regimes will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
4.2 Deficiencies Contributing to Poor Enforcement of 
Environmental Standards 
Environmental enforcement is defined as the set of actions that government or its 
agencies take to ensure compliance with environmental standards.144 Such 
enforcement should guarantee full implementation of environmental standards. 
This study has previously explained that environmental standards in the Nigerian 
regime are codified in environmental legislation. Based on the discussion in 
chapter 3, this study observed continued flagrant disregard of environmental 
standards despite the expectation that sanctions compelling the companies to 
comply will have been enforced. It is therefore apparent that there is a defect in 
the existing environmental enforcement process in the Nigerian oil and gas sector.  
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The flagrant violations raise questions like: have enforcement agencies even 
gained an accurate record of the extent and volume of violations committed other 
than the information given by the companies themselves and the individual 
investigations of NGOs like Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth? Have 
any such companies found to be liable for criminal violations been prosecuted for 
their criminal acts? Some of the companies have alleged third-party acts causing 
pollution; has this been investigated by Nigerian enforcers and culprits charged 
other than the investigation by external bodies like UNEP?  If the environmental 
enforcement agencies and other agencies that contribute to enforcement in the 
regime have done this, then why have the violations clearly continued unabated? 
Most of these un-answered questions will be examined in the next section. The 
study will establish the answers from its determination as to possible deficiencies 
that have contributed to the occurrence of violations, despite the presence of 
enforcement agencies in the regime. The next sections of this chapter will explore 
these possible deficiencies. 
 
4.2.1 Lack of Environmental Awareness on Enforcement Progress and 
Compliance Rate 
This study observed its inability to gain reliable direct information regarding 
enforcement progress and compliance rates on standards such as impact 
assessment and clean-up from the enforcement agencies. This is because such 
reports (if existing) have not been published. Moreover, the agencies have seemed 
reluctant to provide such information and have resisted all attempts to gain such 
information. This has made the study rely mainly on secondary information from 
other sources like reports from Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth. 
Although the information from the secondary sources is sufficiently reliable for the 
big picture of environmental criminal violations painted in this study, such 
information is still not direct data from the agencies. Moreover, there have been 
allegations of the same nature from previous research studies.145 Even where such 
information was provided, they failed to address the particular environmental 
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information requested.146 Writers have argued that on some occasions it has been 
apparent that the FME clearly did not have the particular EIA report information 
being requested.147 This is a direct violation of the standard stipulated in Section 
1 of the Nigerian Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, this contravenes Section 
24 of the EIA Act.  
 
In section 3.3 of this study, it was observed that in some circumstances EIA has 
been approved without the input and consent of other stakeholders required in 
the EIA Act. One of the reasons for this is the possibility that information regarding 
such EIA might not even be communicated to the stakeholders. This is interesting 
considering that some such stakeholders could be members of the local 
communities in which the oil and gas operations are being carried out. It would 
be expected that such community members are aware of the pre-existing 
environmental effects of similar oil and gas projects that have been carried out in 
their communities. Hence, they could provide first-hand information on such 
potential environmental issues for future similar oil and gas operations. This study 
asserts that the best ways to guarantee the stakeholder participation of such 
communities will be by: making the community aware of potential projects, 
engaging them on the EIA process to be carried out and involving them in the 
approval of the EIA report provided by the operator of such project. 
 
Furthermore, this study argues that a failure to create environmental awareness 
on proposed projects or even permit public participation can limit public confidence 
on enforcement. This is because inhabitants of the community might fail to believe 
that any enforcement is actually being carried out to implement the standards if 
there is no accessible evidence to such enforcement. For example, this study has 
observed the lack of criminal prosecutions of environmental offenders in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry based on the absence of any public record showing 
evidence of such application. Indeed, even if any such prosecution has been 
carried out in the past, it cannot be identified and attested if undocumented and 
accessible. Moreover, the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act remove 
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the possibility of any other regulation limiting the public availability of such 
information since it provided no caveat to the extent of its application.  
 
Moreover, if there is no confidence, how will the inhabitants participate in 
environmental matters such as the Niger Delta inhabitants assisting detection of 
third-party oil sabotage criminals and reporting them to the police? Furthermore, 
how will research be conducted towards strengthening the enforcement system if 
there is unwillingness on the part of agencies to provide the required adequate 
data to carry out such research? This study views this as a limitation of the regime 
impeding regulatory enforcement.  
 
4.2.2 Conflicting Statutory Provisions on Enforcement 
Another factor limiting enforcement of environmental standards in the Nigerian 
regime is the conflict of Nigerian environmental legislation regarding exactly which 
agency is in charge of dealing with the fundamental environmental enforcement 
obligations such as oil spill control. For example, pursuant to the NOSDRA 
(Establishment) Act discussed in chapter 2, the NOSDRA is required to coordinate 
and direct the clean-up and remediation of affected sites through the National Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan for Nigeria. On the other hand, Part VIII-B (Contingency 
Planning for the Prevention, Control and Combating of Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Spills) Section 6.1 (ii) of the EGASPIN mandates the DPR to coordinate 
and direct the clean-up and remediation of affected sites through the Initial 
Remedial Action (IRA) Plan. Furthermore, Sections 120 and 121 of the Minerals 
and Mining Act even introduced the Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation 
Programme (EPRP) for the rehabilitation of land that has been disturbed as a result 
of exploitation activities and established the Mines Environmental Compliance 
Department to enforce the exercise.  
 
The question becomes: which exact plan is to be utilised in the enforcement of an 
important standard such as clean-up? Who exactly is to follow through on the 
exercise? In reality, this study believes that the NOSDRA has been performing 
most of the role since they seem to be the only agency with information regarding 
oil spills and the only agency that issues certification on remediation. This does 
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not however, negate the fact that there seem to be a confusion in the regime 
regarding which agency actually carries out the oversight of oil spill response and 
which policy and plan is actually utilised for enforcement. This study argues that 
this could limit the extent of enforcement for compliance by the regulated 
companies. This is because the companies will fail to know which exact policy is 
being utilised to carry out remediation and which exact agency is to direct 
remediation. Moreover, this study wonders how there could be effective criminal 
enforcement of remediation considering that the law is currently vague on who 
enforces. Indeed, even if there is a joint effort at enforcement, the roles of each 
agency in the joint process should be explicitly set out in the rules stipulating 
them. This is also important considering that the existing state of enforcement on 
oil spill remediation has created confusion on who is to enforce, and what agency 
should be held accountable for failing to carry out enforcement relating to 
remediation.  
 
Furthermore, based on independent research conducted by Isah, it was discovered 
that the DPR and the NOSDRA have differing interpretations of the provisions for 
the framework of remediation stipulated in the EGASPIN (which statutorily in the 
EGASPIN, has been allocated to the DPR).148 This study believes that this might 
have contributed to the ease with which most companies abruptly conclude their 
remediation process undetected and get certified for such half-cleaned sites. The 
argument is how there can even be detection of violators on remediation if there 
is no unified understanding as to what is involved in remediation by the agencies 
required to enforce. Where such detection has not been done as a result of conflict 
in interpreting the statute, then how can violators be sanctioned? 
 
4.2.3 Neglect by Enforcement Agencies  
This study observed that most of the enforcement agencies mandated to enforce 
environmental standards have failed to perform these duties properly.149 This is 
despite the clear stipulations of statutory instruments (such as the NOSDRA Act) 
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mandating such enforcement. This study argues that failure to perform such 
enforcement duties is a deliberate act on the part of the agencies. One clear 
example of such deliberate failure to enforce lies in the discovery by Amnesty 
International that some sites certified as remediated by enforcement agencies 
were still polluted by oil spills.  
 
In the previous chapter this study identified the DPR and the NOSDRA to be jointly 
responsible for clean-up investigation, direction and certification by virtue of the 
EGASPIN and the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act. As earlier observed, oil spill clean-
up and remediation are the responsibility of the oil company on whose facility an 
oil spill occurred. Unlike the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act which requires NOSDRA 
to be part of the process, it has been observed that often when any such company 
assesses the site as completely remediated (implying that the oil content in the 
soil and water has dropped at least below the regulatory intervention level for 
remediation),150 it reports back to NOSDRA.151 If NOSDRA is satisfied that the 
company has adequately restored the land to as far as possible to the original 
state, it issues a certificate declaring the clean-up and remediation efforts 
completed.152 
 
The certification of sites discovered to still be polluted by NOSDRA entails that it 
deliberately failed to properly investigate and ensure the proper clean-up and 
remediation of such sites before certifying them. This is a clear breach of the 
obligation to investigate cleaned-up sites codified in PART III (Production 
Operations) Section 7.1.1 of the EGASPIN and Regulation 17 of the Oil Spill 
Recovery, Clean-up, Remediation and Damage Assessment Regulations 2011. In 
January 2013 an International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Panel that 
was requested to review environmental issues in the Niger Delta discovered, once 
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again, that regulators had signed off a site as cleaned up that was still polluted.153 
The panel stated: “in a recently concluded remediation site in Soku, the 
[Chemicals of Special Concern] levels were far higher than standards of EGASPIN 
(2002), even though all the authorities had signed off on the certificate for a clean 
bill of health for that site.”154 In conclusion, the panel stated that: “Based on the 
observations by the Panel, the current remediation practices in oil impacted areas 
in the Niger Delta are not satisfactory. Oil spill responses and remediation are not 
implemented fast enough and the methods and regulatory standards for 
biodiversity and habitat rehabilitation have not been adequately established. 
Some of the issues that are not properly addressed in the current context need a 
different approach consistent with best practice in the industry.”155 This shows 
evidence that NOSDRA have signed off such sites are fully remediated without first 
investigating and ascertaining that the remediation has been carried out 
adequately. This is one such evidences of the failure of enforcement agencies in 
the Nigerian regime to effectively enforce the standards on companies operating 
in Nigeria. 
 
Moreover, as was observed in chapter 2, the EGASPIN requires the director of 
petroleum resource (who is in charge of the DPR) to issue approval for the method 
to be utilised in the remediation, and the NOSDRA (Establishment) Act requires 
the NOSDRA to direct and supervise the process. It therefore entails that where 
such companies have not adequately carried out the process, the method utilised 
and which had been approved by the DPR would have been faulty ab-initio. It also 
entails that the NOSDRA under such circumstances, had either not directed and 
supervised the process at all or had not done so properly. 
 
From the failure of NOSDRA to investigate oil spills before certifying clean-up and 
the failure of DPR to provide a suitable mechanism for clean-up, it is obvious that 
there is neglect on the part of some of the enforcement agencies to avoid 
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implementing the environmental standards of enforcement under Nigerian 
environmental law. Moreover, this study observed no criminal sanction in any of 
the legislation imposed on such neglect by enforcement agencies. In other words, 
any recommendation for the imposition of criminal liability for negligent agencies 
proposed in line with this deficiency will be novel to Nigerian environmental law 
system. However, the study argues that a failure to impose environmental criminal 
liability for agencies that fail to perform will only serve as an encouragement for 
increased non-performance and will also create a seeming complicity between the 
agencies and the defaulting companies themselves. 
 
4.2.4 Corruption of Enforcement Agencies 
One significant motive for an inability of the enforcement agencies to perform in 
Nigeria is corruption. A writer has described corruption as a factor limiting general 
enforcement in Nigeria.156 Indeed, discussion regarding corruption as a factor 
contributing to inadequate prosecution has been done in this study. This study 
therefore, argues that this menace has limited the enforcement of environmental 
standards in the industry. Although the study has found no abundant literature on 
incidents relating to corrupt transactions between agencies and the companies, it 
is only obvious that an agency that receives financial donations from the violating 
companies will ignore the criminal violations of such company. It has been 
reported that rather than investigate oil spill, the NOSDRA has on some occasions 
collected monetary donation to ignore the violations of the 
multinationals.157Moreover, such corrupt transactions that have limited 
enforcement can make the public lose confidence in the enforcement bodies, 
hence even when a member of the public detects a possible environmental 
violation, he will be reluctant to report such incident for the fear that nothing might 
actually be done about duly punishing the offender.  
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4.2.5 Lack of Resources, Manpower and Funding to Enforcement 
Agencies 
Another factor that has limited the ability of the agencies to enforce environmental 
standards is the lack of manpower and funding required by the agencies to carry 
out their duties.158 It has also been alleged that most enforcement agencies lack 
the necessary equipment to determine who has actually caused pollution when 
third-party pollution occurs on an already corroded pipeline.159 For example, based 
on research carried out by Amnesty International and CEHRD in 2013, it was 
confirmed that the NOSDRA is unable to carry out rigorous and independent 
investigations regarding oil spill remediation.160 
 
Moreover, Ogbuigwe asserted that the Nigerian government has failed to provide 
sufficient human and material resources to undertake environmental 
enforcement.161 It has been argued that on the few occasions NOSDRA fulfilled its 
statutory duty to investigate oil spills, the investigation processes were often 
heavily reliant on the information presented by the oil corporations and their 
manpower.162 This has made it difficult for NOSDRA to impartially and effectively 
perform its function.163 It has even been asserted that on some occasions, the 
NOSDRA lacked the necessary equipment to conduct investigations into oil spills 
and rather relied on the information put forward by the corporations regarding the 
extent of pollution done.164 This is interesting considering the allegation that “Shell 
and Eni seem to be publishing unreliable information about the cause and extent 
of spills. The people of the Niger Delta have paid the price for Shell and Eni’s 
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recklessness for too long...”165 This must have informed the position of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Policy 2017 that: “the current system in Nigeria 
regarding maintenance, health and safety in the Nigerian petroleum sector is not 
acceptable. Major safety incidents go without proper investigation and without 
sufficient responsibilities being apportioned.”166 
 
UNEP argued that NOSDRA’s lack of resources entailed that, “the agency has no 
proactive capacity for oil-spill detection and has to rely on reports from oil 
companies or civil society concerning the incidence of a spill. It also has very little 
reactive capacity – even to send staff to a spill location, once an incident is 
reported.”167 To this, Amnesty International reported that the lack of vehicles and 
limited access to the boats and helicopters required to convey the enforcement 
agency staff to the several spill sites has limited the ability of the NOSDRA to 
detect the volume of spill and investigate the approach to clean-up.168 This inability 
has made the agency rather reliant on information tendered by the defaulting 
companies regarding oil spill and oil spill control details.169 Such reliance was 
confirmed from an interview on 7 May 2013 that was held with the Director of 
NOSDRA’s Rivers state branch. Amnesty reported that during the course of the 
interview, the director received a text alert from the Agip Oil Company informing 
him of a spill.170 The text further notified him of when a spill investigation would 
take place (which was a date several days later), and notified the director that the 
NOSDRA workers should be ready to join the Agip team at Agip’s own 
convenience.171 Interestingly, the director confirmed this to have been a usual 
procedure for oil spill investigation for a long time.172 Amnesty International 
further confirmed that on some occasions, it had discovered that NOSDRA 
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delegates unqualified staff on such missions to investigate spills, or assess if 
remediation is complete.173 This confirms the assertion of the UNEP that suffers 
“from a shortage of senior and experienced staff who understand the oil industry 
and can exercise effective technical oversight.”174 
 
This study argues that the reliance is bad in all aspects. First, NOSDRA’s reliance 
on the companies for such investigations limits the independence of such 
investigation. Furthermore, the carrying out of investigation several days after the 
spill contributes to the poor reporting of oil spills hence limiting the proper record 
as to the extent of spill. Moreover, carrying out such investigations ‘several days 
later’ after the spill is in breach of the requirement under the EGASPIN for 
investigation to occur within 24 hours of the spill.  
 
This study observed no public record of any established mechanism for scientific 
analysis (such as the existence of a forensics laboratory) utilised in the regime to 
determining the chemical composition, amount and extent of contamination which 
will help build the case of the prosecution against an environmental offender. 
Indeed, without such analysis, how can the agency sufficiently deduce the extent 
to which a particular action of the environmental offender had contributed to the 
pollution offence? Furthermore, the study found no public record of any specified 
platform for storing records of investigations with which enforcement agencies can 
gather evidence to determine non-compliance. 
 
In addition, on reviewing the allocations reserved in the Appropriation Bill 2018, 
the researcher observed that the NOSDRA was required to secure its funds from 
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.175 The DPR on its own is required to secure 
its funds from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).176 The study 
therefore wonders why this is so, considering that NOSDRA is a statutory 
enforcement body, independent of the Ministry. One would then wonder how the 
agency would be expected to function independently since its resources are tied 
to another ministry of the Nigerian government. Section 44(3) of the Nigerian 
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Constitution (as amended) establishes the NNPC as the main organ through which 
the government engages in exploration and production activities. A writer has 
argued that the challenge of lack of finance has limited the ability of most 
enforcement agencies to adequately enforce the sanctions stipulated under 
Nigerian environmental law.177 
 
In any case, this study wonders how the revenue of an important enforcement 
agency such as the DPR can be tied to the NNPC considering that the NNPC only 
gains its revenue from federal government loans, grants or the sale of crude oil.178 
To this effect, the determination of how much revenue the NNPC has made is 
strictly limited to what the NNPC freely declares as there is no existing provision 
regulating the minimum amount of revenue expected from the NNPC. Hence, the 
DPR is left to be funded at the expense of how much revenue the NNPC has gained 
and declared from the sale of crude oil. In the case that the NNPC does not make 
enough funds in a given year, it could limit the funds available to the DPR to 
function, hence limit the capacity of the DPR to enforce properly. 
 
Furthermore, one of the duties of the DPR is to ensure that oil and gas industry 
participants conform to national and international best oilfield practices.179 Hence, 
the DPR is expected to ensure that oil and gas corporations exercise due diligence 
to prevent pollution from occurring.180 Furthermore, the DPR is expected to ensure 
that oil and gas corporations conform to statutory provisions regarding ending gas 
flaring in Nigeria.181 This study therefore wonders how the DPR can independently 
and impartially implement environmental standards on the oil multinationals 
operating in the Niger Delta considering that the NNPC benefits directly from the 
existing joint venture agreement with the multinationals on production (an 
arrangement that has resulted to the operations breaching the environmental 
standards).  
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4.2.6 Failure of Internal Distribution of Tasks and Sharing of Data 
between Enforcement Agencies 
There is an allegation that enforcement agencies such as NOSDRA have failed to 
coordinate with international partners and entities to secure scientific resources 
and technology for performing their environmental enforcement roles.182 This 
might be a deficiency considering the earlier mentioned deficiency of the lack of 
resources for the agencies to perform. If they have no resources to work with and 
they cannot reach out for aid to other jurisdictions, how then could they perform? 
Moreover, considering that other developed regions like the UK and USA regimes 
discussed in this study might have utilised modern technology to facilitate the 
efficiency of their enforcement, this study views the perceived inability of the 
Nigerian enforcement agencies to reach out to such regimes as a possible 
deficiency on their part.  
 
In the case of NOSDRA, this contravenes the provision of Section 5(d) of the 
NOSDRA Act, requiring the agency to “co-operate with the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and other national, regional and international organisations in 
in the promotion of the exchange of scientific results and research relating to oil 
pollution preparedness and response.” This also detracts from the principle of co-
operation and the spirit of good neighbourliness mentioned in chapter 2. It is 
therefore interesting that this study found no record of any such exchange of 
scientific and technical information or resources towards facilitating enforcement 
in the Nigerian regime. This study argues that the lack of exchange is interesting 
considering that an avenue has been provided for such exchange through the 
Convention for Co-Operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region; and Protocol.183 
 
Article 3(1) of the Convention stipulates that: “The Contracting Parties may enter 
into bilateral or multilateral agreements, including regional or sub regional 
agreements, for the protection of the marine and coastal environment of the West 
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the West and Central African Region; and Protocol 1981. Entry into Force 1984. 
   174 
 
and Central African Region, provided that such agreements are consistent with 
this Convention and conform to international law...” Similarly, Article 4(1) of the 
Convention stipulates that: “The Contracting Parties shall, individually or jointly 
as the case may be, take all appropriate measures in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention and its protocols in force to which they are parties 
to prevent, reduce, combat and control pollution of the Convention area and to 
ensure sound environmental management of natural resources, using for this 
purpose the best practicable means at their disposal, and in accordance with their 
capabilities.” In the same vein, Article 4(2) stipulates that: “…the Contracting 
Parties shall cooperate in the formulation and adoption of other protocols 
prescribing agreed measures, procedures, and standards to prevent, reduce, 
combat and control pollution from all sources or promoting environmental 
management in conformity with the objectives of this Convention.”  
 
Indeed, these provisions show evidence of a regional framework for the 
coordinated approach to enforcement of environmental protection. The above 
stipulations of the Convention indicate not just a joint approach to enforcement 
but also cooperation among contracting states. Interestingly, this Convention is 
yet to be domesticated as Nigerian law, hence has not been applied. Moreover, 
while the NOSDRA Act have provided some brief stipulation on such transboundary 
cooperation, it is the only statute that has provided for this. It is therefore obvious 
that the Nigerian regime have failed to adequately establish legislation providing 
a framework for the exchange of enforcement information and approach, scientific 
expertise and technology for all spheres of environmental enforcement rather than 
a mere mention in the objectives of a clean-up plan. This position was emphasized 
in Article 4(3) of the Convention which stipulates that: “the Contracting Parties 
shall establish national laws and regulations for the effective discharge of the 
obligations prescribed in this Convention, and shall endeavour to harmonize their 
national policies in this regard.” Moreover, this study argues that implementing a 
regional approach to enforcement in Nigeria might also be limited by the additional 
requirement for any such soft law provision or instrument to be adopted under the 
Nigerian legislative regime to be first domesticated under Nigerian law regardless 
of whether the country is a signatory to it or has acceded to it.184 
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4.2.7 Absence of Environmental Watchdog and Penal Sanctions for 
Agencies for Failing to Perform 
There is no statutory watch-dog organisation that has been established under the 
regime to monitor the actions of the environmental agencies towards ensuring 
that they carried out their enforcement roles. To this effect, there is no 
organisation (established under law with binding powers) to monitor the inabilities 
of the agencies to perform and compel them to perform. While NGOs such as 
Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Amnesty International have put out a strong 
message against poor enforcement by the Nigerian agencies,185 there is no explicit 
policy framework establishing them as watchdogs in the regime. While these NGOs 
can repeatedly condemn this ineffectiveness of the agencies, there is no particular 
organisation that provides a strong strategic monitoring role over the performance 
of the agencies. Hence, despite repeated condemnations, the agencies can decide 
to ignore such reports and flagrantly continue in their failure to enforce. This 
observation is significant considering the observation above that no relevant 
subsisting legislation stipulates any criminal penalty for failure of the agencies to 
perform. This creates an impression that there is no repercussion for the failure 
of such agencies to perform their statutory duties of enforcement.  
 
4.2.8 Lack of Political Will to Regulate the Environment 
The ownership and the control of oil and gas resources in Nigeria are vested in the 
Nigerian government.186 In the same vein, Nigerian environmental law holds the 
government accountable for regulating the environment. In effect, there is an 
expectation that the government regulates activities in the oil and gas industry 
such that the environment is not polluted as a result of such activities. Pursuant 
to Section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution, the government is obligated to protect 
the territorial environment and also ensure that the public health of Nigerians is 
protected.  Furthermore, Section 2 of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Act further requires regulators established by the Nigerian government (through 
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the Federal Ministry of Environment) to investigate the environmental impact of 
all major projects in Nigeria. The law also requires the government to refuse to 
issue a permit/licence if it is discovered that the proposed operation poses a 
potential threat to the environment and the public health of its inhabitants. An EIA 
report must be produced by the company to the Ministry of Petroleum Resource 
before it can undertake operations. Section 5 (e) of the repealed Federal 
Environmental Protections Agency Act (FEPA) 1988 projected co-operation 
between the government and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency in 
performing this role.187 Moreover, as has been established in the Minerals Mining 
Act discussed above, government ministers are required to ensure sustainable 
development during the extraction of oil and gas resources.  It is therefore evident 
that statutory provisions stipulate legal responsibility for the Nigerian government 
to ensure environmental protection in the oil and gas industry.  
 
Considering the extensive nature of oil and gas pollution described above, one 
would then wonder to what extent the government has shown commitment 
towards ensuring that the industry stakeholders comply with the obligation to 
protect the environment while conducting their operations. Indeed, while this 
study is of the view that oil and gas companies have caused a large share of 
Nigerian pollution, the study also argues that the government has been complicit 
in regulating the activities of such companies.188 Indeed, a writer has argued that 
the political will to enforce environmental standards, especially in the Niger Delta 
is lacking because operations of the oil industry generate a significant portion of 
the country’s revenue and, as such, the government is not willing to do anything 
that will affect the revenue flow coming from such operations.189 While this view 
is arguable, this study chooses not to totally ignore the possibility of this reason 
being a contributor to the perceived lack of will of the Nigerian government to 
regulate oil and gas multinational companies alleged to violate environmental 
standards. 
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The lack of will of the government concerning Nigerian oil and gas pollution is 
summarised in the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Committee (SERAC) 
v Nigeria190 heard before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(subsequently referred to as the Commission in this Chapter).191 The case is based 
on the provision of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.192 It has 
been pointed out in chapter 2 that the charter has been domesticated in Nigeria 
as it has been enacted as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983. It is also notable that the provisions of 
the domesticated law reflect the exact provisions of the charter. It could therefore 
be assumed that the provisions of the charter are binding on the Nigerian regime 
through the domesticated law.  
 
In this case, the claimant, a class group representing the Ogoni interest alleged 
that the Nigerian government violated the provisions of Articles 16 and 24 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act. 
Article 16 of the Act imposes an obligation on African States to “take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people.” Furthermore, Article 24 provides 
that “all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment 
favourable to their development.” The claimant alleged that by permitting Shell to 
cause damage to the Ogoni environment and harm to the health of inhabitants of 
Ogoni land, the Nigerian government was in clear breach of the Act. To this effect, 
although the oil multinationals polluted the environment, and violated 
environmental standards in place, the Nigerian government failed to perform the 
obligation of regulation set out under Article 24 of the Act.  
 
The claimant alleged that SPDC had failed to properly maintain oil facilities, and 
built the facilities very close to private residences in the Niger Delta communities. 
Hence, the pollution severely affected not just the natural environment of these 
inhabitants, but the inhabitants themselves. In their words, the pollution had 
“serious short and long-term health impacts, including skin infections, 
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gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, and increased risk of cancers, and 
neurological and reproductive problems.”193 However, the claimant also argued 
that the government had failed to compel oil multinationals operating in Nigeria 
to produce EIA reports before undertaking risk laden operations in the Ogoni area. 
 
While ruling, the trial Commission held that the proven conduct of the Nigerian 
government was in clear breach of the obligation required of the latter; to respect, 
protect, and fulfil the provisions of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter Act.194 
The Commission agreed that “the Nigerian government was actively involved in 
the pollution, contamination of the environment and health problems of the Ogoni 
people, by condoning and facilitating the activities of the oil companies through 
placing the legal and military powers of the state at the disposal of the oil 
companies.”195 The Commission based this argument on the existing obligation 
imposed on the Nigerian government by virtue of the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations (to which Nigeria was signatory).The obligations are the requirement 
that the government prevent environmental and public health harm within 
Nigerian territory by formulating policies that would sanction and enforce the 
pollution act of individuals and corporations. 196 On this, the Commission found 
the government guilty of having conspired with the polluting oil corporations to 
degrade the Ogoni environment and cause harm to the livelihood and health of 
the Ogoni populace.197 The Commission found the government guilty of failing to 
prevent the pollution and failing to promote the attainment of sustainable 
development (which is the aim of the NPE).198 It is however, notable that despite 
these convictions, there has not been much improvement in the deficiencies 
identified. 
 
The Commission ruled that compliance with this obligation would have required 
that the Nigerian government:  
I) conducted Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) (for all state 
approved projects and licensed projects) or allowed independent experts 
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to conduct the EIA so as to correctly deduce the environmental risk of a 
given project and also provide communities with sufficient information 
regarding the potential hazards of an approved project.199 
II) took all appropriate responsible steps towards preventing environmental 
pollution, securing sustainable use of the country’s natural resources 
and achieving sustainable development.200 
 
Conversely, the Commission held that the Nigerian government have rather failed 
to:201 
1. regulate the oil and gas operations of multinational corporations in the 
Ogoni area; 
2. implement the domestic and international environmental standards 
regarding safety considerations (during E&P operations) and the prevention 
of pollution; 
3. implement the clean-up of affected sites or compel polluting corporations 
to clean up their pollution discharge and bear the cost of such clean-up; 
and  
4. engage in discussions with Ogoni inhabitants on how best to guarantee the 
sustainable development of the region. 
 
The Commission therefore, advised the Nigerian government to comply with these 
obligations.202 Despite the ruling in the SERAC case, the government failed to 
comply with the environmental and public health obligation provided under the 
African Charter. This failure was reflected in the government’s failure to implement 
tough sanctions on the polluting corporations, despite the continued oil and gas 
pollution in Ogoni leading to the second case of Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, brought before the 
Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice.203 In 
this case the claimant accused the government of violating the socio-economic, 
environmental and health rights of Niger Delta inhabitants, thus (mainly) 
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breaching the provision of Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act.204 This allegation was based on the 
failure of the government to enforce existing environmental legislation on 
sustainable development as set out within the National Policy on Environment.205 
In this dispute, the court held that Nigeria’s failure to effectively regulate the oil 
and gas sector violated the rights established under Article 4.206 The court further 
observed that a breach of the Article 24 right inevitably caused a subsequent 
breach of other rights-such as the rights to the economic and social development 
of Nigerians.207 On this note, the court ordered the Nigerian government to: 
1. Execute effective measures that would restore the Niger Delta environment 
to its former status; 
2. Execute measures that would prevent future pollution; and  
3. Hold oil and gas polluters accountable for their actions by prosecuting them 
more often.208 
 
Indeed, the decision made by the court that the Nigerian government should 
restore the Niger Delta environment to its former status is in line with Section 
2.6.3 of the EGASPIN which mandates the operator to remove all the pollution, 
such that the affected site is restored to its former state. This study argues that 
this requirement looks unrealistic as it is literally impossible to restore an already 
degraded site to exactly how it was before the degradation. The effect of the 
existing degradation would have affected some natural features associated with 
the previous state of the environment. Hence, this study rather suggests the 
implementation of Section 6 (3) of the NOSDRA Act which mandates the operator 
to utilise all practicable measures to restore the environment. 
 
The above cases show evidence that at a national level, the Nigerian government 
has been found accountable for the pollution within its territory. It has however, 
been reported that the government is yet to take sufficient steps towards 
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enforcing the court’s decisions in either of the cases.209 As shown by its failure to 
implement these decisions, it is the view of this study that the Nigerian 
government has failed to enforce an effective environmental regulatory regime 
(especially with regard to its oil and gas industry). The study bases this argument 
on the failure of the government to effectively monitor enforcement and 
compliance to environmental standards among oil and gas companies such as the 
SPDC, hence, indirectly exacerbating the environmental devastation in the Niger 
Delta region.  
 
Furthermore, this study has earlier identified the failure of the Nigerian 
government to properly fund enforcement agencies or provide the essential 
manpower required for them to effectively carry out their enforcement roles. This 
shows further evidence of the lax attitude of the government to environmental 
enforcement and protection. 
 
4.2.9 Confusion of NESREA (Establishment) Act Regarding Oil and Gas 
Regulation 
A major limitation of this Act is the confusion as to whether its provisions 
(especially with regard to sanctioning and enforcement) also relate to the oil and 
gas industry or not. Indeed, in chapter 2, it was observed that while some 
provisions within the Act preclude oil and gas from its scope, other provisions 
specify that enforcement under the Act should cover environmental treaties 
regarding environmental protection in the oil and gas sector. This creates 
confusion as to whether this Act really provides for environmental regulation in 
the oil and gas sector or not. This confusion is significant considering the extent 
of environmental violation in the oil and gas industry. It is also significant 
considering: 1) the controversy regarding the unenforceability of ratified but 
undomesticated treaty provisions provided in Section 12 of the Nigerian 
Constitution; and 2) the earlier observation that the Nigerian government is yet 
to domesticate most of the environmental treaties relating to oil and gas that has 
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been ratified by Nigeria.210 In effect, excluding oil and gas from the coverage of 
the NESREA Act weakens the regulatory capacity of the domestic environmental 
regime governing the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. It has been argued that Nigeria 
should put in more effort to domesticating its ratified treaties.211 This is because 
unless a definite position regarding the enforceability of international instruments 
in Nigeria is set out, there would still be a contradiction as to whether ratified 
treaties and conventions are enforceable in Nigeria or not. To this effect, there 
would still be a doubt as to whether international instruments stipulating 
environmental protection can be implemented in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
by virtue of Section 7c of the NESREA Act.  
 
Interestingly, this study argues that this Act possibly has the best provisions on 
enforcement which tackle some of deficiencies earlier mentioned in this chapter. 
For example, the Act requires enforcement agencies to collaborate, a requirement 
established to be generally lacking in the other environmental regulations 
governing the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, the Act requires trans-boundary 
cooperation in enforcement also generally lacking in the other legislations, except 
the NOSDRA Act that also requires it. The provision under this Act explicitly 
mandates NESREA to collaborate with other agencies to enforce environmental 
standards. It is therefore obvious that this Act is free of some of the deficiencies 
identified in this study to have impeded enforcement. Based on the above facts, 
this study argues that the confusion in the NESREA detracts from the national 
policy on enforcement. If the issues of its relationship with the oil and gas industry 
and the issue of the enforceability of ratified treaties in Nigeria are resolved, the 
NESREA Act provisions will go a long way to adding to the body of law regarding 
environmental enforcement in the industry. 
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4.3 A Defective Petroleum Industries Bill 
Owing to the poor regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas industry (including the 
defectiveness of the existing environmental regime regulating the industry), there 
has been an attempt to overhaul the existing system of regulation in the industry 
by replacing existing regulatory instruments governing the industry with the 
Petroleum Industries Bill (PIB) 2012.212 This will invariably entail replacing the 
environmental statutory provisions regulating the industry with the environmental 
contents of the PIB. This study expects that most of the existing deficiencies of 
the Nigerian environmental regime relating to the oil and gas industry would have 
been corrected in the PIB.  
 
Section 6 (1) of the Bill requires the Federal government to “honour international 
environmental obligations” It is therefore implied that the PIB would require the 
government to be more accountable for the prevention and control of pollution by 
oil and gas multinational corporations. This implies that the limitation to the non-
binding effect of international environmental obligations that has been ratified by 
Nigeria would be reduced. Similarly, Section 200 of the Bill compels operators 
licensed to conduct oil and gas business in Nigeria to:  
1. Conduct EIA before embarking on any upstream and midstream oil and gas 
activity; 
2. Provide an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) within three months of 
operation; 
3. Formulate an environmental awareness plan that would disseminate the 
corporation’s environmental policy objectives to all employees of the 
corporation.  
4. Present a detailed account on steps intended to be taking to prevent 
pollution and control it when necessary.  
 
It is evident from the above that the Bill stipulates succinct obligations in line with 
the existing EIA Act. The Bill however, fails to criminalise the failure to comply 
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with these obligations. In an instance where an operator refuses to comply, the 
Bill fails to make such non-compliance a criminal act nor does it provide any 
penalty for a person in breach of the provision. It is then possible that if the Bill 
were successfully passed into law, and its provisions strictly followed, an operator 
can fail to comply with the EIA obligations and not be sanctioned for such failure. 
In this regard, it seems as if the Bill has reduced the binding force of this obligation 
under Nigerian environmental law. 
 
Section 200 of the Bill stipulates an obligation on the operator to manage the 
environment in accordance with their EMP.213 The issue has however remained to 
what extent the operators would carry this out. This is so, considering that 
although the operators have previously submitted EMPs and have always 
published their sustainability reports, the harmful impacts of their operations have 
not reflected the environmental management processes included in the EMPs.214 
For example, the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) and the SPDC both published 
their EMPs regarding their joint venture operations in the Egbema community of 
the Niger Delta in 2015.215 Regarding this, critics have argued that there has been 
environmental pollution on the same exploration round.216 This pollution shows 
evidence of the failure of the operators to comply with their EMPs. 
 
Section 293 (1) of the Bill also obligates the operator to clean up affected sites 
when pollution occurs. It is however, observable that this provision fails to impose 
corresponding criminal sanctions for non-compliance of this standard. It is the 
view of this study that this failure is a deficiency and detracts from the 
effectiveness of the Bill to enforce the clean-up of polluted sites. 
 
                                                             
213 This is stipulated in Section 200 of the Bill. 
214 Ephraim I Elenwo and Justine A Akankali, 'Environmental Policies and Strategies in Nigeria Oil and Gas 
Industry: Gains, Challenges and Prospects' (2014) 05 Natural Resources 893-894. 
215 Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), 'Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) of The Assa North - Ohaji South Gas Development Project (The Facilities) at Ohaji/Egbema Lga, Imo 
State' (Shell 2015)<https://www.shell.com.ng/sustainability/environment/environment-impact 
assessments/_jcr_content/par/textimage.stream/1468247135099/4022d04728984a9a81ded8d5289c7a2418c1567
8a74895c718fca0de4146cd3f/assa-north-2016.pdf> accessed 27 March 2019; National Agip Oil Company, 
'Environment - NAOC' 
(ENI,2018)<https://www.eni.com/en_NG/sustainability/environment/environment.shtml> accessed 27 March 
2019. 
216 Ikenna Osumgborogwu, F Okoro and I Oduaro, 'Social Effects of Crude Oil Production Activities in 
Egbema, Imo State, Nigeria' (2017) 3 Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences 2-3. 
   185 
 
Moreover, Section 293 (3) of the Bill empowers the DPR to make the determination 
whether the failure of the operator to manage or clean up the environment is 
criminal or not. Such determination by the DPR is a derogation of an exercise of 
powers that should be clearly judicial in nature. It is therefore doubtful whether 
the DPR is the competent authority to make such a determination since it is only 
an enforcement agency and not a court of law.  
 
Considering the apparent weak sanctions stipulated in extant environmental 
criminal laws in the present regime, this study argues that the PIB has only 
provided for similar weak sanctions. For example, this study has argued that not 
only is gas flaring extensive in light of how long gas had been flared in Nigeria 
(since 1958)217 but also severe environmental and health harm has been caused. 
It is therefore surprising that Section 201 of the Bill stipulates that “the lessee 
shall pay such gas flaring penalties as the minister may determine from time to 
time.” This study argues that this stipulation is inadequate considering that Nigeria 
has no provision of a sentencing guideline and there is no specific provision under 
this Bill putting a figure at the minimum penalty the DPR can impose.  
 
Similarly, Section 200 of the PIB mandates an oil and gas operator in Nigeria to 
submit an Environmental Management Plan (EMP), to the DPR. Furthermore, 
Section 341 of the Bill criminalizes the failure of an operator to submit the EMP 
and imposes a fine of N1,500,000 (£3157) on such an offender. However, there 
is no criminal sanction included for an operator that has not gone through the 
proper process of authorization for a proposed operation before commencing the 
operation. This study argues that this criminal fine is not sufficient considering the 
potential environmental and public health implications of the offence. This sanction 
is too weak to compel any of the operational multinational oil and gas subsidiaries 
in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the lack of sanctioning for improperly authorized 
operations detracts from the regime. 
 
It is therefore evident that the PIB in itself still contains some of the deficiencies 
observed in the Nigeria regime from the analysis in this study. This entails that 
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the PIB (in its current state) presents no absolute solution to guaranteeing 
environmental protection in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.  
 
This study is of the view that the deficiencies identified in this chapter have 
contributed to the failure of the Nigerian environmental regime to regulate the oil 
and gas industry. The failure of the regime to regulate has been manifested in the 
examples of such regulatory failure identified in chapter 3. This study will 
therefore, study the UK and USA regimes to establish aspects of the regimes that 
can be adapted by the failing Nigerian regime to correct the deficiencies, hence 
remedy the regulatory. In effect, the study will consider aspects of the UK and 
USA regimes that directly relates to sanctioning and enforcement of their oil and 
gas industries.
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Chapter Five 
Environmental Criminal Sanctions: Comparative Study of the UK, 
USA and Nigerian Regimes 
5.0 Overview of United Kingdom (UK) and United States of 
America (USA) Environmental Criminal Regimes 
This study has identified different violations of environmental standards in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. The study further argued that these violations have 
continued despite existing laws meant to prevent them and irrespective of existing 
enforcement mechanisms that have failed to enforce properly. In line with these 
limitations, the study has identified deficiencies that have contributed to the 
limitations. This chapter therefore seeks to explore aspects of the UK and USA 
regimes that present solutions to the defects identified in chapter 4. It is believed 
that a transplantation of the aspects to the Nigerian regime will correct some 
aspects of the deficiencies identified. It is however, notable that major 
recommendations for transplantation generated in this chapter will be enumerated 
in chapter 6 of this study. This study will therefore give a synopsis on the general 
application of the environmental criminal law systems of the UK and USA regimes. 
 
A) Synopsis of the UK Environmental Criminal Regime 
 
To gain a knowledge of the UK environmental criminal regime, one must first 
determine the scope of environmental crime in the regime and the statutory 
provisions that have provided for its prohibition. There is no precise definition to 
the concept of environmental crime.1 The Environmental Audit Committee views 
environmental crime offences to be regulatory offences established under 
statutory environmental legislation.2 The study will examine the offences of illegal 
                                                             
1 Advameg Incorporated, 'Environmental Crime' (Advameg Incorporated, 2019) 
<http://www.pollutionissues.com/Ec-Fi/Environmental-Crime.html> accessed 18 March 2019. 
2 Environmental Audit Committee, 'Environmental Crime: Wildlife Crime Twelfth Report of Session 2003–04' 
HC 605 (House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited 15th September 2004) 
<https://www.nwcu.police.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/House-of-Commons-Environmental-Audit-
Committee-Environmental-Crime-Wildlife-Crime-Twelfth-Report-of-Session-2003-04.pdf> accessed 10 
December 2018. 
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waste disposal that is neither treated nor stored,3 illegal discharge of hazardous 
waste and failing to comply with clean-up notice. This is because they are similar 
environmental offences that have been established to be existing in the Nigerian 
regime.   
 
The illegally disposed waste is often shipped to non-OECD countries in regions of 
Africa and Asia.4 The illegality of shipping untreated waste to the named zones 
was generated from the Basel Convention of 1992 which made it illegal to ship 
hazardous waste from OECD to non-OECD countries.5 According to the 
Environmental Services Association Education Trust (ESAET), the most significant 
waste crimes in the UK seem to include illegal waste discharge and illegal wildlife 
trade and poaching.6 The UK has set established authorities charged with the 
responsibility of enforcing environmental criminal laws against waste crime in the 
UK. Backed by statutory provisions empowering their functions, the remit for 
tackling waste crime in the UK lies with environmental regulators such as the 
Environment Agency (EA), the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), 
the Natural Resources Wales, the Northern Ireland Environment Agency, the 
Marine Management Organization, the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), and Natural England (NE).  
 
Some UK environmental law has been transposed from European Union (EU) 
directives.  For instance, the UK regime for regulating industrial emissions refers 
to compliance with the EU Industrial Emissions Directive.7 A recently updated 
document by the European Commission described the scope of environmental 
offences in the EU to include: the illegal discharge of harmful gas into the 
                                                             
3 Sam Taylor and others, 'Waste Crime: Tackling Britain's Dirty Secret' (Environmental Services Association 
Education Trust (ESAET) 2015) 
<http://www.esauk.org/application/files/4515/3589/6453/ESAET_Waste_Crime_Tackling_Britains_Dirty_Secr
et_LIVE.pdf> accessed 17 December 2018.   
4 ibid. 
5 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 'The Basel Convention Ban Amendment' (Secretariat of the 
Basel Convention 2011) 
<http://www.basel.int/Implementation/LegalMatters/BanAmendment/tabid/1484/Default.aspx> accessed 31 
July 2018. 
6 Simone Aplin and Jamie Warmington, 'Waste Crime Interventions and Evaluation Project' (Environmental 
Agency 2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/662841/Was
te_crime_interventions_and_evaluation_-_report.pdf> accessed 10 December 2018. 
7 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on Industrial 
Emissions (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control) (OJL 334, 12.12.2010, pp.17-119). 
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atmosphere, illegal discharge of waste into the water or soil, illegal trade in 
wildlife, illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances and the illegal shipment or 
dumping of waste.8 In 2008, the UK transposed the EU Directive on protection of 
the environment through criminal law.9 The core reason for the adoption of the 
Directive was that criminal sanctions provided adequate deterrence required to 
achieve environmental protection.10 Hence the Directive required EU Member 
States to treat serious environmental breaches as criminal offences if such 
breaches were committed deliberately or with at least gross negligence.11 Article 
5 of the Directive stipulates that “Member States shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are punishable 
by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.” 
 
 
This corresponds with existing statutory provisions in the UK environmental 
criminal regime prohibiting different ranges of environmental offences. Some such 
environmental criminal prohibitions have been found in provisions such as: 
Regulation 62 (1)(a) and (b) of the Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2005, Section 85 Water Resources Act 1991, and Section 2(e) of the 
Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971. It must however be noted that the above 
statutory provisions are only random representations of the broad UK 
environmental criminal law provisions.  
 
B) Synopsis of USA Environmental Criminal Statutory Provisions 
 
The USA has like Nigeria, also suffered significant oil pollution.12 The 1960s saw 
an outcry against the growing levels of air, water and land pollution, oil and gas 
                                                             
8 European Commission, 'Environmental Crime - Legislation - Environment - European Commission' 
(Ec.europa.eu, 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/> accessed 10 December 2018. 
9 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law (OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, pp. 28-37). 
10 Andrea Jarolimkova, 'Enforcement of Environmental Protection through Criminal Law' [2013] 3 Common 
Law Review http://www.commonlawreview.cz/enforcement-of-environmental-protection-through-criminal-
law/> accessed 10 August 2019. 
11 ibid. 
12 Some examples of the oil spill pollution include: the Keystone Pipeline spill of 16th November, 2017 which 
discharged approximately 9,700 barrels of oil; the Delta House oil spill of 11th October, 2017 which discharged 
9,350 barrels of oil; the Energy Transfer Partners Dakota Access Pipeline Leak of 4th April, 2017 which 
discharged approximately 2,500 barrels of oil; the Belle Fourche pipeline leak of 5th December, 2016 which 
discharged approximately 4,000 barrels of oil; the Shell Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 12th May, 2016 which 
discharged approximately 2,100 barrels of oil ; the Refugio oil spill of 19th May, 2015 which discharged 
approximately 3,400 barrels of oil; the Yellowstone River oil spill of 17th January, 2015 which discharged 
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pollution in the USA.13 Since then, the USA environmental criminal regime has the 
central aim of prohibiting different forms of environmental offences.14 Prior to 
1967, the USA used civil enforcement processes to a large extent, in implementing 
its administrative environmental laws.15 There was also more emphasis on 
cooperative compliance with environmental principles rather than a coercive 
approach.16 To this effect, the imposition of criminal sanctions was only a last 
option when civil enforcements failed.17 As a result of the prime consideration of 
civil enforcement at the time, the USA Attorney, Criminal Division of the Justice 
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave very minimal 
consideration to prosecution of pollution acts as environmental criminal offences 
and the allocation of sanctions but focused more on ensuring compliance through 
civil injunctions, civil judicial actions, and civil administrative actions.18 
 
However, they soon noted that most USA companies and residents failed to 
comply with the environmental protection standards set under the Clean Air Act 
1963 (as amended in 1990) and Clean Water Act (CWA) 1972.19 Moreover, these 
statutes addressed significant sources of USA pollution.20 Hence non-compliance 
with the provisions implied continued environmental pollution and an inability of 
the Acts to protect the environment. In light of this, the USA regime updated the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970, 1977 and 1990.21 In the 1970 amendment, the Act 
introduced four major regulatory programmes as environmental standards in the 
regime, which included: The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS); the 
State Implementation Plans (SIPs); the New Source Performance Standards 
                                                             
approximately 1,200 barrels of oil; the Lake Michigan oil spill of 24th March, 2014 which discharged 
approximately 39 barrels of oil; and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 20th April-15th July, 2010 mentioned in 
the literature review section above.  
13 Department of Justice (DOJ), 'Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law | ENRD | Department 
of Justice' (Justice.Gov, 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historicaldevelopment-
environmental-criminal-law> accessed 10 December 2018. 
14 DOJ, 'Prosecution of Federal Pollution Crimes | ENRD | Department of Justice' (Justice.gov, 2018) 
<https://www.justice.gov/enrd/prosecution-federal-pollution-crimes> accessed 10 December 2018; 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 'EPA Continues To Exceed Previous Numbers in Civil, Criminal 
Cases, Penalty Assessments' (Environmental Protection Agency 1990) 1534. 
15 Robert I McMurry and Stephen D Ramsey, 'Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in 
Enforcing Environmental Laws' (1986) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1136. 
16 ibid. p.1137. 
17 ibid. p.1136. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid.  
20 ibid. p.1137. 
21 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 'Evolution of The Clean Air Act' (EPA, 2017) 
<https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act> accessed 18 March 2019. 
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(NSPS); and the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAPs).22 These standards were enforced by the EPA (already established by 
the NEPA Act).23 By this, the amendment expanded enforcement authority under 
the Act.24 The 1977 and 1990 amendments introduced and modified major permit 
review requirements to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS.25 
Subsequently, the USA regime has utilised several environmental criminal statutes 
(besides the CAA to implement its environmental standards).  
 
The USA regulates pollution crime that constitutes a breach of its environmental 
standards through the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 1976, the 
CWA 1972, the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act 1972 (MPRSA), 
the Oil Pollution Act 1990 and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships 1980 (APPS).  
 
The RCRA finds anyone who ‘knowingly endangers’ the environment by failing to 
store, treat and dispose hazardous waste or otherwise, obtain an RCRA permit, 
guilty of a crime.26 Upon conviction, the offender is subject to a fine or 
imprisonment.27 A 1980 Congress amendment to s.3008 of the statute increased 
the strictness of the statutes (from the former maximum penalty of one-year 
imprisonment or a $25,000 fine)28 to a maximum penalty of $50,000 for ‘each day 
of the violation’ or imprisonment term of up to 15 years. The amendment also 
considered the crime as a felony instead of a misdemeanour.29 This implies that 
the USA now regards this environmental offence as a serious crime rather than a 
minor wrongdoing. This study argues that not only is the fine under this statute 
severe, but also the daily fine penalty utilised is equally severe enough to deter 
the discharge offence from escalating.   
 




25 ibid.  
26 42 U.S.C. S 6901 et seq. 
27 42 U.S.C. S 6928(d) (2) (A). 
28 45 Fed. Reg. 33066. 
29 Cristopher Harris, Patrick O Cavanaugh and Robert L Zisk, 'Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal 
Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" Of Corporations and their Executives' (1988) 23 Wake Forest Law 
Review 207. 
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The CWA also sanctions intentional illegal waste discharge into USA waters.30 The 
Act also sanctions the discharge of crude oil waste into USA waters.31  The Act 
further sanctions the failure to report a discharge of oil or other hazardous 
substances.32 The Act sanctions a discharge to a Publicly Owned Treatment Works 
(POTW) in violation of: “federal pre-treatment standards;”33 “local pre-treatment 
program;”34 and a “discharge to a POTW causing harm to the system.”35 The 
penalty for these illegal discharge offences include: 1 year and $2,500-$25,000 
for each day the offence subsists and for subsequent convictions, 2 years and/or 
$50,000 per day (for negligent violations); or 3 years and $5,000-$50,000 for 
each day the offence subsists, and for subsequent convictions 6 years and/or 
$100,000 per day (for violations intentionally committed by the offender).36 
 
The knowing endangerment of another person under the Act attracts a penalty of 
15 years and/or $250,000 ($1,000,000 for corporations) and for subsequent 
convictions, doubled.37 By this, the Act increases the penalty for an offender if 
such offender knowingly or negligently causes harm to public health and safety by 
virtue of the pollution offence. The making of false statements under the Act 
attracts a criminal penalty of 2 years and/or $10,000 with an option for 
subsequent convictions of 4 years and/or $20,000 per day of the offence.38 
 
Similarly, the MPRSA 1972 prohibits the transportation of waste material from the 
US with the intent of dumping such waste into ocean waters (without a permit).  
The Act stipulates a maximum fine of $250,000 and/or maximum imprisonment 5 
years.39 Even more, the APPS of 1980 prohibits the offence of knowingly violating 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 
(MARPOL Protocol) or any other USA statute (relating to the discharge of waste 
                                                             
30 33 U.S.C. 1319 (1) & (2). 
31 33 U.S.C. 1319(1) & (2) & 1321 (b) (3). 
32 33 U.S.C. 1321(b) (5). 
33 33 U.S.C. 1319 (1) (A) & (2) (A). 
34 33 U.S.C. 1319(1) (A) & (2) (A). 
35 33 U.S.C. 1319(1) (B) & (2) (B). 
36 ibid. 
37 33 U.S.C. 1319(3). 
38 33 U.S.C. 1319(4). 
39 33 U.S.C. 1411. 
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materials from ships, including garbage, oil, etc.)40 Under the Act, the offence 
attracts a penalty of an imprisonment term of up to 10 years and/or fines. 
 
5.1 Comparative Study of the UK and USA Regimes 
This study identified the defects of the Nigerian environmental crime regime 
including: weak penalties for environmental offences, vagueness of statutory 
provisions, inadequate prosecution of environmental offences, arbitrary power 
held by a single authority, and the inability of enforcement agencies to perform. 
This study will therefore, examine present UK and US statutes dealing with these 
themes which are seen to be lacking in Nigerian law. With this, the study will 
determine aspects of the UK and US environmental criminal laws that can be 
adopted to solve the defects identified in the Nigerian regime. 
 
5.1.1 Tough Sanctions that Deter Violators  
Deterrence to an environmental offence would be possible if there was severe 
punishment attached to the offence.41 This study has previously emphasised the 
need for tough sanctions to deter offences under its discussion in chapter 4. The 
study observed that while a strict environmental regime with tough sanctions 
could constitute deterrence, a poor regime with weak sanctions would fail to 
provide the same deterrent effect. It is therefore necessary to provide adequate 
punishment that would generally discourage the commission of a criminal offence. 
However, the study discovered that some criminal sanctions provided in the 
Nigerian regime were too weak to deter an environmental criminal violator. In the 
end, this has apparently impeded the ability of the criminal sanctioning tool to 
contribute in guaranteeing environmental protection in Nigeria. 
  
A) UK Deterrence through Tough Sanctions in Statutes 
 
 The UK has robust strict sanctions under its environmental law. For example, 
Section 33(1) (a) of the UK’s Environmental Protection Act 1990 prohibits the 
                                                             
40 33 U.S.C. 1908(a). 
41 Michael Hertz, 'Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement' (2018) 7 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review 685. 
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intentional illegal disposal of waste. Furthermore, Section 33 (8) of the Act 
provides that a person who commits the offence shall be liable—on summary 
conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not 
exceeding £40,000 or both; and on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both. Furthermore, while Regulations 
12 and 38 (1), (2) and (3) of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2010 prohibit a violation of the required standards of discharge set in 
an environmental permit and failing to obtain an environmental permit under 
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010; Regulation 39 
of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations imposes a 
liability of a fine not exceeding £50,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months, or to both for an offender convicted summarily; or a fine or 
imprisonment term not exceeding 5 years for an indicted offender. Similarly, 
Section 131(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 stipulates a criminal fine of 
£250,000 for the discharge of oil into UK waters. This study views these sanctions 
as tough especially when applied against individual offenders or Smaller Oil 
Companies convicted of committing environmental violation. The fines might not 
be very tough for multinational oil companies that are very rich. However, if such 
fines are consistently applied to multinational companies that are repeated 
offenders (in line with the Sentencing Guideline discussed below), it can certainly 
hinder the finances of such company and discourage repeated violations. 
 
As will be seen in section 5.1.3 of this study, the UK has suffered fewer oil spill 
pollution incidents when contrasted with the Nigerian examples previously noted. 
Moreover, it will also be observed that the oil spill pollution has also occurred less 
frequently. For instance, the most recent significant offshore oil spill pollution was 
the 2011 Gannet Alpha spill. This was preceded only by the 1993 Braer spill. In 
other words, the Gannet spill occurred 18 years after the previous spill. This is 
totally different from the Nigerian spills that have been observed to occur more 
regularly. Indeed, there is no direct evidence that the lower rate of occurrence of 
the spills have been as a result of tough sanctions in the regime such as the high 
criminal fine of £250,000 stipulated for the discharge of oil into UK waters under 
Section 131(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. However, this study argues 
that such high fines should be encouraged and even higher criminal sanctions 
should be imposed in jurisdictions with more frequent violations such as Nigeria.  




B) USA Deterrence through Tough Sentences 
 
Based on the synopsis of the USA regime described in section 5.0 above, one can 
observe tough environmental sanctions stipulated in the USA regime. Firstly, this 
study observes the use of daily fines in the USA regime. Indeed, as can be 
observed in chapter 2, this has also been applied in the Nigerian regime. The study 
believes this to be a suitable sanctioning tool and should be continued in the 
Nigerian regime. Writers have argued in favour of day fines (which has otherwise 
been referred to as structured fines).42 It has been asserted that this form of fine 
is dependent on the consideration that punishment should be proportionate to the 
offence.43 Furthermore, a writer noted that regarding the use of day fines, “judges 
and other criminal justice practitioners who have become familiar with structured 
fines are impressed by the essential equity of the concept. Although they may be 
simpler to use, tariff fines are inherently unfair because, all too often, the fine 
amounts are too low to be meaningful to affluent offenders but high enough to 
exceed the ability of some defendants to pay.”44 
 
However, these sanctions have not only been restricted to mere laws written on 
paper, but have also been converted to sentences imposed on offenders. This 
study will therefore review some environmental criminal cases that have been 
prosecuted as a result of the collaborative efforts of the ECS, Attorney’s office and 
the ENRD. For this, the study will concentrate on the Environmental Crime Reports 
of the years 2013 and 2014. This is because there were major environmental 
pollutions in the oil and gas industry in these years and also several criminal 
litigations that accompanied them.  
 
i) United States v Transocean Deep Water, Inc.,45 
Transocean pled guilty to a charge brought against the company for the negligent 
discharge of oil pollutants into USA waters (in breach of the CWA) during the 
                                                             
42 Bureau of Justice Assistance, 'How to Use Structured Fines (Day Fines) As an Intermediate Sanction' 
(Department of Justice 1996) <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/156242.pdf>accessed 28 August 2019. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 United States v Transocean Deep Water, Inc., NO. 2:13-cr-00001-JTM-SS (2014). 
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Deepwater Horizon oil spill pollution.46 During pleading, Transocean admitted that 
its employees on board the Deepwater Horizon, acted on the instruction given by 
BP’s ‘well site leaders’ and negligently failed to fully investigate indications that 
the Macondo well was insecure and that oil and gas substances were leaking into 
the well.47 The corporation was sentenced to five years of probation, ordered to 
pay a $100 million criminal fine and a $150 million community service payment 
as restitution to the National Academy of Science (NAS) for oil spill prevention in 
the Gulf of Mexico. The corporation was also ordered to make a restitution of $150 
million community service payment to the National Fish and Wildlife Federation 
(NFWF). 
 
The trial judge observed that the sentence was commensurate with the pollution 
offence committed and would serve as deterrence to future polluters. The judge 
also observed that the criminal payments directed to the NAS and NFWF were 
contributions (in the form of restitution) made by the company towards helping to 
remedy the harm done as a result of the oil spill pollution in the Gulf of Mexico 
caused by Transocean’s actions.48 The judge also observed that the penalties 
provided just punishment and constituted sufficient deterrence to the offence.49 It 
is therefore evident that this sentence would constitute sufficient retribution to the 
corporate offender and deter other corporations from polluting.  
 
ii) United States v BP Exploration and Production, Inc.;50United States v 
Mix51 
In admitting guilt of other crimes charged under this case, BP pled guilty to one 
count of a felony obstruction of Congress,52 a violation of Section 1319 (c) (1) (A) 
of the CWA53 and a violation of the migratory bird preservation standard 
established under the Migratory Bird Treaty Acts 191854 based on their role during 
the Deepwater Horizon pollution incident. BP was sentenced to five years of 
                                                             
46 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1) (A) and 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (3). 
47 Department of Justice, 'Closed Criminal Division Cases: United States v Transocean Deepwater Inc.' 
(Justice.gov, 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-vns/case/transocean> accessed 10 December 2018.   
48 United States v Transocean Deep Water, Inc., NO. 2:13 at 44. 
49 ibid. 
50 United States v BP Exploration and Production, Inc. NO. 2:12-cr-00292-SSV-DEK (2013). 
51 United States v Mix NO. 2:12-cr-00171-SRD-SS (2013). 
52 18 U. S. C. 1505. 
53 33 U. S. C. 1319 (c) (1) (A). 
54 16 U. S. C. 703. 
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probation and to pay criminal fines totalling $4 billion.55 The corporation was also 
ordered to make a restitution of $350 million as community service payment to 
the NAS for oil pollution prevention and a $2.4 billion community service payment 
to the NFWF towards the repair of the Gulf of Mexico habitat.56 It was observed 
that the criminal fines imposed on BP far exceeded any other imposed by the USA 
environmental regime.57 It was also noted that the sentence constituted significant 
deterrence to BP against committing a similar offence in the future.58 Moreover, 
the trial court insisted that the probation was to enable a close watch on BP’s 
future conduct. According to Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the 
Justice Department’s Criminal Division, “The Deepwater Horizon explosion was a 
national tragedy that resulted in the senseless deaths of 11 people and immense 
environmental damage. Through the tenacious work of the Task Force, 
BP…received just punishment for its crimes leading up to and following the 
explosion.”59 
 
iii) United States v Pacific International Lines60 
Pacific International Lines pled guilty to the offences of: making false statements 
to the USA Coast Guard, violating the APPS 1980 by falsifying an oil record book 
concealing waste water operations and discharges and intentionally operating a 
vessel in USA waters without a functioning separator (which USA environmental 
law require operators to use as a pollution control device).  
 
The corporation was sentenced to 36 months’ probation, and ordered to pay 
$2,000,000 as a criminal penalty fine. The corporation was also ordered to make 
a community service payment of $100,000 each as restitution to the NFWF and 
the NMSF. The corporation was also required to implement an environmental 
compliance plan. The trial judge argued that the penalty amounted to sufficient 
sanction for the environmental crime offence committed. Similarly, Matterson61 
                                                             
55 United States v BP Exploration and Production, Inc. NO. 2:12-cr-00292 at 44.  
56 ibid.  
57 EPA, 'Summary of Criminal Prosecutions | Enforcement | USA EPA' (Cfpub.epa.gov, 2020) 
<https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&prosecution_summary_id=2468> 
accessed 24 February 2020. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
60 United States v Pacific International Lines NO. 1:13-cr-00019-TFH (2013). 
61 He was Special Agent in Charge of Coast Guard Investigative Service-Pacific Region at the time. 
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observed that the case was the third of its kind since 2011.62 He believed that the 
penalty imposed on the offender sent “a clear message to shipping companies and 
mariners who wilfully cut corners and violate the laws enacted to protect the 
oceans.”63 
 
iv) United States v Colombia ShipManagement Ltd.;64 United States v 
Colombia ShipManagement GmbH;65 United States v Lupera;66 United 
States v Shapavalov;67 United States v Kondratyev68 
Colombia ShipManagement Ltd. and Colombia ShipManagement GmbH pled guilty 
to the illegal discharge of oil waste from their ships in contravention of the APPS 
1980 and obstruction of justice. The shipping corporations admitted that some of 
their vessels had intentionally evaded the use of required pollution prevention 
equipment and had also provided a false oil record book. U.S. Coast Guard.69 Capt. 
Fish70 stated that the act “was a case of wilful pollution and deliberate falsification 
of records designed to deceive the Coast Guard.”71 
 
Both corporations were sentenced to 48 months of probation. Colombia 
ShipManagement Ltd. was instructed to pay a $3 million fine and to pay a 
community service fine of $1 million to the NFWF. Colombia ShipManagement 
GmbH was sentenced to a $4.8 million fine and instructed to pay a $1.6 million 
community service fine to the NFWF.72 The settlement in this case has been 
adduced to be the largest settlement for pollution involving vessels in both New 
Jersey and Delaware as of 2013.73 Reacting to the penalty handed down by the 
                                                             
62 JOC Staff, 'Pacific International Lines Fined for Criminal Oil Pollution | JOC.Com' (JOC.com, 2013) 
<https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/pacific-international-lines/pacific-international-lines-
fined-criminal-oil-pollution_20130227.html> accessed 10 December 2018.   
63 ibid. 
64 United States v Colombia ShipManagement Ltd. NO. 2:13-cr-00193-SDW (2013). 
65 United States v Colombia ShipManagement GmbH NO. 2:13-cr-00205-SDW (2013). 
66 United States v Lupera NO. 2:12-cr-002816-SDW (2013). 
67 United States v Shapavalov NO. 1:13-cr-00079-SLR (2013). 
68 United States v Kondratyev NO. 1:13-cr-00080-SLR (2013). 
69 NPS Corporation, 'USA (UPDATE): Columbia ShipManagement Handed $10 Million Fine | News | Lubetech' 
(Npscorp.co.uk, 2013) <http://www.npscorp.co.uk/6/news/article/732/usa-update-columbia-shipmanagement-
handed-10-million-fine> accessed 10 December 2018.   
70 He was Chief of Investigations for the Coast Guard at the time. 
71 JOC Staff (n.62).  
72 ibid.  
73 ibid. 
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trial judge, Moreno74 emphasized that the environmental offences committed by 
the companies were serious criminal offences as they damaged the marine 
environment.75 He asserted that the prosecution and tough sanctioning of waste 
discharge offences send the message that pollution of the natural environment is 
considered serious and punished severely.76 Similarly, Fisherman77 believed that 
the tough penalty imposed in the case would deter other shipping companies from 
repeating the same crime.78 Moreover, it was stated that the prosecution was a 
“fine example of multi-district cooperation in enforcing federal environmental law 
and achieving a just sentence.”79 
 
Lupera (who was the second engineer aboard one of the ships) was convicted of 
obstructing justice, and not accurately keeping the oil record book. He was 
sentenced to 24 months’ probation. Vladimir Kondratyev (who was the first 
engineer aboard another of the ships) was accused of the same offence as Lupera 
as well as misinforming the USCG on the details of the oil record book. He was 
sentenced to 24 months’ probation and a $500 fine. Likewise, Shapavalov (who 
was the second engineer aboard the M/T Nordic Passat) was convicted of 
misinforming the US Coast Guard on the usage of oil water equipment on board 
the ship and was sentenced to 24 months’ probation.80 
 
v) United States v W&T Offshore81 
W&T Offshore Inc. pled guilty to washing spilled oil from its platform into the Gulf 
of Mexico instead of informing the National Response Centre of the spill. The 
corporation was sentenced to 36 months’ probation and ordered to pay a criminal 
penalty of $700,000. The corporation was also ordered to make restitution of 
$50,000 to the Southern Environmental Enforcement Network towards funding 
environmental enforcement training (against similar criminal pollution) and 
$250,000 to the NMSF towards funding projects aimed at restoring the Gulf of 
                                                             
74 Moreno was the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Environment and Natural Resources 
Division at the time. 
75 JOC Staff (n.62). 
76 ibid. 
77 The US Attorney for the District of New Jersey. 
78 JOC Staff (n.62). 
79 JOC Staff (n.62). 
80 ibid.  
81 United States v W&T Offshore NO. 2:12-cr-00312-EEF-SS (2014). 
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Mexico. The corporation was also instructed to implement an environmental 
compliance plan. 
 
vi) United States v Harcros Chems., Inc.82 
In this case, Harcros Chems. Inc. was convicted of storing hazardous waste 
without a permit at the company’s laboratory sites for more than two years. This 
was in contravention of the RCRA. The corporation was sentenced to two years’ 
probation and ordered to pay a fine of $1.5 million.  
 
vii) United States v Action Manufacturing Co.83 
Action Manufacturing Co. was convicted of storing 4,570 M608 Explosive Leads 
without a permit and without properly documenting the storage of such hazardous 
substance as required under the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) Regulations. The corporation was sentenced to five years’ 
probation and ordered to pay a $1.2 million fine.84 
 
Based on the list of cases decided in the USA regime discussed above, one can 
observe the imposition of tough sentences as penalties for different forms of 
environmental crimes It is therefore evident that the USA regime have gone 
beyond a lettered commitment of tough sanctioning of environmental crime to an 
application through sentencing of corporate criminal offenders.  
 
5.1.2 Application of Sentencing Guidelines which is Useful in the 
Deterrence of Offenders 
This study will explore the application of Sentencing Guidelines in the UK and USA 
regimes. The study has earlier observed the absence of any such Guideline in the 
Nigerian regime. This section therefore seeks to explore the usefulness of the 
Guideline in the comparative jurisdictions (UK and USA). Any such usefulness 
discovered will serve as a basis for its recommendation to the Nigerian regime.  
 
 
                                                             
82 United States v Harcros Chems., Inc. NO. 2:14-cr-20070-CM-DJW (2014). 
83 United States v Action Manufacturing Co. NO. 2:14-cr-00224-NIQA (2014). 
84 ibid.  
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A) Application of a Sentencing Guideline in the UK Regime 
 
In line with Section 120 of the UK’s Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the UK regime 
has provided a Sentencing Guideline that will apply to individuals of 18 years and 
above, as well as organisations that are sentenced on or after July 1 2014. 
Pursuant to Section 125 (1) (b) of the Coroners and Justice Act, “every court must, 
in exercising any other function relating to the sentencing of offenders, follow any 
sentencing guidelines which are relevant to the exercise of the function.” Hence, 
the Sentencing Guideline serves to shape the exercise of discretion of courts within 
the permitted parameters of statutory sanctions. Offences for which there are 
detailed guidelines  are categorised under Section 33 of the Environmental 
Protection Act and Regulations 12 and 38(1), 2 and 3 of the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations.  
 
Other analogous offences (related to the subject of discussion in this chapter) 
provided in the Guideline are: breach of an abatement notice85 under Section 80 
of the Environmental Protection Act with a statutory maximum of unlimited fine; 
breach of duty of care to prevent escape of waste under Section 33 of the 
Environmental Protection Act and breach of Environmental Permitting Regulations 
under Section 34 of the Environmental Protection Act both with a statutory 
maximum of unlimited fine. The Sentencing Council sets out a 12-step Sentencing 
Guideline for England and Wales to punish and deter environmental offenders, as 
well as reduce the financial gain associated with environmental offences. It is 
however notable that all steps in the UK Guideline applies to both individual and 
corporate offenders except regarding the use of criminal fines set out in step 4. 
These 12 step guidelines include:86 
1) The court can make a compensation order (of an amount it considers 
appropriate) in line with Section 130 Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 requiring the criminal offender to compensate any 
injury or damage resulting from the offence. In effect, the court can require 
                                                             
85 An abatement notice is served on the owner(s) or occupier(s) of a property from which a private nuisance 
arises, warning them of the intention to enter on the land in order to abate the nuisance. Abatement notices can 
only be issued by enforcement officers. 
86 Sentencing Council for England and Wales, 'Organizations: Unauthorized or Harmful Deposit, Treatment or 
Disposal etc. Of Waste/ Illegal Discharges To Air, Land And Water' (Sentencing Council 2014) 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/magistrates-court/item/organisations-illegal-discharges-to-air-
land-and-water-unauthorised-or-harmful-deposit-treatment-or-disposal-etc-of-waste/>accessed 10 August 2019. 
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that an offender pay compensation for the injury, damage or loss suffered 
as a result of the offence committed. Indeed, pursuant to Section 130 (2a) 
(4) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act, the court must 
consider evidence and any representations made by or on behalf of the 
accused or prosecutor to determine the appropriate amount of 
compensation to be imposed.  
 
2) The court can consider confiscation of proceeds from the environmental 
crime if it deems the action appropriate in relation to the environmental 
offence in line with Sections 6 and 13 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This 
implies that relating to environmental offences, the court can order a 
forfeiture of all funds related to the commission of an environmental 
offence. However, pursuant to Section 6(4) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 
in order to make this determination, the court must decide whether the 
defendant has a criminal lifestyle, he has benefitted from his general 
criminal conduct and he has benefitted from the particular criminal conduct. 
 
3) The court can determine the category of the offence using culpability and 
harm factors. Section 164 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires that a 
criminal penalty must reflect the seriousness of the offence committed and 
the court must consider the financial condition of the offender. In 
determining whether a criminal penalty reflects the seriousness of offence 
committed, the UK Sentencing Guideline provides that the courts should 
consider the culpability and harm factor.87 This also enables the court to 
determine the scale of sentencing that fits the category of offence 
committed. From the UK criminal regime, the culpability of an offender 
(whereby [a] is high culpability and [c] a lower culpability) is deduced to 
be:88 
a) Deliberate act. Under this category, the offender intentionally breaches or 
flagrantly disregards the law. For a ‘responsible corporate officer’ within a 
corporation, such an officer would have intentionally breached statutory 
                                                             
87 Sentencing Council for England and Wales, Environmental Offences: Definitive Guidelines 2014 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Final_Environmental_Offences_Definitive_Guidelin
e_web1.pdf> accessed 6 March 2019. 
88 ibid. 
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provision despite knowing that their actions/omissions can rightly be 
ascribed to the corporation. It is also a deliberate act of a corporation to 
commit an offence when the corporation fails to enforce all measures that 
would enable it avoid committing the criminal act. 
b) Reckless act. Under this category, the offender foresees the risk of 
committing an offence through his act, but wilfully turns a blind eye and 
continues with the offensive act. In the case of a corporation, it foresees 
such a risk but fails to enforce mechanisms to prevent the offence. 
c) Negligent act. Under this category, the offender (especially corporations) 
fails to take reasonable care by enforcing mechanisms for avoiding the 
commission of an offence. 
 
Similarly, under the Environmental Offences Definitive Guideline, if the 
pollutant is dangerous or hazardous, the clean-up and site remediation is 
expected to be very costly.89 
 
4) In distinguishing the starting point and category range of the environmental 
criminal offences, the Sentencing Guideline relates the criminal fines which 
the court can impose on offenders to the financial conditions of the 
offenders. This is because the Guideline seeks to minimise whatever gain 
had been realised through the Commission of the offence. In the UK case 
of R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd,90 the Court of Appeal held that the most 
suitable way to pass a strong message to the directors and shareholders of 
large corporations concerning their environmental responsibilities was to 
impose huge fines.91 Making an analysis, the court suggested that where 
the act of the large corporation causing the crime is deliberate, and adverse 
harm has been caused, “fines equal to a substantial percentage (up to 
100%) of the company's pre-tax net profit for the relevant year could be 
imposed.”92 Furthermore, according to the Guideline, a consideration of the 
relevant recent convictions and/or a history of non-compliance, repeated 
                                                             
89 ibid. 
 
90 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960. 
91 ibid. 
92 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd (n.90) at 108.  
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incidents of offending or offending over an extended period of time, breach 
of an order and offence committed for financial gain could lead to a move 
outside the category ranges (mentioned above) into a substantial upward 
adjustment of the criminal fine.93 
 
5) In some other circumstances, the court can ensure that the imposition of 
financial orders (which could be in the form of compensation, confiscation 
and/or fine) removes any economic benefit that would have accrued to the 
offender from the offence.94 In doing this, the financial order should remove 
any economic benefit the offender has derived through the commission of 
the offence including: avoided costs, operating savings, any gain made as 
a direct result of the offence.95 
 
6) The court can determine that the proposed fine is proportionate to the 
financial means of the offender. This will entail ensuring that the financial 
order has a real economic impact on the management and shareholder 
which will instil in them the importance of complying with environmental 
regulations. Indeed, in some bad cases, it would even be acceptable that 
the fine will have the effect of putting the offender out of business.96 
 
7) In considering the proportionality mentioned in step 6, the court can review 
other factors that are relevant to guaranteeing such proportionality with 
due regard to the means of the offender and the seriousness of the 
offence.97 
 
8) The court can consider circumstances which may require a reduction or 
review of sentence such as assistance to prosecution.98 This is pursuant to 
Sections 73 and 74 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. 
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9) The court can consider potential reduction of the sentence of an offender 
who has entered a guilty plea.99 This is pursuant to Section 144 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
10) The court will consider the possibility of making ancillary orders such as: 
the forfeiture of the vehicle used in committing the environmental crime in 
line with Section 33C of the Environmental Protection Act; the deprivation of 
property that is a proceed of the environmental crime in line with Section 
143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 where Section 
33C of the Environmental Protection Act is inapplicable;  and ordering an 
offender to take steps to remediate within a specified period pursuant to 
Regulation 44 of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations where the offender is guilty of an unauthorised discharge.100 
 
11) The court will consider that sentences are just and proportionate to 
offending behaviour. This is referred to in the Guideline as the totality 
principle.101 
 
12) The court will give reasons for every sentence in line with Section 174 of 
the Criminal Justice Act.102 
 
Indeed, the  UK Sentencing Guideline lends legitimacy to the UK sentencing of 
crimes. This is because the Guideline encourages proportionality of punishment to 
the offence committed. It is worthwhile remembering that this is a major 
deficiency that has been noted in the Nigerian regime. It is the view of this study 
that such proportionality will in turn encourage deterrence to a criminal offender. 
From the 12 step UK Sentencing Guideline outlined above, it is obvious that 
consideration of the level of sentence to be imposed is made in line with the 
severity of the harm caused by the environmental offence, the level of culpability 
of the offender and the financial capacity of the offender. Indeed, the 
determination of sentences using the harm and culpability approach makes the 
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penalty more suitable for the particular offence committed. Hence, in line with the 
Guideline, although a defaulter who deliberately violated environmental standards 
will be severely penalised, a negligent and reckless violator will equally be 
punished. Similarly, it entails that a company that commits very serious 
environmental crime will expect sentences bearing the highest range of sanctions 
on the statutory parameters for such offences.  
 
This study has earlier identified the deficiency of very weak statutory sanctions in 
the Nigerian regime. However, it is argued that the absence of a Sentencing 
Guideline in the Nigerian regime makes matters even worse. A Sentencing 
Guideline in Nigeria could have matched even the highest scale of the weak 
sanctions to the significant offences committed in the Nigerian regime. On the 
other hand, the absence of such Guideline removes what would have been a 
discretion to courts to impose sentences that reflect at least the highest scale of 
the existing weak sanctions in the Nigerian regime. In effect, the absence of the 
Guideline entails that the courts can choose to impose the lowest sanction in the 
already weak scale of sanctions provided in the Nigerian statutes. Whereas, as in 
the UK Guideline, where the sentencing is made proportional to severity of the 
offence and harm caused, environmental violations that result in significant harm 
will be punished severely in line with the existing tough sanctions in the UK 
statutes.  This will create some form of fear among industry participants not to be 
in a hurry to cause violations with significant environmental harm knowing that 
they could suffer a significant amount of statutory sanctions for their action. 
 
This study further noted the possibility of considering the financial ability of the 
offender during sentencing in the UK regime, hence the proportioning of sentences 
to the financial strength of the offender.  The study reiterates the severe criminal 
sanctions provided in the UK environmental regime. The range/scale of financial 
penalties specified in the statutes are severe enough for the environmental 
offences prohibited. This study welcomes the proportioning of offences (in line 
with the guidelines) to the financial capacity of the offender as it will entail the 
severe sentencing of big oil and gas companies that have defaulted. Consequently, 
a defaulting company will understand that it will suffer the highest range of penalty 
scaled for the offence in the relevant statute during sentencing. For example, in 
committing the environmental offence prohibited and sanctioned under Section 34 
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of the Environmental Protection Act with a statutory maximum of unlimited fine, 
such an offender will understand that the trial court already has a responsibility 
to impose a very high fine that will impact the financial resource of the offender. 
Moreover, such an offender also understands that there is simply no limit to what 
such a court can impose for the offence. This study welcomes this approach as it 
will reduce the financial advantage that seem to come with committing 
environmental offences.  
 
Such an approach to sentencing will instil in the general company, its management 
and shareholders, the importance of complying with such environmental 
standards. Moreover, by providing that there are cases whereby the regime can 
put the offender out of business through severe fines on the company’s funds, the 
Sentencing Guideline seeks to remind all companies in the UK (including those 
operating in the oil and gas sector) that the punishment that comes with 
environmental crime is too expensive to bear. By this, such companies are 
deterred from engaging in such environmental criminal acts that can necessitate 
such. 
 
B) Application of Sentencing Guideline in the USA Regime 
 
The USA Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its first extensive agency 
Guideline for proceeding in criminal cases on June 16, 1976103 and acknowledged 
the need for the vigorous pursuit of enforcement using criminal sanctions.104 This 
position was reiterated by James W Wooreman (then Assistant Attorney General 
of the Justice Department’s Land and Natural Resource Division) who was quoted 
as stating: “For these transgressions, the Department of Justice has begun to 
invoke grand jury investigations both against corporations and against individuals. 
The Department will prosecute criminal conduct in this area.”105 
 
Indeed, building on this move, the USA has greatly increased the discretion of 
courts to penalise environmental criminal offences even beyond the statutory 
                                                             
103 Robert I McMurry and Stephen D Ramsey (n.15).  
104 ibid. 
105 Robert I McMurry and Stephen D Ramsey (n.15) p.1138. 
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range provided in the relevant statutes.106 This has been reflected in the USA 
Federal Sentencing Guideline by the United States Sentencing Commission which 
sought to make sentences for pollution crimes tougher.107 In determining the type 
of sentence to impose, the sentencing judge should consider the severity of harm 
caused by the offence and whether it is a repeated offence.108 In line with the 
Guideline, punishments that can be imposed on corporations guilty of 
environmental offences include: criminal fines,109 probation sentences,110 
community service orders, restitution orders111 and compliance and ethics 
programme orders. Imprisonment has been omitted from this list because the 
scope of discussion in the study has focused on corporate pollution, and companies 
cannot, in any traditional sense, be incarcerated. Furthermore, community service 
orders have been omitted from the list outlined below as they cannot apply to a 
company. Otherwise, most other provisions of the Guideline are applicable to both 
individual and corporate offenders. These provisions of the Guideline include: 
 
i) Criminal Fines 
It is notable that the Corporate Fine Guideline assumes that a corrupt corporation 
ought to be fined to the extreme if the statutory limit allows.112 It is notable that 
the Corporate Fine Guideline states that a corporation found to have been 
established for criminal reasons or to have operated by criminal means should be 
fined at a level that will strip such company of all its assets.113 
 
                                                             
106 Joel A Mintz, Enforcement at the EPA (University of Texas Press 2012) p.33. 
107 Formerly United States Sentencing Commission, United States Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual (1992) 
18 U.S.C.A application 4 at 64 (West Supplementary 1992); now United States Sentencing Commission, United 
States Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual (2018-2019 Edition). 
108 ibid. 
109 18 U.S.C. 3571. 
110 18 U.S.C. 3561(a) (1); U.S.S.G. §8D1.1. 
111 U.S.S.G. §8B1.1. 
112 U.S.S.G. §8C1.1. The Guideline are however, limited to the scope established by Congress. Hence, the 
Guideline calculation that falls short of a statutory minimum or exceeds a statutory maximum must be adjusted 
accordingly, U.S.S.G. §§8C3.1, 5E1.2(c). 
113 U.S.S.G. §8C1.1. In United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 2002), it was held thus: “Tri-City was 
exposed to a $500,000 fine under the statute and what has been called a death penalty fine under §8C1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.... It is clear that Tri-City was conceived in crime and performed little or no legitimate 
activity”. 
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In lieu of establishing special corporate fine standards for some offences,114 there 
are two general statutory provisions for criminal fines in the Guideline.115 The first 
sets the maximum limit for any criminal fine116 while the other establishes the 
factors that determine the imposition of different levels of fine on either individuals 
or corporate offenders.117 In considering the factors that are used to determine 
the level of fine to be imposed, the court may consider: the ability of the criminal 
offender to pay the fine;118 the level of offence committed and the culpability of 
the offender.119 
 
Unless the profit or loss associated with the offence is greater than the fine, the 
corporate offender’s base fine is set at one of 38 levels proportional to the 
offence.120 In line with this, the relevant fine range is determined by the score of 
the corporation’s culpability.121 Based on this, the Guideline has further specified 
certain factors that must be considered in determining the applicable range of fine 
that can be imposed on a corporate offender.122 Generally statutory limits of fines 
                                                             
114 U.S.S.G. §8C2.10. It is provided that: “The Commission has not promulgated guidelines governing the 
setting of fines for counts not covered by §8C2.1”. 
115 ibid. 
116 In line with 18 U.S.C.3571(c), a court is permitted to impose a fine to the maximum amount of $500,000 
when an organization is convicted of a felony, and a range of $10,000 to $500,000 for misdemeanors. However, 
18 U.S.C. 3571(d) provides that the court may impose a fine of not more than twice the gain or loss associated 
with the offence. This study is of the view that the caveat in 3571(d) can in some cases, exceed the statutory 
limit set in the 3571(c). Moreover, 18 U.S.C. 3571(c) (1) permits the court to impose higher fines when the 
congress has approved the increase.  
117 18 U.S.C. 3553. 
118 U.S.S.G. §8C2.2.  
119 U.S.S.G. §8C2.3 to §8C2.9. 
120 U.S.S.G. §8 C2.4. The base fine is the greatest of the following: the pre-tax gain from the crime, the amount 
of intentional loss inflicted on the victims, and an amount based on the Sentencing Commission's ranking of the 
seriousness of the crime (ranging from $5,000 to $72.5 million). 
121 U.S.S.G. §§8C 2.5 to 8C 2.8. 
122 According to U.S.S.G. §8C2.8: “(a) In determining the amount of the fine within the applicable guideline 
range, the court should consider: (1) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 
respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further 
crimes of the organization; (2) the organization’s role in the offense; (3) any collateral consequences of 
conviction, including civil obligations arising from the organization’s conduct; (4) any nonpecuniary loss 
caused or threatened by the offense; (5) whether the offense involved a vulnerable victim; (6) any prior criminal 
record of an individual within high-level personnel of the organization or high-level personnel of a unit of the 
organization who participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the criminal conduct; (7) any prior 
civil or criminal misconduct by the organization other than that counted under §8C2.5(c); (8) any culpability 
score under §8C2.5(Culpability Score) higher than 10 or lower than 0; (9) partial but incomplete satisfaction of 
the conditions for one or more of the mitigating or aggravating factors set for in §8C2.5 (Culpability Score); 
(10) any factor listed in 18 U.S.C. §3572(a); and (11) whether the organization failed to have, at the time of the 
instance offense, an effective compliance and ethics program within the meaning of §8B2.1 (Effective 
Compliance and Ethics Program). (b) In addition, the court may consider the relative importance of any factor 
used to determine the range, including the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, the pecuniary gain from the 
offense, any specific offense characteristic used to determine the offense level, and any aggravating or 
mitigating factor used to determine the culpability score.” 
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stipulated in a regulatory instrument that proscribes the offence supersedes any 
conflicting range of fines stipulated in the Guideline.123 However, it has also been 
provided that a major aim of the USA criminal sentencing system is to ensure that 
the system strips the offender of all gains associated with the offence after 
financial sanctioning measures (such as fine, restitution order, compliance order 
and remedial costs) has been applied.124 In line with this, among other 
prescriptions, the Guideline prescribes that when the criminal action constitutes 




Probation was made a sentence in and of itself by the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act 1984.126 According to the Sentencing Guideline, a probation sentence 
shall be: “at least one year127 but not more than five years if the offense level is 
6 or greater.128 Corporations convicted of a federal crime must be placed on 
probation, where the court decides against fining them.129 However, in some 
circumstances, the court might elect to fine such offenders and still sentence them 
to probation.130 The Guideline establishes probation as a means of guaranteeing 
that offenders comply with required obligations to pay a fine or special financial 
orders, make restitution, set up a compliance programme, engage in community 
service, or comply with remedial orders.131 Probation is also found appropriate 
when: the corporation has been found to have been previously convicted of the 
offence within 5 years of the subsisting conviction;132 the responsible corporate 
officer within a corporation has been found to be involved in the same offence 
within five years of the subsisting conviction;133 and applying the probation will 
reduce the risk of future criminal misconduct being committed by the offender.134 
Indeed, applying the probation will guarantee compliance with the sentencing 
                                                             
123 U.S.S.G. §8C3.1 (b), (c). 
124 U.S.S.G. §8C2.9. 
125 U.S.S.C. §8C4.4. 
126 18 U.S.C. § 3561. 
127 U.S.S.G. §8D1.2 (a) (1); 18 U.S.C. 3561(c)(1). 
128 U.S.S.G. §8D1.2 (a); 18 U.S.C. 3561(c). 
129 U.S.S.G. §8D1.1 (a) (7); 18 U.S.C. 3551(c). 
130 ibid. 
131 U.S.S.G. §8D1.1 (a) (1), (2), (3). 
132 U.S.S.G. §8D1.1 (a) (4). 
133 U.S.S.G. §8D1.1 (a) (5). 
134 U.S.S.G. §8D1.1 (a) (6). 
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directives of 18 U.S.C. 3553 (a)(2) regarding the need to:135 reflect the 
seriousness of the offence; enhance respect for the law; provide just and adequate 
punishment; ensure deterrence to the commission of crime; protect the public 
from future crime; and rehabilitate and correct the offender. 
 
Corporate probation mandates corporations not to engage in further 
misconduct.136 In line with the Guideline, the discretionary probationary conditions 
require corporations to: publicize their conviction at their own cost;137 establish 
and sustain a compliance programme;138 notify their employees and shareholders 
of their offence and compliance programme;139 inform the courts or probation 
services of its finances periodically;140 carry out periodic audits and bearing the 
cost of the audits;141 or pay periodic fines or fulfil restitution orders.142 
 
iii) Restitution 
Depending on the offence, a court may order a convicted corporation or individual 
to pay restitution to victims of the crime.143 In effect, the court may exercise 
discretion in making this order. At other times, the court may impose the 
restitution as a condition of probation of the defendant144 or subject to plea 
bargain.145 Environmental matters for which the court might impose an order of 
restitution include: transportation of hazardous materials146 and air transportation 
of hazardous materials.147 
 
iv) Community Service Order 
The Guideline also provides that an offender may be ordered to engage in 
community service in relation to the harm caused by the offensive act so long as 
                                                             
135 U.S.S.G. §8D1.1 (a) (4); 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2). 
136 18 U.S.C. 3563(a) (1), U.S.S.G. §8D1.3 (a) (1). 
137 U.S.S.G. §8D1.4 (a). 
138 U.S.S.G. §8D1.4 (b) (1). 
139 U.S.S.G. §8D1.4 (b) (2). 
140 U.S.S.G. §8D1.4 (b) (4), (3). 
141 U.S.S.G. §8D1.4 (b) (5). 
142 U.S.S.G. §8D1.4 (b) (6). 
143 Charles Doyce, 'Corporate Criminal Liability:' (Congressional Research Service 2013) 
<https://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/books_3511_0.pdf> accessed 14 August 2019.  
144 18 U.S.C. 3563(b) (2). 
145 18 U.S.C. 3663(a) (1) (A), (3). 
146 18 U.S.C. 3663(a) (1); 49 U.S.C. 5124. 
147 18 U.S.C. 3663(a) (1); 49 U.S.C. 46312. 
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the offender possesses the required skills, facilities, or knowledge suited for the 
community service task.148 The Guideline however stresses that the community 
service task must be related to the harm caused or else monetary sanctions will 
be a more appropriate penalty.149 
 
v) Compliance and Ethics Programme 
The Guideline establishes a compliance and ethics programme that may be 
required to be undertaken by corporate offenders.150 Indeed, a corporation that 
has already failed to install such a program in its system might be ordered to do 
so.151 The Guideline requires that the programmes must enhance the ethical 
culture of corporations and increase the detection and prevention of criminal 
misconduct within the corporation.152 Components of the programmes as set out 
in the Guideline include: formation of procedures designed to identify and prevent 
criminal misconduct;153 involvement of responsible corporate officers in the 
programme (particularly the daily operations);154 reduction of operations of 
corporations that has been identified to show minimal commitment to ethicality in 
operations;155 training of employees and agents on the programme;156 monitoring, 
auditing and evaluation of the programme;157 encouragement and reward for 
corporations that have performed creditably in line with the programme’s goals;158 
disciplining of inconsistent conduct;159 and prompt response to the identification 
of in-house corporate criminal conduct.160 
 
This study observed the provision under the USA Guideline requiring the 
imposition of probation during sentencing for repeated offenders. This can ensure 
that companies do not repeatedly commit environmental crime. This study 
discovered that not only were the Nigerian violations severe, but they were 
                                                             
148 U.S.S.G. §8D1.3; U.S.S.G. §8D1.3 (Commentary). 
149 U.S.S.G. §8D1.3 (Commentary). 
150 Charles Doyce (n.137).  
151 ibid. 
152 U.S.S.G. §8B2.1 (a). 
153 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1 (b) (1).  
154 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1(b)(2).  
155 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1 (b) (3). 
156 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1(b)(4).  
157 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1(b)(5).  
158 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1(b)(6).  
159 U.S.S.G. §8D2.1(b)(7).  
160 U.S.S.G. §8D1.3; U.S.S.G. §8D1.3 (Commentary). 
   213 
 
repeated such as the failure to clean-up which is still subsisting. The study also 
observed the discretion permitting courts to impose a requirement on the 
offending company to publish the conviction. Indeed, this can damage the public 
image of such companies. This study welcomes this approach as it will discourage 
companies from committing environmental offence. 
 
Regarding the imposition of criminal fines during sentencing, this study welcomes 
the toughening of fines for repeated offenders. This will increase the deterrence 
of committing such offence on existing offenders as they will understand that 
being caught as a repeated offender carries an even greater penalty. Similar to 
the UK Environmental Offences Definitive Guideline, the USA Sentencing Guideline 
makes the sentences for environmental offences proportional to the seriousness 
of the offence. Again, regarding sentencing, this will prevent the danger of 
applying sanctions that are either too weak to compel deterrence or too severe to 
rehabilitate the offender to sentences. Moreover, it is observed that the USA 
Guideline also provides greater sentencing to repeated offenders. This study 
argues that this sanctioning mechanism will also provide deterrence to offenders 
who believe they can always violate environmental standards in order to make 
profit. Furthermore, similar to the UK, the USA Guideline seeks to take away 
criminal profits, thereby impacting the finances of a criminal violator. This will 
further make offenders understand that there is no actual gain in the criminal 
violation of standards considering that the profits acquired will still be taken away 
during sentencing. This study argues that applying greater sentencing to repeated 
offenders and seeking to take away the finances of offenders will deter offenders 
from believing that criminal violation of environmental standards pays. 
 
5.1.3 Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Pollution Offences  
This study discussed the doctrine of ‘piercing of the corporate veil’ in chapter 4. 
The study is of the view that ‘piercing the corporate veil’ is done in order to bring 
corporate actors’ behaviour into conformity with the statutory environmental 
standards (of pollution prevention, complying with clean-up notice, etc.) stipulated 
in any regime. It is therefore necessary to discuss the application of this doctrine 
in the UK and USA regimes, especially considering that the study found no clear 
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decided case of environmental violations by corporations and their officers in the 
Nigerian regime. Hence, beyond establishing the importance of the doctrine, the 
Nigerian regime can derive guidance from the examples of the applications of the 
doctrine in the UK and USA regimes. This section will first discuss the application 
in the UK regime, and the USA regime afterwards. 
  
A) Application of Corporate Sanctioning in the UK 
 
In discussing its application in the UK regime, the study seeks to determine the 
approach that has been utilised by the UK in the imposition of liability for corporate 
oil pollution offenders. It has been asserted that some significant environmental 
pollution has been caused by corporations.161 Similarly, some significant oil 
pollution in the UK offshore industry has been caused by ships owned or managed 
by corporations. Some such pollution that serve as evidence for this assertion 
include:  
a) the 1967 Torrey Canyon Oil spill which caused the discharge of about 
119,000 tons of crude oil on the Scilly Isles, contaminating 120 miles of the 
Cornish coast, 50 miles of French coastline and killing some 15,000 sea 
birds.162 At the time of the incident, the super tanker SS Torrey Canyon 
which caused the spill was owned by Barracuda Tanker Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California but chartered to British 
Petroleum.163 
 
b) the 1996 Sea Empress spill which caused the discharge of about 72,000 
tons of crude oil near Pembrokeshire in Wales, causing significant harm to 
birds and marine life.164 At the time of the incident, the MV Sea Empress 
                                                             
161 Stuart Bell, Donald McGillivray and Ole W Pedersen, Environmental Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 
2013) p.280.   
162  Adam Vaughn, 'Torrey Canyon Disaster – The UK's Worst-Ever Oil Spill 50 Years On' The Guardian 
(2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/18/torrey-canyon-disaster-uk-worst-ever-oil-spill-
50tha-anniversary> accessed 10 December 2018; Fiona McKay, 'The Worst Marine Oil Spills in UK and World 
History'(HeraldScotland,2016)<https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/homenews/15809323.The_worst_marine
_oil_spills_in_UK_and_world_history/>accessed 10 December 2018. 
163 ibid. 
164 British Broadcasting Corporation 'BBC NEWS | World | Europe | Comparing the Worst Oil Spills' British 
Broadcasting Corporation (2018) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2491317.stm> accessed 10 
December 2018. 
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was a single-hull Suezmax Liberian registered oil tanker managed by Sea 
Tankers Management Co Ltd.165 
 
 
c) the 1993 Braer spill which discharged 85,000 tons of oil on the Shetland 
Islands and caused high respiratory hazard to seals in the region.166 The MV 
Braer that caused the spill was an oil tanker owned by Braer Corporation, 
operated by Canadian Ultramar Ltd and managed by B+H ShipManagement 
Company.167 
 
d) or even the recent 2011 Gannet Alpha platform spill in the North Sea off 
the Aberdeen coast which caused a discharge of more than 200 tons of 
oil.168 This platform was operated by Shell.169 
 
It is therefore trite to review the UK’s application of corporate liability for pollution 
offences. This is necessary considering that if the actions and decision making 
strategy of corporations and their controlling officers are effectively checked, 
environmental criminal violations will be greatly reduced. Considering the 
significant pollution that has been caused by corporate activities (such as oil and 
gas pollution),170 the Environmental Audit Committee has noted that sometimes 
companies criminally pollute because of their neglect of environmental 
obligations.171 At other times, the pollution can also be a deliberate and intentional 
act of the company, taken with the full knowledge of the environmental harm that 
could result from such an act.172 In this case, the environmental offences will 
                                                             
165 David Johnson and Nickie Butt, 'The Sea Empress Disaster- 10 Years On' (World Wildlife Fund 2006) 
<http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/ma_seaemp10yrson.pdf> accessed 15 February 2020. 
166 Ailsa J. Hall, John Watkins and Lex Hiby, 'The Impact of the 1993 Braer Oil Spill on Grey Seals in Shetland' 
(1996) 186 Science of the Total Environment 119-125. 
167 John MacGregor, 'Braer' (Asset Publishing Service Gov.UK 1993) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/54c11606e5274a15b3000015/MAIBReport_Braer-1993.pdf> 
accessed 15 February 2020. 
168 Adam Barnett, 'Shell's £22,500 Fine for North Sea Oil Spill Slammed As 'Paltry' By Campaigners' 
Independent (2015) <https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/shells-22500-fine-for-north-sea-oil-spill-
slammed-as-paltry-by-campaigners-a6747536.html> accessed 10 December 2018. 
169 ibid. 
170 Environmental Agency, 'Regulating the Waste Industry: 2015 Evidence Summary' (Gov.UK 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulating-the-waste-industry-evidence-summaries> accessed 10 
December 2018. 
171 Environmental Audit Committee 'Corporate Environmental Crime, Second Report of Session' HC 136 
(House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited 8th Feb 2005) p.5. 
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require proof of the company’s mens rea in order for its guilt to be proven. 
However, on many other occasions, the liability could be based on merely having 
‘caused’ the prohibited act, and in such case strict liability.  
 
It has been observed above that the requirement for liability in the Nigerian 
environmental regime is mainly strict liability. Conversely, the UK has utilised both 
the requirements of mens rea, and strict liability in the determination of its 
environmental offences. For example, under Section 33 (1) (a) of the EPA, it is an 
offence for a person to ‘knowingly’ deposit controlled waste on any UK land without 
obtaining a permit and ensuring compliance with any conditions regulating waste 
discharge. From the above statutory provision, and the use of the word 
‘knowingly’, mens rea can be identified as an element of this offence in the UK.  
 
However, along with Nigeria, the UK also strictly prohibits environmental offences 
(such as oil pollution offences). For example, Section 3 of the Prevention of Oil 
Pollution Act 1971 provides that an offender who ‘causes’ oil pollution by the 
discharge of oil from a pipeline or during exploration is guilty of a crime and is 
liable to a fine of up to £50,000. Section 85 of the Water Resources Act 1991 finds 
an offender criminally liable for ‘causing’ the discharge of “poisonous, noxious, 
polluting or solid matter” into controlled waters, and punishable on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for up to three months or to a fine of up to £20,000 
or both; and on indictment, to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine 
or both.173 There is therefore an expectation that enforcement agencies would 
enforce the environmental sanctions stipulated for these corporate crimes.174 
 
                                                             
173 Similarly, Regulation 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations 1996 finds any 
person that ‘causes’ a discharge of oil or oil waste from UK tankers into the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, 
the Black Sea and the Antarctic area (hence, contravening the provisions of Regulations 12, 13 and 16) to be 
guilty of an offence and liable to a penalty of up to a £50,000 fine. In National Rivers Authority v The Yorkshire 
Water Services Ltd [1995] 1 AC 444, Yorkshire Water Services Ltd was found liable for causing the discharge 
of polluting substances from their system into the river, regardless of the fact that it was a third party that 
directly caused the discharge through their system. The court also disregarded the fact that they did not 
necessarily explicitly consent to the pollution act. All that mattered was that the pollution occurred on an 
existing system they had already set in place. In this case, the court considered the explicit meaning of the word 
‘caused’ to determine that it was an existing system they had already set in place that eventually resulted in the 
discharge.  
174 Valsamis Mitsilegas and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 'Fighting Environmental Crime in the UK: A Country 
Report' (Queen Mary University Press 2018) p.52. 
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Often, to determine the liability of a company, ‘the acts and state of mind’ of 
officers who represent the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company are imputed to 
the company itself. Such officers have been described in this study as ‘responsible 
corporate officers’ because they are either in charge of the functioning of the 
company (such as the company directors) or directly involved in the offensive act. 
Indeed, ‘having a controlling mind within the company’ entails that the corporate 
officer must able to influence policies that could have led to the commission of the 
pollution offence by the company.175 Tromans and Thornton encouraged a piercing 
of the corporate veil to impose personal liability on such officers towards 
compelling companies to proactively consider environmental issues at the policy 
formation level of the company. The writers have also viewed the doctrine of 
imposing criminal liability on corporate officers as an effective way of making 
corporate officers more responsible in complying with environmental laws.176 Their 
reason for this belief is that a corporate officer who is responsible for making the 
decisions of any corporation would rather comply with environmental principles 
when he understands that he could personally bear a measure of the criminal 
liability arising from the corporation’s breach of the environmental principle.177 A 
‘relevant corporate officer’ in this purview includes: the director, manager, chief 
executive, or secretary.178 
 
In effect, the UK environmental regime has pierced the veil to impose criminal 
liability on relevant corporate officers that consent to or connive with their 
corporation to effect an environmental crime, despite being in a position to prevent 
it.179 Hence under the regime, a corporate officer would be liable for an intentional, 
reckless or negligent act resulting to an environmental offence being caused by 
                                                             
175 Section 41 (3) (4) of the Petroleum Act 1998; Section 217 of the Water Resources Act 1991; and Section 41 
of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulation 2016. 
176 Stephen Tromans and Justine Thornton, ‘Taking Responsibility; Personal Liability under Environmental 
Law’ (Earthscan Publications Ltd 2001) p.1. 
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178 This is provided for in Section 157 Environmental Protection Act; Regulation 41 Environmental Permitting 
(England and Wales) Regulation; Section 52 of the Clean Air Act.  
179 This is provided for in Section 157 of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990; Regulation 16 (6) of 
the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations 2005; Regulation 65 of 
the Offshore Marine Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) Regulations 2007; Section 11 (2) of the Continental 
Shelf Act 1975; Section 4 of the Petroleum Submarine and Pipelines Act 1975; and Section 52 of the Clean Air 
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its company. In effect, such actions would be deemed that they consented to or 
connived with the company to commit the environmental offence.180 
 
This notion of corporate officer liability was historically provided in the failed 
Corporate Responsibility Bill 2002. In line with what would have been Section 7 
(a) of the Bill, a director was expected to consider the environmental, social and 
economic impacts of their operations before making any decision for the company 
to embark on such operation. Section 7 (b) would have required the director to 
take every reasonable step to mitigate any such implication that might arise. 
Section 8 was to impose liability on a director who caused pollution as a result of 
negligence or wilful misconduct. According to Section 12 of the Bill, such a director 
would have been fined or imprisoned or even prohibited from being a director for 
a specified number of years. This Bill would have emphasized the strict position of 
the UK on corporate officers being responsible for environmental issues while 
directing the operations of their companies. However, generally companies would 
be found liable for their corporate offences whereby responsible corporate officers 
within such company lacked the ‘directing mind and will’ to influence actions that 
will prevent corporate crime. 
 
For instance, in Huckerby v Elliot,181 it was argued that for a corporate officer to 
be found vicariously liable for the crime of its corporations, such an officer must 
not only be aware of the environmental offence but also must actively encourage 
the act causing the criminal pollution and/or participate in it. In the case, the 
company operated a gaming club without licence. Huckerby as the director of the 
company was charged with the offence because the offence committed by the 
company was attributable to her neglect. Indeed, evidence showed that although 
she was the company director, she lacked knowledge of the company’s operations 
as its co-director and the company manager was handling most such operations. 
The court however convicted Huckerby because regardless of her lack of 
knowledge, she ought to have exercised some form of oversight as the co-director 
and the manager.  In this case, connivance was defined as a situation whereby an 
officer is, “well aware of what is going on but his agreement is tacit, not actively 
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encouraging what happens but letting it continue and saying nothing about it.”182 
To argue connivance, the prosecution must establish that such an officer was 
aware of the offence and did nothing to criticize or stop it. This element of criminal 
liability seeks to ensure that a corporate officer reasonably endeavours to rectify 
a pollution offence as soon as he is aware of the offence to absolve himself of any 
allegation of conniving in committing the crime. 
 
The Court however set aside the decision arguing that there was no general rule 
mandating each director to exercise some degree of control over the company’s 
business. In effect, inasmuch as the director had no reason to distrust her 
delegate, she was within her right to delegate such a duty to another official of 
the company. However, it has been stipulated that when a corporate officer (who 
has the authority to stop the offence or influence a prevention of the offence) 
consents to an environmental offence committed by his company, he or she is also 
deemed to have connived to commit the offence.183 Hence, the responsible 
corporate officer would in this circumstance, have deliberately committed the 
environmental offence.  
 
Similarly, in Woodhouse v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council,184 the 'general 
manager' of a waste disposal site was absolved from guilt for the discharge of 
waste from the site. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish the fact 
that the manager possessed the required authority to affect the general policy of 
the company regarding waste discharge. The court held that for the manager of a 
company to be held responsible for an environmental offence committed by the 
company, the manager must be a decision maker capable of influencing the 
company’s policy.  Thus, a responsible corporate officer’s authority must include 
an ability to influence company policy and the strategy of operations for the 
company.185 
 
                                                             
182 ibid.at 193. 
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184 Woodhouse v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council [1994] Env. LR 30. 
185 In the appeal case of R v Boal [1992] 1 QB 591, the initial conviction of the day-to-day 'general manager' of 
the Foyles bookstore subject to Section 23 Fire Precautions Act 1971, was overturned on the grounds that he 
lacked the requisite power to determine the corporate policy of the book store. It was rather maintained that 
criminal liability as specified in Section 23 of the Act only apply to officers who are in authority and are 
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In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass,186 the House of Lords emphasized that the 
litmus test for determining the liability of a corporate officer is whether the 
corporate officer has sufficient authority in the corporation to influence the 
commission or prevention of the act that caused the pollution. This view was 
originally asserted by Lord Denning in H. L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v T. J. 
Graham & Sons Ltd187 whereby he referred to the company as a human body, and 
the directors as the “directing mind and will” of the body. On those grounds, in 
the Woodhouse case, the manager was not the ‘directing mind and will’ of 
Woodhouse. This is because he lacked the capacity to influence the company’s 
general policies, including those that cover the site. This position was reiterated 
in 2012, where a technical manager of a company was absolved from waste 
discharge because he lacked enough authority to permit the offence.188 
 
Relative to the exploration and production of oil and gas, Section 137(2) of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides that the Secretary of State makes regulation 
holding the captain, pilot or owner of the ship responsible for any oil and gas 
pollution that occurs from the ship. It is noteworthy that the Regulation bypasses 
whatever corporation the ship would have been registered with, to target 
particular persons who are involved with the ship. Emphasizing how seriously the 
UK seeks to deal with any such ‘relevant officer’ who fails in this duty of care to 
prevent oil pollution from a ship, Section 139 of the said Act provides that a person 
guilty of the Section 137(2) offence will, on summary conviction, be sanctioned 
by a fine not exceeding £50,000. This study appreciates the piercing of the 
corporate veil, in this instance by imposing a tough penalty on a person who might 
have caused an oil and gas pollution offence from a ship. The study further 
appreciates the penalty imposed as significant enough for a normal individual. 
 
Hence, the burden has been placed on company officials to ensure that they 
coordinate the company policies in a way that operations arising from such policy 
would portray corporate social responsibility, good corporate governance and 
commitment to environmental responsibility.189 While noting the requirement of 
                                                             
186 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
187 H. L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v T. J. Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 (CA), 172. 
188 R v St Regis Paper Co Ltd [2012] Env LR 16. [2012] 1 CR App R 14.  
189 This was highlighted in the cases of National Rivers Authority v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd [1994] 
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‘sufficient authority’ on the part of a relevant corporate officer, it is noted that 
Section 217 of the Water Resources Act finds a third party whose act or default 
contributes to the commission of the pollution, guilty of an offence. Hence, in this 
circumstance, although the third party might not necessarily be a member of the 
polluting corporation (such as oil pipeline vandals), the fact that such a third-party 
offender participated in the acts that resulted to the pollution offence is sufficient 
legal grounds for the criminal liability of the third-party polluter.   
 
B) Application of Corporate Sanctioning in the USA 
 
The application of this doctrine has not been restricted to the UK alone. It has also 
been applied in the USA regime. The USA Federal environmental laws contain 
criminal sanctions for the environmental liability of corporations operating within 
the USA.190 This statutory position has been reflected in several publicly recorded 
cases (the lack of decided cases on the prosecution of corporate environmental 
violators has been observed to be a deficiency in the Nigerian regime). A USA 
Federal case law that emphasized corporate liability for environmental crime is 
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v United States191 where the court 
held that often corporations are responsible for regulatory crimes.192 In New York 
Central, the court also noted that corporations might be penalised for the criminal 
actions of their employees (if the employee acted within the authority conferred 
by the company).193 The court noted that failing to apply criminal penalties to 
errant companies would only encourage several criminal offences in breach of 
criminal law to be unaccounted for.194 This is because it might be difficult to 
identify the actual culprits within the corporation who were responsible for 
                                                             
190 United States v Agosto-Vega 617 F.3d 541, 552-53 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
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obligations enacted to protect the public does not require a proof of mens rea to determine the guilt of the 
offender. 
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committing the criminal action.195 The court noted that what was most important 
was that the agent acted within his scope of corporate authority and that the 
corporation stood to benefit from the action of the agent that amounted to the 
criminal act.196 
 
This therefore means that the USA federal environmental criminal system has 
expanded its prosecution and sentencing scope to include ‘relevant corporate 
officers’ within a company that has been found guilty of criminal pollution.197 The 
approach evolved from the vicarious liability doctrine which  reflects the position 
that a corporate officer is liable for the acts or omissions of a company in which 
he/she had a ‘relevant share’ or ‘control’.198 Abrams commented that the phrase, 
‘relevant share’ in itself, portrays a literal interpretation of some measure of 
participation in the criminal act.199 This could be inferred to suggest accessory 
liability on the part of the offending corporate officer. Accessory liability is borne 
by a secondary party to the offence other than the principal offender.  In that 
case, the offender is responsible to the extent of his participation in the criminal 
act. Indeed, as a writer put it, “the word ‘responsible’ itself reflects some notion 
of culpability.”200 
 
Just as in the UK, a justification of a corporate officer’s ‘relevant share’ for criminal 
pollution in the USA, would rely on his extent of participation in the environmental 
crime. For this, one can observe with the aid of some decided cases, the 
prosecution and sanctioning of corporate officers who have directly participated in 
some such environmental crimes in the USA regime. These cases include: 
 
i) United States v Caldwell;201 United States v Dingus202 
In this case, Ray Caldwell (manager of All Out Sewer and Drain Services, Inc.) 
was charged with the offences of: knowingly violating the CWA by knowingly and 
illegally discharging industrial waste from the company’s pump to the publicly 
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owned treatment works (POTW) and giving a false report of the volume of sewage 
waste discharged to avoid surcharges. Caldwell was convicted on all counts of the 
charge. A prison sentence of 27 months was imposed on Caldwell, including a 
three year probation term, $250, 000 fine to be shared jointly and severally with 
the company, and $689, 219.28 in restitution to be shared jointly and severally 
with the company.203 The restitution was to be paid to the POTW, County and City. 
Dingus (the main perpetrator in the above pollution) pled guilty to the charge 
against him and was given a thirty-day prison sentence, one-year probation 
(including 60 days of electronic monitoring), a $15, 000 fine, and a requirement 
to complete 40 hours of community service.204 
 
ii) United States v Nadel & Gussman Rockies LLC.;205 United States v 
Cartaya206 
Nadel & Gussman Rockies LLC pled guilty to negligently causing the illegal 
discharge of 113 barrels of crude oil from a tank battery used by the company for 
its oil and gas operations. This was contrary to Section 1319 (c) (2) (a) of the USA 
Clean Water Act 1972. While emphasizing that a discharge of hazardous waste 
had grave implications for public health and the natural environment, the trial 
judge asserted that the CWA prohibits a discharge of hazardous substances in a 
manner that can cause harm to the environment and/or public health.207 The judge 
also stated that oil waste is a major hazardous substance and that its discharge 
has been known to cause grave environmental and public health challenges.208 
 
The corporation was sentenced to three years’ probation and ordered to pay a 
criminal penalty, a fine of $357,500. The corporation was also ordered to make a 
restitution of $430, 500 and $212, 000 to the Yellowstone Park Foundation and 
the Grand Teton National Park Foundation, respectively. The corporation was also 
instructed to implement a regulatory compliance plan.209 Cartaya (the major 
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contractor that handled the operations), pled guilty to the charges of false 
statement on documents required under CWA and was sentenced to three years’ 
probation, a fine of $10, 000 and 250 hours community service. While the study 
views the penalty imposed on the corporation as fairly substantial, the study 
argues that the penalty of the corporate officer that perpetrated the pollution is 
very small when compared to the ensuing pollution.210 
 
iii) United States v Michael H. Weitzenhoff, Thomas W. Mariani (as 
defendants-appellants)211 
The defendants-appellants were convicted of overseeing 40 separate discharges 
of waste activated sludge (WAS) directly into the ocean from the East Honolulu 
plant between April 1988 and June 1989 resulting in 436,000 pounds of pollutant 
solids being discharged into the ocean.212 This was in breach of the provision of 
s.1319 (c) (2) (A) of the CWA of 1972.213 Subject to the statutory provision, the 
offence of intentionally violating a permit limitation set for the discharge of waste 
is a felony with a criminal penalty of up to three years imprisonment. The above 
discharge violated the required 30-day average effluent limit under the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. They were also recorded 
as having instructed employees to conceal information about this pollution from 
the USA Environmental Protection Agency.214 Following an FBI investigation, the 
defendants were charged with thirty-one counts of conspiracy and substantively 
violating the CWA. The district court sentenced Weitzenhoff to 21 months and 
Mariana, 33 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgement of the lower court. This study views the penalty imposed on the 
offender as tough considering the history of sentences imposed in the previous 
cases examined above. 
 
iv) United States v Egan, et al.215 
This case involved a fatal explosion that happened in 2005 on board a petroleum 
barge owned by Egan Marine Corp., causing a discharge of 4,800 gallons of oil 
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and 32 tons of oil solids into a canal. During a bench trial in June 2014, Egan 
Marine Corp. and its captain Dennis Egan were convicted of the negligent 
discharge of oil pollution into a navigable waterway and negligent 
manslaughter.216 The judge observed that the prosecution had sufficiently 
established that the pollution was directly caused by an instruction given by 
Dennis Egan to an employee to warm a pump using a propane torch.217 It is 
notable that the liability of Dennis Egan directly arose from the instruction given 
down, to the pollution caused. Hence, Dennis Egan shared in the liability of directly 
causing the pollution, and in effect violating the Clean Water Act.218 
 
According to U.S. Attorney Zachary T. Fardon, the case served as an example to 
‘relevant corporate officers’ and corporations on what to expect when they fail to 
perform the duty of care that they owe the crew members on their vessels and 
fail to comply with environmental standards regarding pollution control.219 The 
federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois sentenced Dennis Egan to 
six months in federal prison.220 Egan Marine Corp. was sentenced to three years 
of supervised release and ordered to pay more than $5.3 million as restitution to 
the National Pollution Funds Centre for the cost it incurred towards cleaning up 
the spill.221 
 
v) United States v Barnett222 
In this case, Barnett was convicted after pleading guilty to authorising the 
discharge of waste grease and oil and making false statements to conceal the 
discharge. In his capacity as the principal agent of Denali Industries Inc. Barnett 
pled guilty to this charge and was sentenced to 48 months of probation and a 
payment of $15,000 as restitution. In this case, the trial judge also observed that 
the pollution caused by the company only occurred as a result of the direct 
instruction issued by Barnett to the company employees to effect the discharge.223 
                                                             
216 Lance Duroni, 'Barge Captain Gets 6 Mos. For Fatal Accident, Oil Spill - Law360' (LexisNexis, 2018) 
<https://www.law360.com/articles/673150/barge-captain-gets-6-mos-for-fatal-accident-oil-spill> accessed 10 
December 2018. 
217 United States v Egan Marine Corporation, Dennis Michael15 F. 2d 2477 - Court of Appeals, (7th Cir. 2016). 
218 33 U.S.C. SS 1321 (b) (3), 1319 (c) (1) (A). 
219 Lance Duroni (n.217).  
220 United States Department of Justice, 'Monthly Bulletin: Environmental Crime Section' (Justice.gov, 2018) 
<https://www.justice.gov/enrd/file/783731/download> accessed 10 December 2018. 
221 ibid. 
222 United States v Barnett No. 2:12-cr 00378-TC (2014). 
223 ibid. 
   226 
 
 
vi)  United States v Brightwell224 
In this case, Patrick Brightwell was charged with substantive CWA violations and 
permitting the negligent discharge of harmful waste into a river. While justifying 
his decision, the trial judge established that the negligent discharge of harmful 
waste by B&P Environmental LLC occurred under the direct supervision and 
authority of Patrick Brightwell (in his capacity of principal officer of a project B&P 
Environmental LLC was engaged in).  Brightwell pled guilty to each count of the 
charge and was given a prison sentence of 10 months, probation of 36 months, 
and a penalty of $270,667 as restitution to the Department of Interior Restoration 
Fund. Similarly, the guilt of Anderson (the company driver) was established in a 
separate conviction owing to his singular act of driving down the solid waste 
wrapped in plastic and dumping it into the river with another employee, ‘despite 
being knowledgeable of the content of the bags.’225 It was therefore irrelevant as 
to whether the driver actually knew the direct causes of pollution waste. Anderson 
was convicted of contributory negligence to the criminal pollution. He pled guilty 
to negligently contributing to the criminal discharge. He was sentenced to 24 
months’ probation.226 
 
Furthermore, as has been mentioned above, the liability of a corporate officer can 
arise from the fact that such “officer was in a position of control, and violation 
occurred, the officer presumably failed in his duty to prevent that violation.”227 
The case of United States v. Iverson228 nullifies any possible absolution of guilt 
that could have arisen as a result of the corporate officer’s lack of direct 
participation in the pollution act. In the case it was established that a person can 
only be regarded as a ‘relevant corporate officer’ if such a person can influence 
the company policy permitting the discharge. Hence, regardless that such an 
officer might not have directly done the act causing the discharge, the officer 
would still be found guilty of having contributed to the discharge.229 Thus, if it is 
                                                             
224 United States v Brightwell NO. 1:13-cr- 00315-JEB (2014).  
225 United States v Anderson NO. 13-cr-00046-JEB (2014). 
226 ibid. 
227 Thruxtun Hare, 'Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Negligent Violations of 
the Clean Water Act' (2018) 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 972. 
228 United States v Iverson 162 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998). 
229 Seigel L Michael, White Collar Crime: Law, Procedure, Theory, and Practice (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business 2014) p.86. 
   227 
 
proven that a corporate officer has the authority to make decisions within the 
company or is empowered to oversee the interest of the company, and he fails to 
utilise such authority to stop pollution from occurring (despite being aware of it), 
he is equally fully liable for the pollution offence. It can therefore be argued that 
just like the UK, the USA regime seeks to influence the corporate strategy and 
policies of company regarding pollution. 
 
Promoting the doctrine of corporate responsibility even further, it has been argued 
that the prosecution of corporate officials for criminal pollution achieves 
deterrence to corporate criminal pollution more than an imposition of criminal fines 
on corporations.230 This is in line with the earlier established fact that such 
corporate officers are the thinking mind of the corporation and hugely influence 
the decisions of the corporation. The deterrence is important considering that 
corporate criminal pollution often causes harm to the environment and on some 
occasions, to public health. An instance of criminal pollution caused by the criminal 
act of a corporation was the case of the Deep-water Horizon oil spill pollution of 
2010 which caused a discharge of 4.9 million barrels of crude oil and the death of 
11 persons and the injury of 17 workers.231 It is the view of this study that merely 
imposing a criminal fine for significant criminal pollution such as the Deep-water 
incident does not equate the pollution offence committed with the punishment 
meted out. Moreover, such a criminal fine becomes less relevant where the 
offender is a wealthy multinational such as BP that could easily pay the criminal 
fine (considering the profits it would usually make from its business operations).  
 
Examples of cases that have illustrated the liability and sanction of ‘responsible 
corporate officers’ by virtue of their position within the company, even when they 
have not directly caused the environmental offence include:  
 
a) United States v Lupo232 
In this case, the US government charged Hardrock Evacuating LLC and Ben Lupo 
(the owner of Hardrock Evacuating LLC) for the illegal discharge of waste water 
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containing brine and drilling mud from the company’s storage tank into a storm 
drain, severally, from November 2012 to January 2013. Lupo was particularly 
charged for failing in his duty as owner of the company, to ascertain the 
environmental standards of his company’s operations, which if done, could have 
prevented the illegal discharge. In justifying his decision, the trial judge stated “it 
is an expectation that a stakeholder be accountable to the affairs of his 
responsibility.” In this scenario, the trial court saw Lupo as having sufficient 
interest and authority in the affairs of Hardrock Evacuating LLC to have prevented 
the pollution ab initio. Thus, his liability amounted from a failure to do so. Lupo 
pled guilty and was sentenced, and given a prison sentence of 28 months and 
ordered to pay a fine of $25, 000 as a criminal penalty for the offence. 
Furthermore, the company’s employee (Goff) was charged with knowingly 
participating in effecting the discharge.233 Goff pled guilty to the offence and was 
convicted.234 He was sentenced to three years’ probation and 300 hours 
community service.235 
 
b) United States v NH Envtl. Grp.Inc.236 
Upon pleading guilty, the trial court convicted NH Envtl. Grp. Inc (which operated 
under the name Tierra Environmental and Industrial Services) and Rott (the 
company’s manager) for illegally discharging waste water into the sewage system 
(hence, violating the provision of the CWA). In the case involving Rott,237 despite 
the fact that he had not directly authorised the pollution (as this was directly 
carried out by Grad) he was still convicted. This was because the trial court 
observed that it was his duty (by virtue of his position as company manager) to 
have ensured that the operations manager acted within the statutory standards 
regulating waste discharge under US federal law. This emphasizes once more the 
expectation that US federal environmental laws expect an officer with sufficient 
authority to exercise sufficient duty of care over his company’s operations in 
preventing pollution crime. The company pled guilty to negligently discharging the 
waste water, hence violating the provision of the CWA.  
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The company was sentenced to a probation term of four years, ordered to pay a 
criminal fine of $70, 000 and ordered to pay a total of $100, 000 as restitution to 
the City of Hammond and the Hammond Sanitary District. Rott pled guilty to a 
violation of the CWA and was sentenced to two years’ probation and a $4,000 fine. 
Similarly, on two separate charge sheets, the court convicted Holmes (the 
company owner)238 and Grad (the company’s operations manager)239 for failing to 
prevent the pollution offence on the ground that by virtue of their position, they 
were ‘responsible corporate officers’ capable of influencing the pollution decision 
but rather authorized it in their capacities. Holmes pled guilty to negligently 
violating the CWA and was sentenced to four years’ probation, a $30, 000 fine and 
100 hours’ community service. Grad also pled guilty to knowingly violating the 
CWA and was sentenced to one-year probation and a $1,000 fine. 
 
These examples reflect the concerted effort by the USA environmental regime 
towards prosecuting corporate officers who have either directly participated in 
causing pollution or other officers who should have exercised the authority 
embedded within their positions to stop pollution from happening. It is however 
to be noted that this deduction has been made from a limited number of cases 
and to sufficiently adjudge the efforts of the USA regime in prosecuting 
environmental pollution crimes, one must first identify the scale of pollution 
incidents and contrast it against the overall number of prosecutions. This is a 
discussion for future studies.  
 
5.1.4 Clear Cut Enforcement Mechanisms Implemented by UK and USA 
Environmental Agencies 
This study has previously observed different forms of environmental crime in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. The study also observed that enforcement agencies 
have failed to enforce environmental standards that would prevent or compel oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria to comply with environmental principles and 
obligations. This study will therefore examine the approach adopted by the UK and 
USA enforcement agencies towards the implementation of environmental 
standards. This study will hereafter, discuss the model enforcement of 
                                                             
238 United States v Holmes NO. 2:13-cr-00140-PPS-PRC (2014). 
239 United States v Grad NO. 2:13-cr-00126-PPS-PRC (2014). 
   230 
 
environmental standards utilised by the UK and USA regimes for its oil and gas 
upstream industry.  
 
A) UK Application of Sufficient Enforcement  
 
Firstly, in the UK’s onshore oil and gas industry, Minerals Planning Authorities 
(MPA) [as part of local councils] grant planning permission for the location of any 
wells and well pads, and impose conditions to ensure that the impact on the use 
of the land is acceptable.240 The planning system controls the development and 
use of land in the public interest.241 This takes into account the effects (including 
cumulative effects) of potential pollution on health, the natural environment or 
general amenity.242  
 
In chapter 1, this study has identified the Environment Agency (EA) as a major 
environmental agency for England and Wales. The EA derives its powers of 
enforcement from the Environment Act 1995. Section1 (1) and 5 of the Act 
established the EA to prevent, minimize and even remedy environmental pollution. 
One of the expectations that arises from this requirement is that the Agency 
ensures that everybody (including corporations) take precautions against the 
illegal discharge of hazardous waste. The EA can do this by cleaning up illegal 
waste sites (at the expense of the polluter) or forcing the polluter to do so or even 
prosecuting polluting parties. The EA can also ensure that a polluter mitigates the 
effect of his pollution by cleaning up the pollution, compensating the pollution 
victims and making restitution to environmental agencies.  
 
As has been stated in chapter 1, occasional references will also be made to the 
offshore areas for the purposes of discussing environmental regulation in the 
comparative model jurisdictions of the UK and USA oil and gas industries. The 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) used to regulate the 
environmental aspects of offshore oil and gas exploration and production down to 
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decommissioning before its abolition in 2016.243 However, as a result of a 
government restructuring in 2016, the department was abolished and replaced by 
the Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy's (BEIS).244 DECC was 
responsible for the enforcement of environmental protection in the UK offshore oil 
and gas upstream and midstream sectors.245 Proponents have argued that in the 
UK regime, priority is given to environmental protection above licencing.246 Hence, 
DECC as a major enforcement agency in the UK oil and gas industry at the time 
took its environmental enforcement duties very seriously.247 DECC provided a 
guidance that required operators to possess an Environmental Management 
System (EMS) (in which a regulator can find mechanisms drafted in line with the 
environmental objectives of the OSPAR Offshore Strategy248 and aimed at 
continually improving the quality of the environment.249 This has not ended with 
the restructuring of DECC. There is clear evidence that the guidance 
recommending EMS designed to achieve the general objectives of the OSPAR 
Offshore Strategy has been continued by BEIS and Offshore Petroleum Regulator 
for Environment and Decommissioning (OPRED).250 
 
DECC also set up standards requiring all operators operating in the UK to 
implement a verified Environmental Management System (EMS), towards 
preventing pollution in the offshore oil and gas industry and ensuring that the 
operators comply with environmental statutory provisions daily.251 DECC’s 
inspection policies have become integral tools for discovering environmental 
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offenders in the UK oil and gas sector (for instance, operators that fail to maintain 
or carry out an Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (OPEP).252 Furthermore, DECC 
Environmental Inspectorate was charged with enforcing compliance of operators 
with environmental obligations.253 Enforcement by the inspectorate includes:254 
a) Ensuring that operators carry out measures towards preventing and 
remedying pollution;  
b) Complying with environmental standards regulating operations in the 
industry; and 
c) Ensuring that operators are accountable for a breach of the obligations. 
 
Records of sanction notices issued by BEIS to operators that have defaulted 
include: Statoil (UK) Limited in line with Sections 21, 23 and 24 of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974;255 BP Exploration Operating Company Limited in line 
with Regulation 13 (1) (A) of the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution 
Prevention and Control) Regulations 2005;256 and Canadian Natural Resources 
(CNR) International (UK) Limited in line with Regulation 13 (1) (A) of the Offshore 
Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations 2005.257 
 
There is also clear evidence of the dedicated sanctioning strategy of the BEIS has 
yielded some achievements in the reduction of pollution. For example, it is on 
record that in 2017 alone, there were 38 improvement notices and 6 prohibition 
notices issued against offenders by the joint efforts of the BEIS and HSE258 which 
positively impacted the environment in the following ways:  
a) Reduced minor hydro carbon release to 45 in 2017 as against the 110 it 
was in 2007;259 
b) Reduced significant hydro carbon release from 71 it was in 2016 to 23 in 
2017;260 and  
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c) Reduced major hydro carbon release from 4 in 2015 to 1 in 2017.261 
 
An important feature of the developed UK environmental regime is the properly 
regulated decommissioning system designed in line with Part IV of the Petroleum 
Act 1998. This study previously noted the poor regulation and implementation of 
sanctions on operators that fail to decommission in the Nigerian regime. The study 
has argued that this weakness is an evidence of deficiency in the Nigerian 
environmental regime. This is a different case in the UK regime. Under the regime, 
the OPRED  is empowered to enforce compliance with the decommissioning 
standard.262 By this, they ensure that operators decommission their disused 
facilities at the end of a field’s economic life.263 There is existing evidence of 
completed and existing decommissioning programmes currently being undertaken 
in the UK.264 Hence, it can be sufficiently assumed that the decommissioning policy 
in the UK is working.  
 
It is also notable that Section 40-41 of the UK Petroleum Act clearly stipulates 
sanctions in the form of fine or imprisonment which will be imposed on an offender 
that fails to comply with decommissioning standards. This study has however, 
provided no evidence that the working policy is as a result of the existing robust 
sanctions in the regulatory structure. The study however suggests the possibility 
of the robust sanctions deterring potential defaulters. This study therefore stresses 
the relevance of sanctions in ensuring environmental compliance with standards. 
Other general sanctions that can be utilised by enforcers in the UK oil and gas 
regime (as stipulated in the BEIS Offshore Oil and Gas Environment Policy) 
include: enforcement notice, improvement notice, prohibition notice, revocation 
and prosecution.265 This study therefore considers the sanctions fundamental to 
proper regulation for the standard. 
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Another pillar that has contributed to the proper regulation of decommissioning in 
the UK is public participation. In a bid to transparently regulate this standard on 
operators, OPRED publishes the decommissioning programmes and invites the 
public to comment on proposals set out in each programme.266 Also, to ensure 
effective enforcement, OPRED engages with the offshore oil and gas sector on 
decommissioning regulatory issues and makes presentation on decommissioning 
to operators and other stakeholders annually.267 The presentation is made at 
regular meetings between OPRED and Oil & Gas UK (OGUK), the oil and gas 
industry representative body.268 OGUK is usually represented by virtually all the 
active offshore operators.269 This shows evidence of public participation in the 
enforcement of this important standard.  
 
The joint effort has also clearly yielded desired results as records show that all the 
existing decommissioning programmes recorded above to have been earlier 
proposed have been completed as of 2017.270 Public participation has therefore 
made the UK decommissioning policy represent the ideas of all in industry 
participants.271 Further than the involvement of industry participants, there is a 
requirement for the inclusion of public voice in the development of 
decommissioning policy in the UK.272 This is carried out in line with Directive 
2003/35/EC on public participation (otherwise known as the Public Participation 
Directive) requiring that the public be consulted on decisions resulting to relevant 
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consents and permits for decommissioning with the reasons and considerations 
on which the decisions have been based. 273  
 
This also similar to the requirement of Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive274 for 
the European Union (EU) which provides that all projects not otherwise connected 
with management of a Special Protection Areas (SPA) or a Special Areas of 
Conservation (SAC) must first be approved through the opinion of the general 
public. Moreover, the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Conservation of Habitats) 
Regulations 2001 apply the Habitats Directive in relation to oil and gas projects 
that are carried out wholly or partly on the UK's Continental Shelf and territorial 
waters.275 Likewise, Article 68 of the Council Directive 85/337/EEC [Environmental 
Assessment]276 stipulates that: “member States shall ensure that any request for 
development consent and any information gathered pursuant to Article 5 are made 
available to the public within a reasonable time in order to give the public an 
opportunity to express an opinion before the development consent is given.” 
 
The Offshore Production and Pipelines (Assessment of Environmental Effects) 
Regulation 1999 amended in the Offshore Production and Pipelines (Assessment 
of Environmental Effects) (Amendment) Regulations 2007, implemented the 
Council Directive requiring public participation in the assessment and effects of 
certain public and private activities on the environment.277  In the same vein, the 
Marine Licensing (Pre-application Consultation) (Scotland) Regulations 2013 
require marine licence applicants intending to undertake certain marine activities 
to carry out a pre-application consultation process in Scotland.278 Such activities 
usually include large projects that have the potential for substantial impacts on 
the environment.279 The requirement allows local communities, environmental 
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groups and other interested parties to comment on any such proposed project at 
its developmental stages, even before an application for a marine licence is 
submitted.280 Hence, such activities will be subject to public pre-application 
consultation. 
 
Furthermore, this study argues that a positive way of promoting such participation 
is by first making the environmental information available and accessible. One of 
the deficiencies identified in the Nigerian regime is the lack of public access to 
information on environmental enforcement. The UK on the other hand, has 
provided legislative instruments that stipulate the requirement of access to 
environmental information. Regulations 4-5 of the UK’s Environmental 
Information Regulations (EIRs) and Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 mandate public authorities to disseminate environmental information. This 
tallies with Section 5 of the UK’s Regulators Code281 which requires enforcement 
authorities to provide clear information, guidance and advice on standards to 
regulated persons. This will facilitate compliance on the part of the regulated 
persons. Indeed, this study observed that there is in fact no provision under 
Nigerian law criminalising a failure to make such disclosures which might have 
contributed to the inaccessibility of environmental information. Whereas, 
Regulation 19 of the UK’s EIR criminalizes the act of a public authority trying to 
prevent such disclosure. 
 
Indeed, the researcher noted the open publication of the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency’s (SEPA’s) annual Performance Measurement Report (PMR) that 
reviews and measures its performance.282 Based on the 2017-2018 PMR, the 
agency had achieved the following:283 
a) Reduction of GHG emissions from 3,614 tonnes of CO2 in 2006-2007 to 
2,239 tonnes; 
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b) In 2007, the agency set a target to reduce emissions by 42% by March 
2019. The agency achieved 38% of the target; and 
c) Reducing emissions by 7.5% since 2016. 
 
The PMR is part of an Annual Operating Plan that measures its overall progress 
towards achieving the targets set by these performance measures.284 
Furthermore, under a Compliance Assessment Scheme, SEPA publishes a 
Compliance Assessment Report that shows the extent of compliance of 
companies.285 
 
It is the view of this study that publishing these reports is in line with the principle 
requiring environmental awareness. It is also compliant with the standard 
stipulated under Regulations 4-5 of the Environmental Information Regulations 
and Section 1 of the UK’s Freedom of Information Act. Moreover, the researcher 
could easily access most other information regarding information with which this 
study was formed (such as the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
reports utilised above). Publishing records on environmental enforcement enables 
the public to be aware of what the agencies established to protect their 
environment have achieved, hence participate in the process. Publishing the 
reports and making enforcement information easily accessible allow for public 
scrutiny on performance and focuses on areas that could be improved on if lacking.  
 
Between May 27, 2016 and May 26, 2017, OPRED issued five enforcement notices 
(3 pursuant to the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and 
Control) Regulations 2005 and 2 pursuant to the Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases 
Regulations 2015) and 1 improvement notice pursuant to the Offshore 
Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.) Regulations 2015.  
Such notices permit offshore installations to continue operating whilst improving 
their deficiencies.286 OPRED also completed one prosecution during the period and 
referred 3 other cases for prosecution.287 BEIS/OPRED openly publishes its 
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enforcement policy which manifests the pillar of environmental awareness and 
guarantees that enforcement actions are consistent and transparent.288 Inspectors 
from both agencies collaborate with the oil and gas industry to assist them to 
comply with the regulatory requirements.289 
 
Another major enforcement agency to be considered in this section is the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). This agency was established and its 
powers set out under Chapter II of the Environment Act 1995.290 The SEPA is 
Scotland’s principal environmental regulator.291 Its duties include: protecting and 
improving the Scottish environment and public health, ensuring that Scottish 
natural resources are utilised in a sustainable manner and that the exploitation of 
such resources contribute to the devolved region’s sustainable economic 
growth.292 Among other mechanisms, two enforcement mechanisms that have 
been utilised by the agency to enforce compliance with environmental standards 
include: referrals to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Services (COPFS) and 
the issuance of statutory notice.293 In 2014-2015 alone, SEPA made:294 36 
referrals on environmental offenders for prosecution by the COPFS295 against the 
27 it made in 2013-2014, 116 statutory notices against 93 in 2013-2014, and 
issued 141 warning letters against 137 in 2013-2014. Furthermore, in 2016–2017, 
SEPA made:296 12 referrals to COPFS as against 36 in 2014-2015; issued 120 
statutory notices as against 116 in 2014-2015; and issued 113 warning letters as 
against 141 in 2014-2015. 
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From the examination of the UK regime (Scotland), it is evident that there are 
various mechanisms (such as to referrals to the COPFS, warning letters, issuance 
of statutory notices, guidance plans, compliance initiatives, and control rules) 
utilised by the regime for its enforcement. This study particularly noted the high 
rate at which the regime has utilised referrals to the COPFS and the issuance of 
statutory notices. The study therefore believes that the enforcement regime is 
equipped with measures to make regulated persons and companies comply. This 
study is of the view that if a variety of enforcement options were provided in the 
Nigerian statutes other than just investigation and detection, there will be greater 
options through which the regulated persons in the oil and gas industry could be 
made to comply. While it must not be exactly these standards, this study is of the 
view that the UK model analysed above serve as a model for the proposed 
inclusion in the Nigerian regime giving the evidence of its success mentioned 
above. 
 
This study has earlier mentioned that regulators and enforcement authorities in 
this study refer to one and same thing. The UK government published the 
Regulators Code 2014297 (pursuant to Section 23 of the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006) as guidance for authorities while carrying out their enforcement 
activities.  Pursuant to Section 3 of the Code, enforcement authorities are advised 
to prioritise risk. If applied by Nigeria, this will help address the deficiency of lack 
of resources that has limited enforcement in the oil and gas sector. For example, 
greater resources can be allocated to the areas of oil spill detection, remediation 
and improper abandonment/lack of proper decommissioning that have been 
discovered to be major violations requiring adequate enforcement. It is also 
notable considering that the study has already established lack of resources as 
limiting enforcement in such areas, particularly remediation. In Section 3.3 of the 
Regulators Code, the enforcement authorities are guided to design a risk 
assessment framework which will enable them to allocate resources to effectively 
address priority risks. This study believes that this mechanism can be utilised by 
the Nigerian regime to make the resource allocation effective. 
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Section 6 of the Code stipulates that enforcement authorities should ensure that 
their enforcement duties are carried out transparently. In line with this, the Code 
is concluded with the assertion that the UK government wants “businesses, 
regulated bodies and citizens to challenge regulators who they believe are not 
acting in accordance with their published policies and standards.”298 Similar to the 
Code, Section 2 (a) of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 
requires that enforcement/regulatory activities must be carried out in a 
transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent manner. This stipulation 
implies that where such enforcement is short of any of these, regulated persons 
or any other person or institution is within their right to question the enforcement 
process.  
 
This study notes the non-existence of any guidance of this form in most Nigerian 
enforcement agencies. Moreover, none of the existing Nigerian environmental 
statutes make any reference to the need for transparency of the enforcement 
authorities. This study therefore, believes that if guidance codes of the UK form 
discussed here were generally existing in the Nigerian regime or even enacted 
statutes put reasonable emphasis on transparency, it would greatly minimise the 
lack of transparency in the Nigerian regime evidenced by the incidents of 
corruption mentioned in chapter 4. This is because there will be a clear statutory 
mandate against the lack of transparency going beyond corruption (in the form of 
money donations to impede enforcement). Such mandate will encompass all other 
forms of enforcement actions deemed to be non-transparent. 
 
This study has earlier noted the failure of statutory provisions in the Nigerian 
regime concerning the inability of enforcement agencies to perform. However, 
Regulation 2 of the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 stipulates that a 
Scottish Minister can include provisions compelling a regulator (also an 
enforcement agency) to enforce an existing regulatory requirement. Moreover, 
Regulation 3 (1) (a) of the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act stipulates that the 
regulator must comply with carrying out the regulatory duties required of it unless 
it lacks the capacity to do so or there is conflicting statutory requirement regarding 
the duties of the regulator. Pursuant to Regulation 3 (2), where the regulator fails 
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to comply, the Minister can declare that the regulator has failed to comply with its 
duty and/or instruct the regulator to take steps to remedy the failure. Moreover, 
in a situation whereby the regulator fails to abide by the direction, Regulation 3 
(3) (c) provides that the Minister could apply to the Court of Session for an order 
requiring the regulator to comply. In effect, while the above provisions under the 
Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act do not directly entail criminal sanctions on the 
agencies for failing to perform, this shows evidence that enforcement agencies are 
not exempted from being compelled to regulate. This study welcomes this 
mechanism as a check and balance mechanism that might have contributed to the 
effective enforcement noted in the UK regime.  
 
It is therefore without doubt that the UK has applied a commendable model of 
enforcement. This study will also examine the USA regime to determine ways in 
which it has enforced environmental standards in the oil and gas industry and 
mechanisms it has utilised to carry this out. 
 
 
B) USA Application of Sufficient Enforcement  
 
The development of conventional oil and gas reserves on USA federal lands is 
mainly governed by the Mineral Leasing Act 1920 (as amended in 1947). This 
development occur through leasing schemes mainly regulated by the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) under the Department of Interior (DOI).299 Similarly, 
Section 301 of the USA’s Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 1976 
also establish the BLM. Pursuant to Section 302 of the FLPMA, the lands utilised 
for oil and gas purpose must be managed in accordance with existing statutory 
instruments (including those relating to environmental protection). Section 303 of 
the FLPMA further stipulates that a failure to comply with this standard will result 
to the licence of the operator being suspended or terminated as the case may be. 
 
The only other agency that provides environmental enforcement in the USA 
onshore industry is the EPA.  It has been asserted that a core priority of the EPA 
is the prevention, preparation for and response to crude oil spills that occur in and 
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around the inland waters of the USA.300 Scholars have argued that EPA is the 
typical example of an agency utilising the ‘Rule Strategy’.301 The rationale for this 
strategy has been clearly documented in open web information published by the 
agency which warns that it will utilise tough enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
that individuals and companies comply with environmental standards.302 The ‘Rule 
Strategy’ is mainly reliant on enforcement rules utilised to implement 
environmental protection standards.303 Practical enforcement rules that the EPA 
has initiated to enable effective performance of their duties include: Spill 
Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC)304 and the Facility Response Plan 
(FRP) Rules.305 
 
Through the FRP rule, the EPA compels risk laden oil and gas operators to submit 
their response plan and prepare to respond to significant oil discharges or even 
the threat of a discharge.306 Through the SPCC Rules, the EPA assists the facilities 
of oil and gas corporations to prevent a discharge of crude oil into the navigable 
waters of the USA or its adjoining shorelines. The EPA has also created guidelines 
to enable a practicable implementation of its enforcement roles. For instance, in 
August 2013, the EPA revised the SPCC Guidance for Regional Inspectors.307 With 
this guidance, regional inspectors of the EPA can easily review the extent to which 
a facility has implemented the SPCC Rules. This guidance is intended to assist 
regional inspectors in reviewing a facility's implementation of the Spill Prevention, 
Control, and the EPA has also made the guidance available to operators of facilities 
that may be required to comply with the SPCC Rules as well as the general 
public.308 The EPA has also implemented an Underground Injection Control 
programme, which compels most USA states to regulate wells that have the 
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potential of discharging oil waste.309 In the same vein, the USA Coast Guard is the 
main enforcement agency required to respond to spills in coastal waters and deep 
water ports.310 
 
The EPA has also implemented the National Compliance Initiative (NCI) towards 
ensuring that operations involved during energy extraction comply with 
environmental obligations.311 The NCI advances the strategic plan of the EPA 
concerning significant public health and environmental problems caused by 
exposure to hazardous compounds and a reduction of the non-attainment of 
environmental standards.312 The plan also concerns the improvement of air 
quality, provision of clean and safe water, and improvement in compliance with 
the USA’s environmental laws.313 
 
To facilitate compliance with environmental standards, the EPA recently released 
a new compliance assistance resource for operators.314 This resource provides 
easily accessible information to assist oil and gas operators in complying with 
federal and state environmental standards.315 According to Bodine (EPA Assistant 
Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), “many small and 
medium-sized oil and natural gas owners and operators want to comply with 
environmental requirements but don’t have the expertise to fully understand 
                                                             
309 EPA, 'Distribution of Final Work Product from the National Underground Injection Control (UIC) Technical 
Workgroup- Minimizing and Managing Potential/Impacts of Injection Induced Seismicity from Class II Dis at 
Veils: Practical Approaches' (EPA 2015) <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
08/documents/induced-seismicity-201502.pdf> accessed 15 April 2019; Edith Allison and Ben Mandler, 'US 
Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations' (American Geosciences Institute 2018) 
<https://www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/factsheet/pe/regulation-oil-gas-operations> accessed 15 
April 2019. 
310 EPA (n.313).  
311 EPA, 'National Compliance Initiative: Ensuring Energy Extraction Activities Comply with Environmental 
Laws' (EPA 2019) <https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/national-compliance-initiative-ensuring-energy-
extraction-activities-comply> accessed 15 October 2019. 
312 ibid. 
313 EPA, 'EPA Announces FY 2020-2023 Priorities for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance' (EPA 2019) 
<https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-fy-2020-2023-priorities-enforcement-and-compliance-
assurance> accessed 15 October 2019. 
314 EPA, 'EPA Announces Environmental Compliance Website for the Crude Oil and Natural Gas Sector' (EPA 
2019) <https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-announces-environmental-compliance-website-crude-oil-and-
natural-gas-sector> accessed 7 October 2019. 
315 ibid. 
   244 
 
them. The portal has put much of the information they need in one place to help 
them comply.”316  
 
It has also been asserted that “a ruthless and efficient investigation and 
enforcement capability will produce compliance through the mechanism of 
deterrence”.317 In other words, the EPA has continually sought to monitor 
compliance, identify violations of existing standards under its statutory 
instruments and gather evidence on offenders which it submits to the ECS.318 In 
line with this, EPA Special Agents constantly investigate environmental offenders 
in the oil and gas industry and report offenders for prosecution.319 The special 
agents in charge of investigation are the EPA's Criminal Investigation Division (EPA 
CID) Special Agents.320 It is asserted that the agents receive eight weeks of basic 
federal law enforcement and Criminal Investigator training at a Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Centre.321 Such agents are highly trained at investigations 
related to air, water, and land resources.322 They are made up of scientists, 
technicians and even lawyers, hence the agency possess diverse backgrounds and 
rich work experience.323 
 
The EPA has further asserted that it carries out ‘environmental forensic analyses’ 
and ‘technical evaluations’ to facilitate criminal enforcement.324 The EPA has also 
carried out environmental forensics for its programmes through the National 
Enforcement Investigation Centre (NEIC).325  This role of the NEIC supports 
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complex criminal and civil enforcement investigation and programmes.326 The 
NEIC also serves the EPA’s fully accredited ISO 17025 forensics laboratory and 
provides multi-disciplinary expert teams to conduct field investigations, gather 
and evaluate evidence to determine non-compliance.327 The agency also gathers, 
retrieves and evaluates computer evidence of offences for prosecution.328 The EPA 
often times, provides expert technical advice to the ECS and other US Attorneys 
who prosecute under the DOJ on environmental matters.329 Based on past records 
of investigations,330 writers have observed that EPA Agents are distinctively 
adversarial and confrontational  when the agency detects violation of 
environmental standards.331 
 
Some such investigations that have yielded positive results in the USA regime 
include: the investigation into Wood Group PSN Inc. which resulted in the 
corporation being ordered to pay $9.5 million on February 23, 2017, for their 
involvement in the Deep Water Horizon spill on the Gulf of Mexico;332the 
investigation into the International Petroleum Corporation of Delaware 
(IPC) which led to the company being ordered on February 2, 2017, to pay a 
criminal fine of $1,300,000 fine and $2,200,000 as restitution to the City of 
Wilmington for environmental crimes, including a conspiracy to violate the Clean 
Water Act;333 and the investigation into KMTEX, KTX, Crosby and Ramsey which 
led to the companies being ordered on October 12, 2017, to pay $3.5 million 
dollars for criminal violations of the Clean Air Act by negligently releasing 
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hazardous air pollutants after a tank explosion at their chemical and petroleum 
processing facility in Port Arthur, Texas, on March 31, 2011.334 
 
Indeed, utilising only the BLM and EPA for discussion on environmental 
enforcement in the USA regime provides very limited example of environmental 
enforcement in the USA. This is significant considering that the USA is used as a 
model regime in this study. The study will therefore, also explore environmental 
enforcement in the USA offshore industry (comprising of the Outer Continental 
Shelf [OCS]). In line with this, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE) which is also part of the DOI serves as a major environmental 
compliance enforcement division in the OCS.335 In this capacity, their roles include 
the monitoring, verification, improvement and enforcement of compliance 
standards for environmental matters in the OCS.336 The standards include, but are 
not limited to, provisions of environmental laws and regulations as well as 
conditions imposed on OCS licences and permits.337 It has been reported that the 
agency has mainly enforced compliance of industry participants with the National 
Environmental Protection Act by monitoring the activities of such corporations to 
ensure they were in line with the provisions of the Act.338  The BSEE has also 
established mechanisms to enable them carry out their enforcement task 
effectively. For instance, in 2016, the BSEE assembled an Environmental 
Stewardship Core Working Group to clarify its environmental stewardship ambition 
and mission and build its current programme objectives and responsibilities 
towards enhancing its environmental stewardship.339 
 
Just like the EPA, the BSEE has gone beyond a paper obligation to enforcing 
environmental standards in the USA regime. For instance, the BSEE has 
implemented Well Control Rules to serve as pollution control standards during 
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drilling operations on the OCS.340 They have also implemented the Oil and Gas 
Production Safety Systems Rules to serve as pollution control standards during oil 
and gas production.341 Subject to executive342 and secretarial343 orders for the 
minimisation of avoidable regulatory strain on industry participants, the agency 
has revised the Well Control Rules344 and the Oil and Gas Production Safety 
Systems Rules345 towards ensuring that while the regulatory burden does not 
strain the participants, it compels them to carry out their operations in an 
environmentally friendly manner.346 The agency has gone beyond investigation to 
issue recommendations on best practice mechanisms that can enhance 
environmental safety during oil and gas operations.347 
The Deepwater Horizon pollution has served as a lesson that safety and 
environmental protection required during workflow processes cannot be 
ignored.348 This led to the formulation of the Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems (SEMS) rules (otherwise referred to as the Workplace 
Safety Rules which was issued in October 2010).349 This original SEMS concerned 
all offshore oil and gas operations in federal waters and mandated the previously 
voluntary practices in the API Recommended Practice 75 which establishes 
environmental and safety standard issues.350 This has been enhanced by the SEMS 
II final rule which has provided greater protection by additionally providing 
employee training, and strengthening auditing procedures by requiring it to be 
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completed by independent third parties.351 It will also enhance the environmental 
protection of offshore oil and gas drilling operations.352 The SEMS II Final Rules 
has revised and added several new requirements to the existing regulations for 
the original SEMS.353 Operators were required to integrate these new requirements 
into all SEMS programme existing before September 14, 2011.354 One such 
important requirement is the establishment of guidelines for reporting possible 
violations of safety and environmental regulations directly to BSEE and mandating 
the BSEE to act on such reports.355 Other such requirements include: enhanced 
well design, improved blowout preventer design, testing and maintenance, and an 
increased number of trained inspectors.356 
 
Moreover, this research observed that due to the robust mechanism of 
enforcement in the regime, there is cooperation between the agency and other 
offshore operation regulators. This was evident in the acceptance and 
implementation of the recommendations made by the BSEE regarding 
environmental safety during operations, by the offshore operation regulators.357 
It is therefore not in doubt that enforcement agencies in the USA have been active 
in implementing environmental standards in the USA oil and gas industry.  
 
5.1.5 Applying Criminal Sanctions through Criminal Prosecution 
As earlier observed, there is an obvious lack of prosecution and sentencing of 
environmental offenders in Nigeria. This is interesting, considering the significant 
environmental offences that has been committed in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. The study also identified factors that have contributed to the deficient 
prosecution of environmental offenders in the Nigerian regime. This section will 
therefore, determine (through and examination of the UK and USA regimes) that 
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can be adapted to the Nigerian regime to facilitate improved criminal prosecution 
of environmental offences.  
 
5.1.5.1 Availability of Multiple Expert Prosecutors 
As has been observed, in Nigeria all criminal prosecutions at the Federal level 
(including environmental offences in the oil and gas industry) are carried out by 
the Attorney-General of the Federation or other statutorily designated members 
of his department. This study has particularly argued that they often lacked the 
required skill and expertise to prosecute environmental offences.  
 
A) UK Utilisation of Multiple Expert Prosecutors 
 
On the other hand, some environmental enforcement agencies are permitted to 
prosecute in the UK. This is with the exception of Scotland in which the agencies 
cannot start prosecutions themselves but must go through COPFS (as had been 
mentioned above). For example, Section 54 of the UK’s Environment Act 1995 
stipulates that the Environment Agency through its designates can prosecute 
environmental offences. This solves the deficiency of specialisation since the 
agency itself is the relevant regulatory body that enforces the standards and by 
such detects the offenders. The study will explore into the role of environmental 
prosecutors in Scotland to emphasise the availability, commitment and timeliness 
of environmental crime prosecution in Scotland.  
 
As has been earlier mentioned in this chapter, SEPA works with the COPFS to 
improve the prosecution of environmental crime in Scotland.358 To achieve the 
best outcome on reports of environmental crime by SEPA, the Crown Office and 
COPFS and SEPA ensure  effective liaison between the organs.359 One such 
framework that has facilitated the liaison is the Environmental Crime Protocol 
which has been developed to ensure transparency in the relationship between 
COPFS and SEPA and that environmental cases are being dealt with in the most 
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effective and consistent way.360 In addition, the protocol covers liaison 
arrangements at national and local level and joint training as well as disclosure 
and publicity.361  
 
COPFS is divided into 11 regions; each region has nominated at least one 
Procurator Fiscal Depute to specialise in SEPA cases (Area Specialist).362 To ensure 
transparency in the reporting of cases and subsequent attention to the case by 
COPFS, it has been asserted that where the Reporting Solicitor has any concerns 
about a case they are usually entitled to discuss the concerns as early as possible 
with the Area Specialist (or allocated Procurator Fiscal Depute), often through a 
case conference.363 SEPA’s target is to report 90% of cases within six (or four) 
months of the date of the incident towards preventing undue delays in 
investigations and reporting.364 It is however noteworthy that technically complex 
investigations, especially those requiring specialist evidence, may take longer 
(being six months or more).365 For significant cases, or at the request of either 
party, a post-disposal assessment meeting may be called to learn lessons for the 
future. Any learning can be reported back to the SEPA/COPFS national or local 
liaison meetings.366 
 
B) USA Utilisation of Multiple Expert Prosecutors 
 
Likewise, the solution to the deficiency of specialisation and availability of 
prosecutors is inspired in the USA regime. In the USA, criminal prosecutions are 
generally carried out by the Department of Justice (DOJ).367 Under the DOJ, the 
duty of prosecution against environmental offenders (including environmental 
offenders in the oil and gas industry) is coordinated by the Environmental Crimes 
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Section (ECS).368 It is asserted that there are forty three prosecutors and twelve 
support staff to carry out the prosecution on behalf of the department against 
environmental offenders.369 ECS attorneys prosecute environmental criminal cases 
throughout ninety-four federal judicial districts in coordination with the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD) and the USA Attorneys’ 
Offices (with a select number of Assistant USA Attorneys vastly trained by the ECS 
in environmental criminal prosecution).370  The prosecution process will often 
involve an ECS prosecutor participating in the investigation of an environmental 
crime and subsequently arraigning the environmental offender before the grand 
jury for indictment.371 After indictment, the ECS prosecutor then prepares the 
charge for trial.372  
 
Furthermore, special agents within EPA's Criminal Investigation Division 
coordinate with the ECS and the other prosecutor agencies listed above to 
investigate environmental offences. To achieve this efficiently, they jointly 
constitute a body referred to as the Environmental Crime Task Force Teams for 
most such environmental criminal offences they deal with.373 Through this team, 
the various agencies seating on the team collaborate on strategies and share 
information to improve the detection and prosecution of environmental crime and 
to deter such crime before it happens.374 
 
Indeed, the above discussion presents a solution to the deficiency of the limited 
number of persons to prosecute clearly obvious in the Nigerian regime and that 
has limited the proportion of environmental criminal prosecution in the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry to the barest minimum. In chapter 4, this study has observed 
that the Attorney General of the Federation of Nigeria is sometimes unable to 
prosecute probably as a result of unwillingness to prosecute on account of corrupt 
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motives or as a result of burden of prosecuting several criminal offences (other 
than just environmental offence relating to the oil and gas sector). On the other 
hand, this study observes several agencies charged with prosecution of 
environmental offences in the USA regime, which eases the burden of prosecution. 
This provides several avenues to prosecution other than just concentration on one 
single office. 
 
Furthermore, this study argues that by utilising specialised agencies like the ENRD 
and ECS, the USA regime has incorporated specialisation which will enhance the 
effective prosecution of environmental criminal matters. This study views this as 
more efficient than the Nigerian system considering that the Attorney General of 
the Nigerian Federation or members of his department might possibly lack the 
environmental expertise required to prosecute environmental criminal matters. It 
is on record that between October 1, 1998 and September 30, 2014, the ECS 
alone has prosecuted over 1,083 individuals and 404 corporate defendants, 
resulting in 774 years of incarceration and $825 million in criminal fines and 
restitution.375 Their cases have set the modern standards for natural resources 
damages (NRD) and funding for ecological restoration.376 This is not surprising 
considering some of the prosecutions resulting in tough sentences in the oil and 
gas industry alone discussed above.  
 
The analysis shows evidence of a reasonable willingness to prosecute 
environmental offences in the industry under the USA regime (that is clearly 
lacking in the Nigerian regime). The case law also shows evidence of the practical 
implementation of the criminal sanctions embedded within the USA regime 
through prosecutions. Similarly, based on the case law examples observe in the 
USA regime as seen above, this study argues that the message would have been 
driven home that responsible corporate officers must tirelessly work towards 
preventing any form of environmental crime, or else they could be prosecuted and 
sanctioned for their actions or omission to act. 
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5.1.5.2 Availability of Environmental Courts 
This study also pointed out the clogging of the Federal High Courts (FHC) and the 
possible inexperience of the FHC to properly decide on environmental criminal 
matters to be a contributory factor to the delay in prosecution of environmental 
offences in the Nigerian regime. There have been calls for a unified establishment 
of environmental courts or tribunals in the USA.377  It is believed that there are 
over 1,200 Environmental Courts and Tribunals (ECTs) in 44 countries at their 
national or state/provincial level with 20 more countries planning to establish 
theirs.378 It is argued that this continuing increase in ECTs has been facilitated by 
the development of new national laws and policies, the acknowledgement of the 
relationship between human rights and environmental protection, the challenge of 
climate change, and dissatisfaction with the existing judicial system for the 
adjudicating environmental offences.379  
 
Environmental matters and the legal and policy responses to them demand some 
degree of specialist knowledge.380 It has been observed that ECTs are often 
specialised in the area of environmental matters.381 In effect, judges and other 
ECT members need to be educated and acclimatised to environmental matters and 
the legal and public response to such matters. The environmental education ought 
to have been done even before the judges and ECT members are appointed.382 
 
Scholars have argued in favour of ECTs. To some, environmental courts provide a 
solid binding forum for resolving environmental disputes383 and would enable 
efficient environmental adjudication and judicial expertise in trying complex 
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environmental offences.384 In addition, it has been asserted that in some 
jurisdictions like Australia, ECTs provide a devolved and more accessible forum to 
hear and learn the environmental challenges of rural inhabitants who otherwise 
would not want to come to regular courts.385 In effect, such specialised courts 
provide full access rights for persons who have suffered environmental harm. 
Indeed, this fits part of the purpose of environmental justice as stipulated in the 
Aarhus Convention (which has been discussed in chapter 2 above). 
 
Firstly, this study will not be utilising the UK as a case study for its exploration of 
well-developed environmental court systems. This is because the two regions of 
the UK jurisdiction used as case study for the UK in this study (being England and 
Scotland)386 are still developing their environmental court models. In England, the 
First-Tier Tribunal (Environment) was established under Section 3 of the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. It was established to receive appeals against 
civil sanctions issued by the Environment Agency, Natural England or any other 
regulator.387 Subsequently in 2011, the UK government started the process of 
transferring a broad range of administrative appeals under environmental 
legislation scattered amongst several bodies, to the tribunal based on a report 
titled “consistency and effectiveness–strengthening the new environment tribunal” 
commissioned by Professor Macroy.388 While this transfer has long since been 
completed, there is still a broad range of environmental issues the tribunal fails to 
cover such as environmental criminal offences.389 
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In the same vein, Scotland’s sheriff courts adjudicate on certain civil390 and 
criminal391 environmental matters.392 Furthermore, the sheriff court can adjudicate 
on certain statutory appeals relating to the environment.393 However, it has been 
argued that the adjudication of environmental matters in the Sheriff court is 
usually not comprehensive and coherent.394 Cowan argued that Scotland needs an 
environmental court with simplified procedures and a broad jurisdiction covering 
civil cases, criminal cases and administrative appeals.395 
 
The above factors therefore will inspire this study to explore other jurisdictions 
that have possibly developed a better system of ECTs. To adequately analyse 
possible factors that will contribute to the success of ECT in Nigeria, this study will 
expand its scope of comparative study (regarding this subject) to other models of 
ECTs including: New South Wales in Australia, New Zealand and the states in the 
USA that have developed such specialised courts. The study believes that the 
characteristics of the models of ECTs utilised in this section cover most of the 
advantages of a modern ECT. The study has however, utilised the USA model to 
show the trial system for ECT that can be applied by Nigeria. This determination 
will be utilised by the study in its recommendation to the Nigerian regime 
regarding the adoption of an environmental court. The recommendations for the 
Nigerian regime will however be made in the recommendation section of this 
study. 
 
A) State of New South Wales, Australia  
 
This jurisdiction has set up the New South Wales Land and Environment Court 
(NSWLEC) universally regarded as one of the best and most independent ECTs as 
it has comprehensive and exclusive jurisdiction over both civil and criminal 
environmental, land use planning and development matters.396 In the same vein, 
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the NSWLEC of Australia has been recognized as one of the most innovative ECTs 
and it advises other ECTs around the world.397 Some such innovations include:398 
i) Provision for court evaluation of environmental disputes;  
ii) Provision of an Online Sentencing Data Base for environmental criminal 
offences that enables environmental judges easily access statistics and 
commentary on sentences;  
iii) Utilisation of expert commissioners who continually train judges and 
other judicial staff on environmental matters; 
iv) Evaluation of an ECT on the extent of development and make 
recommendations to the Chief Judge for improvement initiatives; 
v)  Adoption of a ‘multi-door courthouse’ that provides complainants with 
access to other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms other 
than litigation; 
vi) Facilitation of response to restorative justice that compel perpetrators of 
environmental crime to remediate the environment. 
 
It has been noted that a contributor to inadequate prosecution of environmental 
offences in Nigeria is the possible lack of judges with specialist knowledge and 
expertise. On the other hand, Section 12(2) of the Land and Environment Court 
Act 1979 of New South Wales mandates that judges and commissioners must 
possess among others, relevant environmental qualifications, and knowledge of 
the subject of environmental protection and assessment.  In effect, the judges 
and commissioners are well trained in these subjects even before being appointed 
to their positions. 
 
It has also been asserted that the NSWLEC’s innovation has contributed to the 
facilitation of easy access to environmental justice in Australia by delimiting the 
challenges to environmental public interest litigation.399 It has achieved this by 
attempting to be liberal with construing requirements on the locus standi of private 
persons to prosecute environmental criminal matters400 and not necessarily 
requiring a public interest litigant to lodge security for the costs of such 
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environmental litigation.401 Indeed, regarding public interest litigation, the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines has also encouraged the easy litigation of 
environmental criminal matters by private persons.402 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the prime purpose of every ECT should be a 
just, quick and cheap adjudication of environmental litigations.403 This is a 
challenge that has been pointed out by this study as being possibly present under 
the current adjudication of environmental matters relating to the oil and gas 
industry in the Nigerian FHC. On the other hand, the NSWLEC has reduced delay 
in environmental adjudication by applying efficient case management.404 Case 
management relates to a series of policies, processes and technologies designed 
to achieve the just, quick and cheap adjudication of litigation.405 Such policies 
might include court rules and practice notes on dispute resolution processes from 
filing to finalization.406 The NSWLEC has applied a separate case management 
process for each peculiar environmental dispute.407 
 
Processes that have been applied by the NSWLEC in the past include but are not 
limited to:408  direction hearings before judges and commissioners to set a timeline 
regarding the particular litigation for the filing of applications, documents and 
evidence; facilitating document and information exchange between the parties 
through interlocutory applications; adopting case management conferences; and 
facilitating case evaluations by the court to assure that the cases are being 
adjudicated in a timely manner and that the deadlines for the adjudication process 
are adhered to. To achieve this, the court has utilised case management 
technologies such as a comprehensive and current court website providing all 
necessary information for parties; electronic filing and processing; 
teleconferencing and videoconferencing for hearings and taking evidence; and 
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computer data management systems to track the status, progress and deadlines 
for each case.409 
 
It has also been observed that the NSWLEC has been at the forefront of developing 
environmental jurisprudence as a result of the large number of cases it deliberates 
on relating to matters of substantive, procedural, distributive and restorative 
justice.410 Even more, the NSWLEC has shown willingness to incorporate the 
developed aspects of other jurisdictions such as the USA, New Zealand, the UK, 
and the International Court of Justice in developing its own model. An example of 
this is seen in the Australian case of Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire 
Council,411 whereby the NSWLEC referred to the judicial decisions relating to the 
interpretation of the precautionary principle in other jurisdictions such as: the 
European Court of Justice, the courts of New Zealand, India, the United Kingdom, 
USA, and Pakistan, as well as the International Court of Justice (It is however 
notable that this principle was not a basis of the facts of the case).412 Moreover, 
decisions of the NSWLEC have, in turn, been cited by several overseas 
environmental scholars towards developing their environmental law and policy.413 
In other words, this can be utilised by other jurisdictions seeking to improve 
theirs.414 This has particularly informed the comparative analysis of this model by 
this study.  
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B) New Zealand 
 
This jurisdiction has set up what is regarded as one of the best ECTs globally.415 
The ECT comprises 9 law-trained environment judges and 15 environment 
commissioners. These judges and commissioners are vastly trained in 
environmental matters.416 The ECT serves the entire country with three registries 
in different parts which allows the ECT to consistently provide environmental 
justice to all its citizens.417 
 
The ECT is permitted to regulate its litigation proceedings as it deems appropriate 
without any recourse to general court rules or procedure of tendering evidence.418 
Furthermore, the ECT judges and their staff are known to make use of information 
technology mechanisms such as the use of iPads to track case materials, an 
interactive website communicating updated case decisions regularly, and 
exploring the possibilities of an e-filing process in starting environmental case 
proceedings.419 
 
C) States in the USA 
 
Pursuant to USA environmental law, Congress directed the President of the USA 
through the Attorney-General to consider the possibility of establishing a Federal 
environmental court.420 Section 9 of the CWA stipulates that “the President, acting 
through the Attorney General, shall make a full and complete investigation and 
study of the feasibility of establishing a separate court or court system, having 
jurisdiction over environmental matters and shall report the results of such 
investigation and study together with his recommendations to Congress not later 
than one year after the date of enactment of this Act.”  By virtue of this provision, 
subsequent environmental courts and tribunals that have been established in the 
USA include: the Vermont Superior Court Environmental Division, local courts such 
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as the Tennessee Environmental Courts, and administrative tribunals such as the 
US EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board.421 In particular, the Hawaii environmental 
courts were set up, pursuant to Act 218, Session Laws of Hawaii 2014.422 The 
court which started operations on July 1, 2015 tries both civil and criminal matters 
relating to the environment.423 
 
Although the ECTs in both Vermont and Hawaii have both civil and criminal 
jurisdiction, this is still limited as efforts to incorporate law and policy on land use 
as part of their scope was rejected in Congress.424 In any case, appeals from the 
ECTs still head to the general courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of the USA, 
thus limiting the enforceability of its environmental decisions.425 While this view 
has not been expressed elsewhere, this study has discussed the USA ECTs in these 
individual states (rather than a national ECT) to show evidence that as a first step, 
countries with significant barriers to ECTs or even without any ECT (such as 
Nigeria) might consider establishing it in sample states in the country with 
significant environmental challenges and utilise the experiences to apply it 
nationally.  
 
5.1.6 Presence of Environmental Watchdog on Agencies 
This study also observed the lack of environmental watchdog in the Nigerian 
regime. This lack is made notable by the apparent non-performance of the 
environmental enforcement agencies in the regime. In contrast, the UK regime 
have not only allocated duties and functions to enforcement agencies but have 
also established watchdog organisations to monitor the commitment and 
performance of the agencies. The regime has utilised the European Commission 
and European Environment Agency (ECEEA) as watchdog organisations to monitor 
the extent to which enforcement agencies comply with their duties.426 Hence, they 
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provide strategic oversight over the agencies and make periodic reports on the 
commitment to Parliament.427 
 
Subsequent to Brexit, the Environmental Audit Committee has recommended the 
creation of an Environmental Enforcement and Audit Office (EEAO)-modelled on 
the National Audit Office (NAO) as an independent oversight body that will take 
over the monitoring role.428 The EEAO is meant to ensure that ensure that the 
governance, enforcement, oversight and policy functions are not lost upon leaving 
the European Union.429 It was recommended that the government fund the 
environmental role of the organisation from several sources such as EU funds, 
urban funds, private investment, net gain and nature capital.430 Also, the 
Environmental Audit Committee recommended that the Office for Environmental 
Protection (OEP) should be created to hold the government accountable for 
environmental protection and ensure that the targets of the regime on 
environmental preservation were met.431  
 
In 2018, Andrew Goddard responded to the government's consultation on 
environmental principles and accountability for the environment by asserting that: 
“For the government to deliver a green Brexit, it is imperative that oversight and 
enforcement are maintained upon the UK’s exit from the EU.”432 Relating this to 
the Nigerian regime, it is important that a body be established to carry out 
oversight over the enforcement role of its environmental enforcement agencies 
especially considering the apparent current failure of the agencies to enforce 
properly. In addition, Goddard observed that the new environmental watchdog 
should be independent and accountable to parliament only.433 He also suggested 
that the watchdog should be supported by the necessary expertise and funds to 
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carry out its duties.434 In line with this suggestion, this study will subsequently 
recommend the establishment of similar environmental watchdog  to the Nigerian 
regime considering the possibility that some of the existing enforcement agencies 
in the regime might be fully controlled by the Nigerian government. This study will 
further recommend that sufficient funds be provided for any future watchdog 
established in the Nigerian regime, and indeed all other environmental agencies 
in the regime in line with enforcement objectives.  
 
Regarding the provision of sufficient of funds, this study will explore the USA 
application of funding for its agencies. The USA regime has shown commitment to 
the effective funding of environmental agencies in the industry. For instance, the 
total FY budget for the BSEE in 2017 was an estimated $205 million.435 Out of this 
budget, a total of $189,968,000 was allocated to operations, safety and 
environmental enforcement.436 The FY 2014 -2018 DOI Strategic Plan, in 
compliance with the principles of the Government Performance and Results 
(GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010, stipulates mission objectives, goals, strategies, 
and corresponding metrics that collectively make up an integrated and focused 
approach for accessing performance of agencies under the DOI across the wide 
range of DOI programmes.437 Indeed, this strategic plan is the foundational 
structure for planning the FY 2017 Budget for the BSEE (that is part of the DOI).438 
The budgetary allocation stated above is in line with the strategic plan of the 
agency and has been tailored to achieve the environmental enforcement aims and 
objectives of the BSEE.  
 
Similarly, an enacted budget of $8,849,488,000 was provided for the EPA in 2019 
as against $8,824,488,000 in 2018 and $8,058,488,000 in 2017.439 It is notable 
that these budgetary funds are tied to the enforcement target objectives of the 
agency and the USA regime has also provided an accessible platform to measure 
the attainment of such objectives in line with the budgetary allocation that has 
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been provided each year.440 For instance, in line with the budget, the EPA met its 
2018 target to accelerate the pace of clean-ups and return sites to beneficial use 
in their communities.441 The EPA returned 51 Superfund sites to become ready for 
anticipated use (RAU) in line with the FY 2018 target, and exceeded the brownfield 
target of 684 by making 861 brownfields sites RAU.442 In line with the FY-2019 
Budget, the agency further seeks to make an additional 102 Superfund sites and 
1,368 brownfield sites RAU by September 30, 2019.443 Furthermore, although 
there is incomplete data regarding the extent to which the EPA increased 
environmental law compliance rate in line with the FY-2018 Budget, the agency 
(in line with the FY-2019 Budget) seeks to increase compliance with the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) by 
reducing the percentage of permittees who are presently not complying from a 
baseline of 24% to 21% by September 30, 2019.444 From the above analysis, it is 
evident that the USA environmental enforcement agencies are adequately 
provided with funds to carry out their roles unlike the Nigeria regime. 
 
5.1.7 Harmonized Environmental Provisions 
Previously, oil spills in the USA were regulated under different environmental 
statutes. Some of these statutes include: The Limitation of Liability Act 1851 which 
made vessel owners liable for all costs related to pollution from their vessels up 
to the post incident value of the vessel.445 However, the position of the Limitation 
of Liability Act on financial liability for oil spill changed after the Torrey Canyon 
incident in the English Channel in 1967.446 Out of the $8 million clean-up cost, the 
Torrey Canyon was only held liable for $50 under the Limitation of Liability Act, 
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simply because that was the value of the only surviving lifeboat after the 
incident.447 
 
Barely two years after the Torrey Canyon spill, there was another spill in the Santa 
Barbara Channel.448 These successive spills compelled the US Congress to enact 
environmental statutes on different aspects of oil spill liability.449 Some of these 
statutes included the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 1973,450 the 
Deepwater Port Act 1974,451 the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act 1978,452 Port 
and the Waterways Safety Act 1972.453 However, the most significant oil spill 
statute at the time was the Federal Water Pollution Act 1965454 (now the CWA 
1972) which imposed a penalty of up to $250, 000 on vessels that spill crude oil 
into US waters.  
 
After the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989 in which approximately 11 million gallons of 
crude oil were discharged, the Alaska Oil Spill Commission in 1989 was formed to 
examine the causes of the spill and issue recommendations on potential policy 
changes.455 The Commission issued 52 recommendations for legislative 
improvements,456 fifty of which were eventually worked into the Oil Pollution Act 
1990. This Act regulates all aspects of oil spills and the attendant liabilities.457 
Section 1002 (a) of the Oil Pollution Act defines who a responsible party is, 
provides for the enforcement of the clean-up of affected sites, and assigns cost 
liability for such clean-up to the offender who had been found liable. Section 1004 
sets a compensation liability for tanker vessels larger than 3,000 gross tons at 
$10 million. Similarly, under this provision, responsible parties who have caused 
pollution in onshore facilities are liable for up to $350 million clean-up cost per 
spill; while holders of leases or permits for offshore facilities, except deep water 
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ports, are liable for up to $75 million per spill. These unified provisions on all 
aspects of clean-up of pollution spill in the USA is codified in the USA’s Oil Pollution 
Act. On the contrary, the study has established in section 4.2.2 that there seem 
to be different provisions and frameworks regarding enforcement of clean-up from 
the NOSDRA Act, the Minerals and Mining Act and the EGASPIN. Moreover, there 
seem to be duplicity in the roles of the NOSDRA and the DPR regarding the 
enforcement of clean-up.  
 
This study argues that this confusion could be easily resolved if all aspects of 
enforcement regarding environmental standards such as clean-up were codified in 
respective single documents or the provisions in separate documents were 
harmonised to complement each other. Regarding the seeming disorganisation of 
the Nigerian agency NOSDRA certifying sites wrongly alleged by companies to 
have been completed without verifying from the DPR that it has been done up to 
standard, this study recommend the enactment of a statutory provision such as 
Section 4 of the UK’s Regulators Code458 which stipulates that the authorities 
secure mechanisms to share information with each other concerning their 
regulatory/enforcement activities which will invariably help target their resources 
and activities and reduce the confusion that can arise from duplicated 
enforcement. This will encourage internal distribution of tasks and sharing of data 
between the agencies. 
 
The study has studied the UK and USA regimes and identified exemplary aspects 
of the regimes (concerning sanctioning and administrative enforcement) that can 
be adapted by the Nigerian regime. This study will utilise the identified examples 
as models with which it will recommend solutions to the failing Nigerian regime.  
 
  
                                                             
458 Department for Business Innovation and Skills (n.283).  




This study has identified deficiencies contributing to the poor regulation of 
environmental standards in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Some such 
deficiencies include:  
i) weak environmental criminal sanctions which fail to adequately punish 
offenders and deter future commission of the environmental criminal 
act.  
 
ii) penalties that fail to rehabilitate offenders and are not proportionate with 
the environmental crime committed.  
 
iii) absence of criminal prosecutions for environmental offences. This has 
been identified to be caused by 
a)  the corruption of the police force limiting detection of environmental 
crime; 
b) lack of will of the Attorney-General of the Federation to prosecute 
environmental offences relating to the oil and gas industry; 
c) inadequacy of the Federal High Court in trying Environmental 
offences; 
d)  absence of public interest litigation in the regime, heavy Standard 
of Proof required for the prosecution to prove their case against 
environmental offenders;  
 
iv) inadequate enforcement of environmental standards caused by failure 
of establishment statutes to provide other enforcement mechanisms, 
conflicting provisions on the enforcement of clean-up obligation, 
negligence of the agencies to perform, lack of technological and scientific 
resources, manpower and funding to enforcement agencies, absence of 
an environmental watchdog and penal sanctions for agencies for failing 
to perform, and lack of political will to regulate the environment and the 
   267 
 
confusion of the NESREA (Establishment) Act regarding environmental 
enforcement in the oil and gas industry.  
 
From the analysis above, it is obvious that the UK and USA regimes have aspects 
of criminal sanctioning and enforcement that are better developed than the 
Nigerian regime. Based on this analysis, such aspects can be applied to some of 
the deficient areas of the Nigerian regime to correct the defectiveness of the 
Nigerian regime as it concerns the oil and gas industry.  This study will suggest 
the application of such developed aspects through the means of 
recommendations. In addition, the study will recommend other possible 
mechanisms (in the form of rules or systems) that might not have been discovered 
from the comparator regimes, but will present a solution to the deficiencies of the 
Nigerian regime.  
 
6.1 Recommendations 
This study will make recommendations towards the development of the Nigerian 
regime (mostly based on the argument drawn out of the study carried out of the 
UK and the USA regimes). Indeed, most of the recommendations address aspects 
of Nigerian environmental criminal laws and enforcement systems that need to be 
improved. To this effect, it could necessitate the repeal of existing laws and 
enactment of new laws covering the environmental subject or the amendment of 
the provisions in the existing laws regarding the subject. Moreover, this study 
understands that correction does not happen in one day. This is because in some 
circumstances, the process of correction might be rigid, gradual and could linger. 
Nevertheless, if commenced and sustained, it will eventually be actualised. It is a 
gradual process that takes time, if sustained. The list of recommendations that 
can be adapted to the Nigerian regime (in light of the comparative study) to 
present a solution to its existing deficiencies include: 
6.1.1. Strengthening the Enforcement of Environmental Standards 
This study argues that a strong, committed and proper enforcement of 
environmental standards will contribute to environmental protection in the 
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Nigerian regime. However, certain factors have to be set in place for this to occur.  
Considering such factors, this study recommends that: 
i) There should be a proactive approach and willingness on the part of 
enforcement agencies to carry out their duties. This study has examined 
approaches of enforcement utilised by the USA and UK and discovered 
the active involvement of the agencies in carrying out their roles. From 
the UK and USA analysis above, there is a clear commitment to enforce 
on the part of the agencies. This is evidenced in the transparency with 
which the enforcement records and compliance rates have been 
published. This recommendation therefore appeals to the consciousness 
of duty on the part of the enforcement agencies.  
 
ii) The regime should give adequate attention to tackling corruption among 
enforcement agencies. Indeed, this study had earlier observed that 
Section 19 (a) (11) of the Independent Corrupt Practices Act 2000 
stipulates a penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment without option to a fine for 
any public officer that uses his/her position for personal undue 
advantage. The enforcement agencies as set up by federal law are also 
public officers, hence should be subject to this rule. If therefore it is 
discovered that an enforcement agent has refused to perform in 
exchange for such corrupt gratifications, such agent should be penalized 
in accordance with the sanction.  
 
iii) Adequate financial provisions should be made to the agencies to 
facilitate performance. In line with the USA model to budgeting for their 
agencies, this study recommends that such financial budgets to be 
enacted in the Nigerian regime should be tied to strategic performance 
goals. Tying the financial resources of the agencies to the overall 
strategic plan on enforcement compels the agencies to be more effective 
and productive in their enforcement, as failure to do so apparently 
means a non-justification of the extent of financial provision tied to the 
enforcement plan.  
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Further to allocating annual budgets for the enforcement agencies, this 
study observes that the duties of the agencies are crucial in the light of 
the significant pollution occurring in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
To this effect, this study has sought other sources of funds for the 
agencies that would facilitate effectiveness in carrying out their duties.  
The study therefore recommends easy access of the enforcement 
agencies to funds provided in the Consolidation Revenue Funds (CRF).  
Section 123 of the Constitution (as amended) stipulates that the 
Nigerian government (or its component) can make withdrawal from the 
funds if there is evidence of an urgent need. Moreover, pursuant to 
Section 81 of the Constitution (as amended), the judiciary has some 
entitlement to the funds by virtue of the urgency of the nature of their 
judicial role. The study recommends that providing some entitlement to 
the agencies for the funds would reduce the hurdle of the agencies 
waiting till the end of each allocation year before they can access funds. 
This becomes limiting where there might be an immediate need to carry 
out an enforcement duty requiring funds. 
 
iv) Other environmental monitoring bodies should be established by 
legislation to monitor the performance of the enforcement agencies 
(until the laws establishing the agencies can be amended in the long 
term to include sanctions for the failure of the agencies to carry out their 
enforcement duties). The monitoring bodies should be statutorily 
empowered to conduct reviews into the agencies to make them more 
accountable in their actions and more responsive to their duties. There 
should be a sufficient measure of independence for the monitoring body 
and if possible, it should only be answerable only to the National 
Assembly (as the Nigerian National Assembly can inquire into the 
operation and propriety of all agencies and government parastatal in the 
country). The monitoring bodies must also be specialised on 
environmental matters to effectively perform the checks and balance 
role. 
 
v) Furthermore, this study observed a clear demarcation of roles between 
the enforcement agencies and the operators they regulate in the UK and 
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USA regimes. This study believes that this would have contributed to 
their ability to enforce environmental standards effectively and 
impartially in the industry. To this effect, this study recommends that 
the DPR (which is a major environmental enforcement agency in Nigeria) 
should be separated from the NNPC (which is the main Nigerian 
indigenous oil and gas corporation and in operations with the other 
multinational oil and gas companies alleged to have committed 
environmental crime) to enable them perform their enforcement role 
effectively without the bias of control from the NNPC. Moreover, the 
finance of the NOSDRA should not be tied to the Ministry of Petroleum 
but should be directly included in the National budget since NOSDRA is 
a statutorily established agency.  
 
vi) The Nigerian regime should adopt explicit mechanisms that facilitate the 
enforcement of environmental standards. The regime can adapt the 
mechanisms observed in the UK regime in the form of warning letters, 
statutory notices, guidance plans, compliance initiatives, and control 
rules. This study is of the view that where such enforcement 
mechanisms are applied, the processes of sanctioning such as 
prosecution will become more efficient. To this effect, the study 
recommends that enforcement agencies in the Nigerian regime be given 
liberty to do the same. This study does not believe that establishing such 
mechanisms will undermine the supremacy of existing laws stipulating 
the functions of the agencies but will only rather complement it.  
 
vii) As has been utilised in the UK and USA model regimes, enforcement 
agencies in the Nigerian regime should provide public access to 
enforcement regulations by setting out reports on how they have 
handled enforcement issues, their performance in implementing 
environmental standards and the extent to which individuals and 
corporations have complied with environmental standards by virtue of 
their enforcement actions. Such reports should be available on platforms 
that can easily be accessed by members of the public. This will facilitate 
public scrutiny and contribution on such relevant environmental 
subjects, invariably achieving public participation in environmental 
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matters. It will also facilitate environmental awareness of environmental 
enforcement thus reflecting the agencies as being transparent and 
accountable for their actions.  
 
viii) There should be internal distribution of tasks and sharing of data 
between enforcement agencies. 
 
ix) Novel sanctions should be established in Nigerian law to punish 
enforcement agencies and their agents that unreasonably fail to carry 
out their environmental enforcement functions. Regulations can be 
enacted compelling the agencies to carry out their role and providing a 
mechanism with which the agencies can be prosecuted for a failure to 
do so. 
 
x) Furthermore, Regulations should emphasise the need for transparency 
by enforcement authorities. Such Regulations should expand the scope 
of actions viewed by the regime as not being transparent to include all 
other actions that can incite the authority to be complicit in aiding and 
abetting environmental violations. 
 
6.1.2 Increasing the Prosecution of Environmental Offences 
This study has included this recommendation as short term considering that there 
are existing laws that have criminalised the environmental offences in the oil and 
gas industry. Moreover, the study has established the occurrences of the offences. 
Indeed, even if tough criminal sanctions were included in the laws and they were 
not implemented through prosecution of offenders, the sanctioning of offenders 
will still be incomplete. The study identified deficiencies that have limited the 
prosecution of environmental offences in the Nigerian regime. Based on these 
deficiencies and the comparative study of the UK and USA models, this study 
recommends the following factors that can be adopted to improve the current 
state of the prosecution of environmental offenders in the Nigerian regime: 
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i) Utilisation of multiple expert prosecutors to facilitate easier and broader 
prosecution of environmental offences. This ensures that it is not only 
the Attorney-General and members of his team that carry out the 
prosecution of environmental offences. There will be multiple entities 
capable of performing this function. Moreover, such entities should be 
specialised in environmental and criminal matters to effectively carry out 
this role (as can be adapted from the model of the USA regime discussed 
above). For this purpose, this study recommends that instead of creating 
new agencies empowered with this role, the role of existing enforcement 
agencies could be extended to include this important function of 
prosecution to ensure sustained enforcement on environmental criminal 
matters beginning from the investigation and detection of such 
environmental offences. 
 
ii) Adoption of environmental courts that will specifically handle 
environmental matters (including environmental criminal matters). 
First, as has been suggested in chapter 5, the Nigerian regime can adapt 
the USA approach of establishing the courts in respective states to test 
their applicability in the states and synergy with each other before 
implementing it in the country as a whole. In establishing environmental 
courts in Nigeria, consideration should be given to ensure that: 
1) The administration of the environmental courts is willing to 
incorporate the developed aspects of other model jurisdictions that 
will improve the court process as has been done by the NSWLEC 
(discussed in section 5.3.2.2 above); 
2) Judges and environmental commissioners of the courts are 
adequately trained on environmental matters and environmental 
aspects of oil and gas exploitation; 
3) Just like the NSWLEC, the environmental courts should be 
independent, comprehensive and exclusive over environmental 
matters; 
4) There should be periodic evaluation of the adequate settlement of 
environmental disputes in line with the NSWLEC model; 
5) There should be provision of an accessible online database containing 
statistics on all environmental criminal matters that have been 
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decided for reference in the deliberation of future environmental 
cases; 
6) There should be periodic review of the extent of development of the 
environmental courts and recommendations to the chief judge for 
initiatives to improve the courts; 
7) In addition to sentences of fines and imprisonment for environmental 
pollution crimes, the courts should order perpetrators of 
environmental crime to remediate the environment; 
8) There should be an adaptation of Public-interest litigation system 
from the NSWLEC regime into the Nigerian criminal legal system. 
This does not negate the role of the Attorney General and his team 
to perform their normal prosecutor duties even in this environmental 
court. Rather, the study suggests a coordinated joint effort between 
the general public and the statutory persons empowered with this 
function; 
9) The courts should utilise case management technologies just like the 
NSWLEC such as a comprehensive and current court website 
providing all necessary information for parties through electronic 
filing and processing; teleconferencing and videoconferencing for 
hearings and taking evidence; and computer data management 
systems to track the status, progress and deadlines for each case. 
 
iii) The study noted that some police officers have received financial 
donations in exchange for failing to detect third party oil sabotage 
perpetrators. In line with Section 19 of the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Act, this study recommends that police officers found to have 
failed to perform the function as a result of their corrupt practices should 
be sentenced to prison which will serve as general deterrence to other 
officers. The provision of Section 19 should be extended to other corrupt 
staff of the environmental enforcement agencies that are found guilty of 
receiving financial donations in place of performing their enforcement 
duties. 
 
iv) It is recommended that the enforcement agencies be permitted to 
prosecute environmental offences considering that they possess the 
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required environmental expertise. Hence, this study recommends an 
adaptation of the system utilised in USA regime permitting agencies to 
easily prosecute environmental crimes and on time. Based on this, the 
study recommends that the Nigerian government can appoint lawyers 
and experienced prosecutors into the agencies to provide the required 
expertise in litigation. The researcher believes that a combined team of 
environmentalists and experienced lawyers will make a qualified and 
formidable environmental criminal prosecution team. On these grounds, 
the law should extend the powers of prosecuting environmental offences 
to the enforcement agencies (as it is currently lacking under Nigerian 
law).  
 
v) This study further recommends the practical application of the existing 
mechanism under some of the statutes permitting any given Minister to 
withdraw the licence of oil and gas corporations that fail to observe the 
obligations listed on their licence as well as the statutory obligations that 
serve as standards for their operations. Although this sanction 
mechanism has been provided under relevant environmental laws in the 
regime, it has not been effectively utilised with regard to oil and gas 
pollution. To this effect, the study argues that if it is utilised to sanction 
some offending operators, the fear of losing their licence will deter other 
operators in the region from polluting. 
 
6.1.3 Providing Adequate Criminal Sanctions for Environmental 
Offenders 
Considering that this study has identified that environmental criminal sanctions in 
the Nigerian regime are either too weak to punish offenders or guarantee 
deterrence to the environmental offence or are too severe to fit the offence 
committed and guarantee rehabilitation of the environmental offender, this study 
recommends the following: 
a) Enacting environmental criminal sanctions that fit the nature of the offence 
committed and are severe enough to impact on the financial resources of 
the environmental offender so that it will deter any future commission of 
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the offence. Hence, the sanction will be severe on offenders that have 
committed major environmental offences such as the oil and gas spills 
identified in Nigeria. On the other hand, the sanction should not be so 
severe that it fails to rehabilitate the environmental offender-for example 
the long imprisonment terms and death penalty that have been utilised in 
the Nigerian regime discussed below.  
 
The nature of prison terms utilised in the USA regime as examined in the 
USA cases above can also be adapted during sentencing in Nigerian courts. 
This does not mean that the specific terms utilised in the USA regime must 
be adopted. This is because the terms applied in those USA cases are only 
right fits for the specific offences in those cases. Hence, the study 
recommends an adaptation of the UK and USA systems that scale statutory 
criminal sanctions and sentencing for environmental criminals according to 
their culpability, the extent of the offence and significance of the 
environmental offence committed. In particular, this study recommends a 
drastic increase in the nature of the fines prescribed as criminal sanctions 
in Nigeria. The adaptation of adequate sanctions into the existing statutory 
regime can be carried out by amending existing provisions to include tough 
sanctions. 
 
b) To achieve the consistent sentencing recommended above, this study 
recommends the adaptation of a Sentencing Guideline such as those utilised 
by both the UK and USA regimes. Notwithstanding the lack of prosecution 
for environmental offences in the oil and gas industry, the study insists that 
establishing such guidelines will potentially facilitate proportionality in the 
Nigerian criminal sentencing system. The study recommends that while 
formulating the guideline, the Nigerian regime should adapt characteristics 
identified in the UK and USA Guidelines such as: matching the sentence to 
the income of the offender, matching the sentence to the severity of the 
offence, matching the sentence to the culpability of the offender and 
considering the repeated nature of the offence. Considering the 
contradictions observed in some of the statutory provisions discussed in the 
Nigeria regime, this study recommends that such guidelines should be 
made in correlation to the provision of existing statutes to avoid confusion.  
   276 
 
 
6.1.4 Harmonising Complementary Laws on Environmental Subjects 
This study has established the conflict of existing laws regarding relevant 
environmental subjects in the regime such as remediation and the scope of powers 
of enforcement agencies. There should be explicit provision on what liability 
directly applies to an offender and what sanctions are specifically imposed for the 
offences. There should be clear wording as to whether intention is required to 
determine fault or not. Similarly, while this study notes the scattered provisions 
in different legislation on enforcement of the remediation standard, this study 
observed that the USA regime has rather moved towards harmonising its 
provisions into single documents providing for the sanctioning and enforcement of 
specific standards. In this light, this study recommends that the scattered 
provisions on oversight of enforcement on remediation should be gathered into 
one single document specifying which agency has an oversight. If, however, as a 
result of the diverse aspects of enforcement regarding the subject, there is need 
to split the enforcement roles on remediation, then the respective statutes should 
explicitly distinguish the role and extent of power of the agencies in the regards 
of their specific enforcement roles. Moreover, a singular plan/policy on 
remediation should be adopted to facilitate the process.  
 
6.1.5 Clarifying the Confusion of the NESREA (Establishment) Act  
This study has argued that the NESREA Act provides arguably the best 
enforcement mechanisms under the Nigerian regime at present. This study also 
noted the obvious confusion as to whether the NESREA Act deals with oil and gas 
matters or not. For this reason, the study recommends that the scope of the 
NESREA Act should be amended to explicitly cover the oil and gas industry. 
Moreover, just like most other sanctions in the regime, the criminal sanction 
provisions of the Act should be strengthened to deter environmental offenders.  
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6.1.6 Amending the PIB or Enacting New Legislation 
Indeed, the arguments in this study have pointed towards the need for new law 
or the amendment of existing law. There have been several views regarding the 
impact of the PIB on the Nigerian environmental regime. Truly, if enacted as law, 
the PIB is expected to repeal existing oil and gas laws. However, the study has 
also noted that the PIB in its current state does not proffer any solution to the 
deficiencies identified in the environmental components of such laws. Moreover, 
there is no certainty that the full contents of the PIB would eventually be passed 
into law, let alone the environmental criminal components. The study therefore, 
reiterates the need for the PIB to be disregarded as an instrument that will add 
any change in the respect of the environmental defect discussed in this study. The 
researcher recommends that the legislature should either amend the existing 
environmental laws in the regime in the light of the discussion that has been made 
in this study or enact new laws that would implement the recommendations in this 
study. The study believes that if these recommendations are incorporated into 
existing laws and systems, the regime will be more effective at ensuring 
environmental protection in the oil and gas industry. 
 
6.1.7 Commitment by the Nigerian Government 
This study has established the fact that the Nigerian government has not actively 
supported environmental regulation in their oil and gas sector. The researcher also 
argues that most of the recommendations in this study can only be effective if 
they are adopted and utilised by the Nigerian government. Hence, the study 
recommends that the government should show proof of their commitment to 
environmental issues  by adopting and ensuring the implementation of the 
recommendations set out in this section. Furthermore, relevant provisions for 
revocation of oil and gas licences (such as seen in the EGASPIN) should be utilised 
in the Nigerian regime. The Minister of Petroleum should consider this as a robust 
deterrence measure, especially for repeated offenders. This study argues that 
when a licence is withdrawn from one company, other companies will think twice 
before repeating the same violations, for fear of risking their own licence. 
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Indeed, most of the recommendations above have been derived from adopted 
aspects of the UK and USA regime combined. If the recommendations are 
implemented, they will correct most of the deficiencies associated with the 
Nigerian regime. This will not only contribute to making oil and gas industry 
participants more compliant with environmental standards, but will undoubtedly 
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